PATTERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(Criminal Cases)
Prepared by the Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions
District Judges Association Fifth Circuit
2015 Edition

For Customer Assistance Call 1-800-328-4880

Mat  #41811739

Dedication

This 2015 edition is dedicated to two jurists who have continuously served with distinction on the Fifth Circuit Committee on Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) from 1990 through 2012. Hayden Head and George P. Kazen served as co-chairs of the 2012 edition. The foundation for these proposed instructions is largely built on their intellect and dedication to the rule of law.

Introduction

The 2015 edition of the Pattern Jury Instructions (Crim- inal) continues a project initiated by the Fifth Circuit District Judges Association more than twenty years ago. It reflects a collaborative eff	of judges appointed successively by the Association to provide jury instructions accurately reflective of the criminal law and useable by our judges and practitio- ners in the trial of criminal cases before juries in this circuit. These last few years has seen a change in the type of cases being heard by the trial judges in this Circuit. Accord- ingly, the Committee has added over 35 new instructions ranging from health care fraud to hostage taking and explo- sive materials and sex traffi	The Notes have been amended in many of the proposed instructions to reflect cases that have been decided since publication of the 2012 edition.
Our research is current through June 1, 2015.
In preparing an instruction, the Committee begins where you begin, that is, with an examination of the statute and United States Supreme Court opinions, and opinions from the Fifth Circuit, interpreting the statute. Committee members submit proposed instructions, then the editorial subcommittee meets to review any proposed changes. Should you become aware of any errors or changes in caselaw that should be noted, or you would like to submit a proposed instruction for the Committee’s review, you are invited to bring those  to our  attention at Xavier_Rodriguez@txwd.uscourts.gov.
While these pattern charges do not presume to be a legal treatise, the Committee has attempted to make accurate statements of the law.
These pattern charges should be used for what they are—an aid to guide you instructing the jury on each indi- vidual case. Notes are added to identify issues, offer explana- tions, or provide legal authority.
Please note that some of the Instruction numbers have been changed since the last edition.
The Committee was able to re-enlist the excellent ser- vices of Professor Susan R. Klein. We thank Dean Ward Farnsworth from the University of Texas School of Law for

Fifth Circuit Criminal Jury Instructions

sharing her and her assistant, Cené Abroms. We acknowl- edge the special efforts of many of our clerks and office staff whose work has been significant.
Our predecessors’ work is the foundation of our efforts.
They deserve our continued thanks.

Xavier Rodriguez Chairman
District Judge, W.D. Texas
Honorable Lance M. Africk District Judge, E.D. Louisiana
Henry J. Bemporad Magistrate Judge, W.D. Texas
James J. Brady
Senior Judge, M.D. Louisiana
Nannette J. Brown
District Judge, E.D. Louisiana
Randy Crane
District Judge, S.D. Texas
Marcia A. Crone
District Judge, E.D. Texas

Kurt D. Engelhardt
District Judge, E.D. Louisiana

Professor Susan R. Klein Reporter
Univ. of Texas Law School
Andrew S. Hanen
District Judge, S.D. Texas
Harry Lee Hudspeth Senior Judge, W.D. Texas
Sim T. Lake III
District Judge, S.D. Texas
Marina Garcia Marmolejo District Judge, S.D. Texas
Alia Moses
District Judge, W.D. Texas
H.	Michael Sokolow
First Asst. Public Defender Southern District of Texas
Greg Surovic
Asst. U.S. Attorney Western District of Texas

Table of Contents
TABLE OF CONTENTS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(Criminal Cases)
I.	GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.01	Preliminary Instructions.....................................	3	
1.02	Note-Taking by Jurors ........................................	8	
1.03	Introduction to Final Instructions .....................	10	
1.04	Duty to Follow Instructions ...............................	11	
1.05	Presumption of Innocence, Burden of Proof, Reasonable Doubt ...............................................	
12	
1.06	Evidence — Excluding What is Not Evidence .	14	
1.07	Evidence — Inferences — Direct and Circum- stantial ................................................................	
16	
1.08	Credibility of Witnesses .....................................	18	
1.09	Character Evidence ............................................	20	
1.10	Impeachment by Prior Inconsistencies .............	22	
1.11	Impeachment by Prior Conviction (Defendant’s Testimony) ..........................................................	
24	
1.12	Impeachment Prior Conviction (Witness Other Than Defendant) ................................................	
25	
1.13	Impeachment by Evidence of Untruthful Char- acter .....................................................................	
26	
1.14	Accomplice — Informer — Immunity ...............	27	
1.15	Accomplice — Co-Defendant — Plea Agree- ment .....................................................................	
29	
1.16	Witness’s Use of Addictive Drugs .....................	31	
1.17	Expert Opinion Testimony ................................	32	
1.18	On or About ........................................................	33	
1.18A	Venue — Conspiracy ..........................................	34	
1.19	Caution — Consider Only Crime Charged .......	36	
1.20	Caution — Punishment .....................................	37	
1.21	Single Defendant — Multiple Counts ...............	38	
1.22	Multiple Defendants — Single Count ...............	39	
1.23	Multiple Defendants — Multiple Counts .........	40	
1.24	Duty to Deliberate ..............................................	41	
1.25	Unanimity of Theory ..........................................	43	
1.26	Confession — Statement — Voluntariness (Single Defendant) ..............................................	
45	

Fifth Circuit Criminal Jury Instructions

1.27	Confession — Statement — Voluntariness (Multiple Defendants)	46
1.28	Entrapment	48
1.29	Identification Testimony	51
1.30	Similar Acts	53
1.31	Possession	55
1.32	Attempt	57
1.33	Lesser Included Offense	59
1.34	Insanity	61
1.35	Alibi	63
1.36	Justification, Duress, or Coercion	64
1.36	A	Self-Defense — Defense of Third Person	66
1.37	‘‘Knowingly’’ — To Act	68
1.37	A	Deliberate Ignorance	69
1.38	‘‘Willfully’’ — To Act	71
1.39	Interstate Commerce — Defined	75
1.40	Foreign Commerce — Defined	76
1.41	Commerce — Defined	77
1.42	Cautionary Instruction During Trial — Tran- script of Tape Recorded Conversation	78
1.42	A	Transcript of Foreign Language — Tape Re- corded Conversation	80
1.43	Summaries and Charts not Received in Evi- dence	82
1.44	Summaries and Charts Received in Evidence .	83 1.45	Modified ‘‘Allen’’ Charge		85
II.	SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS 2.01A	8 U.S.C. §  1324(a)(1)(A)(i) - Bringing Aliens
into the United States	94
2.01B	8 U.S.C. §  1324(a)(1)(A)(ii) - Transporting Aliens into or Within the United States	96
2.1	C	8 U.S.C. §  1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) - Concealing or Harboring Aliens	98
2.02A	8 U.S.C. §  1325(a)(1) - Illegal Entry	100
2.2	B	8 U.S.C. §  1325(a)(2) - Eluding Examination
or Inspection	102
2.2	C	8 U.S.C. §  1325(a)(3) – Illegal Entry By False
or Misleading Representation	104

Table of Contents

2.03	8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) – Illegal Reentry Following Deportation    ..........................................................	
106	
2.04	18 U.S.C. § 2 - Aiding and Abetting (Agency)..	109	
2.05	18 U.S.C. § 3 - Accessory After the Fact ..........	112	
2.06	18 U.S.C. § 4 - Misprision of a Felony ..............	114	
2.07	18 U.S.C. § 111 - Assaulting a Federal
Officer    .................................................................	
116	
2.08A	18 U.S.C. § 152 (First Paragraph) - Bankruptcy: Concealment of Assets (Bank- ruptcy Proceeding Pending) ...............................	
120	
2.08B	18 U.S.C. § 152 (Fourth Paragraph) - Bankruptcy: Presenting or Using a False Claim (Bankruptcy Proceeding Pending) .........	
122	
2.09A	18 U.S.C. §  201(b)(1) - Bribing a Public Of- ficial .....................................................................	
123	
2.09B	18 U.S.C. §  201(b)(2) - Receiving Bribe by a Public Official ......................................................	
125	
2.09C	18 U.S.C. §  201(c)(1)(A) - Illegal Gratuity to a Public Official ......................................................	
127	
2.09D	18 U.S.C. §  201(c)(1)(B) - Receiving Illegal Gratuity by a Public Official ..............................	
129	
2.10	18 U.S.C. §  215(a)(1) - Bribery or Reward of a Bank Officer ........................................................	
131	
2.11	18 U.S.C. § 241 - Conspiracy to Deprive Person of Civil Rights .....................................................	
132	
2.12	18 U.S.C. § 242 - Deprivation of Civil Rights	135	
2.13	18 U.S.C. §  286 - Conspiracy to Defraud the Government With Respect to Claims ...............	
140	
2.14	18 U.S.C. §  287 - False Claims Against the Government ........................................................	
143	
2.15A	18 U.S.C. §  371 - Conspiracy to Commit Of- fense ....................................................................	
145	
2.15B	18 U.S.C. §  371 (Second Clause) - Conspiracy to Defraud ...........................................................	
148	
2.16	Multiple Conspiracies ........................................	151	
2.17	Conspirator’s Liability For Substantive
Count ..................................................................	
153	
2.18	Conspiracy — Withdrawal .................................	155	
2.19	18 U.S.C. § 471 - Counterfeiting ......................	158	
2.20	18 U.S.C. §  472 - Passing Counterfeit Securi- ties or Obligations ..............................................	
160	

Fifth Circuit Criminal Jury Instructions

2.21A	18 U.S.C. §  495 (First Paragraph) - Forgery Against the United States .................................	
162	
2.21B	18 U.S.C. § 495 (Second Paragraph) - Uttering a Forged Writing to Defraud the United States  .................................................................	
163	
2.22A	18 U.S.C. § 510(a)(1) - Forging Endorsement on a Treasury Check, Bond, or Security of the United States ......................................................	
164	
2.22B	18 U.S.C. § 510(a)(2) - Uttering a Forged Trea- sury Check, Bond, or Security of the United States ...................................................................	
166	
2.23A	18 U.S.C. §  513(a) - Securities of the States and Private Entities ...........................................	
168	
2.23B	18 U.S.C. §  513(b) – Securities of the States and Private Entities ...........................................	
170	
2.24A	18 U.S.C. § 545 - Smuggling  ............................	172	
2.24B	18 U.S.C. §  545 (Second Paragraph) - Illegal Importation of Merchandise ..............................	
174	
2.25	18 U.S.C. §  553(a)(1) (First Paragraph) - Exportation of Stolen Vehicles ..........................	
176	
2.26	18 U.S.C. §  554 – Smuggling Goods from the United States ......................................................	
178	
2.27	18 U.S.C. §  641 (First Paragraph) - Theft of Government Money or Property ........................	
180	
2.28	18 U.S.C. §  656 - Theft or Embezzlement by Bank Officer or Employee ..................................	
183	
2.29	18 U.S.C. § 657 - Theft From Lending, Credit, and Insurance Institutions ................................	
186	
2.30A	18 U.S.C. § 659 (First Paragraph) - Theft From Interstate Shipment ...........................................	
189	
2.30B	18 U.S.C. § 659 (Second Paragraph) - Buying or Receiving Goods Stolen From Interstate Shipment .............................................................	
192	
2.31	18 U.S.C. §  661 – Theft Within Special Mari- time and Territorial Jurisdiction .......................	
195	
2.32	18 U.S.C. §  664 – Theft or Embezzlement From Employee Benefit Plan..............................	
197	
2.33A	18 U.S.C. §  666(a)(1)(A) - Theft Concerning Programs Receiving Federal Funds ..................	
199	
2.33B	18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) - Bribery Concerning Programs Receiving Federal Funds (Soliciting a Bribe) ................................................................	
205	

Table of Contents

2.33C	18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) - Bribery Concerning Programs Receiving Federal Funds (Offering a Bribe) ...................................................................	

209	
2.34	18 U.S.C. § 751(a) - Escape ..............................	212	
2.35	18 U.S.C. § 752(a) - Aiding Escape ..................	214	
2.36A	18 U.S.C. §  842(a)(1) – Dealing in Explosive Materials Without License..................................	
216	
2.36B	18 U.S.C. §  842(a)(2) – False Statements in Connection With Explosive Materials ..............	
218	
2.36C	18 U.S.C. §  842(d) – Unlawful Distribution of Explosive Materials .............................................	
220	
2.36D	18 U.S.C. § 842(i)(1) – Possession of Explosives by a Prohibited Person........................................	
222	
2.37	18 U.S.C. § 844(i) – Arson of Property Used in Interstate Commerce or Used in an Activity Affecting Interstate Commerce...........................	
224	
2.38	18 U.S.C. §  871 - Threats Against the Presi- dent ......................................................................	
227	
2.39	18 U.S.C. §  875(b) - Interstate Transmission of Extortionate Communication ........................	
229	
2.40	18 U.S.C. § 876(b) - Mailing Threatening Com- munications .........................................................	
231	
2.41	18 U.S.C. § 911 - Misrepresentation of Citizen- ship ......................................................................	
233	
2.42	18 U.S.C. § 912 - False Impersonation of Federal Officer or Employee — Demanding or Obtaining Anything of Value ............................	
234	
2.43A	18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) - Dealing in Firearms Without License ..................................................	
236	
2.43B	18 U.S.C. §  922(a)(6) - False Statement to Firearms Dealer .................................................	
238	
2.43C	18 U.S.C. §  922(d) - Unlawful Sale or Disposi- tion of Firearm or Ammunition .........................	
240	
2.43D	18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) - Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon ..........................................	
242	
2.44	18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) - Using/Carrying a Firearm During Commission of a Drug Traf- ficking Crime or Crime of Violence ...................	
245	
2.45	18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(2) and (a)(3) - False State- ments to Federal Agencies and Agents ............	
250	
2.46	18 U.S.C. §  1005 (Third Paragraph) - False Statements in Bank Records .............................	
253	

Fifth Circuit Criminal Jury Instructions

2.47	18 U.S.C. § 1014 - False Statement to a
Bank ...................................................................	
255	
2.48A	18 U.S.C. §  1028(a)(1) - Production of False Document ............................................................	
258	
2.48B	18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4) - Possession of False Document with Intent to Defraud United States ...................................................................	
262	
2.49A	18 U.S.C. §  1029(a)(2) - Use of Unauthorized Access Device ......................................................	
265	
2.49B	18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3) – Possession of Counter- feit or Unauthorized Access Devices..................	
268	
2.50	18 U.S.C. §  1035 – False Statements Relating To Health Care Matters .....................................	
271	
2.51	18 U.S.C. §  1084 – Transmission of Wagering Information .........................................................	
274	
2.52A	18 U.S.C. § 1111 – Murder (First Degree) ......	276	
2.52B	18 U.S.C. § 1111 – Murder (Second Degree) ...	279	
2.53	18 U.S.C. § 1112 – Voluntary Manslaughter	281	
2.54	18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) – Kidnapping ...............	283	
2.55	18 U.S.C. § 1203 – Hostage Taking .................	286	
2.56	18 U.S.C. §  1341 – Mail Fraud; Money / Prop- erty or Honest Services ......................................	
289	
2.57	18 U.S.C. § 1343 – Wire Fraud; Money / Prop- erty or Honest Services ......................................	
294	
2.58A	18 U.S.C. § 1344(1) – Bank Fraud ...................	298	
2.58B	18 U.S.C. § 1344(2) – Bank Fraud ...................	303	
2.59	18 U.S.C. § 1347(a) – Health Care Fraud .......	307	
2.60	18 U.S.C. § 1461 – Mailing Obscene Material .	312	
2.61	18 U.S.C. §  1462 – Interstate Transportation of Obscene Material (by Common Carrier) ......	
316	
2.62	18 U.S.C. § 1465 – Interstate Transportation of Obscene Material (for Purposes of Sale or Distribution) .......................................................	
318	
2.63A	18 U.S.C. §  1503(a) – Corruptly Obstructing Administration of Justice ..................................	
320	
2.63B	18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) – Obstructing Administra- tion of Justice by Threats or Force ....................	
323	
2.63C	18 U.S.C. §  1503(a) – Corruptly Influencing a Juror ....................................................................	
325	
2.64	18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1) – Intimidation to Influ- ence Testimony ...................................................	
327	

Table of Contents

2.65	18 U.S.C. § 1519 – Destroying, Altering, or Falsifying a Document in a Federal Investiga- tion .......................................................................	

330	
2.66	18 U.S.C. § 1544 (First and Second Paragraph)
– Misuse of A Passport ......................................	
333	
2.67A	18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (First Paragraph, First Clause) –Counterfeiting Immigration Docu- ments ...................................................................	
335	
2.67B	18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (First Paragraph, Second Clause) – Use or Possession of Fraudulent Im- migration Documents .........................................	
337	
2.67C	18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (Fourth Paragraph) – False Statements in Connection with Immigra- tion Documents ...................................................	
339	
2.68	18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) – Sex Trafficking .........	341	
2.69	18 U.S.C. §  1623 – False Declaration Before Grand Jury or Court ..........................................	
344	
2.70A	18 U.S.C. §  1708 (First Paragraph) – Theft of Mail Matter .........................................................	
347	
2.70B	18 U.S.C. §  1708 (Third Paragraph) – Posses- sion of Stolen Mail .............................................	
349	
2.71	18 U.S.C. §  1709 – Embezzlement / Theft of Mail Matter by Postal Service Employee .........	
351	
2.72A	18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(1) – Providing Contraband in Prison ..............................................................	
353	
2.72B	18 U.S.C. §  1791(a)(2) – Possessing Contra- band in Prison ....................................................	
355	
2.73A	18 U.S.C. §  1951(a) – Extortion by Force, Violence, or Fear ................................................	
356	
2.73B	18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) – Extortion under Color of Official Right .......................................................	
359	
2.74	18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) – Interstate and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeer- ing Enterprises ...................................................	
362	
2.75	18 U.S.C. § 1955 – Illegal Gambling
Business .............................................................	
365	
2.76A	18	U.S.C.	§§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i)	and 
1956(a)(1)(B)(i) – Laundering of Monetary Instruments – Proceeds of
Unlawful Activity ..............................................	

369	

Fifth Circuit Criminal Jury Instructions

2.76B	18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(3)(A) and 1956(a)(3)(B) –
Laundering of Monetary Instruments – Prop- erty Represented to be Proceeds of Unlawful Activity ................................................................	

375	
2.77	18 U.S.C. § 1957 – Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived from Speci- fied Unlawful Activity ........................................	
379	
2.78	18 U.S.C. § 1959(a) – Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering .......................................................	
382	
2.79	18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) - Racketeer Influenced Cor- rupt Organizations ..............................................	
388	
2.80A	18 U.S.C. § § 2113(a) and (d) – Bank
Robbery ..............................................................	
393	
2.80B	18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) – Bank Theft ....................	397	
2.81	18 U.S.C. § 2119 – Carjacking .........................	400	
2.82A	18 U.S.C. §  2242(1) – Sexual Abuse – Threats or Fear .................................................................	
403	
2.82B	18 U.S.C. §  2242(2) – Sexual Abuse – Victim Incapable .............................................................	
405	
2.82C	18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) – Sexual Abuse of a Minor ..................................................................	
407	
2.82D	18 U.S.C. § 2243(b) – Sexual Abuse of a
Ward ...................................................................	
409	
2.83	18 U.S.C. §  2250 – Failure to Register as Sex Offender    ...............................................................	
411	
2.84	18 U.S.C. §  2251(a) – Sexual Exploitation of Children – Producing Child Pornography ........	
413	
2.85A	18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) – Sexual Exploitation of Children – Receiving and Distributing Mate- rial Involving Sexual Exploitation of Minors ...	
417	
2.85B	18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) – Sexual Exploita- tion of Children – Possession of Child Pornog- raphy ...................................................................	
422	
2.85C	18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) – Sexual Exploitation of Children – Transporting or Shipping of Child Pornography (Visual Depiction of Actual Minor) ..................................................................	

426	
2.85D	18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A) – Sexual Exploita- tion Of Children – Receiving or Distributing Child Pornography (Visual Depiction of Actual Minor) ..................................................................	

430	

Table of Contents

2.85E	18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B) – Sexual Exploita- tion of Children – Receiving or Distributing Material that Contains Child Pornography .....	

434	
2.85F	18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) – Sexual Exploita- tion of Children – Possessing or Accessing Child Pornography (Visual Depiction of an Actual Minor) ......................................................	

437	
2.86	18 U.S.C. §  2312 – Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Motor Vehicle, Vessel, or Aircraft ..	
441	
2.87	18 U.S.C. §  2313 – Receipt of a Stolen Motor Vehicle, Vessel, or Aircraft ................................	
443	
2.88	18 U.S.C. §  2314 (First Paragraph) – Inter- state Transportation of Stolen Property ...........	
445	
2.89	18 U.S.C. §  2315 (First Paragraph) – Receipt, Possession or Sale of Stolen Property ...............	
448	
2.90A	18 U.S.C. §  2320(a)(1) – Trafficking in Coun- terfeit Goods or Services ....................................	
451	
2.90B	18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(2) – Trafficking in Goods or Services Bearing a Counterfeit Mark Likely to Cause Confusion, Mistake, or Deception .....	
453	
2.90C	18 U.S.C. §  2320(a)(3) – Trafficking in Coun- terfeit Military Goods or Services .....................	
455	
2.90D	18 U.S.C. §  2320(a)(4) – Trafficking in Coun- terfeit Drugs .......................................................	
457	
2.91	18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) – Enticement of a
Minor ...................................................................	
459	
2.92	18 U.S.C. § 3146 – Failure to Appear ..............	462	
2.93	21 U.S.C. §  841(a)(1) – Controlled Substances
– Possession With Intent to Distribute ............	
464	
2.94	21 U.S.C. §  843(b) – Unlawful Use of Com- munication Facility ............................................	
468	
2.95	21 U.S.C. §  846 – Controlled Substances – Conspiracy ...........................................................	
470	
2.96	21 U.S.C. § 848 – Continuing Criminal Enter- prise .....................................................................	
475	
2.97	21 U.S.C. §  856(a)(1) – Controlled Substances
– Manufacturing Operations .............................	
479	
2.98	21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960(a)(1) – Controlled Substances – Unlawful Importation .................	
481	
2.99	22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) – Exporting Arms Without a License .............................................................	
484	
2.100	26 U.S.C §  5861(d) – Receiving or Possessing Unregistered Firearms .......................................	
486	

Fifth Circuit Criminal Jury Instructions

2.101
2.102A	26 U.S.C. § 7201 – Tax Evasion .......................
26 U.S.C. §  7206(1) – False Statements on	488	
	Income Tax Return .............................................	491	
2.102B	26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) – Aiding or Assisting in Preparation of False Documents Under Inter- nal Revenue Laws ..............................................	
494	
2.103	31 U.S.C. §  5316(a)(1) – Reports on Exporting and Importing Monetary Instruments ..............	
496	
2.104	31 U.S.C. §  5324(a)(3) – Structuring Transac- tions To Evade Reporting Requirements ..........	
498	
2.105	31 U.S.C. 5332(a) – Bulk Cash Smuggling into or out of the United States ................................	
501	

PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(Criminal Cases)

I.	GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.1	Preliminary Instructions
1.2	Note-Taking by Jurors (Optional Addition to Preliminary Instruction)
1.3	Introduction to Final Instructions
1.4	Duty to Follow Instructions
1.5	Presumption of Innocence, Burden of Proof, Reasonable Doubt
1.6	Evidence—Excluding What is Not Evidence
1.7	Evidence—Inferences—Direct and Circumstantial
1.8	Credibility of Witnesses
1.9	Character Evidence
1.10	Impeachment by Prior Inconsistencies
1.11	Impeachment by Prior Conviction (Defendant's Testimony)
1.12	Impeachment by Prior Conviction (Witness Other Than Defendant)
1.13	Impeachment by Evidence of Untruthful Character
1.14	Accomplice—Informer—Immunity
1.15	Accomplice—Co-Defendant—Plea Agreement
1.16	Witness's Use of Addictive Drugs
1.17	Expert Opinion Testimony
1.18	On or About
1.18	A	Venue—Conspiracy
1.19	Caution—Consider Only Crime Charged
1.20	Caution—Punishment
1.21	Single Defendant—Multiple Counts
1.18	

PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS

1.22	Multiple Defendants—Single Count
1.23	Multiple Defendants—Multiple Counts
1.24	Duty to Deliberate
1.25	Unanimity of Theory
1.26	Confession—Statement—Voluntariness (Single Defendant)
1.27	Confession—Statement—Voluntariness    (Multiple Defendants)
1.28	Entrapment
1.29	Identification Testimony
1.30	Similar Acts
1.31	Possession
1.32	Attempt
1.33	Lesser Included Offense
1.34	Insanity
1.35	Alibi
1.36	Justification, Duress, or Coercion 1.36A	Self-Defense—Defense of Third Person
1.37	“Knowingly”—To Act 1.37A	Deliberate Ignorance
1.38	“Willfully”—To Act
1.39	Interstate Commerce—Defined
1.40	Foreign Commerce—Defined
1.41	Commerce—Defined
1.42	Cautionary Instruction During Trial—Transcript of Tape Recorded Conversation
1.42	A	Transcript of Foreign Language—Tape Recorded Conversation
1.43	Summaries and Charts not Received in Evidence
1.44	Summaries and Charts Received in Evidence
1.45	Modified “Allen” Charge
1.42	

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.01

PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

Members of the Jury:

1.01

Now that you have been sworn, I will give you some preliminary instructions to guide you in your participa- tion in the trial.

Duty of the jury:

It will be your duty to find from the evidence what the facts are. You and you alone will be the judges of the facts. You will then have to apply to those facts the law as the court will give it to you. You must follow that law whether you agree with it or not.

Nothing the court may say or do during the course of the trial is intended to indicate, or should be taken by you as indicating, what your verdict should be.

Evidence:

The evidence from which you will find the facts will consist of the testimony of witnesses, documents and other items received into the record as exhibits, and any facts that the lawyers agree to or stipulate to or that the court may instruct you to find.

Certain things are not evidence and must not be considered by you. I will list them for you now.

1.	Statements, arguments, and questions by lawyers are not evidence.

2.	Objections to questions are not evidence. Lawyers have an obligation to their clients to make objections when they believe evidence being offered is improper under the rules of evidence. You should not be influenced by the objection or by the court's ruling
1.	

1.01	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
on it. If the objection is sustained, ignore the question. If it is overruled, treat the answer like any other. If you are instructed that some item of evidence is received for a limited purpose only, you must follow that instruction.

3.	Testimony that the court has excluded or told you to disregard is not evidence and must not be considered.

4.	Anything you may have seen, heard, or read outside the courtroom is not evidence and must be disregarded. You are to decide the case solely on the ev- idence presented here in the courtroom.

There are two kinds of evidence: direct and circumstantial. Direct evidence is direct proof of a fact, such as testimony of an eyewitness. Circumstantial evi- dence is proof of facts from which you may infer or conclude that other facts exist. I will give you further instructions on these as well as other matters at the end of the case, but keep in mind that you may consider both kinds of evidence.

It will be up to you to decide which witnesses to believe, which witnesses not to believe, and how much of any witness's testimony to accept or reject. I will give you some guidelines for determining the credibility of witnesses at the end of the case.

Rules for criminal cases:

As you know, this is a criminal case. There are three basic rules about a criminal case that you must keep in mind.

First: the defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The indictment brought by the govern- ment against the defendant is only an accusation, noth-

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.01

ing more. It is not proof of guilt or anything else. The defendant therefore starts out with a clean slate.

Second: the burden of proof is on the government until the very end of the case. The defendant has no burden to prove his or her innocence, or to present any evidence, or to testify. Since the defendant has the right to remain silent, the law prohibits you from arriving at your verdict by considering that the defendant may not have testified.

Third: the government must prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. I will give you further instructions on this point later, but bear in mind that in this respect a criminal case is different from a civil case.

Summary of applicable law:

In this case the defendant is charged with —————. I will give you detailed instructions on the law at the end of the case, and those instructions will control your deliberations and decision. But in order to help you fol- low the evidence, I will now give you a brief summary of the elements of the offense that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt to make its case. [Summarize the elements of the offense.]

Conduct of the jury:

Now, a few words about your conduct as jurors.

During the course of the trial, do not speak with any witness, or with the defendant, or with any of the lawyers in the case. Please do not talk with them about any subject at all. You may be unaware of the identity of everyone connected with the case. Therefore, in order to avoid even the appearance of impropriety, do not engage in any conversation with anyone in or about the courtroom or courthouse. It is best that you remain in

1.1	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
the jury room during breaks in the trial and do not lin- ger in the hall. In addition, during the course of the trial, do not talk about the trial with anyone else—not your family, not your friends, not the people with whom you work. Also, do not discuss this case among your- selves until I have instructed you on the law and you have gone to the jury room to make your decision at the end of the trial. Otherwise, without realizing it, you may start forming opinions before the trial is over. It is important that you wait until all the evidence is received and you have heard my instructions on rules of law before you deliberate among yourselves.

You, as jurors, must decide this case based solely on the evidence presented here within the four walls of this courtroom. This means that during the trial you must not conduct any independent research about this case, the matters in this case, and the individuals or corporations involved in the case. In other words, you should not consult dictionaries or reference materials, search the Internet, websites, or blogs, or use any other electronic tools to obtain information about this case or to help you decide the case. Please do not try to find out information from any source outside the confines of this courtroom.

I know that many of you use cell phones, the Internet, and other tools of technology. You also must not talk to anyone at any time about this case or use these tools to communicate electronically with anyone about the case. This includes your family and friends. You may not communicate with anyone about the case through any means, including your cell phone, through e-mail, Blackberry, iPhone, text messaging, or on Snapchat or Twitter, or through any blog or website, including Facebook, Google+, MySpace, LinkedIn, or YouTube. You may not use any similar technology of social media, even if I have not specifically mentioned it here. I expect you will inform me as soon as you become

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.01

aware of another juror's violation of these instructions. A juror who violates these restrictions jeopardizes the fairness of these proceedings, and a mistrial could result, which would require the entire trial process to start over.

Course of the trial:

I will now give you a roadmap to help you follow what will happen over the entire course of this trial. First, the government will make an opening statement, which is simply an outline to help you understand the evidence as it is admitted. Next, the defendant's at- torney may, but does not have to, make an opening statement. Opening statements are neither evidence nor arguments.

The government will then present its witnesses, and counsel for the defendant may cross-examine them. Following the government's case, the defendant may, if he wishes, present witnesses whom the government may cross-examine. If the defendant decides to present evidence, the government may introduce rebuttal evidence.

After all the evidence is in, the attorneys will pres- ent their closing arguments to summarize and interpret the evidence for you, and the court will instruct you on the law. After that, you will retire to deliberate on your verdict.

The trial will now begin.
Note

This instruction is largely based on the Federal Judicial Center's Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges (6th ed. 2013).

1.2	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.02

NOTE-TAKING BY JURORS (OPTIONAL ADDITION TO PRELIMINARY
INSTRUCTION)

ALTERNATIVE A

You may not take notes during the course of the trial. There are several reasons for this. It is difficult to take notes and, at the same time, pay attention to what a witness is saying. Furthermore, in a group the size of yours, certain persons will take better notes than oth- ers, and there is the risk that the jurors who do not take good notes will depend upon the jurors who do take good notes. The jury system depends upon all jurors paying close attention and arriving at a unani- mous decision. I believe that the jury system works bet- ter when the jurors do not take notes.

You will note that we do have an offi court reporter making a record of the trial; however, we will not have typewritten transcripts of this record avail- able for your use in reaching a decision in this case.

ALTERNATIVE B

If you would like to take notes during the trial, you may do so. On the other hand, you are not required to take notes if you prefer not to do so. Each of you should make your own decision about this.

If you decide to take notes, be careful not to get so involved in the note-taking that you become distracted from the ongoing proceedings. Your notes should be used only as memory aids. You should not give your notes precedence over your independent recollection of the evidence. If you do not take notes, you should rely upon your own independent recollection of the proceed-

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.02

ings and you should not be unduly infl	by the notes of other jurors.

Notes are not entitled to any greater weight than the memory or impression of each juror as to what the testimony may have been. Whether you take notes or not, each of you must form and express your own opinion as to the facts of the case.

You will note that we do have an offi court reporter making a record of the trial; however, we will not have typewritten transcripts of this record avail- able for your use in reaching a decision in this case.
Note

Whether jurors take notes is a matter of discretion with the trial judge. See Fortenberry v. Maggio, 664 F.2d 1288, 1292 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Rhodes, 631 F.2d 43, 45–46 (5th Cir.
1980); see also United States v. Aguilar, 242 F. App'x 239, 248 (5th Cir. 2007). Note-taking could diminish potential prejudice to indi- vidual defendants in a joint trial. See United States v. Posada- Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 863 (5th Cir. 1998).

1.3	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.03

INTRODUCTION TO FINAL INSTRUCTIONS

Members of the Jury:

In any jury trial there are, in effect, two judges. I am one of the judges; the other is the jury. It is my duty to preside over the trial and to decide what evi- dence is proper for your consideration. It is also my duty at the end of the trial to explain to you the rules of law that you must follow and apply in arriving at your verdict.

First, I will give you some general instructions which apply in every case, for example, instructions about burden of proof and how to judge the believability of witnesses. Then I will give you some specific rules of law about this particular case, and finally I will explain to you the procedures you should follow in your deliberations.

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.04

DUTY TO FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS

1.04

You, as jurors, are the judges of the facts. But in determining what actually happened—that is, in reach- ing your decision as to the facts—it is your sworn duty to follow all of the rules of law as I explain them to you.

You have no right to disregard or give special at- tention to any one instruction, or to question the wisdom or correctness of any rule I may state to you. You must not substitute or follow your own notion or opinion as to what the law is or ought to be. It is your duty to apply the law as I explain it to you, regardless of the consequences.

It is also your duty to base your verdict solely upon the evidence, without prejudice or sympathy. That was the promise you made and the oath you took before be- ing accepted by the parties as jurors, and they have the right to expect nothing less.
Note

See United States v. Smith, 296 F.3d 344, 348 n.2 (5th Cir. 2002) (approving trial judge's jury charge that: “[I]t is your sworn duty to follow all the rules of law as I explain them to you”); United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 580–81 (5th Cir. 2000) (no plain error in instructing jury, pursuant to Instruction No. 1.04, that: “[I]t is also your duty to base your verdict solely upon the evi- dence, without prejudice or sympathy”); see also United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2315 (1995) (“[T]he judge must be permit- ted to instruct the jury on the law and to insist that the jury follow his instructions.”); United States v. Wofford, 560 F.3d 341, 352 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Gaudin for the same premise).

1.5	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.05

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE, BURDEN OF PROOF, REASONABLE DOUBT

The indictment or formal charge against a defen- dant is not evidence of guilt. Indeed, the defendant is presumed by the law to be innocent. The defendant begins with a clean slate. The law does not require a defendant to prove his innocence or produce any evi- dence at all [and no inference whatever may be drawn from the election of a defendant not to testify].

The government has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and if it fails to do so, you must acquit the defendant. While the government's burden of proof is a strict or heavy burden, it is not necessary that the defendant's guilt be proved beyond all possible doubt. It is only required that the government's proof exclude any “reasonable doubt” concerning the defendant's guilt.

A “reasonable doubt” is a doubt based upon reason and common sense after careful and impartial consider- ation of all the evidence in the case. Proof beyond a rea- sonable doubt, therefore, is proof of such a convincing character that you would be willing to rely and act upon it without hesitation in making the most important de- cisions of your own affairs.
Note
Delete bracketed material if defendant testifies.

An instruction on the presumption of innocence protects “the accused's constitutional right to be judged solely on the basis of proof adduced at trial.” Taylor v. Kentucky, 98 S. Ct. 1930, 1935 (1978). But “failure to give a requested instruction on the presump- tion of innocence does not in and of itself violate the Constitution.” Kentucky v. Whorton, 99 S. Ct. 2088, 2090 (1979). Yet, while fail- ure to instruct on the presumption of innocence may be harmless error, failure to instruct a jury on the reasonable doubt standard is

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.05

not susceptible to the harmless error analysis. See Arizona v. Fulmi- nante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1255 (1991).

To comply with due process, it must be proven that the defendant committed each element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct. 2078, 2080–83 (1993); In re Winship, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970); see also United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2012). However, there is not a specific definition of reasonable doubt that must be used as long as the concept is correctly conveyed to the jury. See Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. 1239, 1242 (1994); Holland v. United States,
75 S. Ct. 127, 138 (1954).

Additional “clean slate” language has been added. See United States v. Walker, 861 F.2d 810, 811, 813–14 (5th Cir. 1988) (panel recommended additional “clean slate” language in order to “absolutely assure the jurors' understanding”). The Fifth Circuit has approved this instruction without the added “clean slate” language. See United States v. Creech, 408 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 128 n.1 (5th Cir.
1994); United States v. Castro, 874 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Stewart, 879 F.2d 1268, 1271 (5th Cir. 1989); see also United States v. Arceneaux, 432 F. App'x 335, 338 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. MacHauer, 403 F. App'x 967 (5th Cir. 2010).

A panel of the Fifth Circuit has also commented, in dicta, on instructing the jury on the government's burden of proof within this instruction. See Williams, 20 F.3d at 129 n.2, 132 n.5 (prefer- ring the Federal Judicial Center's instruction contrasting reason- able doubt and preponderance of the evidence); United States v. Shaw, 894 F.2d 689, 692–93 (5th Cir. 1990) (Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction on the presumption of innocence and the government's burden of proof was adequate, but the instruction set forth in Walker, 861 F.2d at 811, 813, is preferable).

Although not automatic error, note that definitions of reason- able doubt that include the phrases “actual substantial doubt,” “moral certainty,” or “grave uncertainty”—without further explana- tion or instruction—may violate due process, depending on the understanding of the jury. See Victor, 114 S. Ct. at 1245–47; Cage v. Louisiana, 111 S. Ct. 328, 329–30 (1990); Morris v. Cain, 186
F.3d 581, 584–89 (5th Cir. 1999).

1.6	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.06

EVIDENCE—EXCLUDING WHAT IS NOT EVIDENCE

As I told you earlier, it is your duty to determine the facts. To do so, you must consider only the evidence presented during the trial. Evidence is the sworn testimony of the witnesses, including stipulations, and the exhibits. The questions, statements, objections, and arguments made by the lawyers are not evidence.

The function of the lawyers is to point out those things that are most significant or most helpful to their side of the case, and in so doing to call your attention to certain facts or inferences that might otherwise escape your notice. In the fi analysis, however, it is your own recollection and interpretation of the evidence that controls in the case. What the lawyers say is not bind- ing upon you.

During the trial I sustained objections to certain questions and exhibits. You must disregard those ques- tions and exhibits entirely. Do not speculate as to what the witness would have said if permitted to answer the question or as to the contents of an exhibit. Also, certain testimony or other evidence has been ordered removed from the record and you have been instructed to disre- gard this evidence. Do not consider any testimony or other evidence which has been removed from your consideration in reaching your decision. Your verdict must be based solely on the legally admissible evidence and testimony.

Also, do not assume from anything I may have done or said during the trial that I have any opinion concern- ing any of the issues in this case. Except for the instruc- tions to you on the law, you should disregard anything I may have said during the trial in arriving at your own verdict.

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

Note

1.06

While this instruction is appropriate as a final instruction on evidence, reliance solely on it to cure prejudicial comments, ques- tions, or arguments during trial may be insufficient in some cases, depending on several factors, and stronger cautionary instructions should be given to the jury during trial to ameliorate prejudice to the defendant in those cases. See United States v. Rodriguez-Lopez, 756 F.3d 422, 433–34 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Aguilar, 645
F.3d 319, 326–27 (5th Cir. 2011) (looking at three factors: (1) the magnitude of the prejudice, (2) the eff of cautionary instruc- tions, and (3) the inculpatory evidence).

United States v. McCann, 613 F.3d 486, 496–98 (5th Cir. 2010) (generic instruction and little inculpatory evidence); United States
v. Gracia, 522 F.3d 597, 604 (5th Cir. 2008) (generic instruction did not cure, only moderately reduced, the prejudicial taint of improper statements); United States v. Thompson, 482 F.3d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 2007) (repeated instruction that prosecutor's putatively improper statements were not evidence was sufficient to eliminate any unfair prejudice); United States v. Ramirez- Velasquez, 322 F.3d 868, 873 n.4 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Rocha, 916 F.2d 219, 235 (5th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. McClatchy, 249 F.3d 348, 358 (5th Cir. 2001) (curative instruction regarding trial judge's comment); United States v. Inocencio, 40 F.3d 716, 728–29 (5th Cir. 1994). The trial judge may choose not to give a stronger instruction when “a specifi curative instruction [would be] inappropriate because it would merely call further at- tention to [an improper comment that was only slightly prejudi- cial], and thus be more harmful than the original comment.” United States v. Thomas, 548 F. App'x 987, 990 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Paul, 142 F.3d 836, 844 (5th Cir. 1998)).

1.7	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.07

EVIDENCE—INFERENCES—DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL

ALTERNATIVE A

In considering the evidence, you are permitted to draw such reasonable inferences from the testimony and exhibits as you feel are justified in the light of com- mon experience. In other words, you may make deduc- tions and reach conclusions that reason and common sense lead you to draw from the facts which have been established by the evidence.

Do not be concerned about whether evidence is “direct evidence” or “circumstantial evidence.” You should consider and weigh all of the evidence that was presented to you.

The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. But the law requires that you, after weighing all of the evi- dence, whether direct or circumstantial, be convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt before you can find him guilty.

ALTERNATIVE B

In considering the evidence, you are permitted to draw such reasonable inferences from the testimony and exhibits as you feel are justified in the light of com- mon experience. In other words, you may make deduc- tions and reach conclusions that reason and common sense lead you to draw from the facts which have been established by the evidence.

Do not be concerned about whether evidence is “direct evidence” or “circumstantial evidence.” You

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.07

should consider and weigh all of the evidence that was presented to you.

“Direct evidence” is the testimony of one who as- serts actual knowledge of a fact, such as an eye witness. “Circumstantial evidence” is proof of a chain of events and circumstances indicating that something is or is not a fact.

The law makes no distinction between the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. But the law requires that you, after weighing all of the evi- dence, whether direct or circumstantial, be convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt before you can find him guilty.
Note

Alternative B is provided for judges who prefer to explain the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.

A similar instruction was approved in United States v. Clark, 506 F.2d 416 (5th Cir. 1975) (“The law makes no distinction be- tween the weight to be given either direct or circumstantial evidence. But the law requires that the jury, after weighing all of the evidence, whether direct or circumstantial, must be convinced of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt before he can be convicted.”). See also United States v. Thomas, 627 F.3d 146, 155 (5th Cir. 2010).

“The government may prove its case by direct or circumstantial evidence, and the jury is free to choose among reasonable construc- tions of the evidence.” United States v. Porras-Burciaga, 450 F. App'x 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 2007)). After a correct instruction is given on reasonable doubt, “the amplifi	of the charge to discuss circumstantial evidence [is] within the discretion of the court.” Clark, 506 F.2d at 418. Yet, further instruction beyond that in Clark “may [be] confusing and incorrect.” Id.; see also United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804, 823 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Ransom, 515 F.2d 885, 890 (5th Cir. 1975).

1.8	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.08

CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES

I remind you that it is your job to decide whether the government has proved the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. In doing so, you must consider all of the evidence. This does not mean, however, that you must accept all of the evidence as true or accurate.

You are the sole judges of the credibility or “believ- ability” of each witness and the weight to be given to the witness's testimony. An important part of your job will be making judgments about the testimony of the witnesses [including the defendant] who testifi in this case. You should decide whether you believe all, some part, or none of what each person had to say, and how important that testimony was. In making that de- cision I suggest that you ask yourself a few questions: Did the witness impress you as honest? Did the witness have any particular reason not to tell the truth? Did the witness have a personal interest in the outcome of the case? Did the witness have any relationship with either the government or the defense? Did the witness seem to have a good memory? Did the witness clearly see or hear the things about which he testified? Did the witness have the opportunity and ability to understand the questions clearly and answer them directly? Did the witness's testimony diff from the testimony of other witnesses? These are a few of the considerations that will help you determine the accuracy of what each witness said.

[The testimony of the defendant should be weighed and his credibility evaluated in the same way as that of any other witness.]

Your job is to think about the testimony of each witness you have heard and decide how much you

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.08

believe of what each witness had to say. In making up your mind and reaching a verdict, do not make any de- cisions simply because there were more witnesses on one side than on the other. Do not reach a conclusion on a particular point just because there were more wit- nesses testifying for one side on that point. You will always bear in mind that the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of call- ing any witnesses or producing any evidence.
Note

The language in brackets should be deleted if the defendant did not testify.

“Our legal system [ ] is built on the premise that it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of competing witnesses.” Kansas v. Ventris, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1847 n.* (2009); see
United States v. Bailey, 100 S. Ct. 624, 637 (1980) (“[A] defendant is entitled to have the credibility of his testimony, or that of wit- nesses called on his behalf, judged by the jury.”); United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 491 (5th Cir. 2011) (the Confrontation Clause requires “that defense counsel be permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reli- ability of the witness”) (citations omitted); see also United States v. Guanespen-Portillo, 514 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2008) (standard jury instruction on the credibility of witnesses reduced potential prejudice in failure to give other instructions); United States v. Munoz-Hernandez, 94 F. App'x 243, 245 (5th Cir. 2004) (instruc- tion mitigated prejudice of improper prosecutorial questioning); United States v. Johnston, 127 F.3d 380, 388 (5th Cir. 1997) (judge's comment concerning witness mitigated by instructions).

This instruction has been cited with approval. See United States v. Whittington, 269 F. App'x 388, 410 (5th Cir. 2008) (no indication pattern instruction was not proper); United States v. Ramirez-Velasquez, 322 F.3d 868, 873 n.4 (5th Cir. 2003) (part of instructions); United States v. Hernandez Leon, 54 F. App'x 592, *1 (5th Cir. 2002) (no plain error for giving conforming instruction); United States v. Tanios, 82 F.3d 98, 101 (5th Cir. 1996) (middle paragraph of instruction was a sufficient response to defendant's concern).

1.9	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.09

CHARACTER EVIDENCE

Where a defendant has off evidence of good general reputation for [opinion testimony concerning]: truth and veracity, honesty and integrity, or character as a law-abiding citizen, you should consider such evi- dence along with all the other evidence in the case.

Evidence of a defendant's character, inconsistent with those traits of character ordinarily involved in the commission of the crime charged, may give rise to a reasonable doubt, since you may think it improbable that a person of good character with respect to those traits would commit such a crime.
Note

Character evidence is admissible in the form of reputation or opinion. Depending on the form of character evidence introduced, the appropriate bracketed language should be used. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1), 405(a); United States v. John, 309 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Wilson, 408 F. App'x 798, 809 (5th Cir. 2010) (giving instructions to “consider such evidence along with all the other evidence in the case” and that character evidence “may give rise to a reasonable doubt, since you may think it improbable that a person of good character in respect to those traits would commit such a crime”); United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078, 1086 (5th Cir. 1979) (approving instruction); United
States v. Leigh, 513 F.2d 784, 785–86 (5th Cir. 1975) (jury must be instructed that reputation evidence is considered along with—and not after—the other evidence in the case, and it cannot be instructed that such evidence is only to be used to “tip the scales” or “excuse” the defendant).
“A character instruction is warranted only if the defendant first introduces admissible character evidence.” John, 309 F.3d at
303. It is generally not error to refuse this instruction where character evidence is not “central or crucial.” United States v. Baytank, 934 F.2d 599, 614 (5th Cir. 1991); see United States v. Hunt, 794 F.2d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1986) (not abuse of discretion to refuse to give the instruction because it did not prevent the jury from considering the character evidence, nor did it seriously hinder the defendant's presentation of his defense). However, when the is-

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.09

sue of character is “necessarily a vital part of [the] defense,” fail- ure to give the instruction warrants reversal. John, 309 F.3d at 304–05 (refusing the above instruction was abuse of discretion “tantamount to impairing [defendant's] ability to present his defense” where character evidence was the central theory of the defense); but see United States v. Osorio, 288 F. App'x 971, 980 (5th Cir. 2008) (not abuse of discretion to refuse pattern instruc- tion because character evidence was not crucial to the defense).

Also note that the Supreme Court has held, with respect to ev- idence of a defendant's good character, that “such testimony alone, in some circumstances, may be enough to raise a reasonable doubt of guilt and that in the federal courts a jury in a proper case should be so instructed.” Michelson v. United States, 69 S. Ct. 213, 219 (1948) (citing Edgington v. United States, 17 S. Ct. 72 (1896)). This has led to disagreement among various courts of appeal as to the propriety of “standing alone” language in jury instructions. See Spangler v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 2884, 2884–85 (1988) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (discussing the disagreement). This Circuit's instruction includes language that good character may give rise to reasonable doubt. See John, 309 F.3d at 303.

1.10	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.10

IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR INCONSISTENCIES

The testimony of a witness may be discredited by showing that the witness testifi falsely, or by evi- dence that at some other time the witness said or did something, or failed to say or do something, which is in- consistent with the testimony the witness gave at this trial.

Earlier statements of a witness were not admitted in evidence to prove that the contents of those state- ments are true. You may not consider the earlier state- ments to prove that the content of an earlier statement is true; you may only use earlier statements to deter- mine whether you think the earlier statements are con- sistent or inconsistent with the trial testimony of the witness and therefore whether they affect the credibility of that witness.

If you believe that a witness has been discredited in this manner, it is your exclusive right to give the testimony of that witness whatever weight you think it deserves.
Note

This instruction is for use when a witness's prior statements are admitted only for impeachment purposes. See Fed. R. Evid. 613, 801(d)(1); United States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 758–59 (5th Cir. 2008). A prior statement of the defendant is not hearsay and does not require a limiting instruction. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). Similarly, if the prior statement is not hearsay under Rule 801(d)(1) and is admitted as substantive evidence, a limiting instruction is not necessary. See Fiber Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Roehrs, 470 F.3d 1150, 1160 (5th Cir. 2006) (deposition testimony); see, e.g., Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d at 758–59; United States v. Booty, 621 F.2d 1291, 1298–99 (5th Cir. 1980).
A limiting instruction on the use of prior inconsistent state- ments is required upon request. See Valentine v. United States, 272 F.2d 777, 778 (5th Cir. 1959). In the absence of a request, fail-

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.10

ure to give a limiting instruction can sometimes be plain error. See United States v. Newell, 315 F.3d 510, 523 (5th Cir. 2002); United
States v. Waldrip, 981 F.2d 799, 805 (5th Cir. 1993) (“Plain error appears only when the impeaching testimony is extremely damag- ing, the need for the instruction is obvious, and the failure to give it is so prejudicial as to aff the substantial rights of the accused.”).

1.11	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.11

IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION (DEFENDANT'S TESTIMONY)

You have been told that the defendant, ———, was found guilty in ————— of ————— (e.g., bank robbery). This conviction has been brought to your attention only because you may wish to consider it when you decide, as with any witness, how much of the defendant's testimony you will believe in this trial. The fact that the defendant was previously found guilty of that crime does not mean that the defendant committed the crime for which the defendant is on trial, and you must not use this prior conviction as proof of the crime charged in this case.
Note

This charge should be given when the prior conviction is used for impeachment purposes only. See Fed. R. Evid. 105, 609. If the conviction was admitted as a similar offense pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), use Instruction No. 1.30, Similar Acts. This instruction should not be given if a defendant's prior convic- tion is an essential element of the crime charged. See, e.g., Instruc- tion Nos. 2.43 and 2.96, Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon and Continuing Criminal Enterprise, respectively.

See also United States v. Turner, 674 F.3d 420, 430 (5th Cir. 2012) (a similar limiting instruction was appropriate); United States v. Bullock, 71 F.3d 171, 175 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995) (pattern instruction cured possible prejudice); but see United States v. Royal, 972 F.2d 643, 647 n.6 (5th Cir. 1992) (substantially similar instruc- tion with addition that allowed jury to consider prior conviction for Rule 404(b) purposes).

Regarding whether a Texas deferred adjudication is a convic- tion for impeachment purposes, see United States v. Hamilton, 48 F.3d 149 (5th Cir. 1995).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.12

1.12

IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION (WITNESS OTHER THAN DEFENDANT)

You have been told that the witness, —————, was convicted in ————— of ————— (e.g., armed robbery). A conviction is a factor you may consider in deciding whether to believe that witness, but it does not neces- sarily destroy the witness's credibility. It has been brought to your attention only because you may wish to consider it when you decide whether you believe the witness's testimony. It is not evidence of anything else.
Note

See Fed. R. Evid. 105, 609; United States v. Dong Dang Huynh, 420 F. App'x 309, 316 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[A] jury charge instructing that evidence of witnesses' prior convictions was to be considered ‘as reflecting on their credibility as witnesses only’ was ‘sufficient to avoid jury consideration of [the testifying witness's] plea as rele- vant to [the defendant's] guilt or innocence.’ ’’) (quoting United States v. King, 505 F.2d 602, 606, 609 (5th Cir. 1974)); United
States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 346 (5th Cir. 2008) (curative instruc- tion substantially similar to pattern instruction). The last sentence addresses the issue raised in United States v. West, 22 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 1994).

1.13	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.13

IMPEACHMENT BY EVIDENCE OF UNTRUTHFUL CHARACTER

You have heard the testimony of —————. You also heard testimony from others concerning their opinion about whether that witness is a truthful person [the witness's reputation, in the community where the wit- ness lives, for telling the truth]. It is up to you to decide from what you heard here whether ————— was telling the truth in this trial. In deciding this, you should bear in mind the testimony concerning the witness's [reputa- tion for] truthfulness as well as all the other factors al- ready mentioned.
Note

See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(3), 405, 608(a); see also United States
v. Pipkin, 114 F.3d 528, 535 (5th Cir. 1997) (refusal to give this instruction was not grounds for reversal when the jury was given a general credibility instruction).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.14

1.14

ACCOMPLICE—INFORMER—IMMUNITY

The testimony of an alleged accomplice, and/or the testimony of one who provides evidence against a defendant as an informer for pay, for immunity from punishment, or for personal advantage or vindication, must always be examined and weighed by the jury with greater care and caution than the testimony of ordinary witnesses. You, the jury, must decide whether the witness's testimony has been affected by these circum- stances, by the witness's interest in the outcome of the case, by prejudice against the defendant, or by the benefits that the witness has received either financially or as a result of being immunized from prosecution. You should keep in mind that such testimony is always to be received with caution and weighed with great care.

You should never convict any defendant upon the unsupported testimony of such a witness unless you believe that testimony beyond a reasonable doubt.
Note

This instruction has been cited with approval. See United States v. Ordonez, 286 F. App'x 224, 237 (5th Cir. 2008) (no error to instruct jury to consider unsupported testimony of an accom- plice or co-conspirator with great care and not to convict on their unsupported testimony “unless you believe that testimony beyond a reasonable doubt”); United States v. Zavala, 541 F.3d 562, 578 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 153
(5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Goff, 847 F.2d 149, 161 n.13 (5th
Cir. 1988); United States v. D'Antignac, 628 F.2d 428, 435 n.10 (5th Cir. 1980); Wilkerson v. United States, 591 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1979) (approving an instruction that testimony of a co-conspirator must be weighed with caution).
“[T]he credibility of the compensated witness, like that of the witness promised a reduced sentence, is for a properly instructed jury to determine.” United States v. Villafranca, 260 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F.2d 310, 315 (5th Cir. 1987)) (error to refuse a specific cautionary instruction on the credibility of a compensated witness and instead

1.14	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
give a general instruction on witness credibility, unless testimony is thoroughly corroborated). It is not error to refuse to give a specific instruction as to the suspect credibility of a compensated witness where the jury is given an instruction substantially simi- lar to the fi sentence of this instruction. See United States v. Narviz-Guerra, 148 F.3d 530, 538 (5th Cir. 1998). The court must give specific instructions to the jury about the credibility of paid witnesses. See Villafranca, 260 F.3d at 379–80; see also United States v. Dimas, 108 F. App'x 927, 927–28 (5th Cir. 2004).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.15

1.15

ACCOMPLICE—CO-DEFENDANT—PLEA AGREEMENT

In this case the government called as one of its wit- nesses an alleged accomplice, named as a co-defendant in the indictment, with whom the government has entered into a plea agreement. This agreement provides for (e.g., the dismissal of some charges and a binding [non-binding] recommendation for a favorable sentence). Such plea bargaining, as it is called, has been approved as lawful and proper, and is expressly provided for in the rules of this court.

An alleged accomplice, including one who has entered into a plea agreement with the government, is not prohibited from testifying. On the contrary, the testimony of such a witness may alone be of sufficient weight to sustain a verdict of guilty. You should keep in mind that such testimony is always to be received with caution and weighed with great care. You should never convict a defendant upon the unsupported testimony of an alleged accomplice unless you believe that testimony beyond a reasonable doubt.

The fact that an accomplice has entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged is not evidence of the guilt of any other person.
Note

This instruction was approved by United States v. Quiroz, 137
F. App'x 667, 671–72 (5th Cir. 2005) and United States v. Ramirez, 106 F.3d 397, *9 (5th Cir. 1997) (unpublished). See also United States v. Jackson, 230 F. App'x 425, 426 (5th Cir. 2007) (instruct- ing the jury on guilty pleas of co-defendants removed prejudice of improper prosecutorial remarks).

Portions of this instruction were approved in: United States v. Tacker, 424 F. App'x 399, 400 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Valuck, 286 F.3d 221, 228 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Posada-

1.15	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 872–73 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Petti-
grew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1518 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Stephens, 62 F.3d 393, *1 (5th Cir. 1995) (unpublished); and United States v. Pierce, 959 F.2d 1297, 1304 (5th Cir. 1992).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.16

1.16

WITNESS'S USE OF ADDICTIVE DRUGS

The testimony of a witness who is shown to have used addictive drugs during the period of time about which the witness testifi must always be examined and weighed by the jury with greater care and caution than the testimony of ordinary witnesses.

You should never convict any defendant upon the unsupported testimony of such a witness unless you believe that testimony beyond a reasonable doubt.
Note

See United States v. Acosta, 763 F.2d 671, 689 (5th Cir. 1985) (fi	instruction substantially similar to this instruction was “complete, emphatic and adequate”); see also United States v. Laury, 49 F.3d 145, 152 (5th Cir. 1995) (not reversible error to fail to give instruction when “general credibility/weight of the evidence instruction” was given and the defendant was able to argue the point to the jury); United States v. Gadison, 8 F.3d 186, 190 (5th Cir. 1993) (the fact that a witness is a recovering drug addict raises an issue of credibility, not admissibility); United States v. Blankenship, 923 F.2d 1110, 1117 (5th Cir. 1991).

1.17	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.17

EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY

During  the  trial  you  heard  the  testimony  of
—————, who expressed opinions concerning —————. If scientifi technical, or other specialized knowledge might assist the jury in understanding the evidence or in determining a fact in issue, a witness qualifi by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify and state an opinion concerning such matters.

Merely because such a witness has expressed an opinion does not mean, however, that you must accept this opinion. You should judge such testimony like any other testimony. You may accept it or reject it and give it as much weight as you think it deserves, considering the witness's education and experience, the soundness of the reasons given for the opinion, and all other evi- dence in the case.
Note

Judges should be aware that the admission of improper “profile testimony” by a law enforcement agent as an expert may be error. See, e.g., United States v. Medeles-Cab, 754 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Montes-Salas, 669 F.3d 240, 250 (5th Cir.
2012); United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d 354, 366 (5th
Cir. 2010); United States v. Morin, 627 F.3d 985, 998 (5th Cir.
2010); United States v. Sanchez-Hernandez, 507 F.3d 826, 831–33
(5th Cir. 2007).
The text of this instruction does not describe the witness as an “expert witness” to avoid infl	the jury by use of that description.

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.18

ON OR ABOUT

1.18

You will note that the indictment charges that the offense was committed on or about a specified date. The government does not have to prove that the crime was committed on that exact date, so long as the govern- ment proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime on a date reasonably near —————, the date stated in the indictment.
Note

This instruction was approved in United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 445–46 (5th Cir. 2008).

“The prosecution is not required to prove the exact date al- leged in the indictment; it suffi if a date reasonably near is established.” United States v. Mata, 491 F.3d 237, 243 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Valdez, 453 F.3d 252, 260 (5th Cir.
2006)); see also United States v. Girod, 646 F.3d 304, 316–17 (5th
Cir. 2011).

If the defendant has raised an alibi defense dependent upon a particular day, this instruction should be coordinated with Instruc- tion No. 1.35, Alibi. See United States v. King, 703 F.2d 119, 122–25 (5th Cir. 1983) (approved instructions substantially similar to Instruction Nos. 1.18 and 1.35, and held that the trial court did not err in giving both the “On or About” instruction and the “Alibi” instruction).

1.18	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.18A VENUE—CONSPIRACY
The events presented at trial happened in various places. There is no requirement that the entire conspir- acy take place in the ————— District of —————, but in order for you to return a guilty verdict, the govern- ment must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that either the agreement or an overt act took place in this district, even if the defendant never set foot in the district. An overt act is an act performed to effect the object of a conspiracy, although it remains separate and distinct from the conspiracy itself. Though the overt act need not be of criminal nature, it must be done in furtherance of the object of the conspiracy.

Unlike the other elements of the offense, this is a fact that the government has to prove only by a preponderance of the evidence. This means the govern- ment has to convince you only that it is more likely than not that part of the conspiracy took place in the
————— District of —————. All other elements of the offense must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. You are instructed that ————— (list County or Parish where government alleges agreement or overt act oc- curred) is located in the ————— District of —————.
Note

Unless “otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Con- gress, any offense against the United States begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such of- fense was begun, continued, or completed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a); see also United States v. Strain, 396 F.3d 689, 693 (5th Cir. 2005).
“In cases involving conspiracy offenses, venue is proper in any district where the agreement was formed or where an overt act occurred.” United States v. Thomas, 690 F.3d 358, 369 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Garcia Mendoza, 587 F.3d 682, 686 (5th Cir. 2009); see also Whitfield v.

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.18A

United States, 125 S. Ct. 687, 693 (2005) (stating that the “Court has long held that venue is proper in any district in which an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy was committed”); United States
v. Pomranz, 43 F.3d 156, 158–59 (5th Cir. 1995). This is true even if the defendant never “set foot” in that district and even if all overt acts in that district occurred before the defendant joined the conspiracy. See United States v. Rodriguez-Lopes, 756 F.3d 422, 429–30 (5th Cir. 2014); Pomranz, 43 F.3d at 159, n.2; United States v. Caldwell, 16 F.3d 623, 624 (5th Cir. 1994).
“[T]he prosecution's burden of proof in establishing venue dif- fers from the burden of proving other elements. The prosecution need only show the propriety of venue by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt.” Strain, 396 F.3d at 692
n.3 (citing United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir. 1984)); see also Garcia Mendoza, 587 F.3d at 686.

“The ‘failure to instruct on venue is reversible error when trial testimony puts venue in issue and the defendant requests the instruction . . . .’ ’’ United States v. Zamora, 661 F.3d 200, 208 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. White, 611 F.2d 531, 536 (5th Cir. 1980)); see Garcia Mendoza, 587 F.3d at 687. “Venue is not put ‘in issue’ when the government presents adequate evidence of venue, and the defendant fails to contradict the government's evidence.” Zamora, 661 F.3d at 208 (citing Caldwell, 16 F.3d at 625). “If venue is not put at issue, the district court's failure to instruct on venue is, at worst, harmless error.” Id. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit has stated that “[w]hen a venue instruction is requested, the burden of giving an instruction weighs lightly against the value of safeguarding venue rights” and, therefore, “[t]he better procedure is to give the venue instruction when requested, regardless of whether the trial court believes trial testimony has put venue in issue.” Caldwell, 16 F.3d at 625 n.1.

1.19	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.19

CAUTION—CONSIDER ONLY CRIME CHARGED

You are here to decide whether the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen- dant is guilty of the crime charged. The defendant is not on trial for any act, conduct, or offense not alleged in the indictment. Neither are you called upon to return a verdict as to the guilt of any other person or persons not on trial as a defendant in this case, except as you are otherwise instructed.
Note

See United States v. Poydras, 569 F. App'x 318 (5th Cir. 2014) (second sentence of pattern instruction guarded against unfair prejudice); United States v. Jones, 664 F.3d 966, 980–81 (5th Cir. 2011) (instruction that included the first two sentences “sufficiently articulated to the jury that they were only to consider the federal crimes charged and not any of the state rules and regulations that were discussed”); United States v. Arceneaux, 432 F. App'x 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2011) (approving substantially similar instruction); United States v. Garcia, 567 F.3d 721, 728–29 (5th Cir. 2009) (second sentence of pattern instruction guarded against unfair prejudice); United States v. Naranjo, 309 F. App'x 859, 867 (5th Cir. 2009) (first two sentences of this instruction cured potential prejudice); United States v. Harris, 205 F. App'x 230, 232 (5th Cir. 2006) (second sentence of this instruction constituted a general limiting instruction to cure prejudicial remark); United States v. Chavez, 151 F. App'x 302, 306 n.6, 309 (5th Cir. 2005) (approving this instruction as mitigating potential prejudice of improper evi- dence); United States v. Stapleton, 65 F. App'x 508, *5 (5th Cir. 2003) (first two sentences of this instruction mitigated introduction of prejudicial evidence); United States v. Husain, 244 F.3d 133, *9
n.8 (5th Cir. 2000) (unpublished) (same); United States v. Cortinas, 142 F.3d 242, 254 (5th Cir. 1998) (similar instruction contributed to remedy prejudice of joint trial); United States v. Allie, 978 F.2d 1401, 1409 (5th Cir. 1992) (first two sentences of this instruction mitigated introduction of prejudicial evidence); United States v. Royal, 972 F.2d 643, 647, 647 n.6 (5th Cir. 1992) (approving a substantially similar instruction); United States v. Fotovich, 885 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1989) (same).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.20

CAUTION—PUNISHMENT

1.20

If a defendant is found guilty, it will be my duty to decide what the punishment will be. You should not be concerned with punishment in any way. It should not enter your consideration or discussion.
Note

See Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (1994) (“It is well established that when a jury has no sentencing function [as it would, for example, in a capital trial], it should be admon- ished to ‘reach its verdict without regard to what sentence might be imposed.’ ’’); United States v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1153–54 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Del Toro, 426 F.2d 181, 184 (5th
Cir. 1970).

1.21	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.21

SINGLE DEFENDANT—MULTIPLE COUNTS

A separate crime is charged in each count of the indictment. Each count, and the evidence pertaining to it, should be considered separately. The fact that you may find the defendant guilty or not guilty as to one of the crimes charged should not control your verdict as to any other.
Note

This instruction as approved in United States v. Hickerson, 489 F.3d 742, 746 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Prejudice from a failure to sever counts can be cured by proper jury instructions, and juries are generally presumed to follow their instructions.”). See also United States v. Turner, 674 F.3d 420, 429–30 (5th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Bennett, 258 F. App'x 671, 682–83 (5th Cir. 2007) (this instruction mitigated “spill over” of elements of other charged crimes); United States v. Butler, 429 F.3d 140, 148 (5th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Reedy, 304 F.3d 358, 368–69 (5th Cir. 2002).

In some cases, such as prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act) and 21 U.S.C.
§ 848 (Continuing Criminal Enterprise), a conviction on one or more counts (“predicate off	are necessary to support a conviction on another count. In such cases, the last sentence of the instruction should be deleted or modified.

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.22

1.22

MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS—SINGLE COUNT

The case of each defendant and the evidence pertaining to that defendant should be considered separately and individually. The fact that you may find one of the defendants guilty or not guilty should not control your verdict as to any other defendant.
Note

See United States v. Rubio, 321 F.3d 517, 526 (5th Cir. 2003) (instructions suffi   to prevent prejudice from joint trial); see also United States v. Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d 307, 315 n.2 (5th Cir. 1999) (instruction safeguarded defendant from possibility of guilt transference).

1.23	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.23

MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS—MULTIPLE COUNTS

A separate crime is charged against one or more of the defendants in each count of the indictment. Each count, and the evidence pertaining to it, should be considered separately. The case of each defendant should be considered separately and individually. The fact that you may find one or more of the accused guilty or not guilty of any of the crimes charged should not control your verdict as to any other crime or any other defendant. You must give separate consideration to the evidence as to each defendant.
Note

This charge has been cited with approval by the Fifth Circuit.
See United States v. Bernegger, 661 F.3d 232, 237 (5th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 354 (5th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Fernandez, 559 F.3d 303, 317 (5th Cir. 2009) (approving some of the language in this instruction).

In some cases, such as prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act) and 21 U.S.C.
§ 848 (Continuing Criminal Enterprise), a conviction on one or more counts (“predicate off	are necessary to support a conviction on another count. In such cases, the fourth sentence of the instruction should be deleted or modified.

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.24

DUTY TO DELIBERATE

1.24

To reach a verdict, whether it is guilty or not guilty, all of you must agree. Your verdict must be unanimous on each count of the indictment. Your deliberations will be secret. You will never have to explain your verdict to anyone.

It is your duty to consult with one another and to deliberate in an effort to reach agreement if you can do so. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with your fellow jurors. During your deliberations, do not hesitate to reexamine your own opinions and change your mind if convinced that you were wrong. But do not give up your honest beliefs as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because the opinion of your fellow jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.

Remember at all times, you are judges—judges of the facts. Your duty is to decide whether the govern- ment has proved the defendant guilty beyond a reason- able doubt.

When you go to the jury room, the first thing that you should do is select one of your number as your foreperson, who will help to guide your deliberations and will speak for you here in the courtroom.

A verdict form has been prepared for your convenience.

[Explain verdict form.]

The foreperson will write the unanimous answer of the jury in the space provided for each count of the indictment, either guilty or not guilty. At the conclu-

1.24	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
sion of your deliberations, the foreperson should date and sign the verdict.

If you need to communicate with me during your deliberations, the foreperson should write the message and give it to the court security offi I will either reply in writing or bring you back into the court to answer your message.

Bear in mind that you are never to reveal to any person, not even to the court, how the jury stands, numerically or otherwise, on any count of the indict- ment, until after you have reached a unanimous verdict.
Note

“In the routine case, a general unanimity instruction will ensure that the jury is unanimous on the factual basis for a convic- tion, even where in indictment alleges numerous factual bases for criminal liability.” United States v. Creech, 408 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2005). Regarding the use of a specific unanimity instruction, see Note to Instruction No. 1.25, Unanimity of Theory.

Concerning the admonition against disclosure of the numeri- cal division of the jury, see Brasfi v. United States, 47 S. Ct. 135, 135–36 (1926) (questioning jury on its numerical split consti- tuted reversible error) and United States v. Chanya, 700 F.2d 192, 193 (5th Cir. 1983) (district court's inquiry into numerical division of jury before giving “Allen” charge constituted reversible error).

For discussions about how a trial judge may handle allega- tions of juror misconduct during deliberations, including a juror's refusal to follow his duty to deliberate, see United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 126–28 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Patel, 485 F.
App'x 702, 712–14 (5th Cir. 2012).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.25

UNANIMITY OF THEORY

1.25

You have been instructed that your verdict, whether it is guilty or not guilty, must be unanimous. The following instruction applies to the unanimity requirement as to Count —————.
Count ————— of the indictment accuses the defendant of committing the crime of ————— in ——— (e.g., three) different ways. The first is that the defen- dant  —————.  The  second  is  that  the  defendant
—————. The third is that the defendant —————.
The government does not have to prove all of these for you to return a guilty verdict on this charge. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt on one is enough. But in or- der to return a guilty verdict, all of you must agree that the same one has been proved. All of you must agree that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant —————; or, all of you must agree that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant —————; or, all of you must agree that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant —————.
Note

In Richardson v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 1710 (1999), the Supreme Court confirmed that a jury must unanimously find each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. But, “a federal jury need not always decide unanimously which of several possible sets of underlying brute facts make up a particular element, say, which of several possible means the defendant used to commit an element of the crime.” Id. (citing Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491 (1991)). The Court distinguished the requirement of jury unanim- ity on elements versus means underlying the element. Id. For example, because “an element of robbery is force or the threat of force, some jurors might conclude that the defendant used a knife to create the threat; others might conclude he used a gun.” Id. As this is a disagreement over “means” underlying a particular ele- ment of a crime, the jurors need not unanimously agree whether a

1.25	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
knife or gun was used, as long as they unanimously agree “the defendant had threatened force.” Id. In Richardson, the statute at issue criminalized a continuing criminal enterprise, a violation of which occurs when there is a “continuing series of violations.” Id. at 1708. The Court had to decide whether the “series of violations” referred to one single element, made up of a certain number of drug crimes (the “means”), or whether each individual violation constituted a separate element. Id. at 1710. It found that each violation was an element, requiring jury unanimity as to each drug crime committed. Id. at 1713; see, e.g., United States v. Talbert, 501 F.3d 449, 451–52 (5th Cir. 2007) (unanimity not required for particular fi	under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)); see also United States v. Patino-Prado, 533 F.3d 304, 310–12 (5th Cir. 2008) (una- nimity requirement discussed with regard to drug and other conspiracies).

“In the routine case, a general unanimity instruction will ensure that the jury is unanimous on the factual basis for a convic- tion, even where an indictment alleges numerous factual bases for criminal liability.” United States v. Creech, 408 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2005); see United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 579–80 (5th Cir. 2000). But, “such an instruction is insufficient if ‘there ex- ists a genuine risk that the jury is confused or that a conviction may occur as the result of diff	jurors concluding that a defendant committed diff	acts.’ ’’ Creech, 408 F.3d at 268 (quoting United States v. Holley, 942 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1991)); see also United States v. Villegas, 494 F.3d 513, 515–16 (5th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Moreno, 227 F. App'x 361, 362–63 (5th Cir. 2007). An instruction that was similar to this instruction was found suf- ficient to guard against a non-unanimous verdict in United States v. Mauskar, 557 F.3d 219, 226–27 (5th Cir. 2009).

See also McKoy v. North Carolina, 110 S. Ct. 1227 (1990); United States v. Tucker, 434 F. App'x 355, 359–62 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Dillman, 15 F.3d 384 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Correa-Ventura, 6 F.3d 1070 (5th Cir. 1993); Holley, 942 F.3d at
926; United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1977).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.26

1.26

CONFESSION—STATEMENT—VOLUNTARINESS (SINGLE DEFENDANT)

In determining whether any statement, claimed to have been made by the defendant outside of court and after an alleged crime has been committed, was know- ingly and voluntarily made, you should consider the ev- idence concerning such a statement with caution and great care. You should give such weight to the state- ment as you feel it deserves under all the circumstances.

You may consider in that regard such factors as the age, sex, training, education, occupation, and physi- cal and mental condition of the defendant, his treat- ment while under interrogation, and all the other cir- cumstances in evidence surrounding the making of the statement.
Note

The Fifth Circuit has approved this instruction. See United States v. Betancourt, 586 F.3d 303, 307 (5th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Bell, 367 F.3d 452, 461–62 (5th Cir. 2004); see also 18
U.S.C. § 3501(a) (if a confession is submitted to the jury, the trial judge “shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances”); Corley v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1558, 1563–64, 1564 n.2 (2009); but see United States v. Guanespen-Portillo, 514 F.3d 393, 405 (5th Cir. 2008) (failure to give instruction not plain error).

1.27	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.27

CONFESSION—STATEMENT—VOLUNTARINESS (MULTIPLE DEFENDANTS)

In determining whether any statement, claimed to have been made by a defendant outside of court and af- ter an alleged crime was committed, was knowingly and voluntarily made, you should consider the evidence concerning such a statement with caution and great care. You should give such weight to the statement as you feel it deserves under all the circumstances.

You may consider in that regard such factors as the age, sex, training, education, occupation, and physi- cal and mental condition of the defendant, his treat- ment while under interrogation, and all the other cir- cumstances in evidence surrounding the making of the statement.

Any such statement should not be considered in any way whatsoever as evidence with respect to any other defendant on trial.
Note

This instruction is the same as Instruction No. 1.26, but adds a last sentence when there are multiple defendants. Although the instruction has been approved, United States v. Watson, 591 F.2d 1058 (5th Cir. 1979) (approving this instruction in substantially the same form), and is generally acceptable, the judge should be aware that an incurable Bruton problem can be created in submit- ting to the jury the name of a codefendant within the confession, even with a limiting instruction. Bruton v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 1620, 1627–28 (1968); see United States v. Leal, 74 F.3d 600, 605–06 (5th Cir. 1996) (limiting instruction adequate to prevent prejudice of co-defendant's statement that did not name defendant by name).

Redaction has been recognized as adequate, but not always so.
See Gray v. Maryland, 118 S. Ct. 1151, 1155–57 (1998); Richardson
v. Marsh, 107 S. Ct. 1702, 1707–09 (1987); United States v. Cantu- Ramirez, 669 F.3d 619, 631–32 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v.

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.27

Stalnaker, 571 F.3d 428, 434 n.4 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Ramos-Cardenas, 524 F.3d 600, 607–10 (5th Cir. 2008).

1.28	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.28

ENTRAPMENT

The defendant asserts that he was a victim of entrapment.

Where a person has no previous intent or purpose to violate the law, but is induced or persuaded by law enforcement officers or their agents to commit a crime, that person is a victim of entrapment, and the law as a matter of policy forbids that person's conviction in such a case.

On the other hand, where a person already has the readiness and willingness to break the law, the mere fact that government agents provide what appears to be a favorable opportunity is not entrapment. For example, it is not entrapment for a government agent to pretend to be someone else and to off either directly or through an informer or other decoy, to engage in an unlawful transaction.

If you should find beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in the case that, before anything at all oc- curred respecting the alleged off  involved in this case, the defendant was ready and willing to commit such a crime as charged in the indictment, whenever opportunity was afforded, and that government officers or their agents did no more than offer the opportunity, then you should find that the defendant is not a victim of entrapment.

On the other hand, if the evidence in the case should leave you with a reasonable doubt whether the defendant had the previous intent or purpose to commit an off of the character charged, apart from the inducement or persuasion of some officer or agent of the government, then it is your duty to find the defendant not guilty.

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.28

The burden is on the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not entrapped.

You are instructed that a paid informer is an “agent” of the government for purposes of this instruction.
Note

This instruction has been cited and approved in a number of cases. See, e.g., United States v. Hidalgo, 226 F. App'x 391, 397 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Wise, 221 F.3d 140, 154 (5th Cir.
2000); United States v. Brace, 145 F.3d 247, 256–57 (5th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Hernandez, 92 F.3d 309, 311 (5th Cir. 1996).

Note that United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 689 n.29 (5th Cir. 1997), argues that this jury instruction misstates the law, suggesting, between the requirements of predisposition and lack of inducement, the word “and” in the fourth paragraph be replaced with “or.” This change was not made above.

See also Jacobson v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1535, 1540 (1992) (where the government “has induced an individual to break the law, and the defense of entrapment is at issue, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was disposed to commit the criminal act prior to first being approached by government agents.”); Hernandez, 92 F.3d at 310–11 (affirming the adequacy of this instruction with respect to the requirement expressed in Jacobson).

Generally, it is reversible error to refuse to submit a requested entrapment instruction to the jury if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to rule in favor of the defendant on that theory. See United States v. Theagene, 565 F.3d 911, 918–24 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Smith, 481 F.3d 259, 262–63 (5th Cir. 2007);
United States v. Ogle, 328 F.3d 182, 185 (5th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Gutierrez, 343 F.3d 415, 419 (5th Cir. 1993). “The ques- tion is whether the defendant identified or produced ‘evidence from which a reasonable jury could derive a reasonable doubt as to the origin of criminal intent and, thus, entrapment.’ ’’ Theagene, 565 F.3d at 918 (discussing the required two prongs of predisposition and inducement).

An issue may arise in a case in which a defendant denies the requisite intent to commit the crime in question or denies that he was involved in one or more of the acts essential to the commission of the charged crime and alternatively contends that he was in any

1.28	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
event entrapped. In Mathews v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 883, 886 (1988), the Supreme Court held that “even if the defendant denies one or more elements of the crime, he is entitled to an entrapment instruction whenever there is sufficient evidence from which a rea- sonable jury could find entrapment.” In United States v. Collins, 972 F.2d 1385, 1413 (5th Cir. 1992), the trial judge declined to give a requested instruction to the effect that the defendant has a right to deny participation in the crime and alternatively plead entrapment. The Fifth Circuit held that there was no reversible error, but stressed that “the jury repeatedly was told that the defendants were denying culpability for the crime.” Id. Consider- ing the unusual nature of such an alternative contention, on request of a defendant, the judge should consider giving a specific instruction to the effect that a defendant may deny that he engaged in the activity constituting the charged offense and alternatively plead entrapment.

A related defense is entrapment by estoppel, which is “ap- plicable when a government offi or agent actively assures a defendant that certain conduct is legal and the defendant reason- ably relies on that advice and continues or initiates the conduct.” United States v. Jones, 664 F.3d 966, 979 (5th Cir. 2011). Similarly, a requested instruction on this defense should be given if there is “an evidentiary basis in the record which would lead to acquittal.” United States v. Spires, 79 F.3d 464, 466 (5th Cir. 1996).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.29

IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY

1.29

In any criminal case the government must prove not only the essential elements of the offense or offen- ses charged, as hereafter defined, but must also prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the alleged offense[s].

In evaluating the identification testimony of a wit- ness you should consider all of the factors already mentioned concerning your assessment of the credibility of any witness in general, and should also consider whether the witness had an adequate opportunity to observe the person in question at the time or times about which the witness testified. You may consider all matters, including the length of time the witness had to observe the person in question, the prevailing condi- tions at that time in terms of visibility or distance and the like, and whether the witness had known or observed the person at earlier times.

You may also consider the circumstances surround- ing the identification itself including, for example, the manner in which the defendant was presented to the witness for identifi	and the length of time that elapsed between the incident in question and the next opportunity the witness had to observe the defendant.

If, after examining all of the testimony and evi- dence in the case, you have a reasonable doubt as to the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the offense charged, you must find the defendant not guilty.
Note

Barber v. United States, 412 F.2d 775, 777 n.1 (5th Cir. 1969), approved a similar instruction. See also United States v. Ramirez- Rizo, 809 F.2d 1069, 1071–72 (5th Cir. 1987) (not reversible error to refuse this requested identifi	instruction); Johnson v.

1.29	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Blackburn, 778 F.2d 1044, 1052 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Banks, 485 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1973).
See generally Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012);
Watkins v. Sowders, 101 S. Ct. 654 (1981).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.30

SIMILAR ACTS

1.30

You have heard evidence of acts of the defendant which may be similar to those charged in the indict- ment, but which were committed on other occasions. You must not consider any of this evidence in deciding if the defendant committed the acts charged in the indictment. However, you may consider this evidence for other, very limited, purposes.

If you fi beyond a reasonable doubt from other evidence in this case that the defendant did commit the acts charged in the indictment, then you may consider evidence of the similar acts allegedly committed on other occasions to determine:

Whether the defendant had the state of mind or intent necessary to commit the crime charged in the indictment;

or

Whether the defendant had a motive or the op- portunity to commit the acts charged in the indictment;

or

Whether the defendant acted according to a plan or in preparation for commission of a crime;

or

Whether the defendant committed the acts for which he is on trial by accident or mistake.

These are the limited purposes for which any evi- dence of other similar acts may be considered.

1.30	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Note

See Fed. R. Evid. 105, 404(b). United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978), sets out the test. United States v. Pompa, 434 F.3d 800, 806 (5th Cir. 2005), cites this instruction with approval. See also United States v. Duffaut, 314 F.3d 203, 209–10 (5th Cir. 2002), United States v. Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 1998), and United States v. Chiak, 137 F.3d 252, 258 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998), approving partial or similar instructions.

A limiting instruction may minimize the prejudicial effect of the introduction of similar act evidence at trial. See Huddleston v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 1502 (1988); United States v. Ebron,
683 F.3d 105, 132 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d
250, 263 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Walters, 351 F.3d 159,
166–67 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Taylor, 210 F.3d 311, 318
(5th Cir. 2000).

In United States v. Peterson, 244 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 2001), sev- eral defendants were tried jointly and Rule 404(b) evidence was introduced only as to one defendant. In reviewing a claim by the other defendants that they were prejudiced, the Fifth Circuit com- mented that “it might [be] better to use the actual names rather than ‘those defendants’ in the instructions in order to make crystal clear to the jury that Rule 404(b) evidence against” one defendant “could not be considered, even for ‘other, very limited purposes,’ against” other codefendants. Id. at 395.

Ordinarily, a court need not issue a specific instruction, sua sponte, on the limits of Rule 404(b) evidence. See United States v. Garcia, 567 F.3d 721, 728–29 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Waldrip, 981 F.2d 799, 805–06 (5th Cir. 1993). The court “need not provide a limiting instruction each and every time a prior bad act is introduced into evidence.” Hernandez-Guevara, 162 F.3d at 874 (finding no error to fail to issue, sua sponte, a limiting instruction after each piece of similar act evidence is introduced when it was included in the final jury instructions); see United States v. Brugman, 364 F.3d 613, 621 (5th Cir. 2004).

However, under some circumstances, the failure to give an instruction sua sponte regarding a defendant's prior convictions may constitute plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Gibson, 55 F.3d 173, 180 (5th Cir. 1995); Waldrip, 981 F.2d at 805–06; United
States v. Diaz, 585 F.2d 116, 117 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Garcia, 530 F.2d 650, 656 (5th Cir. 1976).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.31

POSSESSION

1.31

“Possession,” as that term is used in these instruc- tions, may be one of two kinds: actual possession or constructive possession.

A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing, at a given time, is in actual possession of it.

A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is in constructive possession of it.

Possession may be sole or joint. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, posses- sion is sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint.

You may find that the element of possession is pres- ent if you fi beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual or constructive possession, either alone or jointly with others.
Note
A number of Fifth Circuit cases continue to cite this instruc- tion with approval. See United States v. Lewis, 265 F. App'x 255, 257 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Horace, 227 F. App'x 350,
352–53 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Gross, 142 F. App'x 829,
830 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Bradford, 54 F. App'x 592, *3
(5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cano-Guel, 167 F.3d 900, 905–06
(5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Prudhome, 13 F.3d 147, 149–50
(5th Cir. 1994).
The instruction on actual or constructive possession can be given when the evidence supports a finding of actual and construc- tive possession. See United States v. Melancon, 662 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2011) (finding no reversible error to include constructive

1.31	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
possession instruction when evidence supported constructive pos- session, even though the case was primarily an actual possession case); United States v. Loudd, 2009 WL 122561, *1 (5th Cir. 2009) (‘‘ ‘[A] constructive possession instruction is not improper if the ev- idence supports it, even if the Government is seeking to prove actual possession.’ ’’) (citing United States v. Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d 121, 132 (5th Cir. 2003)); United States v. Horace, 227 F. App'x 350, 352 (5th Cir. 2007) (fi	that the evidence lent permissible inference to theory of constructive possession); United States v. Diaz-Rivera, 229 F. App'x 330, 331 (5th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 416 (5th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1212 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Ortega, 859 F.2d 327, 329–31 (5th Cir. 1988).

“‘[G]uilty knowledge may not be inferred solely from the defendant's control’ ’’ of a vehicle. United States v. Rivera, 444 F. App'x 774, 781 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Gonzales- Rodriguez, 621 F.3d 354, 361 (5th Cir. 2010)). When a controlled substance is “hidden,” i.e., not “clearly visible or readily acces- sible,” in a vehicle and the defense is lack of knowledge, a “knowl- edge” instruction more specific than Instruction No. 1.37 (“Know- ingly”—to Act) is required. United States v. Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1994). In these cases, there must be “additional circumstantial evidence that is suspicious in nature and demon- strates guilty knowledge.” Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 621 F.3d at 361; accord United States v. Mudd, 685 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir. 2012);
United States v. Sanchez, 432 F. App'x 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Fellove, 402 F. App'x 957, 959 (5th Cir. 2010) (list- ing indicators of guilty knowledge).
If an unlawful drug is hidden from view in a vehicle, a charge such as the following should be considered:

The government may not rely only upon a defendant's ownership and control of the vehicle to prove the defendant knew that he possessed a controlled substance. While these are factors you may consider, the government must prove that there is other evidence indicating the defen- dant's guilty knowledge of a controlled substance hidden in the vehicle.

See Pennington, 20 F.3d at 598.

If contraband is found in a jointly occupied location, the jury must find some other indicator of possession besides joint posses- sion allowing them to infer that the defendant had “knowing dominion or control over the contraband.” United States v. Moreland, 665 F.3d 137, 150 (5th Cir. 2011).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.32

ATTEMPT

1.32

It is a crime for anyone to attempt to commit a violation of certain specified laws of the United States. In this case, the defendant is charged with attempting to ————— (describe the substantive offense alleged in the indictment, e.g., possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance).

The elements of ————— (describe substantive of- fense) are: ————— (give required elements unless they are already given elsewhere in the charge).

For you to find the defendant guilty of attempting to commit ——————————— (describe substantive of- fense), you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant intended to commit
————— (describe the substantive offense); and
Second: That the defendant did an act that consti- tutes a substantial step towards the commission of that crime and that strongly corroborates the defendant's criminal intent and amounts to more than mere preparation.
Note

This instruction was cited approvingly in United States v. Redd, 355 F.3d 866, 875 n.9 (5th Cir. 2003). See also United States
v. Aldawsari, 740 F.3d 1015, 1019–20 (5th Cir. 2014) (affi district court's similar jury instruction, which adequately distin- guished “mere preparation” from “some preparation”).

The elements of the offense are discussed in United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 127 S. Ct. 782, 788 (2007) (accepting Model Penal Code's “substantial step” test, and holding that indictment suf- ficiently alleged attempted reentry into the United States by the use of the word “attempts” coupled with the specifi	of the time and place of the attempted illegal reentry); United States v.

1.32	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Crow, 164 F.3d 229, 235 (5th Cir. 1999) (no plain error in jury instructions for attempted violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (d) where trial court neglected to instruct on the language concerning “substantial step” where evidence established that defendant sent and requested sexually explicit videos via the Internet from a person he believed to be a minor); and United States v. Thompson, 130 F.3d 676, 688 (5th Cir. 1997) (fi	suffi evidence of substantial step in attempt to kill a federal judge in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1114 established by payment of funds for hit).

“Our prior case law makes clear that a ‘substantial step’ must both (1) be an act strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal intent and (2) amount to more than mere preparation.” United States v. Sanchez, 667 F.3d 555, 563 (5th Cir. 2012); see also United
States v. Oviedo, 525 F.2d 881, 885 (5th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370, 376 (5th Cir. 1974). For example, the “affirmative act of collecting a substantial part of the equipment and ingredients for manufacturing methamphetamine [or other controlled substances] can constitute action beyond ‘mere prepara- tion’ suffi to constitute a substantial step.” United States v. Jessup, 305 F.3d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 2002).

Attempt is usually a lesser included offense of the completed crime. A defendant, however, may be convicted of a substantive of- fense in addition to attempting to commit the same kind of substantive offense, so long as there is a different factual basis for the two separate crimes. See United States v. Anderson, 987 F.2d 251, 254–56 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming convictions for manufactur- ing one batch of methamphetamine and attempting to manufacture a second batch).

Impossibility is not a defense to a criminal attempt charge. See United States v. Rankin, 487 F.3d 229, 231 (5th Cir. 2007); see also Redd, 355 F.3d at 875–76 (approving instruction in attempted violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a) and 846 that the “fact that the object of the attempt was impossible to accomplish because the of- fi had removed the box containing cocaine from the tractor- trailer rig is not a defense to this charge”); United States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the distinction between legal and factual impossibility is generally elusive and affirming conviction where defendant intended to engage in sexual acts with a 14-year-old girl and took substantial steps towards doing so).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.33

LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE

1.33

We have just talked about what the government has to prove for you to convict the defendant of the crime charged in the indictment, (e.g., committing a bank robbery in which someone was exposed to risk of death by the use of a dangerous weapon). Your fi task is to decide whether the government has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant commit- ted that crime. If your verdict on that is guilty, you are finished.

But if your verdict is not guilty, or if after all rea- sonable efforts, you are unable to reach a verdict, you should go on to consider whether the defendant is guilty of ————— (the lesser crime, e.g., simple bank robbery). You should fi the defendant guilty of ————— (the lesser crime) if the government has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following elements: ————— (list all elements of the lesser crime).

The difference between these two crimes is that to convict the defendant of ————— (the lesser crime), the government does not have to prove ————— (describe missing element of greater crime, e.g., that defendant exposed someone to risk of death by use of a dangerous weapon). This is an element of the greater crime, but not the lesser crime.

Of course, if the government has not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
————— (the lesser crime), your verdict must be not guilty of all of the charges.
Note

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(c) provides: “A defendant may be found guilty of any of the following: (1) an of- fense necessarily included in the offense charged; (2) an attempt to

1.33	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
commit the offense charged; or (3) an attempt to commit an offense necessarily included in the offense charged, if the attempt is an of- fense in its own right.”

In Schmuck v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1443, 1450 (1989), the Supreme Court concluded that “one off is not ‘necessarily included’ in another [under Rule 31(c)] unless the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense. Where the lesser offense requires an element not required for the greater off  no instruction is to be given under Rule 31(c).” Thus, under the “elements only” test, an offense is a lesser included off only if all of its statutory elements can be demonstrated without proof of any fact or element in addition to those that must be proved for the greater offense. An offense is not a lesser included off if it contains an additional statutory element that is not included in the greater offense.

See Carter v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2159 (2000) (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) requires three elements not required by 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and therefore is not a lesser included offense of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)); United States v. Mays, 466 F.3d 335, 341 (5th Cir. 2006) (possession of a controlled substance is a lesser included offense of possession with intent to distribute, but failure to give instruction was not plain error where defense counsel made strate- gic choice not to request it); but see United States v. Ambriz, 727 F.3d 378, 381–83 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that possession of a con- trolled substance is not a lesser included offense of distribution of a controlled substance); United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 450 (5th Cir. 2004) (neither misprision of a felony nor accessory after the fact are lesser included offenses of aiding and abetting mur- der); United States v. Estrada-Fernandez, 150 F.3d 491, 494 (5th Cir. 1998) (lesser included offense instruction may be given only if
(1)	elements of offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense, and (2) the evidence at trial permits a jury to rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater offense); see also United States v. McElwee, 646 F.3d 328, 341 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Finley, 477 F.3d 250, 255 (5th Cir. 2007).

The phrase “after all reasonable efforts” has been included in the second paragraph to address the concerns raised in United States v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1153 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.34

INSANITY

1.34

The defendant claims that he was insane at the time of the events alleged in the indictment. If you conclude that the government has proved beyond a rea- sonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime as charged, you must then consider whether the defendant should be found “not guilty only by reason of insanity.”

For you to fi the defendant not guilty only by reason of insanity, you must be convinced that the defendant has proven the following by clear and convincing evidence:

First, that at the time of the crime, defendant suf- fered from a severe mental disease or defect;

Second, that because of a severe mental disease or defect, the defendant was unable to appreciate the nature and quality of his acts, or was unable to ap- preciate that his acts were wrong. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense.

On the issue of insanity, it is the defendant who must prove his insanity by clear and convincing evidence. You should render a verdict of “not guilty only by reason of insanity” if you are persuaded by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was insane when the crime was committed.

Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that makes it highly probable that defendant had a severe mental disease and as a result was unable to appreci- ate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts. Such proof must be suffi	to produce a fi belief or conviction as to the truth of both elements of the defense.

1.34	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Remember, then, that there are three possible verdicts in this case: guilty, not guilty, and not guilty only by reason of insanity. No matter which verdict you choose, your vote must be unanimous as to this verdict.
Note

The Fifth Circuit affi a district court's use of a similar instruction on insanity in United States v. Shannon, 981 F.2d 759, 761 (5th Cir. 1993). In Shannon, the Fifth Circuit also held that a defendant is not entitled to a jury instruction which describes mandatory commitment procedures accompanying a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity. Id. at 764.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision and held that “the IDRA [Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. §§ 4241–4247] does not require an instruction concerning the consequences of a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict, and that such an instruction is not to be given as a matter of general practice.” Shannon v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (1994).
The Supreme Court did recognize that an instruction “of some form may be necessary under certain limited circumstances,” e.g., if a witness or prosecutor states to the jury that a defendant would go free after a not guilty by reason of insanity verdict, a district court might need to “intervene with an instruction to counter such misstatement.” Id.

In United States v. Barton, 992 F.2d 66, 69 & n.6 (5th Cir. 1993), following In re Medrano, 956 F.2d 101, 102 (5th Cir. 1992), the court defined clear and convincing evidence in the context of an insanity defense as “that weight of proof which produces in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the fact finder to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts of the cause.”

See United States v. Long, 562 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2009), United States v. Eff, 524 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2008), United States v. Dixon, 185 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Levine, 80 F.3d 129 (5th Cir. 1996), for Fifth Circuit decisions on the insanity defense.

See 18 U.S.C. § 4242(b) (providing that the jury shall be instructed to fi the defendant guilty, not guilty, or not guilty only by reason of insanity).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.35

ALIBI

1.35

One of the issues in this case is whether the defendant was present at the time and place of the al- leged crime.

Evidence has been introduced raising the issue of an alibi that the defendant was not present at the time when, or at the place where, the defendant is alleged to have committed the offense charged in the indictment.

It is the government's burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt each of the essential elements of the off     including the involvement of the defendant; and if, after consideration of all the evidence in the case, you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was present at the time or place as alleged in the indictment, you must fi the defendant not guilty.
Note

United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 135 (5th Cir. 1995), approved an instruction in substantially the same form.

1.36	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.36

JUSTIFICATION, DURESS, OR COERCION

The defendant claims that if he committed the acts charged in the indictment, he did so only because he was forced to commit the crime. If you conclude that the government has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime as charged, you must then consider whether the defendant should nevertheless be found “not guilty” because his actions were justified by duress or coercion.

The defendant's actions were justified, and there- fore he is not guilty, only if the defendant has shown by a preponderance of evidence that each of the following four elements is true. To prove a fact by a preponder- ance of the evidence means to prove that the fact is more likely so than not so. This is a lesser burden of proof than to prove a fact beyond a reasonable doubt.

The four elements which the defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence are as follows:

First: That the defendant was under an unlawful present, imminent, and impending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded fear of death or serious bodily injury to himself [to a family member];

Second: That the defendant had not recklessly or negligently placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be forced to choose the crim- inal conduct;

Third: That the defendant had no reasonable legal alternative to violating the law, that is, he had no rea- sonable opportunity to avoid the threatened harm; and

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.36

Fourth: That a reasonable person would believe that by committing the criminal action he would directly avoid the threatened harm.
Note

The Supreme Court in Dixon v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2437 (2006), recognized that there is no due process violation by placing the burden on the defendant to establish a defense of duress. Fifth Circuit cases set forth the elements of this defense in essentially the same terms as this instruction. See United States v. Wyly, 193 F.3d 289, 300 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 873 (5th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Francisco, 497 F. App’x 412, 420 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Montes, 602
F.3d 381, 389 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d 170,
179 (5th Cir. 1994).

The test of whether the defense of duress exists is an objective one, not a subjective one. See Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d at 873; Willis, 38 F.3d at 176.

As with any affirmative defense, the trial court may refuse to give the justifi	instruction if the defendant fails to submit sufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find duress. See Posada- Rios, 158 F.3d at 873; United States v. Liu, 960 F.2d 449, 455 (5th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir. 1990), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Lambert, 984 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).

1.36	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.36A

SELF-DEFENSE—DEFENSE OF THIRD PERSON

The defendant has off      evidence that he acted in self-defense [defense of another]. The use of force is justified when a person reasonably believes that force is necessary for the defense of oneself or another against the immediate use of unlawful force. However, a person must use no more force than appears reasonably neces- sary under the circumstances.

[Force likely to cause death or great bodily injury is justified in self-defense [defense of another] only if a person reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm.]

The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in [reasonable] self-defense [defense of another].
Note

The Fifth Circuit approved this instruction in United States v. Ramos, 537 F.3d 439, 465 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The jury instructions did explain the law relating to self-defense and defense of others, as well as the objective reasonableness standard necessary for the use of force . . . . [T]hese instructions were not erroneous and certainly do not rise to the level of plain error.”). While the Fifth Circuit approved of this instruction in Ramos, the opinion did not specifically scrutinize the phrasing of the third paragraph, namely, that the “government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in reasonable self-defense.” See also United States v. Keiser, 57 F.3d 847, 850–52 (9th Cir. 1995) (find- ing the same instruction adequate). The word “reasonable” could be construed as superfluous or as an improper qualifier such that the defendant is justified in defending himself only where he acts in reasonable self-defense, rather than plain self-defense (which already calls for a defendant's reasonable belief). In United States
v. Branch, the Fifth Circuit stated that the government's burden was to “negate self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt” (not to ne- gate reasonable self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt). 91 F.3d 699, 714 n.1 (5th Cir. 1996).
In Branch, the court described “[s]elf-defense [as] an affirma-

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.36A

tive defense on which the defendant bears the initial burden of production.” 91 F.3d at 714 n.1. “If and only if the defendant has met his burden of production, the Government bears the burden of persuasion and must negate self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

As a general proposition, a defendant is entitled to any instruc- tion as to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence suffi  for a reasonable jury to fi   in his favor. Id.; United States v. Stone, 960 F.2d 426, 432 (5th Cir. 1992).

It is a necessary precondition to the claim of self-defense that the defendant be free from fault in prompting the use of force. See Branch, 91 F.3d at 717 (citing Wallace v. United States, 16 S. Ct. 859, 861–62 (1896)).

1.37	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.37 “KNOWINGLY”—TO ACT
The word “knowingly,” as that term has been used from time to time in these instructions, means that the act was done voluntarily and intentionally, not because of mistake or accident.
Note

See United States v. Aggrawal, 17 F.3d 737, 744 (5th Cir. 1994) (this instruction is the “correct” definition of “knowingly”).

Refusal to give this “knowingly” instruction may not be error if the substantive off instruction adequately covers the ele- ment of knowledge. See United States v. Cano-Guel, 167 F.3d 900 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d 202 (5th Cir. 1993).

A judge is cautioned that, in instructing on a statute which punishes “otherwise innocent conduct,” the knowledge require- ment applies to each element. See United States v. Ahmad, 101 F.3d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1996).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.37A DELIBERATE IGNORANCE

1.37A

You may find that a defendant had knowledge of a fact if you fi  that the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would otherwise have been obvious to him. While knowledge on the part of the defendant can- not be established merely by demonstrating that the defendant was negligent, careless, or foolish, knowledge can be inferred if the defendant deliberately blinded himself to the existence of a fact.
Note

The Fifth Circuit has instructed that “if a deliberate ignorance instruction is given, a ‘balancing’ instruction should be considered upon request of defendant.” United States v. Vasquez, 677 F.3d 685, 695–96 (5th Cir. 2012). See also United States v. Alaniz, 726
F.3d 586, 612 (5th Cir. 2013).

See also United States v. St. Junius, 739 F.3d 193, 204–06 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Roussel, 705 F.3d 184, 190–92
(5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 701–03 (5th
Cir. 2012); United States v. Jones, 664 F.3d 966, 978 (5th Cir.
2011); United States v. McElwee, 646 F.3d 328 (5th Cir. 2011);
United States v. Miller, 588 F.3d 897, 906 (5th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Arledge, 553 F.3d 881, 889 (5th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Orji-Nwosu, 549 F.3d 1005, 1009 (5th Cir. 2008); United States
v. Nguyen, 493 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ricardo, 472 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Mendoza-Medina, 346 F.3d 121 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Saucedo-Munoz, 307 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Wells, 262 F.3d 455 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Peterson, 244 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 852 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Moreno, 185 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Threadgill, 172 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1990).
The deliberate ignorance instruction should be used spar- ingly—only when the facts and statute under which the defendant is being prosecuted justify it. See United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1990). The instruction is properly given if the evi- dence shows that: “[T]he defendant (1) was subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of the illegal conduct, and (2)

1.37	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
purposefully contrived to avoid learning of the illegal conduct.”
Vasquez, 677 F.3d at 697; Miller, 588 F.3d at 906 (citing United
States v. Connor, 537 F.2d 480, 486 (5th Cir. 2008)).

The deliberate ignorance instruction “does not lessen the government's burden to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the knowledge elements of the crimes have been satisfi United States v. Reveles, 190 F.3d 678, 686 (5th Cir. 1999).

When a deliberate ignorance instruction is appropriate only with respect to one of a group of co-defendants, the Fifth Circuit has approved the giving of the instruction accompanied by a state- ment that the instruction may not apply to all of the defendants. See United States v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 288–91 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Reissig, 186 F.3d 617, 619–20 (5th Cir.
1999).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.38 “WILLFULLY”—TO ACT
Note

1.38

An instruction defining “willfully” should be given only when, by statute or court decision, “willfully” is made a mental state ele- ment of the offense charged. An instruction on “willfully” should not be given just because willfully is alleged in the indictment, un- less it is a legal element of the offense charged.

Prosecutors frequently include the word “willfully” in the indictment, even when not required by statute or case law. See United States v. Hunt, 794 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1986) (instructing on “willfully” in mail fraud prosecution). This practice should be discouraged. Historically, the usual definition of that term was:

The word “willfully,” as that term has been used from time to time in these instructions, means that the act was committed vol- untarily and purposely, with the specifi intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.

Court decisions indicate, however, that this defi	is not accurate in every situation. See United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 461, 463 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008). As stated in United States v. Granda, 565 F.2d 922, 924 (5th Cir. 1978), the term “willfully” has “defied any consistent interpretation by the courts.” In United States v. Bailey, 100 S. Ct. 624, 631 (1980), the Court stated: “[F]ew areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper definition of the mens rea required for any particular crime.” In Ratzlaf v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 655, 659 (1994), the Supreme Court, quoting
from Spies v. United States, 63 S. Ct. 364, 367 (1943), recognized that “willful is a word of many meanings, and its construction is often influenced by its context.” See also United States v. Arditti, 955 F.2d 331, 340 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that the meaning of “willfully” varies depending upon the context).

“Willfully” connotes a higher degree of criminal intent than knowingly. “Knowingly” requires proof of knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense. See Bryan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1939, 1945 (1998). “Willfully” requires proof that the defendant acted with knowledge that his conduct violated the law. See Ratzlaf, 114 S. Ct. at 657; United States v. Fountain, 277 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2001) (Congress chose “knowingly” as the mens rea requirement for submitting false records in connection with the purchase or

1.38	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
sale of fish, therefore the district court properly refused to instruct on “willfully”).

In Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991), the Supreme Court defined “willful” for prosecutions under the Internal Reve- nue Code. Because of the complexity of the tax laws, “willful” crim- inal tax off	are treated as an exception to the general rule that “ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution.” Id. at 609. “Congress has accordingly softened the impact of the common-law presumption by making specifi intent to violate the law an element of certain federal criminal tax offenses.” Id. “The standard for the statutory willful- ness requirement is the ‘voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.’ ’’ Id. at 610 (quoting United States v. Pomponio, 97 S. Ct. 22, 23 (1976), and United States v. Bishop, 93 S. Ct. 2008, 2017 (1973)). The Court reversed a conviction because the trial court instructed the jury that the defendant's good faith belief that he was not violating the law must have been objectively reasonable. Id. However, a good faith belief that the law is unconstitutional does not negate the willfulness requirement. Id. Thus it is not er- ror to instruct a jury not to consider a defendant's claims that a tax law is unconstitutional. Id. at 612–13; see also United States v. Simkanin, 420 F.3d 397, 409–410 (5th Cir. 2005) (no error in fail- ing to include specific jury instruction on good faith defense to a 26
U.S.C. § 7202 charge where court instructed the jury that “to act willfully means to act voluntarily and deliberately and intending to violate a known legal duty”); United States v. Townsend, 31 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that “[t]he U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the term ‘willfully’ connotes a voluntary, intentional violation of known legal duty” in a case involving eva- sion of federal excise taxes); United States v. Charroux, 3 F.3d 827, 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (defining willfulness as ‘‘ ‘voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty’ ’’ in a gasoline excise tax evasion case). In United States v. Masat, the Fifth Circuit stated that in a tax evasion case, “willfulness simply means a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty” and that the jury instruction defin- ing “willfully” does not have to include any language about bad purpose or evil motive. 948 F.2d 923, 931–32 (5th Cir. 1991).

In Bryan, 118 S. Ct. at 1944, the Supreme Court addressed whether the term “willfully” in 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(a)(1)(A) and 924(a)(1)(D) requires proof that the defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful, or whether it also requires proof that the defendant knew of the specific federal licensing requirement. The Court noted that a “willful” act, as a general matter, is one under- taken with a “bad purpose.” Id. at 1945. For a “willful” violation of a statute, the government must prove that the defendant acted with the knowledge that his conduct was unlawful. Id. In this case, the defendant argued that “willfully” in the context of

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.38

§ 924(a)(1)(D) required knowledge of the law because of the Court's previous interpretation of “willfully” in violations of tax laws and in violations involving structuring of cash transactions to avoid a reporting requirement. Id. at 1946. The Court distinguished these two types of cases because they involved highly technical statutes that presented the danger of ensnaring individuals engaged in ap- parently innocent conduct. Id. at 1946–47. As a result, the Court held “that these statutes carve out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse and require that the defendant have knowledge of the law.” Id. at 1947. In this case, under 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(1)(D), the danger of convicting individu- als engaged in apparently innocent activity is not present because the jury found that the defendant knew that his conduct was unlawful. Id. Thus, the Court held that “the willfulness require- ment of § 924(a)(1)(D) does not carve out an exception to the traditional rule that ignorance of the law is no excuse; knowledge that the conduct is unlawful is all that is required.” Id.
The Supreme Court has cautioned that the required mental state may be diff	even for diff	elements of the same crime, and that the mental element encompasses more than just the two possibilities of “specific” and “general” intent. See Liparota
v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 2084, 2087 n.5 (1985). The Committee has therefore abandoned the indiscriminate use of the term “will- fully” accompanied by an inflexible definition of that term. Instead, we have attempted to define clearly what state of mind is required, i.e., what the defendant must know and intend to be guilty of the particular crime charged. This approach finds support in United States v. Jobe, 101 F.3d 1046, 1059 (5th Cir. 1996), which found no error when the trial court declined to separately defi “willful- ness” but did give the pattern jury definition of “knowingly” and otherwise “correctly charged the jurors on the element of intent in each off	See also United States v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 560, 570 & n.6 (5th Cir. 2006) (court correctly instructed on “willfully” in deprivation of civil rights case by conforming to Instruction No. 2.12).
Nevertheless, the historical defi	of “willfully,” quoted above, was given and approved in a money laundering and misap- plication of bank funds case, United States v. Giraldi, 86 F.3d 1368, 1376 (5th Cir. 1996), and a prosecution for unlawfully pay- ing inducements for referrals of Medicare patients, United States v. Davis, 132 F.3d 1092, 1094 (5th Cir. 1998).

See also United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 447 (5th Cir. 2007) (“The FCPA does not define ‘willfully,’ and we therefore look to the common law interpretation of this term to determine the suffi	of the jury instructions pertaining to the mens rea element. The definition of ‘willful’ in the criminal context remains

1.38	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
unclear despite numerous opinions addressing this issue. Three levels of interpretation have arisen that help to clear the haze. Under all three, a defendant must have acted intentionally—not by accident or mistake.”).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.39

INTERSTATE COMMERCE—DEFINED

1.39

Interstate commerce means commerce or travel be- tween one state, territory or possession of the United States and another state, territory or possession of the United States, including the District of Columbia.
Note

In cases involving statutes that have as an element of the of- fense a requirement that activity takes place in interstate com- merce or has an effect on interstate commerce, the issue of whether the activity takes place in interstate commerce or has an effect on interstate commerce should be submitted to the jury. See United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995) (“materiality” is a jury is- sue in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1001). Fifth Circuit cases have implicitly accepted that the interstate commerce effect is a jury question and have dealt with instructions that a jury finding of certain specified acts beyond a reasonable doubt constitutes “an effect on interstate commerce as a matter of law.” United States v. Hebert, 131 F.3d 514, 521–22 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v.
Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 239–40 (5th Cir. 1997).
See National Federation of Independent Businesses v. Sebelius,
132 S. Ct. 2566, 2587–91 (2012) (fi	that Congress may regulate activity that aff interstate commerce, but not inactivity).

1.40	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.40

FOREIGN COMMERCE—DEFINED

Foreign commerce means commerce or travel be- tween any part of the United States, including its ter- ritorial waters, and any other country, including its ter- ritorial waters.
Note

See United States v. Montford, 27 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. De La Rosa, 911 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1990); Note to Instruction No. 1.39, Interstate Commerce.

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.41

COMMERCE—DEFINED

1.41

Commerce includes travel, trade, transportation, and communication.
Note

The Fifth Circuit approved this definition in United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 800 (5th Cir. 1999), and United States v.
Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205 (5th Cir. 1997).

1.42	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.42

CAUTIONARY INSTRUCTION DURING TRIAL— TRANSCRIPT OF TAPE RECORDED CONVERSATION

Exhibit ————— has been identified as a typewrit- ten transcript of the oral conversation which can be heard on the tape recording received in evidence as Ex- hibit —————. The transcript also purports to identify the speakers engaged in such conversation.

I have admitted the transcript for the limited and secondary purpose of aiding you in following the content of the conversation as you listen to the tape recording, and also to aid you in identifying the speakers.

You are specifi instructed that whether the transcript correctly or incorrectly reflects the content of the conversation or the identity of the speakers is entirely for you to determine based upon your own evaluation of the testimony you have heard concerning the preparation of the transcript, and from your own examination of the transcript in relation to your hear- ing of the tape recording itself as the primary evidence of its own contents; and, if you should determine that the transcript is in any respect incorrect or unreliable, you should disregard it to that extent. It is what you hear on the tape that is evidence, not the transcripts.

[In this case there are two transcripts because there is a difference of opinion as to what is said on the tape. You may disregard any portion of either or both transcripts if you believe they reflect something differ- ent from what you hear on the tape. It is what you hear on the tape that is evidence, not the transcripts.]
Note
This instruction should be given when the tape is played and again in the final charge.

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.42

See United States v. Murray, 988 F.2d 518, 525–27 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Rena, 981 F.2d 765, 767–70 (5th Cir. 1993).
The showing of a transcript-assisted video recording to the jury without the contemporaneous playing of the underlying audio recording represented in the transcript “may constitute error.” United States v. Thompson, 482 F.3d 781, 788 (5th Cir. 2007).

1.42	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.42A

TRANSCRIPT OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE—TAPE RECORDED CONVERSATION

Among the exhibits admitted during the trial were recordings that contained conversations in the ————— language. You were also provided English transcripts of those conversations. The transcripts were provided to you by the government [defendant] so that you can consider the content of the conversations on the recordings. Whether a transcript is an accurate transla- tion, in whole or in part, is for you to decide. You should not rely in any way on any knowledge you may have of the language spoken on the recording; your consider- ation of the transcripts should be based on the evidence introduced in the trial.

In considering whether the transcript[s] accurately describes the meaning of a conversation, you should consider the testimony presented to you regarding how, and by whom, the transcript was made. You may consider the knowledge, training, and experience of the translator, as well as the nature of the conversation and the reasonableness of the translation in light of all the evidence in the case.

[In this case there are two transcripts because there is a difference of opinion as to what is said on the tape. You may disregard any portion of either or both transcripts if you believe they reflect something differ- ent from what you hear on the tape. It is what you hear on the tape that is evidence, not the transcripts.]
Note

See United States v. Booker, 334 F.3d 406, 412 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Poor quality and partial unintelligibility do not render tapes inadmissible unless the unintelligible portions are ‘so substantial as to render the recording as a whole untrustworthy.’ [citation omitted]. In United States v. White, 219 F.3d 442, 448 (5th Cir.

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.42A

2000), this Court affirmed the use of a transcript of the translation of a Spanish language tape, half of which was conceded to be unintelligible. [citation omitted]. Because there was testimony from an FBI agent regarding the accuracy of the translation and a cautionary instruction given to the jury, we found no abuse of discretion in admitting the transcript of the tape.”); United States
v. Gonzalez-Balderas, 11 F.3d 1218, 1124 (5th Cir. 1994).

1.43	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
1.43

SUMMARIES AND CHARTS NOT RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE

Certain charts and summaries have been shown to you solely as an aid to help explain the facts disclosed by evidence (testimony, books, records, and other docu- ments) in the case. These charts and summaries are not admitted evidence or proof of any facts. You should determine the facts from the evidence that is admitted.
Note

“If a summary or chart is introduced solely as a pedagogical device [not received into evidence], the court should instruct the jury that the chart or summary is not to be considered as evidence, but only as an aid in evaluating evidence.” United States v. Harms, 442 F.3d 367, 375 (5th Cir. 2006); see Fed. R. Evid. 611(a); United
States v. Buck, 324 F.3d 786, 790–92 (5th Cir. 2003) (differentiat- ing Fed. R. Evid. 611 and 1006).

United States v. Ogba, 526 F.3d 214, 225 (5th Cir. 2008) ap- proved this instruction. United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535, 548 (5th Cir. 2001) and United States v. Winn, 948 F.2d 145, 157–58, 157 n.30 (5th Cir. 1991), approved similar instructions. See also United States v. Ollison, 555 F.3d 152, 161 (5th Cir. 2009) (no er- ror in allowing demonstrative exhibits as “pedagogical” devices to present the government's version of the case when they were not admitted into evidence and instructions were given to the jury not to treat them as evidence).

This instruction is not appropriate when the summaries and charts have been introduced into evidence under Rule 1006. See Fed. R. Evid. 1006; United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561, 575 (5th Cir. 2001) (“A summary chart that meets the requirements of Rule 1006 is itself evidence and no instruction is needed. Such charts are distinguishable from pedagogical aids, which are merely to assist the jury in understanding the evidence and should be ac- companied by an appropriate limiting instruction.”).

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.44

1.44

SUMMARIES AND CHARTS RECEIVED IN EVIDENCE

Certain charts and summaries have been received into evidence. You should give them only such weight as you think they deserve.
Note

The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Williams, 264 F.3d 561 (5th Cir. 2001), wrote:

A summary chart that meets the requirements of Rule 1006 is itself evidence and no instruction is needed. United States v. Smyth, 556 F.2d 1179, 1184 (5th Cir. 1977). Such charts are distinguishable from pedagogical aids, which are merely to assist the jury in understanding the evi- dence and should be accompanied by an appropriate limit- ing instruction. United States v. Stephens, 779 F.3d 232, 238 (5th Cir. 1985). In the present case, the summary charts were entered into evidence pursuant to Rule 1006 and thus no instruction was needed.
Id. at 575. This was in response to claimed error that there was no instruction given.
Yet, in United States v. Whitfield, when the trial court gave an instruction similar to this instruction, the Fifth Circuit panel wrote, “Rule 1006 allows admission of summaries . . . Summary evidence must have an adequate foundation in evidence that is al- ready admitted, and should be accompanied by a cautionary instruction.” 590 F.3d 325, 364–65 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United
States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535, 547 (5th Cir. 2001)).
The above charge is consistent with Whitfi because it as- sumes the judge has insured there is other record evidence upon which the basis of the chart can be made, but it is inconsistent with Williams, which says no instruction is necessary. The Com- mittee advises the judge to determine whether the proponent of the summary evidence is seeking its admission as evidence itself. If so, and if Rule 1006 conditions are met, an instruction may not be necessary. See Fed. R. Evid. 1006.

In United States v. Jones, 664 F.3d 966, 975–76 (5th Cir. 2011), the Fifth Circuit stated:

1.44	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The Appellants' objection was that for a summary to be admit- ted, all of the evidence that the summary intends to summarize must also be admitted. This is incorrect. United States v. Valencia, 600 F.3d 389, 417 (5th Cir. 2010) (explaining that evidence underlying a summary need not actually be admitted). Therefore, the district court's admission of the summaries of the Appellants' bank records was not error.

GENERAL AND PRELIMINARY INSTRUCTIONS

1.45

MODIFIED “ALLEN” CHARGE

Members of the Jury:

1.45

I am going to ask that you continue your delibera- tions in an effort to agree upon a verdict and dispose of this case; and I have a few additional comments I would like for you to consider as you do so.

This is an important case. If you should fail to agree on a verdict, the case is left open and may be tried again.

Any future jury must be selected in the same man- ner and from the same source as you were chosen, and there is no reason to believe that the case could ever be submitted to twelve men and women more conscien- tious, more impartial, or more competent to decide it, or that more or clearer evidence could be produced.

Those of you who believe that the government has proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt should stop and ask yourselves if the evidence is really convincing enough, given that other members of the jury are not convinced. And those of you who believe that the government has not proved the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt should stop and ask yourselves if the doubt you have is a reasonable one, given that other members of the jury do not share your doubt.

Remember at all times that no juror is expected to yield a conscientious opinion he or she may have as to the weight or effect of the evidence. But remember also that, after full deliberation and consideration of the ev- idence in the case, it is your duty to agree upon a verdict if you can do so without surrendering your conscien- tious opinion. You must also remember that if the evi-

1.45	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
dence in the case fails to establish guilt beyond a rea- sonable doubt, the accused should have your unanimous verdict of Not Guilty.

You may be as leisurely in your deliberations as the occasion may require and should take all the time which you may feel is necessary.

I will ask now that you retire once again and continue your deliberations with these additional com- ments in mind to be applied, of course, in conjunction with all of the instructions I have previously given to you.
Note

“District courts have broad discretion to give Allen charges when the jury indicates deadlock.” United States v. Hitt, 473 F.3d 146, 153 (5th Cir. 2006). “Courts ‘may give modified versions of the Allen charge, so long as the circumstances under which the district court gives the instruction are not coercive, and the content of the charge is not prejudicial.’ ’’ Id. (quoting United States v. McClatchy, 249 F.3d 348, 359 (5th Cir. 2001)); see also United States v. Fields,
483 F.3d 313, 339–40 (5th Cir. 2007).

See also United States v. Allard, 464 F.3d 529, 535–36 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Nguyen, 28 F.3d 477, 483–84 (5th Cir.
1994); United States v. Pace, 10 F.3d 1106, 1125 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing the 1990 version of this instruction).

For other cases discussing whether the circumstances sur- rounding the giving of an Allen charge are coercive, see United States v. Andaverde-Tinoco, 741 F.3d 509, 517–18 (5th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Winters, 105 F.3d 200, 203–04 (5th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Lindell, 881 F.2d 1313, 1320–22 (5th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Betancourt, 427 F.2d 851, 854 (5th Cir. 1970).

II.	SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.01A	Bringing Aliens into the United States 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(i)
2.01B	Transporting Aliens into or Within the United States 8
U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)
2.1	C	Concealing or Harboring Aliens 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)
2.2	A	Illegal Entry 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1)
2.02B	Eluding Examination or Inspection 8 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a)(2)
2.2	C	Illegal Entry by False or Misleading Representation 8
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)
2.3	Illegal Reentry Following Deportation 8 U.S.C.
§ 1326(a)
2.4	Aiding and Abetting (Agency) 18 U.S.C. § 2
2.5	Accessory After the Fact 18 U.S.C. § 3
2.6	Misprision of a Felony 18 U.S.C. § 4
2.7	Assaulting a Federal Officer 18 U.S.C. § 111 2.08A	Bankruptcy: Concealment of Assets (Bankruptcy
Proceeding Pending) 18 U.S.C. § 152 (First
Paragraph)
2.8	B	Bankruptcy: Presenting or Using a False Claim (Bankruptcy Proceeding Pending) 18 U.S.C. § 152 (Fourth Paragraph)
2.9	A	Bribing a Public Official 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1) 2.09B	Receiving Bribe by a Public Official 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(b)(2)
2.09C	Illegal Gratuity to a Public Official 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(c)(1)(A)
2.9	D	Receiving Illegal Gratuity by a Public Official 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(c)(1)(B)
2.10	Bribery or Reward of a Bank Officer 18 U.S.C.
§ 215(a)(1)
2.11	Conspiracy to Deprive Person of Civil Rights 18 U.S.C.
§ 241
2.12	Deprivation of Civil Rights 18 U.S.C. § 242
2.13	Conspiracy to Defraud the Government with Respect to Claims 18 U.S.C. § 286
2.9	

PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS

2.14	False Claims Against the Government 18 U.S.C. § 287 2.15A	Conspiracy to Commit Offense 18 U.S.C. § 371
2.15	B	Conspiracy to Defraud 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Second Clause)
2.16	Multiple Conspiracies
2.17	Conspirator's Liability for Substantive Count
2.18	Conspiracy—Withdrawal
2.19	Counterfeiting 18 U.S.C. § 471
2.20	Passing Counterfeit Securities or Obligations 18 U.S.C.
§ 472
2.21	A	Forgery Against the United States 18 U.S.C. § 495 (First Paragraph)
2.21	B	Uttering a Forged Writing to Defraud the United States 18 U.S.C. § 495 (Second Paragraph)
2.22	A	Forging Endorsement on a Treasury Check, Bond, or Security of the United States 18 U.S.C. § 510(a)(1)
2.22	B	Uttering a Forged Treasury Check, Bond, or Security of the United States 18 U.S.C. § 510(a)(2)
2.23	A	Securities of the States and Private Entities 18 U.S.C.
§ 513(a)
2.23	B	Securities of the States and Private Entities 18 U.S.C.
§ 513(b)
2.24	A	Smuggling 18 U.S.C. § 545
2.24	B	Illegal Importation of Merchandise 18 U.S.C. § 545 (Second Paragraph)
2.25	Exportation of Stolen Vehicles 18 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (First Paragraph)
2.26	Smuggling Goods From the United States 18 U.S.C.
§ 554
2.27	Theft of Government Money or Property 18 U.S.C.
§ 641 (First Paragraph)
2.28	Theft or Embezzlement by Bank Officer or Employee 18
U.S.C. § 656
2.29	Theft From Lending, Credit, and Insurance Institutions 18 U.S.C. § 657
2.30	A	Theft From Interstate Shipment 18 U.S.C. § 659 (First Paragraph)
2.30	B	Buying or Receiving Goods Stolen From Interstate Shipment 18 U.S.C. § 659 (Second Paragraph)
2.31	Theft Within Special Maritime and Territorial Jurisdiction 18 U.S.C. § 661
2.32	Theft or Embezzlement From Employee Benefit Plan 18
U.S.C. § 664
2.33	A	Theft Concerning Programs Receiving Federal Funds 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)
2.30	

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.33B	Bribery Concerning Programs Receiving Federal Funds (Soliciting a Bribe) 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B)
2.33C	Bribery Concerning Programs Receiving Federal Funds (Offering a Bribe) 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)
2.34	Escape 18 U.S.C. § 751(a)
2.35	Aiding Escape 18 U.S.C. § 752(a)
2.36	A	Dealing in Explosive Materials Without License 18
U.S.C. § 842(a)(1)
2.36B	False Statements in Connection with Explosive Materials 18 U.S.C. § 842(a)(2)
2.36C	Unlawful Distribution of Explosive Materials 18 U.S.C.
§ 842(d)
2.36	D	Possession of Explosives by a Prohibited Person 18
U.S.C. § 842(i)(1)
2.37	Arson of Property Used in Interstate Commerce or Used in an Activity Affecting Interstate Commerce 18
U.S.C. § 844(i)
2.38	Threats Against the President 18 U.S.C. § 871
2.39	Interstate Transmission of Extortionate Communication 18 U.S.C. § 875(b)
2.40	Mailing Threatening Communications 18 U.S.C.
§ 876(b)
2.41	Misrepresentation of Citizenship 18 U.S.C. § 911
2.42	False Impersonation of Federal Officer or Employee— Demanding or Obtaining Anything of Value 18 U.S.C.
§ 912
2.43	A	Dealing in Firearms Without License 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(a)(1)(A)
2.43B	False Statement to Firearms Dealer 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(a)(6)
2.43C	Unlawful Sale or Disposition of Firearm or Ammunition 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)
2.43	D	Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)(1)
2.44	Using/Carrying a Firearm During Commission of a Drug Trafficking Crime or Crime of Violence 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)
2.45	False Statements to Federal Agencies and Agents 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(2) and (a)(3)
2.46	False Statements in Bank Records 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (Third Paragraph)
2.47	False Statement to a Bank 18 U.S.C. § 1014
2.48	A	Production of False Document 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1) 2.48B	Possession of False Document with Intent to Defraud
United States 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4)

PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS

2.49	A	Use of Unauthorized Access Device 18 U.S.C.
§ 1029(a)(2)
2.49	B	Possession of Counterfeit or Unauthorized Access Devices 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3)
2.50	False Statements Relating to Health Care Matters 18
U.S.C. § 1035
2.51	Transmission of Wagering Information 18 U.S.C. § 1084 2.52A	Murder (First Degree) 18 U.S.C. § 1111
2.52	B	Murder (Second Degree) 18 U.S.C. § 1111
2.53	Voluntary Manslaughter 18 U.S.C. § 1112
2.54	Kidnapping 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)
2.55	Hostage Taking 18 U.S.C. § 1203
2.56	Mail Fraud; Money/Property or Honest Services 18 U.S.C. § 1341 [18 U.S.C. § 1346]
2.57	Wire Fraud; Money/Property or Honest Services 18 U.S.C. § 1343 [18 U.S.C. § 1346]
2.58A	Bank Fraud 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1) [18 U.S.C. § 1346]
2.58	B	Bank Fraud 18 U.S.C. § 1344(2)
2.59	Health Care Fraud 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a)
2.60	Mailing Obscene Material 18 U.S.C. § 1461
2.61	Interstate Transportation of Obscene Material (by Common Carrier) 18 U.S.C. § 1462
2.62	Interstate Transportation of Obscene Material (For Purpose of Sale or Distribution) 18 U.S.C. § 1465
2.63	A	Corruptly Obstructing Administration of Justice 18
U.S.C. § 1503(a)
2.63B	Obstructing Administration of Justice by Threats or Force 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)
2.63	C	Corruptly Influencing a Juror 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)
2.64	Intimidation to Influence Testimony 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(b)(1)
2.65	Destroying, Altering, or Falsifying a Document in a Federal Investigation 18 U.S.C. § 1519
2.66	Misuse of a Passport 18 U.S.C. § 1544 (First and Second Paragraphs)
2.67	A	Counterfeiting Immigration Documents 18 U.S.C.
§ 1546(a) (First Paragraph, First Clause) 2.67B	Use or Possession of Fraudulent Immigration
Documents 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (First Paragraph,
Second Clause)
2.67	C	False Statements in Connection with Immigration Documents 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (Fourth Paragraph)
2.68	Sex Trafficking 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)
2.67	

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.69	False Declaration Before Grand Jury or Court 18
U.S.C. § 1623
2.70	A	Theft of Mail Matter 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (First Paragraph)
2.70	B	Possession of Stolen Mail 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (Third Paragraph)
2.71	Embezzlement/Theft of Mail Matter by Postal Service Employee 18 U.S.C. § 1709
2.72	A	Providing Contraband in Prison 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(1) 2.72B	Possessing Contraband in Prison 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2) 2.73A	Extortion by Force, Violence, or Fear 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(a) (Hobbs Act)
2.73	B	Extortion under Color of Official Right 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(a) (Hobbs Act)
2.74	Interstate and Foreign Travel or Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Enterprises 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)
2.75	Illegal Gambling Business 18 U.S.C. § 1955 2.76A	Laundering Monetary Instruments—Proceeds of
Unlawful Activity 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and
1956(a)(1)(B)(i)
2.76	B	Laundering Monetary Instruments—Property Represented to be Proceeds of Unlawful Activity 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(A) and 1956(a)(3)(B)
2.77	Engaging in Monetary Transactions in Property Derived From Specified Unlawful Activity 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957
2.78	Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering 18 U.S.C.
§ 1959(a)
2.79	Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c)
2.80	A	Bank Robbery 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d) 2.80B	Bank Theft 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b)
2.81	Carjacking 18 U.S.C. § 2119
2.82	A	Sexual Abuse—Threats or Fear 18 U.S.C. § 2242(1) 2.82B	Sexual Abuse—Victim Incapable 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2) 2.82C	Sexual Abuse of a Minor 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a)
2.82	D	Sexual Abuse of a Ward 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b)
2.83	Failure to Register as a Sex Offender 18 U.S.C. § 2250
2.84	Sexual Exploitation of Children—Producing Child Pornography 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)
2.85	A	Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuses of Children— Receiving and Distributing Material Involving Sexual Exploitation of Minors 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)
2.85B	Sexual Exploitation of Children—Possession of Child Pornography 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)

PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS

2.85C	Sexual Exploitation of Children—Transporting or Shipping of Child Pornography (Visual Depiction of Actual Minor) 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1)
2.85D	Sexual Exploitation of Children—Receiving or Distributing Child Pornogrophy (Visual Depiction of Actual Minor) 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A)
2.85E	Sexual Exploitation of Children—Receiving or Distributing Material that Contains Child Pornography 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B)
2.85	F	Sexual Exploitation of Children—Possessing or Accessing Child Pornography (Visual Depiction of an Actual Minor) 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)
2.86	Interstate Transportation of a Stolen Motor Vehicle, Vessel, or Aircraft 18 U.S.C. § 2312
2.87	Receipt of a Stolen Motor Vehicle, Vessel, or Aircraft 18
U.S.C. § 2313
2.88	Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property 18 U.S.C.
§ 2314 (First Paragraph)
2.89	Receipt, Possession, or Sale of Stolen Property 18
U.S.C. § 2315 (First Paragraph)
2.90	A	Trafficking in Counterfeit Goods or Services 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320(a)(1)
2.90B	Trafficking in Goods or Services Bearing a Counterfeit Mark Likely to Cause Confusion, Mistake, or Deception 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(2)
2.90C	Trafficking in Counterfeit Military Goods or Services 18
U.S.C. § 2320(a)(3)
2.90	D	Trafficking in Counterfeit Drugs 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(4)
2.91	Enticement of a Minor 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)
2.92	Failure to Appear 18 U.S.C. § 3146
2.93	Controlled Substances—Possession with Intent to Distribute 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
2.94	Unlawful Use of Communication Facility 21 U.S.C.
§ 843(b)
2.95	Controlled Substances—Conspiracy 21 U.S.C. § 846
2.96	Continuing Criminal Enterprise 21 U.S.C. § 848
2.97	Controlled Substances—Manufacturing Operations 21
U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)
2.98	Controlled Substances—Unlawful Importation 21
U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960(a)(1)
2.99	Exporting Arms Without a License 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c)
2.100	Receiving or Possessing Unregistered Firearms 26
U.S.C. § 5861(d)
2.101	Tax Evasion 26 U.S.C. § 7201
2.90	

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.102	A	False Statements on Income Tax Return 26 U.S.C.
§ 7206(1)
2.102	B	Aiding or Assisting in Preparation of False Documents under Internal Revenue Laws 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2)
2.103	Reports on Exporting and Importing Monetary Instruments 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)
2.104	Structuring Transactions to Evade Reporting Requirements 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3)
2.105	Bulk Cash Smuggling 31 U.S.C. § 5332(a)
2.102	

2.01A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.01A

BRINGING ALIENS INTO THE UNITED STATES 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i)

Title 8, United States Code, Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) makes it a crime for anyone knowingly to bring [at- tempt to bring] an alien into the United States at a place other than a designated port of entry.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly brought [at- tempted to bring] an alien into the United States;

Second: That the defendant knew that the person was an alien; and

Third: That entry was [attempted] at a place other than at a designated port of entry.

An alien is any person who is not a natural-born or naturalized citizen of the United States.
Note
The government need not prove the defendant had the specific intent to violate the immigration laws. See United States v. De Jesus Batres, 410 F.3d 154, 162 (5th Cir. 2005) (a subsection (iii) case).
For a discussion of the first element, that defendant “brought” aliens into the country, see United States v. Garcia-Paulin, 627 F.3d 127, 133 (5th Cir. 2010) (discussing whether the defendant had an active role in an alien's entry).
Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(i) prohibits bringing an alien into the United States at a place other than a designated port of entry or a place other than as designated by the Commissioner, meaning “the Commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.” 8
U.S.C. § 1101(8). The functions of that position have now been transferred to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). See 6 U.S.C. §§ 251, 271(b).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.01A

The defi	of “alien” in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(3) also includes someone who is not a “national.” A “national” is a person who “owes permanent allegiance to the United States.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1101(22). The only non-citizen “nationals” who fit within this def- inition are residents of American Samoa and Swains Island. See United States v. Jimenez-Alcala, 353 F.3d 858, 861 (10th Cir. 2003);
Perdomo-Padilla v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 964, 967–70 (9th Cir. 2003). In the rare instance in which a defendant claims to be a “national,” the defi	found in 18 U.S.C. § 1101(22) may be given. See Omolo v. Gonzales, 452 F.3d 404, 408 (5th Cir. 2006).

The statute describes aggravating factors that raise the statu- tory maximum penalty, and that must be submitted as additional elements or special interrogatories, if charged in the indictment. These include: whether the off was done for the purpose of commercial advantage or private gain, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(i); whether the defendant caused serious bodily injury, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(1)(B)(iii);  or  whether  death  resulted,  8  U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv). See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). In United States v. Williams, 449 F.3d 635, 646 (5th Cir. 2006), the Fifth Circuit specifi    approved a jury instruction that included fi	gain as an element. “The ‘fi	gain’ fact is an ‘element’ of a separate, greater aggravated offense.” Id. For a defendant charged with aiding and abetting under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1324(a)(1)(v)(A)(II), the statute does not provide an enhanced sentence based on financial gain. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B)(I).

Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I), defendants may be convicted for conspiring to commit §§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), or 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv). It is unclear whether the government must prove an overt act in order to prove conspiracy under this section. See United States v. Lopez, 392 F. App'x 245 (5th Cir. 2010) (declined to decide the issue). For aiding and abetting and unanimity requirements, see United States v. Williams, 449 F.3d 635, 648 (5th Cir. 2006).

2.01B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.01B

TRANSPORTING ALIENS INTO OR WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii)

Title 8, United States Code, Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(ii), makes  it a  crime  for anyone  to transport an alien within the United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien is here illegally, and in furtherance of the alien's violation of the law.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That an alien had entered or remained in the United States in violation of the law;

Second: That the defendant knew [recklessly disregarded] the fact that the alien was in the United States in violation of the law; and

Third: That the defendant transported the alien within the United States with intent to further the alien's unlawful presence.

[A person acts with “reckless disregard” when he is aware of, but consciously disregards, facts and circum- stances indicating that the person transported was an alien who had entered or remained in the United States in violation of the law.]

An alien is any person who is not a natural-born or naturalized citizen of the United States.

In order for transportation to be in furtherance of the alien's unlawful presence, there must be a direct and substantial relationship between the defendant's act of transportation and its furtherance of the alien's

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.01B

presence in the United States. In other words, the act of transportation must be more than merely incidental to a furtherance of the alien's violation of the law.
Note

The statute does not contain the term “willfully.” Neverthe- less, a series of Fifth Circuit decisions, while reciting the elements of this offense, state that the defendant must have acted “willfully in furtherance of the alien's violation of law.” United States v. Romero-Cruz, 201 F.3d 374, 378 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Williams, 132 F.3d 1055, 1059 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Diaz, 936 F.2d 786, 788 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Morales-
Rosales, 838 F.2d 1359, 1361 (5th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Longoria, 298 F.3d 367, 372 n.6 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc). However, in United States v. Rivera, 879 F.2d 1247, 1251 (5th Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Cotton, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002), the Court specifi rejected an argument that “willful transportation” was an element of this crime, explaining that the essential element was whether there is a “direct and substantial relationship between the transportation and its furtherance of the alien's presence in the United States.” Moreover, the Williams opinion, despite reciting “willfully” as an element, approved a jury instruction “substantially the same” as the 1997 Fifth Circuit Pattern Jury Instruction, and which did not use the term “willfully” as part of the elements of the offense. 132 F.3d at 1061–62.

For a discussion of the term “national,” the aggravating fac- tors raising the statutory maximum penalty for this offense, and conspiracy to commit this off	see Note to Instruction No. 2.01A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), Bringing Aliens into the United States.

2.1	C	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.01C

CONCEALING OR HARBORING ALIENS 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii)

Title 8, United States Code, Section 1324(a)(1)(A)(iii), makes it a crime for anyone to conceal [harbor] [shield from detection] [attempt to conceal, harbor, or shield from detection] an alien, knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that the alien has entered, come to, or remained in the United States in violation of law.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the alien entered [came to] [remained in] the United States in violation of law;

Second: That the defendant concealed [harbored] [shielded from detection] [attempted to conceal, harbor or shield from detection] the alien within the United States;

Third: That the defendant knew [acted in reckless disregard of the fact that] the alien entered [came to] [remained in] the United States in violation of law; and

Fourth: That the defendant's conduct tended to substantially facilitate the alien entering [coming to] [remaining in] the United States illegally.

[A person acts with “reckless disregard” when he is aware of, but consciously disregards, facts and circum- stances indicating that the person concealed [harbored] [shielded from detection] was an alien who entered [came to] [remained in] the United States in violation of the law.]

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.01C

An alien is any person who is not a natural-born or naturalized citizen of the United States.

To “substantially facilitate” means to make an alien's illegal presence in the United States substan- tially easier or less difficult.
Note

In United States v. Shum, the Fifth Circuit held that to “substantially facilitate” means “to make an alien's illegal pres- ence in the United States substantially ‘easier or less difficult.’ ’’ 496 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Dixon,
132 F.3d 192, 200 (5th Cir. 1997)). See United States v. De Jesus
Batres, 410 F.3d 154, 162 (5th Cir. 2005) (discussing elements of the offense); United States v. Rubio-Gonzalez, 674 F.2d 1067 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Varkonyi, 645 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Cantu, 557 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1977).

For a discussion of the term “national,” the aggravating fac- tors raising the statutory maximum penalty for this offense, and conspiracy to commit this off	see Note to Instruction No. 2.01A, 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), Bringing Aliens into the United States.

2.2	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.02A

ILLEGAL ENTRY 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1)

Title 8, United States Code, Section 1325(a)(1) makes it a crime for an alien to enter [attempt to enter] the United States at a time and place other than as designated.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: The defendant was an alien;

Second: The defendant knowingly entered [at- tempted to enter] the United States; and

Third: The defendant entered [attempted to enter] at a place other than a designated port of entry. [and

Fourth: The defendant was previously convicted of a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325.]

An “alien” is a person who is not a citizen or national of the United States. A “national of the United States” is a citizen of the United States or a non-citizen of the United States who owes permanent allegiance to the United States.

If you fi from your consideration of all the evi- dence that the government has proved each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt [as to the charge you are considering], then you should find the defendant guilty [of that charge].

If, on the other hand, you find from your consider- ation of all the evidence that the government has failed to prove any one of these elements beyond a reasonable

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.02A

doubt [as to the charge you are considering], then you should find the defendant not guilty [of that charge].
Note

“Alien” and “national of the United States” are defi	in 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) and § 1101(a)(22)(B), respectively.

“Permanent allegiance” is the obligation of fidelity and obedi- ence an individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces his government and becomes a citizen of another government or sovereign. Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. 147, 154–155 (1871).
Prosecution is not barred by prior or future offi action which may have authorized the alien to be in the United States. Thus, it is the alien status at the time of the alleged offense that is at issue.

A “designated port of entry” as defined by 8 C.F.R. § 100.4 is a place chosen by the Department of Homeland Security whereby an alien arriving by vessel, by land, or by any means of travel other than aircraft may enter the United States. The designation of such a port of entry may be withdrawn whenever, in the judgment of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and Border Protec- tion, such action is warranted. See 8 C.F.R. § 100.4. The ports are listed according to location by districts and are designated either Class A, B, or C. Class A means that the port is a designated port of entry for all aliens. Id. Class B means that the port is a designated port of entry for aliens who at the time of applying for admission are lawfully in possession of valid Permanent Resident Cards or valid non-resident aliens' border-crossing identifi
cards or are admissible without documents under the documentary waivers. Id. Class C means that the port is a designated port of entry only for aliens who are arriving in the United States as crewmen as that term is defined in § 101(a)(10) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(10)) with respect to vessels. 8 C.F.R. § 100.4.

An additional element must be added to the charge if the government alleges a prior conviction, enhancing the offense from a Class B misdemeanor to a felony. See United States v. Rodriguez- Gonzales, 358 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause a subsequent commission under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) changes the nature of the crime, the prior commission must be charged.”).

2.02B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.02B

ELUDING EXAMINATION OR INSPECTION 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(2)

Title 8, United States Code, Section 1325(a)(2) makes it a crime for an alien to elude examination [inspection] after a previous conviction under Title 8, United States Code, Section 1325.

In order for you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the government must prove the following ele- ments beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: The defendant was an alien; and

Second: The defendant knowingly eluded examina- tion [inspection] by immigration officers. [and

Third: The defendant was previously convicted of a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325.]
An “alien” is a person who is not a citizen or national of the United States. A “national of the United States” is a citizen of the United States or a non-citizen of the United States who owes permanent allegiance to the United States.

If you fi from your consideration of all the evi- dence that the government has proved each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt [as to the charge you are considering], then you should find the defendant guilty [of that charge].

If, on the other hand, you find from your consider- ation of all the evidence that the government has failed to prove any one of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt [as to the charge you are considering], then you should find the defendant not guilty [of that charge].

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

Note

2.02B

“Alien” and “national of the United States” are defi	in 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) and § 1101(a)(22)(B), respectively.

“Permanent allegiance” is the obligation of fidelity and obedi- ence an individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces his government and becomes a citizen of another government or sovereign. Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. 147, 154–155 (1871).

An additional element must be added to the charge if the government alleges a prior conviction, enhancing the offense from a Class B misdemeanor to a felony. See United States v. Rodriguez- Gonzales, 358 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause a subsequent commission under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) changes the nature of the crime, the prior commission must be charged.”).

2.2	C	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.02C

ILLEGAL ENTRY BY FALSE OR MISLEADING REPRESENTATION
8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3)

Title 8, United States Code, Section 1325(a)(3) makes it a crime for an alien to enter the United States and willfully make a false or misleading representation [conceal a material fact].

In order for you to find the defendant guilty of this charge, the government must prove the following ele- ments beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: The defendant was an alien;

Second: The defendant entered [attempted to enter] the United States;

Third: The defendant made a false or misleading representation [concealed a material fact] for the purpose of gaining entry; and

Fourth: The defendant acted willfully, that is, he deliberately and voluntarily made the representation knowing it was false [concealed a material fact].

[Fifth: The defendant was previously convicted of a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325.]

An “alien” is a person who is not a citizen or national of the United States. A “national of the United States” is a citizen of the United States or a non-citizen of the United States who owes permanent allegiance to the United States.

[Concealments are “material” if they had a ten- dency to influence the decisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Service.]

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.02C

If you fi from your consideration of all the evi- dence that the government has proved each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt [as to the charge you are considering], then you should find the defendant guilty [of that charge].

If, on the other hand, you find from your consider- ation of all the evidence that the government has failed to prove any one of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt [as to the charge you are considering], then you should find the defendant not guilty [of that charge].
Note

“Alien” and “national of the United States” are defi	in 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) and § 1101(a)(22)(B), respectively.

“Permanent allegiance” is the obligation of fidelity and obedi- ence an individual owes to the government under which he lives, or to his sovereign in return for the protection he receives until, by some open and distinct act, he renounces his government and becomes a citizen of another government or sovereign. Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. 147, 154–155 (1872).

An additional element must be added to the charge if the government alleges a prior conviction, enhancing the offense from a Class B misdemeanor to a felony. See United States v. Rodriguez- Gonzaales, 358 F.3d 1156, 1160 (9th Cir. 2004) (“[B]ecause a subsequent commission under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a) changes the nature of the crime, the prior commission must be charged.”).

2.3	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.03

ILLEGAL REENTRY FOLLOWING DEPORTATION
8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)

Title 8, United States Code, Section 1326(a), makes it a crime for an alien to enter [attempt to enter] [to be found in] the United States without consent of the Sec- retary of the Department of Homeland Security [At- torney General of the United States] to apply for readmission after being deported, removed, excluded or denied admission.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant was an alien at the time alleged in the indictment;

Second: That the defendant had previously been deported [denied admission] [excluded] [removed] from the United States;

Third: That thereafter the defendant knowingly entered [attempted to enter] [was found in] the United States; and

Fourth: That the defendant had not received the consent of the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security [Attorney General of the United States] to ap- ply for readmission to the United States since the time of the defendant's previous deportation.

An “alien” is any person who is not a natural-born or naturalized citizen of the United States.
Note

Specific intent is not an element of this crime; it is a general

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.03

intent crime. See United States v. Jara-Favela, 686 F.3d 289, 302 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Berrios-Centeno, 250 F.3d 294, 297–98 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Guzman-Ocampo, 236 F.3d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 2000). The government must show that the defendant had the general intent to reenter, i.e., the defendant is here voluntarily. See Berrios-Centeno, 250 F.3d at 297–98; United States v. Ortegon-Uvalde, 179 F.3d 956 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Trevino-Martinez, 86 F.3d 65 (5th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Tovias-Marroquin, 218 F.3d 455 (5th Cir. 2000). Attempted illegal reentry into the United States is also a general intent off   and thus, the government does not need to prove that the defendant had a specific intent to violate the immigration laws. See United States v. Morales-Palacios, 369 F.3d 442 (5th Cir. 2004).
The Fifth Circuit has adopted the following standard for determining whether an alien is “found in” the United States: “when his physical presence is discovered and noted by the im- migration authorities, and the knowledge of the illegality of his presence, through the exercise of diligence typical of law enforce- ment authorities, can reasonably be attributed to the immigration authorities.” United States v. Santana-Castellano, 74 F.3d 593, 598 (5th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Gunera, 479 F.3d 373, 376 (5th Cir. 2007). An alien within the United States is not “found in” the United States if he approaches a recognized port of entry and presents his identity card to immigration offi	seeking admission. See United States v. Angeles-Mascote, 206 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2000).
Actual reentry requires physical presence in the United States and freedom from official restraint, while attempted reentry only requires that a previously deported alien approach a port of entry and make a false claim of citizenship or non-resident alien status. See Morales-Palacios, 369 F.3d at 446.

An alien is considered “removed” under Section 1326(a) for purposes of this statute even if the order of removal is entered in absentia after the alien physically departs the United States. See United States v. Ramirez-Carcamo, 559 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 2009).
The Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, acting through the Under Secretary for Border and Transportation Secu- rity, is responsible for granting consent for readmission to aliens not otherwise lawfully admitted. See 6 U.S.C. § 202. As of March 1, 2003, the consent function of the Attorney General was transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. See United States v. Fajardo-Fajardo, 594 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir. 2010) (listing the

2.3	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
consent element of the off    as “the defendant did not receive the consent of the Attorney General of the United States before March 1, 2003, or the Secretary of Homeland Security after Febru- ary 28, 2003, to apply for readmission to the United States”). An instruction similar to the one in Fajardo-Fajardo may be appropri- ate if the government is relying on multiple deportation dates that occurred before and after March 1, 2003, or if the government al- leges a deportation date in the indictment that is prior to March 1, 2003.

A certificate of nonexistence of record is sufficient evidence to prove a lack of consent to reapply for reentry. See United States v. Martinez-Rios, 595 F.3d 581, 586 (5th Cir. 2010). The certificate is considered testimonial evidence that is subject to the Confronta- tion Clause. Id. In contrast, “items in an alien immigration fi [are] non-testimonial in nature and . . . the Confrontation Clause [does] not bar their admission.” United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 437 (5th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Berreca-
Valdez, 448 F. App'x 457, 459 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that docu- ments contained in an alien's immigration file were non-testimonial and their admission did not violate the Confrontation Clause).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.04

AIDING AND ABETTING (AGENCY) 18 U.S.C. § 2

2.04

The guilt of a defendant in a criminal case may be established without proof that the defendant personally did every act constituting the offense alleged. The law recognizes that, ordinarily, anything a person can do for himself may also be accomplished by him through the direction of another person as his or her agent, or by acting in concert with, or under the direction of, an- other person or persons in a joint effort or enterprise.

If another person is acting under the direction of the defendant or if the defendant joins another person and performs acts with the intent to commit a crime, then the law holds the defendant responsible for the acts and conduct of such other persons just as though the defendant had committed the acts or engaged in such conduct.

Before any defendant may be held criminally responsible for the acts of others, it is necessary that the accused deliberately associate himself in some way with the crime and participate in it with the intent to bring about the crime.

Of course, mere presence at the scene of a crime and knowledge that a crime is being committed are not sufficient to establish that a defendant either directed or aided and abetted the crime unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a participant and not merely a knowing spectator.

In other words, you may not fi any defendant guilty unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that every element of the offense as defined in these instruc- tions was committed by some person or persons, and

2.4	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
that the defendant voluntarily participated in its com- mission with the intent to violate the law.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the offense of ——————————— was committed by some person;

Second: That the defendant associated with the criminal venture;

Third: That the defendant purposefully participated in the criminal venture; and

Fourth: That the defendant sought by action to make that venture successful.

“To associate with the criminal venture” means that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal. This element cannot be established if the defendant had no knowledge of the principal's criminal venture.

“To participate in the criminal venture” means that the defendant engaged in some affi	conduct designed to aid the venture or assist the principal of the crime.
Note

If the evidence supports submitting this instruction, and absent a showing of unfair surprise, this instruction can be given whether or not the indictment charges aiding and abetting. See United States v. Lombardi, 138 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Sorrells, 145 F.3d 744 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Casilla, 20 F.3d 600 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Botello, 991
F.2d 189 (5th Cir. 1993); United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d 630 (5th Cir. 1992). This is still true post-Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). See United States v. Creech, 408 F.3d 264 (5th Cir.
2005).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.04

The requirements of liability under the aiding and abetting theory are set forth in United States v. Turner, 674 F.3d 420 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. McDowell, 498 F.3d 308, 313–14 (5th
Cir. 2007); United States v. Garcia, 242 F.3d 593, 596 (5th Cir.
2001); United States v. Montgomery, 210 F.3d 446 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2000), amended on reh'g in part 244 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. De La Rosa, 171 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1999); and United States v. Stewart, 145 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 1998). See also United States v. Garcia, 567
F.3d 721, 731 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Percel, 553 F.3d
903, 911 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Rojas Alvarez, 451 F.3d
320, 333 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376,
385 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Tenorio, 360 F.3d 491, 495 (5th Cir. 2004); United States v. Hernandez-Bautista, 293 F.3d 845, 853 (5th Cir. 2002).

Neither misprision of a felony nor accessory after the fact are lesser-included offenses of aiding and abetting a felony. See United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 450 (5th Cir. 2004).

Any defendant in a multi-defendant case may be punished as a principal under 18 U.S.C. § 2, regardless of the conviction of the other(s). See United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 183–85 (5th Cir. 2009).

For aiding and abetting and unanimity requirements, see
United States v. Williams, 449 F.3d 635, 648 (5th Cir. 2006).

When prosecution is for aiding and abetting a § 924(c) of- fense—using or carrying a fi	when involved in a crime of violence or drug traffi	off		prosecution must show that the accused knew about the gun in advance of the offense and in suffi  time to withdraw from the crime. See Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240, 1249–51 (2014). “Advance knowl- edge” means “knowledge at a time the accomplice can do something with it—most notably, opt to walk away.” 134 S. Ct. at 1249-50. See also United States v. Smith, 2015 WL 1951903 (5th Cir. May 1, 2015).

2.5	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.05

ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT 18 U.S.C. § 3

Title 18, United States Code, Section 3, makes it a crime for anyone who, knowing that a crime has been committed, obstructs justice by giving comfort or assis- tance to the principal in order to hinder or prevent ap- prehension or punishment.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the principal had committed the crime of ——————————— (list the elements of the off se[s] alleged in the indictment);

Second: That the defendant knew of the commis- sion of the above crime by the principal and thereafter comforted      [assisted]      the      principal      by 
——————————— (describe the acts alleged in the indictment); and

Third: That the defendant did the above act[s] intending to hinder [prevent] the principal's apprehen- sion [trial] [punishment].

The government is not required to prove that any act of the defendant influenced the investigation or was relied upon by the authorities.

The government is not required to prove that the principal has been indicted for or convicted of the crime of ——————————— (list the offense[s] alleged in the indictment).
Note
The court must charge on the elements of the underlying of- fense if those elements are not set forth in another count.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.05

The elements of this offense are set forth in United States v. De La Rosa, 171 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Harris, 104 F.3d 1465 (5th Cir. 1997).

Accessory after the fact is not a lesser-included offense of aid- ing and abetting a felony. See United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004).

2.6	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.06

MISPRISION OF A FELONY 18 U.S.C. § 4

Title 18, United States Code, Section 4, makes it a crime for anyone to conceal from the authorities the fact  that  a  federal  felony  has  been  committed.
——————————— (list predicate offense from indict- ment) is a federal felony.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That a federal felony was committed, as charged in Count ————— of the Indictment (list ele- ments of the underlying offense);

Second: That the defendant had knowledge of the commission of the felony;

Third: That the  defendant failed  to notify  an authority as soon as possible. An “authority” includes a federal judge or some other federal civil or military authority, such as a federal grand jury, Secret Service or FBI agent; and

Fourth: That the defendant did an affirmative act, as charged, to conceal the crime.

Mere failure to report a felony is not a crime. The defendant must commit some affirmative act designed to conceal the fact that a federal felony has been committed.

Note

The elements of this offense are set forth in United States v. Adams, 961 F.2d 505 (5th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Salinas, 956 F.2d 80 (5th Cir. 1992).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.06

The court must charge on the elements of the underlying of- fense if it is not set forth in another count.

Misprision of a felony is not a lesser included offense of aiding and abetting a felony. See United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004).

2.7	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.07

ASSAULTING A FEDERAL OFFICER 18 U.S.C. § 111

Title 18, United States Code, Section 111, makes it a crime for anyone to forcibly assault a federal officer while the officer is engaged in the performance of his of- ficial duties.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant forcibly assaulted [re- sisted] [opposed] [impeded] [intimidated] [interfered with] the person described in the indictment;

Second: That the person assaulted was a federal of- ficer as described below, who was then engaged in the performance of his [her] official duty, as charged; and

Third: That the defendant did such acts intentionally.

[Fourth: That in doing such acts, the defendant used a deadly or dangerous weapon or inflicted bodily injury.]

[Fourth: That such acts involved physical contact with the victim or the intent to commit another felony.]

The term “forcible assault” means any intentional attempt or threat to infl injury upon someone else, when coupled with an apparent present ability to do so, and includes any intentional display of force that would give a reasonable person cause to expect immediate bodily harm, whether or not the threat or attempt is actually carried out or the victim is injured.

[The term “deadly or dangerous weapon” includes

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.07

any object capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury. For such a weapon to have been “used,” it must be proved that the defendant not only possessed the weapon but that the defendant intentionally displayed it in some manner while carrying out the forcible assault. The term “bodily injury” means an injury that is painful and obvious, or is of a type for which medical attention ordinarily would be sought.]

You are instructed that ——————————— (list title of federal official, e.g., Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation) is a federal officer, and that it is a part of the offi        duty of such an offi       to
——————————— (list official duty being performed, e.g., execute arrest warrants issued by a judge or mag- istrate of this court).

It is not necessary to show that the defendant knew the person being forcibly assaulted was, at that time, a federal officer carrying out an official duty so long as it is established beyond a reasonable doubt that the victim was, in fact, a federal officer acting in the course of his duty and that the defendant intentionally committed a forcible assault upon that officer.

[On the other hand, the defendant would not be guilty of an assault if the evidence leaves you with a reasonable doubt concerning whether the defendant knew the victim to be a federal officer and only commit- ted such act because of a reasonable, good faith belief that the defendant needed to defend himself against an assault by a private citizen.]
Note
This statute has been interpreted as creating three separate offenses: (1) simple assault; (2) more serious assaults not involving a dangerous weapon; and (3) assaults with a deadly or dangerous weapon. See United States v. Ramirez, 233 F.3d 318 (5th Cir. 2000). The fourth element above, concerning a deadly weapon, and the accompanying bracketed definitions, constitutes the third offense

2.7	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
carrying a maximum penalty of twenty years' confi   Without that element, the above instruction defi	the fi	of- fense of “simple assault,” a misdemeanor. The second off	is under the category of “all other cases,” and carries a maximum penalty of eight years' imprisonment. This crime does not require use of a deadly weapon, nor bodily harm, nor the creation of ap- prehension in the victim. It does, however, require forcible physi- cal contact. See Ramirez, 233 F.3d at 322 (holding that hurling a cup at the victim, striking him and spilling its contents on him, fell in the intermediate category of “all other cases”). The alterna- tive fourth element above, involving physical contact, would have to be given in this situation.

In United States v. Nunez, 180 F.3d 227 (5th Cir. 1999), the indictment charged an assault “by means and use of a dangerous weapon.” The jury was instructed that it could also fi the defendant guilty of forcible assault without a dangerous weapon. The Nunez court found reversible error, rejecting the Government's claim that the jury found a lesser included offense. It held that the instruction impermissibly broadened the indictment from “a specifi and narrow accusation” to one “far more general and broad.” 180 F.3d at 233. An earlier decision, United States v. Williamson, 482 F.2d 508, 513 (5th Cir. 1973), apparently reached a contrary result but was not cited in Nunez.
This circuit has indicated that the first of the three separate offenses—simple assault—would be given its common law meaning of “an attempted battery” or the “placing of another in reasonable apprehension of a battery.” United States v. Hazlewood, 526 F.3d 862, 865 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Ramirez, 233 F.3d at 321–22). The court in Hazelwood found that resisting arrest, though without any physical contact, met the definition of simple assault. Id. In United States v. Williams, 520 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2008), the court noted that the visible possession of a shank during a fistfi comprised the “assault with a deadly weapon” element of the third offense “assault with a dangerous weapon,” despite the fact that the shank did not strike the official. Id. at 421 (noting that merely brandishing a dangerous weapon, even if it is not put to use in the assault, is considered “use” under § 111(b)).
The last paragraph of the instruction is appropriate only when self-defense, or other justifiable action, is raised by the evidence. See United States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255, 1264 (1975); United States v. Moore, 958 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Ochoa, 526 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1976).
A state officer “acting in cooperation with and under control of federal offi         is considered a federal agent under 18 U.S.C.
§§ 111 and 1114. See United States v. Hooker, 997 F.2d 67 (5th Cir.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.07

1993). In that case, the third from the last paragraph would have to be changed accordingly. See United States v. Reed, 375 F.3d 340 (5th Cir. 2004) (statute requires contemporaneous involvement be- tween state and federal officers); United States v. Jacquez-Beltran, 326 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 2003) (cooperation can exist even though the federal officer is not actually present at the time of the assault).

There is no requirement that the defendant knew of the of- fi status of the victim. See Feola, 95 S. Ct. at 1261; United States v. Moore, 958 F.2d 646 (5th Cir. 1992).

The definitions of “deadly or dangerous weapon” and “bodily injury,” are derived from the United States Sentencing Guidelines. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1 cmt. n.1 (2012). Virtually any object can be a dangerous weapon depending on the manner in which it is used. For illustrations of objects that have been used in a manner that would render them “deadly or danger- ous,” e.g., desk, garden rake, and wine bottle, see United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143 (4th Cir. 1994) and cases cited therein.

A misdemeanor conviction under § 111(a)(1) does not require underlying assaultive conduct. See United States v. Williams, 602 F.3d 313, 318 (5th Cir. 2010).

2.8	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.08A

BANKRUPTCY: CONCEALMENT OF ASSETS (BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING PENDING)
18 U.S.C. § 152 (FIRST PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 152, makes it a crime for anyone to conceal property belonging to the estate of a debtor in bankruptcy.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That there existed a proceeding in bank- ruptcy;

Second: That certain property belonged to the bank- rupt estate;

Third: That defendant concealed such property from the creditors [custodian] [trustee] [marshal] [some person] charged with control or custody of such prop- erty; and

Fourth: That the defendant did so knowingly and fraudulently.

The word “conceal” means to secrete, falsify, mutilate, fraudulently transfer, withhold information or knowledge required by law to be made known, or to take any action preventing discovery. Since the offense of concealment is a continuing one, the acts of conceal- ment may have begun before as well as after the bank- ruptcy proceeding began.

It is no defense that the concealment may have proved unsuccessful. Even though the property in ques- tion may have been recovered for the debtor's estate, the defendant still may be guilty of the offense charged.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.08A

Similarly, it is no defense that there was no demand by any offi of the court or creditor for the property alleged to have been concealed. Demand on the defendant for such property is not necessary in or- der to establish concealment.

An act is done fraudulently if done with intent to deceive or cheat any creditor, trustee, or bankruptcy judge.
Note

The elements of this off	are listed in United States v.
Spurlin, 664 F.3d 954, 960 (5th Cir. 2011).
The definitions of “conceal” and “fraudulently” may also apply to prosecution under the other paragraphs of § 152.

Section 152(1) “does not have as an element proof of a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity.” United States v. Maturin, 488 F.3d 657, 662 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that none of the ele- ments of § 152 constitute “a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern” that, under  the  Mandatory  Victims  Restitution  Act,  18  U.S.C.
§ 3663(a)(2), would broaden the scope of restitution).

With respect to jury instructions for prosecutions under the seventh paragraph of 18 U.S.C. § 152, see United States v. West, 22 F.3d 586 (5th Cir. 1994), and United States v. Moody, 923 F.2d
341 (5th Cir. 1991).

2.8	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.08B

BANKRUPTCY: PRESENTING OR USING A FALSE CLAIM (BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDING PENDING)
18 U.S.C. § 152 (FOURTH PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 152, makes it a crime for anyone to present [use] a false claim in any bankruptcy proceeding.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That there existed a proceeding in bank- ruptcy;

Second: That the defendant personally [by or as agent, proxy, attorney] presented [used] a claim for proof against the estate of a debtor;

Third: That such claim was false; and

Fourth: That such claim was presented [used] knowingly and fraudulently.

An act is done “fraudulently” if done with intent to deceive or cheat any creditor, trustee, or bankruptcy judge.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.09A

BRIBING A PUBLIC OFFICIAL 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)

2.09A

Title 18, United States Code, Section 201(b)(1), makes it a crime for anyone to bribe a public offi
For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant directly or indirectly gave [off	[promised]   something   of   value   to 
——————————— (insert name of public offi or person selected to be a public official), a public official [person who has been selected to be a public offi
and

Second: That the defendant did so corruptly with intent to influence an official act by the public official [persuade the public official to omit an act in violation of his lawful duty] [persuade the public official to do an act in violation of his lawful duty].

The term “public official” means Member of Con- gress, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, either before or after such official has qualified, or an officer or employee of or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the District of Colum- bia, in any offi   function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of Government, or a juror.

[The term “person selected to be a public offi
means any person who has been nominated or ap-

2.9	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
tion on any matter, question, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such offi	offi	capacity, or in such offi place of trust or profit.]

An act is “corruptly” done if it is done intentionally with an unlawful purpose.
Note

Similar instructions were used in United States v. Franco, 632 F.3d 880 (5th Cir. 2011), United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325,
348 (5th Cir. 2009), and United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1379–80 & n.16 (5th Cir. 1995). United States v. Pankhurst, 118 F.3d 345, 351 (5th Cir. 1997), describes the elements. “The federal bribery statute ‘has been accurately characterized as a comprehen- sive statute applicable to all persons performing activities for or on behalf of the United States, whatever the form of delegation of authority.’ ’’ United States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Dixson v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 1172 (1984)). This instruction charges a violation of § 201(b)(1)(A) or (C), but does not charge a violation of § 201(b)(1)(B). The second element should be modified in such a case.
“Public offi	and “offi	act” are defi	by 18 U.S.C.
§§ 201(a)(1) and (3). See also Franco, 632 F.32d at 886 (finding no plain error to define “public official” to include “an employee of a private corporation who acts for or on behalf of the federal govern- ment pursuant to a contract”). The term “person who has been selected to be a public official” is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2). For a useful discussion of “public official,” see Baymon, 312 F.3d at 728–29 (the fact that a supervisory cook at a federal correctional facility was a federal employee with official functions was sufficient to support a finding, under a plain error standard, that he was a “public official”), United States v. Thomas, 240 F.3d 445, 446–48 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that a guard employed by a private company operating a detention facility under a contract with the Immigration and Naturalization Service is a “public official”), and United States v. Wilson, 408 F. App'x 798, 806 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that a construction manager for waterway improvements employed by United States Army Corps of Engineers post-Katrina rebuilding is a “public official”). For a discussion of the scope of “of- ficial act,” see United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 325–26 (5th Cir. 1998).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.09B

2.09B

RECEIVING BRIBE BY A PUBLIC OFFICIAL 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(2)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 201(b)(2), makes it a crime for a public official to demand [seek] [receive] [accept] [agree to receive or accept] a bribe. For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant, a public official [person selected to be a public offi directly or indirectly demanded [sought] [received] [accepted] [agreed to receive or accept] personally [for another person] [for an entity] something of value; and

Second: That the defendant did so corruptly in return for being influenced in his performance of an of- ficial act [persuaded to omit any act in violation of his official duty] [persuaded to do any act in violation of his official duty].

The term “public official” means Member of Con- gress, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, either before or after such official has qualified, or an officer or employee of or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the District of Colum- bia, in any offi   function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of Government, or a juror.

[The term “person selected to be a public offi
means any person who has been nominated or ap-

2.09B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
tion on any matter, question, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such offi	offi	capacity, or in such offi place of trust or profit.] An act is “corruptly” done if it is done intentionally with an unlawful purpose.
Note

“Public offi	and “offi	act” are defi	by 18 U.S.C.
§§ 201(a)(1) and (3). “Person selected to be a public offi is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2). For a useful discussion of “public official,” see United States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 728–29 (5th Cir. 2002) (the fact that a supervisory cook at a federal correctional facility was a federal employee with official functions was sufficient to support a finding, under a plain error standard, that he was a “public offi	and United States v. Thomas, 240 F.3d 445, 446–48 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that a guard employed by a private company operating a detention facility under a contract with the Immigration and Naturalization Service is a “public official”). For a discussion of the scope of “official act,” see United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 325–26 (5th Cir. 1998).

To find bribery, the jury is required to find that a public of- ficial accepted a thing of value in return for being influenced in the performance of an official act. See United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 938 (5th Cir. 1995) (fi	the evidence suffi to support the bribery conviction).

For the meaning of “corruptly,” see United States v. Brunson, 882 F.2d 151, 154 (5th Cir. 1989) (discussing the meaning of “cor- ruptly” in the context of “receipt of commissions or gifts for procur- ing loans,” 18 U.S.C. § 215).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.09C

2.09C

ILLEGAL GRATUITY TO A PUBLIC OFFICIAL 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 201(c)(l)(A), makes it a crime for anyone to give [off [promise] anything of value to a public official for [because of] an official act performed [to be performed] by that official. For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant directly or indirectly gave [off	[promised]   something   of   value   to 
——————————— (name of offi	a public offi [former public official] [person selected to be a public of- ficial]; and

Second: That the defendant did so for [because of] an official act performed [to be performed] by the public offi other than as provided by law for the proper discharge of his official duty. The term “public official” means Member of Congress, Delegate, or Resident Com- missioner, either before or after such official has quali- fied, or an officer or employee of or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the District of Columbia, in any official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of Government, or a juror.

[The term “person selected to be a public offi means a person who has been nominated or appointed to be a public offi	or has been offi	informed that such person will be nominated or appointed.]

[The term “offi  act” means any decision or ac- tion on any matter, question, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or

2.09C	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
which may by law be brought before any public official, in such offi	offi	capacity, or in such offi place of trust or profit.]
Note

“Public offi	and “offi	act” are defi	by 18 U.S.C.
§§ 201(a)(1) and (3). The term “person selected to be a public of- ficial” is defined by 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(2). For a useful discussion of “public official,” see United States v. Baymon, 312 F.3d 725, 728–29 (5th Cir. 2002) (the fact that a supervisory cook at a federal cor- rectional facility was a federal employee with official functions was sufficient to support a finding, under a plain error standard, that he was a “public official”), and United States v. Thomas, 240 F.3d 445, 446–48 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that a guard employed by a private company operating a detention facility under a contract with the Immigration and Naturalization Service is a “public official”). For a discussion of the scope of “official act,” see United States v. Parker, 133 F.3d 322, 325–26 (5th Cir. 1998).
The term “corruptly” is not used here because, unlike the crimes covered by 18 U.S.C. § 201(b), those covered by 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(c) do not include “corruptly” as an element. For the intent el- ement required for crimes covered by § 201(c), see United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 119 S. Ct. 1402, 1411 (1999) (“[T]he Government must prove a link between a thing of value conferred upon a public official and a specific ‘official act’ for or because of which it was given.”).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.09D

2.09D

RECEIVING ILLEGAL GRATUITY BY A PUBLIC OFFICIAL
18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(B)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 201(c)(l)(B), makes it a crime for a public official to demand [seek] [receive] [accept] [agree to receive or accept] anything of value personally for [because of] an offi act performed [to be performed] by that official.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant was a public official [for- mer public offi [person selected to be a public of- ficial];

Second: That the defendant directly or indirectly demanded [sought] [received] [accepted] [agreed to receive or accept] something of value personally other than as provided by law for the proper discharge of his official duty; and

Third: That the defendant did so for [because of] an offi act performed [to be performed] by the defendant.

The term “public official” means Member of Con- gress, Delegate, or Resident Commissioner, either before or after such official has qualified, or an officer or employee of or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof, including the District of Colum- bia, in any offi   function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of Government, or a juror.

[The term “person selected to be a public offi

2.09D	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
means any person who has been nominated or ap- pointed to be a public offi	or has been offi
informed  that  such  person  will  be  nominated  or appointed.]

[The term “offi	act” means any decision or ac- tion on any matter, question, cause, suit, proceeding, or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such offi	offi		capacity, or in such offi place of trust or profit.]
Note

See Note to Instruction No. 2.09C, Illegal Gratuity to a Public Official, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.10

2.10

BRIBERY OR REWARD OF A BANK OFFICER 18 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 215(a)(1), makes it a crime for anyone to corruptly give [off [promise] anything of value to any person with intent to infl	[reward] an offi	[director] [employee] [agent] [attorney] of a fi	institution in connec- tion with any business [transaction] of such institution. For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant gave [offered] [promised] something   of   value   in   excess   of   $1,000   to
———————————; and
Second: That the defendant did so corruptly with the intent to influence [reward] ———————————, an offi      [director] [employee] [agent] [attorney] of the fi	institution, in connection with any business [transaction] of that institution.

An act is “corruptly” done if it is done intentionally with an unlawful purpose.

A ——————————— (refer to particular type of institution listed in § 215(b), as charged in the indict- ment) is a financial institution.
Note

See United States v. Brunson, 882 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1989), for a discussion of the meaning of the term “corruptly.” If the prosecu- tion seeks a felony conviction, the jury must determine that the value exceeds $1,000. If there is an issue as to whether the value exceeds $1,000, a lesser included offense instruction may have to be given. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).

2.11	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.11

CONSPIRACY TO DEPRIVE PERSON OF CIVIL RIGHTS
18 U.S.C. § 241

Title 18, United States Code, Section 241, makes it a crime for two or more persons to conspire to injure [oppress] [threaten] [intimidate] any person in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to the person by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant entered into a conspiracy to injure [oppress] [threaten] [intimidate] one or more persons; and

Second: That the defendant specifically intended by the conspiracy to hinder [prevent] [interfere with]
———————————’s enjoyment of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.

[Third: That bodily injury resulted from the defen- dant's conduct.]

[Third: That the defendant's conduct included the use [attempted use] [threatened use] of a dangerous weapon [explosive].]

[Third: That ——————————— died as a result of acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. The government need not prove that the defendant intended for the person to die. It must prove that the person's death was a foreseeable result of the defendant's conduct.]

[Third: That the defendant's conduct included

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.11

kidnapping [an attempt to kidnap] [aggravated sexual abuse] [an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse] [an attempt to kill].]

The indictment charges that the defendant con- spired to deprive ——————————— of the following right: ——————————— (describe, e.g., right to travel, to vote, to enjoy equal access to public accommodations). You are instructed that this right is one secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Note

Certain constitutional rights, e.g., those under the Fourteenth Amendment, protect an individual only against state action, not against wrongs by individuals. If these rights are the subject of the 18 U.S.C. § 241 case, the instruction must also require the jury to fi that the defendant acted “under color of law.” See United States v. Guest, 86 S. Ct. 1170 (1966) (state action required for equal protection violation but not for violation of right to travel); Wilkins v. United States, 376 F.2d 552, 561 (5th Cir. 1967) (interfering with assembly to protest denial of voting rights violates
§ 241, even absent state action); definition under Instruction No. 2.12, Deprivation of Civil Rights, 18 U.S.C. § 242; see also United States v. Guidry, 456 F.3d 493, 507 (5th Cir. 2006) (intent to interfere with victim's due process right to bodily integrity); United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811 (5th Cir. 1979) (intent-death).

Section 241 “would not reach every conspiracy that affected a federal right, but only a conspiracy whose ‘predominant purpose’ was to deter or punish the exercise of the federal right.” See Kinney v. Weaver, 367 F.3d 337, 355 n.22 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Guest, 86 S. Ct. at 1179).

This instruction should be accompanied by an instruction on conspiracy. Several circuits have squarely held that for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 241, the government need not prove an overt act. See, e.g., United States v. Colvin, 353 F.3d 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1301 (10th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit has rendered confl	dicta on this point. Compare United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 1972) (not required), with United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1099 (5th Cir. 1991) (required).
The statute provides for enhancement of punishment if a death results from the acts committed or if such acts include kidnapping

2.11	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill. If the indictment alleges any enhancement element, it should be submit- ted to the jury. See 18 U.S.C. § 241.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.12

DEPRIVATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS 18 U.S.C. § 242

2.12

Title 18, United States Code, Section 242, makes it a crime for anyone, acting under color of law, willfully to deprive any person of a right secured by the Consti- tution or laws of the United States.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant deprived the person of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States by committing one or more of the acts charged in the indictment;

Second: That the defendant acted willfully, that is, that the defendant committed such act or acts with a bad purpose or evil motive to disobey or disregard the law, specifically intending to deprive the person of that right; and
Third: That the defendant acted under color of law. [Fourth: That bodily injury resulted from the
defendant's conduct.]

[Fourth: That the defendant's conduct included the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosive, or fire.]

[Fourth: That ——————————— died as a result of defendant's conduct.]

[Fourth: That the defendant's conduct included kidnapping [an attempt to kidnap] [aggravated sexual abuse] [an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse] [an attempt to kill].]

2.12	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The indictment charges that the defendant deprived
————— of the following right: ——————————— (de- scribe, e.g., right to vote, to enjoy equal access to public accommodations, to due process of law). You are instructed that this right is one secured by the Consti- tution and laws of the United States.

To find that the defendant was acting willfully, it is not necessary for you to find that the defendant knew the specific Constitutional provision or federal law that his conduct violated. But the defendant must have a specific intent to deprive the person of a right protected by the Constitution or federal law.

Acting “under color of law” means acts done under any state law, county or city ordinance, or other governmental regulation, and acts done according to a custom of some governmental agency. It means that the defendant acted in his official capacity or else claimed to do so, but abused or misused his power by going be- yond the bounds of lawful authority. [If a private citi- zen is charged, substitute the following: A private person acts “under color of law” if that person willfully participates in joint activity with someone that person knows to be a public official.]

[“Bodily injury” means (A) a cut, abrasion, bruise, burn, or disfi	(B) physical pain; (C) illness;
(D) impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or (E) any other injury to the body, no matter how temporary.]

[The government need not prove that the defendant intended for the person to die. The government must prove that the death was a foreseeable result of the defendant's willful deprivation of the person's constitu- tional rights.]

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.12

[In the event of an enhancement for aggravated sexual abuse or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, include the following:

A person commits “aggravated sexual abuse” if defendant knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act (1) by using force against that other person; or (2) by threatening or placing that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping.

The term “sexual act” means: (A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus; (B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus; (C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital open- ing of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or (D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.

To find that the defendant used force, you need not find that the defendant was violent. A defendant uses force within the meaning of “aggravated sexual abuse” when defendant employs restraint sufficient to prevent the alleged victim from escaping sexual conduct, or the use of a threat of harm suffi to coerce or compel submission by the alleged victim. Force can also be implied from a disparity in size and coercive power be- tween the defendant and the alleged victim. It is not necessary to fi that the defendant used actual violence against the defendant's alleged victim. Consent that is the product of official intimidation, harassment, or coercion is not true consent at all.]

2.12	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Note
The test for determining which rights are encompassed by this statute is the same as the test for qualified immunity in civil cases. In United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219 (1997), the Supreme Court held that the defendant was entitled to “fair warning” that his conduct deprived his victim of a constitutional right, and that the standard for determining the adequacy of that warning was the same as the standard for determining whether a constitutional right was “clearly established” under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See also Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2515 (2002). Therefore, the statute covers rights that have been “made specific” either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the United States or by deci- sions interpreting them. This is generally a question of law.
The trial judge should be careful to identify the precise constitutional or statutory right that is being deprived before instructing. The substantive due process “shocks the conscience” test should be off only in the absence of a more particular constitutional infringement, as this latter test is quite difficult to satisfy. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865, 1870 (1989) (where constitutional claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to that specific provision, not under the rubric of substantive due process); United States v. Guidry, 456 F.3d 493, 506 n.8 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that because victim was in police custody at time of sexual assault, “this civil rights violation may have been more appropriately analyzed using the Fourth Amendment,” with its balancing test, rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, with its heightened in- quiry into whether the police behavior shocked the conscience).

In United States v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806, 830–32 (5th Cir. 2012), the court held that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for denying a decedent's descendants and survivors the civil right of access to courts. The court analogized the government's “novel theory of criminal liability” to a civil action, in which a plaintiff must identify “a nonfrivolous underlying claim” to maintain a “backward-looking” access to the court claim. Id. at 830–81. Although the government introduced evidence of the decedent's survivors, it did not present evidence that any survivor intended to file a lawsuit. Id. at 831. The court concluded that the government's failure to present evidence “of an actual cause of ac- tion that an actual person lost is critical because it makes it impos- sible to assess, as we must, whether the person's claim would be non-frivolous.” Id. at 831.

In United States v. Kerley, 643 F.2d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 1981), the court reversed a conviction where the jury had been instructed

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.12

that it must fi the defendant “knowingly and intentionally exerted force that he knew to be unlawful” because it had not also been instructed that willfully means acting “with a bad purpose or motive.” The Committee believes that the combination of the defi- nition of the word “willfully” provided in the second element of the instruction and the explanation of “willfully” as not requiring par- ticular knowledge of the Constitution adequately covers all case law. See also United States v. Gonzales, 436 F.3d 560, 570 (5th Cir. 2006) (approving “willfulness” instruction in 18 U.S.C. § 242 case derived from case law and Instruction No. 1.38).

The definition of bodily injury is derived from Gonzales, 436 F.3d at 575 (adopting the definition of bodily injury provided in 18 U.S.C. §§ 831(f)(5), 1365(h)(4), 1515(a)(5), and 1864(d)(2) in cases
in which use of force is not part of the underlying constitutional violation). For a charge in which excessive force was part of the underlying constitutional violation, the Gonzales court followed United States v. Brugman, 364 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2004), and used the same “bodily injury” requirement as for the constitutional excessive force violation.

For a discussion of “aggravated sexual abuse,” see United States v. Simmons, 470 F.3d 1115, 1120–21 (5th Cir. 2006), United
States v. Lucas, 157 F.3d 998, 1002 (5th Cir. 1998), and United
States v. Holly, 488 F.3d 1298, 1301–04 (10th Cir. 2007). The defi- nition of “aggravated sexual abuse” in these cases is derived from 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a).
The defi	of “sexual act” is derived from 18 U.S.C.
§ 2246(2) and should be modifi to fi the facts of a particular case.
The term “foreseeable” is not unduly technical or outside the common understanding of a jury and thus requires no definition. United States v. Moore, 708 F.3d 639, 647 (5th Cir. 2013).

2.13	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.13

CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD THE GOVERNMENT WITH RESPECT TO CLAIMS 18 U.S.C. § 286

Title 18, United States Code, Section 286, makes it a crime for anyone to enter into any agreement, combination, or conspiracy to defraud the United States or any department or agency thereof by obtaining [or aiding to obtain] the payment [or allowance] of any false, fictitious or fraudulent claim.
The  defendant  is  charged  with  conspiring  to
————— (describe the object of the conspiracy as al- leged in the indictment).

A “conspiracy” is an agreement between two or more persons to join together to accomplish some unlawful purpose. It is a kind of “partnership in crime” in which each member becomes the agent of every other member.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant and at least one other person made an agreement to commit the crime of ——— (describe), as charged in the indictment;

Second: That the defendant knew the unlawful purpose of the agreement and joined in it with the intent to further the unlawful purpose; and

Third: The agreement was to defraud the United States, or any department or agency thereof, by obtain- ing or aiding to obtain the payment or allowance of any claim based on a false, fictitious or fraudulent material representation.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.13

The word “defraud” here is not limited to its ordinary meaning of cheating the government out of money or property; it also includes impairing, obstruct- ing, defeating, or interfering with the lawful function of the government or one of its agencies by dishonest means.

A representation is “material” if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the person or entity to which it is addressed.

One may become a member of a conspiracy without knowing all the details of the unlawful scheme or the identities of all the other alleged conspirators. If a defendant understands the unlawful nature of a plan or scheme and knowingly and intentionally joins in that plan or scheme on one occasion, that is suffi to convict him or her for conspiracy even though the defendant had not participated before and even though the defendant played only a minor part.

The government need not prove that the alleged conspirators entered into any formal agreement, nor that they directly stated between themselves all the details of the scheme. Similarly, the government need not prove that all of the details of the scheme alleged in the indictment were actually agreed upon or carried out. Nor must it prove that all the persons alleged to have been members of the conspiracy were such, or that the alleged conspirators actually succeeded in ac- complishing their unlawful objectives.

Mere presence at the scene of an event, even with knowledge that a crime is being committed, or the mere fact that certain persons may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interest, does not nec- essarily establish proof of the existence of a conspiracy. Also, a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way that advances some

2.13	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
purpose of a conspiracy, does not thereby become a conspirator.
Note

The issue of whether materiality is an element of the offense is unsettled. The term is not included in the statute. There is authority requiring proof of materiality under § 286. See United States v. Saybolt, 577 F.3d 195, 202–04 (3d Cir. 2009). This derives from the fact that the statute requires a conspiracy “to defraud”, which in turn implicitly requires materiality. See Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1841 (1999) (“the common law could not have conceived of ‘fraud’ without proof of materiality”).

The Fifth Circuit addressed the issue of materiality in United States v. Barrera, 444 F. App'x 16 (5th Cir. 2011). If the court determines that materiality is an element of the offense, the fol- lowing language was included in Barrera:

“Furthermore, where the conspiracy allegedly involves the making of false and fraudulent statements, § 286 requires proof that ‘the conspirators agreed that those statements or representa- tions would have a material effect on the Government's decision to pay a false, fictitious, or fraudulent claim.’ ’’ Id. at 23 (citing Saybolt, 577 F.3d at 205).

The defi	of “defraud” is derived from United States v.
Clark, 139 F.3d 485, 488–89 (5th Cir. 1998).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.14

2.14

FALSE CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT 18 U.S.C. § 287

Title 18, United States Code, Section 287, makes it a crime to knowingly make a false [fraudulent] claim against any department or agency of the United States.

The ——————————— (name of department or agency) is a department [agency] of the United States within the meaning of that law.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly presented to a department [agency] of the United States a false [fraud- ulent] claim against the United States;

Second: That the defendant knew that the claim represented was false [fraudulent]; and

Third: That the false [fraudulent] claim was material.

A claim is “material” if it has a natural tendency to infl	or is capable of infl	the agency to which it was addressed. It is not necessary to show, however, that the government agency was in fact deceived or misled.

The defendant need not directly submit or present the claim to an employee or agency of the United States. It is sufficient if the defendant submits the claim to a third party knowing that the third party will submit the claim or seek reimbursement from the United States or a department or agency thereof.

2.14	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Note

The issue of whether materiality is an element of the offense is unsettled. The term is not included in the statute. The Fifth Circuit has previously not included materiality as an element of this off    See United States v. Burns, 162 F.3d 840, 850 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Upton, 91 F.3d 677 (5th Cir. 1996). The continued vitality of that holding, however, is called into ques- tion by Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1841 (1999).

A panel of the Fifth Circuit recommended, in dicta, that a materiality instruction be included. See United States v. Foster, 229 F.3d 1196 & n.1 (5th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. Clark, 577 F.3d 273 (5th Cir. 2009).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.15A

2.15A

CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT OFFENSE 18 U.S.C. § 371

Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, makes it a crime for anyone to conspire with someone else to commit an offense against the laws of the United States.
The  defendant  is  charged  with  conspiring  to
————— (describe the object of the conspiracy as al- leged in the indictment).

A “conspiracy” is an agreement between two or more persons to join together to accomplish some unlawful purpose. It is a kind of “partnership in crime” in which each member becomes the agent of every other member.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant and at least one other person made an agreement to commit the crime of ——— (describe), as charged in the indictment;

Second: That the defendant knew the unlawful purpose of the agreement and joined in it willfully, that is, with the intent to further the unlawful purpose; and

Third: That one of the conspirators during the exis- tence of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one of the overt acts described in the indictment, in or- der to accomplish some object or purpose of the conspiracy.

One may become a member of a conspiracy without knowing all the details of the unlawful scheme or the identities of all the other alleged conspirators. If a defendant understands the unlawful nature of a plan or

2.15	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
scheme and knowingly and intentionally joins in that plan or scheme on one occasion, that is suffi to convict him for conspiracy even though the defendant had not participated before and even though the defendant played only a minor part.

The government need not prove that the alleged conspirators entered into any formal agreement, nor that they directly stated between themselves all the details of the scheme. Similarly, the government need not prove that all of the details of the scheme alleged in the indictment were actually agreed upon or carried out. Nor must it prove that all of the persons alleged to have been members of the conspiracy were such, or that the alleged conspirators actually succeeded in ac- complishing their unlawful objectives.

Mere presence at the scene of an event, even with knowledge that a crime is being committed, or the mere fact that certain persons may have associated with each other, and may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests, does not necessarily estab- lish proof of the existence of a conspiracy. Also, a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who hap- pens to act in a way which advances some purpose of a conspiracy, does not thereby become a conspirator.
Note

For the elements of the off     see United States v. Njoku, 737 F.3d 55, 63–66 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Brooks, 681 F.3d 678, 698 (5th Cir. 2012) (discussing this instruction); United States v. Coleman, 609 F.3d 699, 704 (5th Cir. 2010); United States
v. Peterson, 244 F.3d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Richards, 204 F.3d 177, 208 (5th Cir. 2000); and United States v. Soape, 169 F.3d 257, 264 (5th Cir. 1999).
The third element should be deleted for alleged conspiracies where an overt act is not required by statute and is not charged in the indictment. The trial judge should research the particular object offense charged in the indictment to determine whether con- spiracy to commit the offense requires proof of an overt act. For

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.15A

examples of conspiracies that do not require proof of overt acts, see Instruction No. 2.95, Controlled Substances—Conspiracy, 21
U.S.C. § 846, and Whitfield v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 687 (2005) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h)).

Conspiracy to commit a particular substantive offense requires at least the degree of criminal intent necessary to commit the substantive off   itself. See Peterson, 244 F.3d at 389; Soape, 169 F.3d at 264; United States v. Bordelon, 871 F.2d 591 (5th Cir.
1989); United States v. Massey, 827 F.2d 995, 1001 (5th Cir. 1987). Because “[t]he two states of mind are almost always one, or tend to collapse into one,” United States v. Chagra, 807 F.2d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 1986), the proposed instruction will adequately cover the vast majority of cases. If the substantive offense requires “a special state of mind (such as malice aforethought or premeditation),” fur- ther instruction on intent would be necessary. United States v. Thomas, 768 F.2d 611, 618 n.5 (5th Cir. 1985); see United States v.
Harrelson, 754 F.2d 1153, 1171–74 (5th Cir. 1985).

Failure to instruct on the “object” crime of a conspiracy is at least “serious” error, if not plain error. United States v. Smithers, 27 F.3d 142, 144–45 (5th Cir. 1994). If the object is charged in an- other count of the indictment, the instruction can be by reference to that portion of the charge. See United States v. Armstrong, 619 F.3d 380, 386 (5th Cir. 2010). Otherwise, the court must charge on the elements of the object crime along with the conspiracy charge.

This instruction has been quoted with approval in Coleman, 609 F.3d at 705 n.2, and United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325,
354 (5th Cir. 2009).
For multiple conspiracies or a conspirator's liability for a substantive count, see Instruction Nos. 2.16 and 2.17.

2.15B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.15B

CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD
18 U.S.C. § 371 (SECOND CLAUSE)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 371, makes it a crime for anyone to conspire with someone else to defraud the United States or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose.

The defendant is charged with conspiring to de- fraud the United States by ——————————— (de- scribe means, e.g., impairing, obstructing, or defeating the lawful function of the Internal Revenue Service in the ascertainment, assessment or collection of income taxes due).

The word “defraud” here is not limited to its ordinary meaning of cheating the government out of money or property; it also includes impairing, obstruct- ing, defeating, or interfering with the lawful function of the government or one of its agencies by dishonest means.

A “conspiracy” is an agreement between two or more persons to join together to accomplish some unlawful purpose. It is a kind of “partnership in crime,” in which each member becomes the agent of every other member.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant and at least one other person made an agreement to defraud the government or one of its agencies, as charged in the indictment;

Second: That the defendant knew that the purpose of the agreement was to defraud the government and

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.15B

joined in it willfully, that is, with the intent to defraud; and

Third: That one of the conspirators during the exis- tence of the conspiracy knowingly committed at least one of the overt acts described in the indictment, in or- der to accomplish some object or purpose of the conspiracy.

One may become a member of a conspiracy without knowing all the details of the unlawful scheme or the identities of all the other alleged conspirators. If a defendant understands the unlawful nature of a plan or scheme on one occasion, that is sufficient to convict him for conspiracy even though the defendant had not participated before and even though the defendant played only a minor part.

The government need not prove that the alleged conspirators entered into any formal agreement, nor that they directly stated between themselves all the details of the scheme. Similarly, the government need not prove that all of the details of the scheme alleged in the indictment were actually agreed upon or carried out. Nor must it prove that all the persons alleged to have been members of the conspiracy were such, or that the alleged conspirators actually succeeded in ac- complishing their unlawful objectives.

Mere presence at the scene of an event, even with knowledge that a crime is being committed, or the mere fact that certain persons may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests, does not necessarily establish proof of the existence of a conspiracy. Also, a person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way that ad- vances some purpose of a conspiracy, does not thereby become a conspirator.

2.15	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Note

For the scope of the conspiracy to defraud the government clause, see Dennis v. United States, 86 S. Ct. 1840, 1844 (1966),
United States v. Johnson, 86 S. Ct. 749, 751 (1966), Hammer-
schmidt v. United States, 44 S. Ct. 511 (1924), Haas v. Henkel, 30
S. Ct. 249, 254 (1910), United States v. Martin, 332 F.3d 827, 834–35 (5th Cir. 2003), and United States v. Montalvo, 820 F.2d 686, 689 (5th Cir 1987).
The defi	of “defraud” is derived from United States v.
Clark, 139 F.3d 485, 488–89 (5th Cir. 1998).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.16

MULTIPLE CONSPIRACIES

2.16

You must determine whether the conspiracy charged in the indictment existed, and, if it did, whether the defendant was a member of it. If you find that the conspiracy charged did not exist, then you must return a not guilty verdict, even though you find that some other conspiracy existed. If you fi that a defendant was not a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment, then you must fi  that defendant not guilty, even though that defendant may have been a member of some other conspiracy.
Note

A multiple conspiracies instruction is generally required where the indictment charges several defendants with one overall con- spiracy, but the proof at trial indicates that some of the defendants were only involved in separate conspiracies unrelated to the over- all conspiracy charged in the indictment. See United States v. Carba- jal, 290 F.3d 277, 291 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Neal, 27 F.3d 1035, 1052 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Castaneda-Cantu, 20 F.3d 1325, 1333 (5th Cir. 1994). When evidence arguably raises a question of multiple conspiracies, a defendant, upon request, is entitled to an instruction on that theory. See United States v. Cavin, 39 F.3d 1299, 1310 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Stowell, 947 F.2d 1251, 1258 (5th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Cyprian,
197 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that because the defendant made no request, the absence of a multiple conspiracies jury instruction is not “plain error”); Castaneda-Cantu, 20 F.3d at 1334 (reviewing under an abuse of discretion standard when defendant timely makes the request, but is denied).
For a discussion of the primary factors in determining whether a single conspiracy or multiple conspiracies have been proved, see United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d 539, 548–49 (5th Cir. 2014),
United States v. Olguin, 643 F.3d 384, 394–95 (5th Cir. 2011),
United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 770–71 (5th Cir. 2007), United States v. Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d 307, 315–17 (5th Cir. 1999), United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 858–59 (5th Cir.
1997), United States v. Fields, 72 F.3d 1200, 1210–11 (5th Cir.
1996), and United States v. Morris, 46 F.3d 410, 415–17 (5th Cir.
1995).

2.16	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
This instruction was cited with approval in United States v. Castillo, 77 F.3d 1480, 1491–92 (5th Cir. 1996), and United States
v. Thomas, 12 F.3d 1350, 1357 n.4 (5th Cir. 1994). A similar but longer jury instruction on multiple conspiracies was quoted with approval in Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d at 316 n.2, United States v. Pena-Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 1120, 1128–29, 1129 n.9 (5th Cir. 1997), and United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929, 936–37 (5th Cir. 1994).

In view of the trial court's multiple conspiracies charge, it was not error to refuse a requested jury instruction that the jury must unanimously agree that the defendant participated in one particu- lar conspiracy out of several. See United States v. Royal, 972 F.2d 643, 648 (5th Cir. 1992).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.17

CONSPIRATOR'S LIABILITY FOR SUBSTANTIVE COUNT

2.17

A conspirator is responsible for offenses committed by another [other] conspirator[s] if the conspirator was a member of the conspiracy when the offense was com- mitted and if the offense was committed in furtherance of, or as a foreseeable consequence of, the conspiracy.

Therefore, if you have fi found the defendant guilty of the conspiracy charged in Count ————— and if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that during the time the defendant was a member of that conspiracy, another [other] conspirator[s] committed the offense[s] in Count[s] ————— in furtherance of and as a foresee- able consequence of that conspiracy, then you may find the defendant guilty of Count[s] —————, even though the defendant may not have participated in any of the acts  which  constitute  the  off	described in Count[s] —————.
Note

This instruction charges the jury on the Pinkerton principle. Pinkerton v. United States, 66 S. Ct. 1180, 1184 (1946). This instruction was cited with approval in United States v. Thomas, 348 F.3d 78, 84–85 (5th Cir. 2003).

Proof of a conspiracy will not support a conviction on substan- tive counts in the absence of a Pinkerton instruction informing the jury that the defendant could be deemed guilty of substantive counts committed by a co-conspirator in furtherance of a conspir- acy in which the defendant participated. See United States v. Polk, 56 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 1995).
This disjunctive instruction was approved against a challenge that the government should have to prove both that the off
was committed “in furtherance of” the conspiracy and that it was “a foreseeable consequence of” the conspiracy. See United States v. Armstrong, 619 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that instruc- tion was proper, but noting that the First Circuit requires both be

2.17	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
proved); United States v. Dean, 59 F.3d 1479, 1490 n.18 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[A]t a minimum, a proper Pinkerton instruction should at least state clearly that the defendant can be convicted of a substan- tive crime committed by his co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy.”). The Committee warns the trial judge that there is a circuit split on this issue.
This instruction was approved against a challenge that the second paragraph did not suffi	distinguish between two conspiracies and the multiple substantive counts relating to each. See United States v. Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 613–14 (5th Cir. 2013).

A defendant is not liable under the Pinkerton theory for an ad- ditional conspiracy offense committed by his confederates, but only for a substantive offense. See Armstrong, 619 F.3d at 387 (finding no plain error because the prosecutor made it plain in closing argument that Pinkerton liability applies only to substantive crimes).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.18

CONSPIRACY—WITHDRAWAL

2.18

The defendant has raised the affirmative defense of withdrawal from the conspiracy.

A member of a conspiracy remains in the conspir- acy unless he can show that at some point he completely withdrew from the conspiracy. A partial or temporary withdrawal is not sufficient. The defense of withdrawal requires the defendant to make a substantial showing that he took some affi	step to terminate or abandon his participation in the conspiracy. In other words, the defendant must demonstrate some type of affi	action that disavowed or defeated the purpose of the conspiracy. This would include, for example, voluntarily going to the police or other law enforcement officials and telling them about the plan; telling the other conspirators that he did not want to have anything more to do with it; or any other affirma- tive acts that were inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and communicated in a way reasonably likely to reach the other members. Merely doing noth- ing or just avoiding contact with other members is not enough.

The defendant has the burden of proving with- drawal from the conspiracy by a preponderance of the evidence. To prove something by a preponderance of the evidence means to prove that it is more likely so than not so. This is a lesser burden of proof than to prove something beyond a reasonable doubt. “Prepon- derance of the evidence” is determined by considering all the evidence and deciding what evidence is more convincing. You should consider the relevant testimony of all witnesses, regardless of who may have called them, and all the relevant exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may have produced them. If the evi- dence appears to be equally balanced, or if you cannot

2.18	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
say upon which side it weighs more heavily, you must resolve this question against the defendant.

The fact that the defendant has raised this defense, however, does not relieve the government of its initial burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that there was an unlawful agreement and that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily joined it.
Note
Withdrawal is typically raised in the following situations: (1) as a defense to Pinkerton liability, when the defendant claims he withdrew from the conspiracy prior to the commission of substan- tive offenses by other conspirators; (2) as a defense based on the statute of limitations, when the defendant claims that his involve- ment in the conspiracy ended beyond the limitations period; or (3) as a defense to the conspiracy charge itself, when the defendant claims withdrawal prior to the commission of any overt act and the charged conspiracy requires an overt act.
The third situation would not apply to conspiracies such as drug-traffi	conspiracies charged under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 or 963 or money-laundering conspiracies charged under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(h), which do not require proof of an overt act. See United States v. Salazar, 751 F.3d 326, 31 (5th Cir. 2014) (“If the conspir- acy does not even require the commission of an overt act, a defendant can never timely withdraw and can never negate li- ability as to the conspiracy charge.”); see also Whitfield v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 687, 691 (2005); United States v. Shabani, 115 S.
Ct. 382, 386 (1994).
The judge might wish to add language to the opening para- graph explaining which situation applies in the case and emphasiz- ing whether withdrawal is raised as a defense to the conspiracy charge itself or merely to his co-conspirator's substantive offenses that allegedly occurred after withdrawal. See Smith v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 714, 719–20 (2013) (explaining that in some cases, “[w]ithdrawal terminates the defendant's liability for postwithdrawal acts of his co-conspirators, but he remains guilty of conspiracy”); Salazar, 751 F.3d at 330–31.
The components of withdrawal are stated in the following cases: United States v. Heard, 709 F.3d 413, 428 (5th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Schorovsky, 202 F.3d 727, 729 (5th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, 859–60 (5th Cir. 1998); United
States v. Torres, 114 F.3d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1997).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.18

A defendant's incarceration, by itself, does not constitute with- drawal or abandonment. See United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929, 945 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that the defendant is presumed to continue as conspirator unless he makes a “substantial affirmative showing of withdrawal”); see also United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 353 (5th Cir. 2000). Further, a conspiracy does not automati- cally terminate when the government, unbeknownst to some of the conspirators, has defeated the object of the conspiracy. See United States v. Jimenez Recio, 123 S. Ct. 819, 822–24 (2003).

The defendant has the burden of proof on this affi  defense. See Smith, 133 S. Ct. at 720; United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 383 (5th Cir. 2005); Schorovsky, 202 F.3d at 729. As with any affirmative defense, the trial court may refuse to give the withdrawal instruction if the defendant fails to submit sufficient evidence to warrant a reasonable juror finding that the defendant withdrew. United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1514 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. MMR Corp., 907 F.2d 489, 500 (5th Cir.
1990).

2.19	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.19

COUNTERFEITING 18 U.S.C. § 471

Title 18, United States Code, Section 471, makes it a crime for anyone to falsely make or counterfeit any United States money.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First:  That  the  defendant  made  counterfeit
————— (describe money or other security, e.g., United States money); and

Second: That the defendant did so with intent to defraud, that is, intending to cheat someone by making that person think the ——————————— was real.
It is not necessary, however, to prove that the defendant intended to cheat a particular person, or that the United States or anyone else was in fact cheated, so long as it is established that the accused acted with intent to cheat someone.
Note
If there is an issue as to whether the money involved is so un- like the genuine that it may not be considered “counterfeit,” the court should consider defi “counterfeit.” Although the Fifth Circuit has not expressly defined “counterfeit” for purposes of 18
U.S.C. § 471, it has, with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 473 (dealing in counterfeit obligations or securities), defined the term as follows:
A document is considered a counterfeit obligation or security of the United States if the fraudulent obligation bears such a like- ness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible, and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care dealing with a person who is supposed to be upright and honest. United States v. Scott, 159 F.3d 916, 920–21

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.19

(5th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Turner, 586 F.2d 395, 397
(5th Cir. 1978)).

Turner involved an off under 18 U.S.C. § 474 (plates or stones for counterfeiting obligations or securities). Turner cited United States v. Smith, 318 F.2d 94, 95 (4th Cir. 1963), among other cases, for the definition of “counterfeit.” Smith involved an offense under 18 U.S.C. § 472. The trial judge may wish to instruct on the definition of “counterfeit” in the appropriate case.

In United States v. Porter, 542 F.3d 1088 (5th Cir. 2008), the Fifth Circuit recognized its failure to defi “counterfeit” for purposes of § 471, and upheld the trial court's use of a Ninth Circuit pattern jury instruction. Id. at 1094.
A defendant may still violate § 471 even if he manufactured counterfeit money that “was not in any condition for circulation.” United States v. Ndemba, 463 F. App'x 396, 401 (5th Cir. 2012).

2.20	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.20

PASSING COUNTERFEIT SECURITIES OR OBLIGATIONS
18 U.S.C. § 472

Title 18, United States Code, Section 472, makes it a crime for anyone to possess [pass] [utter] [publish] [sell] [attempt to pass] [attempt to utter] [attempt to publish] [attempt to sell] counterfeit United States money with intent to defraud.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant possessed [passed] [ut- tered] [published] [sold] [attempted to pass] [attempted to utter] [attempted to publish] [attempted to sell] counterfeit money;

Second: That the defendant knew at the time that the money was counterfeit; and

Third: That the defendant possessed [passed] [ut- tered] [published] [sold] [attempted to pass] [attempted to utter] [attempted to publish] [attempted to sell] the counterfeit money with intent to defraud, that is, intending to cheat someone by making that person think the money was real.

It is not necessary, however, to prove that the defendant intended to cheat a particular person, or that the United States or anyone else was in fact cheated, so long as it is proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acted with intent to cheat someone.
Note

United States v. Acosta, 972 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1992), describes the elements. If there is an issue as to whether the money involved

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.20

is so unlike the genuine that it may not be considered “counterfeit,” the court should consider defining “counterfeit.” Although the Fifth Circuit has not expressly defined “counterfeit” for purposes of 18
U.S.C. § 472, it has, with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 473 (dealing in counterfeit obligations or securities), defined the term as follows:

A document is considered a counterfeit obligation or security of the United States if the fraudulent obligation bears such a like- ness or resemblance to any of the genuine obligations or securities issued under the authority of the United States as is calculated to deceive an honest, sensible, and unsuspecting person of ordinary observation and care dealing with a person who is supposed to be upright and honest. United States v. Scott, 159 F.3d 916, 920–21 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Turner, 586 F.2d 395, 397
(5th Cir. 1978)).

Turner involved an off under 18 U.S.C. § 474 (plates or stones for counterfeiting obligations or securities). Turner cited United States v. Smith, 318 F.2d 94, 95 (4th Cir. 1963), among other cases, for the definition of “counterfeit.” Smith involved an off under 18 U.S.C. § 472, the statute covered by this instruction. The trial judge may wish to instruct on the definition of “counterfeit” in the appropriate case.

In United States v. Porter, 542 F.3d 1088 (5th Cir. 2008), the Fifth Circuit recognized its failure to defi “counterfeit” for purposes of § 472, and upheld the trial court's use of a Ninth Circuit pattern jury instruction. Id. at 1094.

2.21	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.21A

FORGERY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES 18 U.S.C. § 495 (FIRST PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 495, makes it a crime for anyone falsely to make, alter, forge, or counterfeit a written instrument for the purpose of obtaining money from the United States.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant ————— (describe con- duct, e.g., forged a power of attorney); and

Second: That the defendant did so for the purpose of obtaining or receiving money from the United States when the defendant knew he had no right to have it.

[Second: That the defendant did so for the purpose of directly or indirectly enabling another to receive money from the United States when the defendant knew the other person had no right to receive it.]

The evidence does not have to show that anyone actually  received  any  money  as  a  result  of  the
——————————— (e.g., forgery).
Note

The statute can be used to prosecute forgery of a Treasury check as a felony even if the case would be a misdemeanor under 18 U.S.C. § 510. See United States v. Cavada, 821 F.2d 1046 (5th
Cir. 1987).

If the defendant claims to have authority to sign for another, the government must prove that the defendant lacked such authority. See United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1012 n.9 (5th Cir. 1987).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.21B

2.21B

UTTERING A FORGED WRITING TO DEFRAUD THE UNITED STATES
18 U.S.C. § 495 (SECOND PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 495, makes it a crime for anyone to utter or pass as true any false, forged, or altered written instrument, with intent to defraud the United States. For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant ——————————— (e.g., cashed a forged United States Treasury check) and in doing so stated or implied, directly or indirectly, that the ——————————— (e.g., check) was genuine;
Second: That the defendant knew at the time that
—————————— (e.g., the check) was forged; and
Third: That the defendant ——————————— (e.g., cashed the forged United States Treasury check) with intent to defraud, that is, intending to cheat the United States government. The evidence does not have to show that anyone actually received any money as a result of ——————————— (e.g., the cashing of the forged United States Treasury check).
Note

See United States v. Hall, 845 F.2d 1281, 1284–85 (5th Cir. 1988), and United States v. Smith, 631 F.2d 391, 396 (5th Cir. 1980), for the elements of the offense.

2.22	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.22A

FORGING ENDORSEMENT ON A TREASURY CHECK, BOND, OR SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES
18 U.S.C. § 510(a)(1)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 510(a)(1), makes it a crime for anyone with intent to defraud to falsely make or forge any endorsement or signature on a Treasury check, bond, or security of the United States.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant ——————————— (de- scribe conduct, e.g., forged the signature of another on the Treasury check[s]);

Second: That the defendant did so with intent to defraud, that is, intending to cheat or deceive someone.

The evidence does not have to show that anyone actually received anything of value as a result of the forged signature; and

Third: That the face value of the check [aggregate face value of the checks if more than one] was more than $1,000.00.

The “payee” of a check [bond] [security] is the person to whom the check [bond] [security] is payable.

To “forge” means to write a payee's endorsement or signature on a Treasury check [bond] [security] without the payee's permission or authority.
Note

If a disputed issue under subsection (c) of the statute is

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.22A

whether the face value of the check(s) exceeds a sum of $1,000, the court should consider giving a lesser included offense instruction. See United States v. Taylor, 869 F.2d 812 (5th Cir. 1989), on ag- gregation of face value. See Bobb v. Attorney General of the United States, 458 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2006), for the distinction between the mens rea required for § 510(a)(1) and that required for § 510(b)— the former requires one act with “intent to defraud” while the lat- ter requires only knowledge that the instrument has been stolen or forged.

2.22	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.22B

UTTERING A FORGED TREASURY CHECK, BOND, OR SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES 18 U.S.C. § 510(a)(2)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 510(a)(2), makes it a crime for anyone with intent to defraud to pass, utter, or publish any Treasury check, bond, or se- curity of the United States bearing a falsely made or forged endorsement or signature.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant ——————————— (e.g., cashed a forged United States Treasury check);

Second: That the defendant knew at the time that the check was forged. A forged endorsement or signa- ture is one placed on a check by someone other than the payee without the payee's permission or authority;

Third: That the defendant ——————————— (e.g., cashed a forged United States Treasury check) with intent to defraud, that is, intending to cheat or deceive someone. The evidence does not have to show that anyone actually received anything of value as a result of ——————————— (e.g., the cashing of the forged United States Treasury check); and

Fourth: That the face value of the check was more than $1,000.

The “payee” of a check [bond] [security] is the person to whom the check [bond] [security] is payable.

To “utter” means putting a check [bond] [security] in circulation by means of an assertion or misrepresen- tation that the instrument is genuine.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.22B

“Forgery” means a signature or endorsement made without the true payee's permission or authority.
Note

See Note to Instruction No. 2.22A, 18 U.S.C. § 510(a)(1), Forg- ing Endorsement on a Treasury Check.

See Bobb v. Attorney General of the United States, 458 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2006), for the distinction between the mens rea required for § 510(a) and that required for § 510(b)—the former requires one act with “intent to defraud” while the latter requires only knowledge that the instrument has been stolen or forged.

2.23	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.23A

SECURITIES OF THE STATES AND PRIVATE ENTITIES
18 U.S.C. § 513(a)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 513(a), makes it a crime for anyone to make [utter] [possess] a counterfeited [forged] security of a State [or political subdivision thereof or of an organization] with the intent to deceive another person [organization] [government].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant made [uttered] [pos- sessed] a security;

Second: That the defendant knew that the security was counterfeited [forged];

Third: That the counterfeited [forged] security was of a State [or political subdivision thereof or of an orga- nization]; and

Fourth: That the defendant did so with the intent to deceive another person [organization] [government].

The term “utter” means putting a check [bond] [se- curity] in circulation by means of an assertion or mis- representation that the instrument is genuine.

The term “counterfeited” means a document that purports to be genuine but is not, because it has been falsely made or manufactured in its entirety.

The term “forged” means a document that purports to be genuine but is not because it has been falsely altered, completed, signed, or endorsed, or contains a

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.23A

false addition thereto or insertion therein, or is a combination of parts of two or more genuine documents.

The term “security” means, in relevant part, a note, stock certificate, treasury stock certificate, bond, trea- sury bond, debenture, certificate of deposit, interest of coupon, bill, check, draft, warrant, debit instrument as defined in section 916(c) of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, money order, traveler's check, letter of credit, warehouse receipt, negotiable bill of lading, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest in or participating in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certifi- cate, pre-reorganization certifi of subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting trust certifi  or certifi  of interest in tangible or intangible property.
Note

The elements of this off are set out in United States v. Chappell, 6 F.3d 1095, 1098 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing conditions that require the victim be connected to interstate commerce and conditions warranting separate charges under 18 U.S.C. § 513). See also United States v. Robinson, 318 F. App'x 280 (5th Cir. 2009).
The Fifth Circuit has explained the presence of a mental requirement for two different elements of forgery under 18 U.S.C
§ 513. See United States v. Young, 282 F.3d 349, 353 (5th Cir. 2002) (affirming jury instruction that defendant had to know that the check was not intended for her and had to intend to deceive the organization in order to be convicted). Young also discusses the meaning of the term “forgery” under 18 U.S.C § 513, holding that signing one's own name with the intent of having the signature taken as the signature of another person with the same name still constitutes forgery.
For a defi	of “State” and “organization,” see 18 U.S.C.
§ 513(c)(4) & (5).

2.23	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.23B

SECURITIES OF THE STATES AND PRIVATE ENTITIES
18 U.S.C. § 513(b)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 513(b), makes it a crime for anyone to make [receive] [possess] [sell] [otherwise transfer] an implement designed for making a counterfeit or forged security with the intent that it be so used.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant made [received] [pos- sessed] [sold] [otherwise transferred] an implement;

Second: That the implement was designed for mak- ing a counterfeit or forged security; and

Third: That the defendant intended that the imple- ment be used to make a counterfeit or forged security.

The term “counterfeit” means a document that purports to be genuine but is not, because it has been falsely made or manufactured in its entirety.

The term “forged” means a document that purports to be genuine but is not because it has been falsely altered, completed, signed, or endorsed, or contains a false addition thereto or insertion therein, or is a combination of parts of two or more genuine documents.

The term “security” means, in relevant part, a note, stock certificate, treasury stock certificate, bond, trea- sury bond, debenture, certificate of deposit, interest of coupon, bill, check, draft, warrant, debit instrument as defined in section 916(c) of the Electronic Fund Transfer Act, money order, traveler's check, letter of credit,

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.23B

warehouse receipt, negotiable bill of lading, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest in or participating in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certifi- cate, pre-reorganization certifi of subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting trust certifi  or certifi  of interest in tangible or intangible property.
Note

The Fifth Circuit has held that the language of § 513(b) plainly refers to future use of the implement. United States v. Mancillas, 172 F.3d 341, 342–43 (5th Cir. 1999) (setting out the elements of the offense).

2.24	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.24A

SMUGGLING 18 U.S.C. § 545

Title 18, United States Code, Section 545, makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly and willfully smuggle [introduce clandestinely] [attempt to smuggle] [attempt to introduce clandestinely] merchandise into the United States, with an intent to defraud the United States, in violation of the customs laws and regulations of the United States.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant brought [attempted to bring] ——————————— (describe merchandise) into the United States;

Second:  That  the  defendant  knew  that  the
——————————— (describe merchandise) should have been declared to United States customs authorities as required by law; and

Third: That, intending to defraud the United States by avoiding the United States customs laws, the defendant did not report the ——————————— (de- scribe merchandise) to the customs authorities. [It is not necessary, however, to prove that any tax or duty was owed on the merchandise].

To act with “intent to defraud” means to act with intent to deceive or cheat the United States.

“Merchandise” means goods, wares, and chattels of every description, and includes merchandise the importation of which is prohibited [monetary instruments].

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

Note

2.24A

The fourth paragraph of § 545 establishes a presumption of guilt from the unexplained possession of undeclared imported goods. The presumption has not been included here. This presump- tion has been held unconstitutional. See United States v. Kenaan, 496 F.2d 181, 184 (1st Cir. 1974). The Fifth Circuit held it was not plain error to instruct on the presumption in 18 U.S.C. § 545 where there was suffi evidence to convict the defendant, indepen- dently of the presumption. See United States v. Bentley, 875 F.2d 1114, 1119 (5th Cir. 1989). Relying upon Supreme Court jurispru- dence critical of these types of presumptions, the Committee recom- mends that it not be charged. See Carella v. California, 109 S. Ct. 2419 (1989); Turner v. United States, 90 S. Ct. 642 (1970); Leary v.
United States, 89 S. Ct. 1532 (1969).

The definition of “merchandise” found in 19 U.S.C. § 1401(c) is included in the instructions. See United States v. Garcia-Paz, 282 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2002). The term “monetary instruments” is defined in 31 U.S.C. § 5312(a)(3).

With respect to whether it must be shown that a tax or duty was owed on the merchandise, a majority of circuits have expressly held that 18 U.S.C. § 545 does not require as an element of the crime that the defendant specifi intended to deprive the government of revenue. See United States v. Ahmad, 213 F.3d 805 (4th Cir. 2000); United States v. Robinson, 147 F.3d 851 (9th Cir. 1998); United States v. Borello, 766 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Kurfess, 426 F.2d 1017 (7th Cir. 1970). The Third Circuit, in United States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550 (3d Cir. 1994), disagreed and concluded that an intent to deprive the government of revenue is an essential element and the failure to charge the jury in this manner is plain error. The Fifth Circuit has not met the issue directly. In United States v. One 1976 Mercedes, 450 SLC, 667 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir. 1982), however, the Fifth Circuit spoke of § 545 as prohibiting the smuggling of goods “that ought to have been declared or invoiced.”

2.24	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.24B

ILLEGAL IMPORTATION OF MERCHANDISE 18 U.S.C. § 545 (SECOND PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 545, makes it a crime for anyone knowingly [fraudulently] to import [bring] merchandise into the United States contrary to law.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly [fraudulently] imported [brought] ——————————— (describe mer- chandise) into the United States;

Second: That the defendant's importation [bring- ing] was contrary to ——————————— (describe law[s] in detail); and

Third: That the defendant knew the importation of
——————————— (describe merchandise) was con- trary to law.

“Merchandise” means goods, wares, and chattels of every description, and includes merchandise the importation of which is prohibited.
Note

See Babb v. United States, 252 F.2d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1958) (holding that failure to follow cattle reporting requirement in 19
U.S.C. § 1484(a) subjected defendant to liability under 18 U.S.C.
§ 545 even where underlying cattle regulation itself contained no penalty for its violation); see also United States v. Mitchell, 39 F.3d 465 (4th Cir. 1994).
The term “law” includes not only statutes, but substantive agency regulations having the force and effect of law. See Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 476 (holding that importation of animal hides and horns contrary to reporting regulations of the Fish and Wildlife Service

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.24B

and Department of Agriculture subjected defendant to criminal li- ability under 18 U.S.C. § 545). In instructing the jury on the “con- trary to law” element, the court should specify which law or laws the defendant's act of importation is alleged to have violated. See, e.g., Babb v. United States, 218 F.2d 538, 540 (5th Cir. 1955).

The definition of “merchandise” found in 19 U.S.C. § 1401(c) is included in the instructions. See United States v. Garcia-Paz, 282 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2002).
With respect to the knowledge element, it is not necessary for the defendant to have known the specifi statute violated. It is enough if he acts knowing that his conduct is illegal in some respect. See Babb, 252 F.2d at 708.

Congress has written the second paragraph of § 545 in the disjunctive. Accordingly, the instruction should be modifi to conform to the allegations in the indictment.

With respect to the fourth paragraph of § 545, regarding the presumption of guilt from the unexplained possession of undeclared imported goods, see Note to Instruction No. 2.24A, 18 U.S.C. § 545, Smuggling.

If the indictment alleges either use of fraudulent documents or transportation, concealment, or sale of goods after their illegal importation into the United States, the jury should be charged accordingly.

2.25	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.25

EXPORTATION OF STOLEN VEHICLES 18 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1) (FIRST PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 553(a)(1), makes it a crime for anyone knowingly to export [import] [attempt to import] [attempt to export] any motorized vehicle knowing that the vehicle had been stolen.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly exported [imported] [attempted to import] [attempted to export] a motor vehicle [off-highway mobile equipment] [vessel] [aircraft] [a part of any motor vehicle] [a part of an off- highway mobile equipment] [a part of a vessel] [a part of an aircraft] as described in the indictment; and

Second: That the defendant knew the motor vehicle [off	mobile equipment] [vessel] [aircraft] [a part of any motor vehicle] [a part of an off
mobile equipment] [a part of a vessel] [a part of an aircraft] had been stolen.

To “export” [“import”] means to send or carry from one country to another.

To have been “stolen” means a person wrongfully took property belonging to another with the intent to deprive the owner of its use and benefit either temporar- ily or permanently.
Note
“Motor vehicle” means a vehicle driven or drawn by mechani- cal power and manufactured primarily for use on public streets, roads, and highways, but does not include a vehicle operated only on a rail line. 49 U.S.C. § 32101(7).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.25

“Off-highway mobile equipment” means any self-propelled ag- ricultural equipment, self-propelled construction equipment, or self-propelled special use equipment, used or designed for running on land but not on rail or highway. 18 U.S.C. § 553(c)(2).
“Vessel” includes every description of water craft or other con- trivance used, or capable of being used, as a means of transporta- tion in water, but does not include aircraft. 19 U.S.C. § 1401(a).
“Aircraft” means any contrivance invented, used, or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air. 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(6).

2.26	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.26

SMUGGLING GOODS FROM THE UNITED STATES
18 U.S.C. § 554

Title 18, United States Code, Section 554, makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly [fraudulently] export [send] [attempt to export] [attempt to send] any merchandise [article or object] from the United States contrary to any law or regulation of the United States.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly [fraudulently] exported [sent] [attempted to export] [attempted to send] merchandise as described in the indictment;

Second: That the defendant's exportation [sending] was contrary to ————— (describe the law[s] or regula- tion[s] in detail); and

Third: That the defendant knew the exportation [sending] of the merchandise was contrary to law or regulation.

“Merchandise” means goods, wares, and chattels of every description, and includes merchandise the exportation of which is prohibited.

To “export” means to send or carry from the United States to another country.
Note
If the indictment alleges receipt, concealment, purchase, sale, or facilitation of the transportation, concealment, or sale of merchandise (knowing prior to exportation, the goods were intended for illegal exportation) the jury should be charged accordingly. See United States v. Bernardino, 444 F. App'x 73 (5th

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.26

Cir. 2011) (denying defendant's request that jury instruction should have required both knowledge that weapons required an export license and an intention to export the weapons without the license).

The definition of “merchandise” found in 19 U.S.C. § 31401(c) is included in the instructions. See United States v. Garcia-Paz, 282 F.3d 1212 (9th Cir. 2002).

The definition of “export” is taken from United States v. Castro Trevino, 464 F.3d 536, 541 n.13 (5th Cir. 2006).

2.27	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.27

THEFT OF GOVERNMENT MONEY OR PROPERTY
18 U.S.C. § 641 (FIRST PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 641, makes it a crime for anyone to embezzle [steal] [knowingly convert] any money, property, or thing of value belong- ing to the United States having an aggregate value of more than $1,000.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the money [property] [thing of value] described in the indictment belonged to the United States government and had a value in excess of $1,000 at the time alleged;

Second: That the defendant embezzled [stole] [knowingly converted] such money [property] [thing of value] to the defendant's own use [to the use of an- other]; and

Third: That the defendant did so knowing the money [property] [thing of value] was not his and with intent to deprive the owner of the use [benefit] of the money [property] [thing of value].

The word “value” means the face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail, which- ever is greater, of all such things of value that you find the defendant has embezzled [stolen] [knowingly converted].

It is not necessary to prove that the defendant knew that the United States government owned the property at the time of the wrongful taking.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.27

To “embezzle” means to wrongfully, intentionally take money, property, or thing of value of another after the money, property, or thing of value has lawfully come within the possession or control of the person taking it.

[To “steal” or “knowingly convert” means to wrong- fully take money, property, or thing of value belonging to another with intent to deprive the owner of its use or benefi either temporarily or permanently. Any ap- preciable change of the location of the property with the intent to deprive constitutes a stealing whether or not there is an actual removal of it from the owner's premises.]

No particular type of movement or carrying away is required to constitute a taking.
Note

Amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 641 in 2004, pursuant to the Identity Theft Protection Penalty Enhancement Act, Pub. L. 108- 2754, 118 Stat. 833, make clear that a defendant's acts of theft should be considered in the aggregate. That is, the amounts for all the counts for which the defendant is convicted in a single case should be combined. Section 641 permits the aggregation of multiple thefts to reach the threshold amount of $1,000, and it converts each misdemeanor into a separate felony. See United States v. Lagrone, 773 F.3d 673 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc). A defendant may be charged with a felony for each theft or series of thefts that exceed $1,000 in the aggregate. Id. at 677. The addition of the term “thing of value” in describing government property is consistent with a broader desire to prohibit the theft of intangible property and conforms to the original and amended statutory language. This statute has long been interpreted as having a broader meaning than larceny at common law. See Crabb v. Zurst, 99 F.2d 562 (5th Cir. 1938) (modern theft statutes should be construed more broadly than the common law crime of larceny in order to cover situations not envisioned at common law).

See United States v. Aguilar, 967 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting portions of the instruction and holding that a “hot” check can constitute a violation of the statute as long as the prosecution proves that the defendant intended not to honor the check when he wrote it). This instruction was also approved in United States v. Pruett, 681 F.3d 232, 247 (5th Cir. 2012), and United States v.

2.27	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Dowl, 619 F.3d 494, 501 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that intent to repay is not a defense because to “steal” means the wrongful tak- ing of property with the intent to deprive the owner temporarily or permanently). But see United States v. Jones, 664 F.3d 966, 976 (5th Cir. 2011) (stating without discussion that the government must prove in a § 641 prosecution that the defendant converted Medicare funds with the intent to permanently deprive the United States).

For a discussion of whether federal funds given to state programs retain their federal character, see United States v. Long, 996 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that funds a university received from a state agency retained their federal character, as the federal government exercised control over the ultimate disposi- tion of funds).

See United States v. Sanders, 793 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1986) (clothing that employee of Army and Air Force Exchange Service sought to remove from exchange premises without paying for it constituted a “thing of value of the United States within the mean- ing of the statute”); United States v. Barnes, 761 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1985) (government does not have to prove that it suff actual property loss in a § 641 prosecution, declining to follow dictum in United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455 (5th Cir. 1978)).

If whether the property stolen had a value of more than $1,000 is disputed, the court should consider giving a lesser included of- fense instruction. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.28

THEFT OR EMBEZZLEMENT BY BANK OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE
18 U.S.C. § 656

2.28

Title 18, United States Code, Section 656, makes it a crime for an employee of a federally insured bank to embezzle [misapply] the money, funds, or credits of the bank.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant was an officer [director] [agent] [employee] [someone connected in any capacity] of the bank described in the indictment;

Second: That the bank was a national bank [feder- ally insured bank] at the time alleged;

Third: That the defendant knowingly embezzled [willfully misapplied] funds [credits] belonging to [entrusted to the care of] the bank;

Fourth: That the defendant acted with intent to injure or defraud the bank; and

Fifth: That the amount of money taken was more than $1,000.

“National bank” means a bank organized under the national banking law. “Federally insured bank” means any bank, state or national, the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

To “embezzle” means to wrongfully, intentionally take money or property of another after the money or property has lawfully come within the possession or

2.28	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
control of the person taking it. No particular type of moving or carrying away is required.

[To “willfully misapply” a bank's money or property means to intentionally convert such money or property for one's own use and benefit, or for the use and benefit of another, knowing that one had no right to do so.]

To act with “intent to defraud” means to act with intent to deceive or cheat someone.
Note
This instruction deals with the two most common § 656 cases: embezzlement by a bank employee and misapplication by someone connected with the bank.
The Fifth Circuit has held repeatedly that “intent to injure or defraud” is a necessary element of the offense. See United States v. McCord, 33 F.3d 1434, 1448 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Saks,
964 F.2d 1514, 1519 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1991). In United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1983), the en banc Fifth Circuit rejected as improper a § 656 jury instruction that equated a “reckless disregard of the interest of the bank” with an intent to injure or defraud the bank. The Fifth Circuit viewed this as an improper lowering of the stan- dard of intent or knowledge required for conviction. Id. Other circuits disagree. See, e.g., Willis v. United States, 87 F.3d 1004 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Crabtree, 979 F.2d 1261 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hoffman, 918 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1990). In
United States v. Kington, 875 F.2d 1091, 1097 (5th Cir. 1989), the Fifth Circuit stated it was “undesirable” for a judge to instruct the jury that intent to injure or defraud exists “if the defendant acts knowingly and if the natural consequences of his conduct [are] or may be to injure the bank.” The court cited United States v. Adamson, 700 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc), noting that the jury could make such inferences from the evidence, if taken out of context, which “may appear to mean that the defendant need only know that he is voluntarily engaging in transactions for his own benefit, rather than, as Adamson requires, that the defendant knew he was participating in a deceptive or fraudulent transaction.” Id.

In United States v. Meeks, 69 F.3d 742 (5th Cir. 1995), the Fifth Circuit discussed the meaning of “connected in any capacity” with a bank and concluded that the government does not need to prove that the defendant occupied a position of trust. See also United States v. Hogue, 132 F.3d 1087 (5th Cir. 1998) (regarding

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.28

whether an independent contractor hired to do work at a bank may be “connected” with the bank for purposes of this statute).

If the charge involved is misapplication of funds, as opposed to embezzlement or theft, some causal connection is required be- tween the defendant's actions as an officer, director, agent or em- ployee of the institution and the misapplication, such as a loan. For example, misapplication requires that the defendant made, or influenced in a significant way, as an officer of the institution, the decision to extend the loan. See United States v. McCright, 821 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that bank officer's advocacy for extending a prior loan was not sufficient to show that he had causal connection to a later loan absent the demonstration of a formal link between the two).

If the indictment charges more than one defendant and al- leges aiding and abetting, then it is not necessary to prove that each defendant had such a causal connection, as long as one defendant had a causal connection and all defendants willfully participated in the criminal venture and desired that it succeed. See United States v. Parks, 68 F.3d 860 (5th Cir. 1995).

The causation standard for §§ 656 and 657 is the same. See Parks, 68 F.3d at 863.

If whether the property stolen has a value of more than $1,000 is disputed, the court should consider giving a lesser included of- fense instruction. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).

2.29	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.29

THEFT FROM LENDING, CREDIT, AND INSURANCE INSTITUTIONS
18 U.S.C. § 657

Title 18, United States Code, Section 657, makes it a crime for a person connected with a federally insured lending [credit] [insurance] institution to embezzle [mis- apply] money [funds] [securities] [things of value] belonging to that institution.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant was an offi [agent] [employee] [someone connected in any capacity] of the specified lending [credit] [insurance] institution;

Second: That the accounts of the lending [credit] [insurance] institution were federally insured at the time alleged;

Third: That the defendant knowingly embezzled [willfully misapplied] funds [monies] [securities] [credits] [other things of value] belonging to [entrusted to the care of] such institution;

Fourth: That the defendant acted with intent to injure or defraud the institution; and

Fifth: That the amount of money taken was more than $1,000.

To “embezzle” means to wrongfully, intentionally take money or property of another after the money or property has lawfully come within the possession or control of the person taking it. No particular type of moving or carrying away is required.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.29

[To “willfully misapply” money or property of the lending, credit, or insurance institution means to intentionally convert such money or property to one's own use and benefi or to the use and benefi of an- other, knowing that one had no right to do so.]

To act with “intent to defraud” means to act with intent to deceive or cheat someone.
Note

The elements of the offense are set forth in United States v. Parks, 68 F.3d 860, 863 (5th Cir. 1995), and United States v. Tullos,
868 F.2d 689, 693 (5th Cir. 1989), including the requirement of an intent to injure or defraud the institution. See Note to Instruction No. 2.28, regarding the intent requirement for 18 U.S.C. § 656.
If the charge involved is misapplication of funds, as opposed to embezzlement or theft, some causal connection is required be- tween the defendant's actions as an officer, agent or employee of the institution and the misapplication, such as a loan. For example, misapplication requires that the defendant made, or influenced in a signifi  way, as an offi   of the institution, the decision to extend the loan. See Parks, 68 F.3d at 864; United States v. Roches- ter, 898 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that evidence was suf- fi to support conviction for misapplication of funds where defendant, an influential businessman, encouraged lending institu- tion to extend the loan in question).
If the indictment charges more than one defendant and al- leges aiding and abetting, then it is not necessary to prove that each defendant had such a causal connection, as long as one defendant had a causal connection and all defendants willfully participated in the criminal venture and desired that it succeed. See Parks, 68 F.3d at 864.
The causation standard for §§ 656 and 657 is the same. Id.
For a discussion of the distinction between before-the-fact au- thorization, which is a defense to the charge, and after-the-fact ratification, which is not, see United States v. Mmahat, 106 F.3d 89, 96–97 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that instruction stating that after-the-fact authorization was not a defense to misapplication was not plain error), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Estate of Parsons, 367 F.3d 409 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
If whether the property stolen had a value of more than $1,000

2.29	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
is disputed, the court should consider giving a lesser included of- fense instruction. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.30A

2.30A

THEFT FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENT 18 U.S.C. § 659 (FIRST PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 659, makes it a crime for anyone to steal [embezzle] [unlawfully take, carry away, or conceal] goods that are being shipped from one state to another state [to a foreign country].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant stole [embezzled] [unlaw- fully took, carried away, or concealed] the property described in the indictment from a ——————————— (describe location, e.g., railroad car, aircraft, motor truck) as alleged in the indictment;

Second: That at the time alleged such property was then moving as [was a part of] an interstate [a foreign] shipment of freight;

Third: That the defendant knew the property was not his and had the intent to deprive the owner of the use and benefit of the property; and

Fourth: That such property then had a value in excess of $1,000.

The word “value” means the face, par, market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail, which- ever is greater.

To “steal” means to wrongfully take money or prop- erty belonging to another with intent to deprive the owner of its use or benefi either temporarily or permanently. Any appreciable change of the location of the property with the intent to deprive constitutes a

2.30	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
stealing whether or not there is actual removal of it from the owner's premises.

[To “embezzle” means to wrongfully, intentionally take money or property of another after the money or property has lawfully come within the possession or control of the person taking it.]

An “interstate [foreign] shipment” means goods or property which are moving as a part of interstate [foreign] commerce. The interstate [foreign] character of a shipment begins when the property is first identi- fied and set aside for the shipment and comes into the possession of those who commence its movement in the course of its interstate [foreign] transportation. The in- terstate [foreign] character of the shipment continues until the shipment arrives at its destination and is there delivered; temporary stops between the point of origin and the final destination should not be construed as removing goods from “interstate [foreign] shipment.”

While the interstate [foreign] character of the ship- ment must be proved, it is not necessary to show that the defendant knew that the goods constituted a part of such a shipment at the time of the alleged theft, only that the defendant stole [embezzled] them.
Note

The 2006 amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 659, Pub. L. 109-177,
§ 307(a)(1), include additional facilities from which theft consti- tutes a violation of the statute. These include intermodal contain- ers, trailers, container freight stations, warehouses, and freight consolidation facilities. The amendments also raise the maximum prison sentence for theft of less than $1,000 from one year to three.

The eighth paragraph of the statute provides that waybills or other shipping documents “shall be prima facie evidence of the place from which and to which such shipment was made.” A sug- gested instruction on this issue is:

“Prima facie evidence” means suffi	evidence. In other

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.30A

words, waybills, bills of lading, or other shipping document such as invoices, if proved beyond a reasonable doubt, are sufficient for you to find the interstate or foreign nature of the shipment, but you need not so find.

Defi	of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41, respectively.

If whether the property stolen had a value of more than $1,000 is disputed, the court should consider giving a lesser included of- fense instruction. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).

2.30B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.30B

BUYING OR RECEIVING GOODS STOLEN FROM INTERSTATE SHIPMENT
18 U.S.C. § 659 (SECOND PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 659, makes it a crime for anyone knowingly to buy [receive] stolen goods that have been shipped from one state to another [to a foreign country].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That someone stole [embezzled] the property described in the indictment from a ————— (describe location, e.g., railroad car, aircraft, motor truck) as al- leged in the indictment, while such property was mov- ing as [a part of] an interstate [a foreign] shipment of freight;

Second: That the defendant thereafter bought [received] [possessed] such property knowing that it had been stolen [embezzled] as charged; and

Third: That such property then had a value in excess of $1,000.

The word “value” means the face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail, which- ever is greater.

An “interstate [foreign] shipment” means goods or property that are moving as [a part of] interstate [foreign] commerce.

The interstate [foreign] nature of a shipment begins when the property is fi   identifi   and set aside for the shipment and comes into the possession of those who start its movement in the course of its interstate

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.30B

[foreign] transportation. The interstate [foreign] nature of the shipment then continues until the shipment ar- rives at its destination and is there delivered; temporary stops between the point of origin and the final destina- tion should not be construed as removing goods from “an interstate [foreign] shipment.”

While the interstate [foreign] nature of the ship- ment must be proved, it is not necessary to show that either the person who stole the property or the defen- dant knew that the goods were a part of such a ship- ment at the time they were stolen. But, it is necessary for the government to prove that the defendant knew the property was stolen property at the time the defendant bought, received, or possessed it.

To “steal” means to wrongfully take money or prop- erty belonging to another with intent to deprive the owner of its use and benefi either temporarily or permanently. Any appreciable change of the location of the property with the intent to deprive constitutes a stealing whether or not there is an actual removal of it from the owner's premises.

[To “embezzle” means to wrongfully, intentionally take money or property of another after the money or property has lawfully come within the possession or control of the person taking it.]
Note

The 2006 amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 659, Pub. L. 109-177,
§ 307(a)(1), include additional facilities from which theft consti- tutes a violation of the statute. These include intermodal contain- ers, trailers, container freight stations, warehouses, and freight consolidation facilities. The amendments also raise the maximum prison sentence for theft of less than $1,000 from one year to three. United States v. Daniel, 957 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1992), cites the ele- ments of the offense.
With respect to the eighth paragraph of § 659 regarding “prima facie evidence,” see Note to Instruction No. 2.30A, Theft From In- terstate Shipment.

2.30	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Defi	of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41.

If whether the property stolen had a value of more than $1,000 is disputed, the court should consider giving a lesser included of- fense instruction, Instruction No. 133. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.31

2.31

THEFT WITHIN SPECIAL MARITIME AND TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
18 U.S.C. § 661

Title 18, United States Code, Section 661, makes it a crime for anyone to take [carry away], with intent to steal or purloin, any personal property of another, when the off   is committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the personal property described in the indictment belonged to someone other than the defen- dant;

Second: That the defendant took and carried away such property;

Third: That the defendant acted with intent to steal or purloin the property;

Fourth: That the offense occurred within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; and

[Fifth: That the value of the property was more than $1,000.]

[Fifth: That the property was taken from the person of another.]

2.31	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
stealing whether or not there is an actual removal of it from the owner's premises.

The word “value” means the face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail, which- ever is greater.
Note

“Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7; charges should be included as necessary to fit the particular situation.

See United States v. Griffin, 527 F.2d 434 (5th Cir. 1976) (ap- plying § 641's definition of “value” to § 661).

If whether the property stolen had a value of more than $1,000 is disputed, or whether it was taken from the person of another, the court should consider giving Instruction No. 1.33, Lesser Included Off See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.32

2.32

THEFT OR EMBEZZLEMENT FROM EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN
18 U.S.C. § 664

Title 18, United States Code, Section 664, makes it a crime for anyone to steal or embezzle any of the prop- erty [monies] [funds] [securities] [premiums] [credits] [other assets] of any employee welfare benefit plan, em- ployee pension benefi plan, or of any fund connected therewith.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant stole [embezzled] the property [monies] [funds] [securities] [premiums] [credits] [other assets] described in the indictment;

Second: That at the time alleged such property belonged to or was connected with ——————————— (name of plan); and

Third: That ————— (name of plan) was an em- ployee welfare benefit plan or employee pension benefit plan or a fund connected therewith.

The term “any employee welfare benefi plan or employee pension benefi plan” means any employee benefi plan subject to any provision of Title I of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, also known as ERISA.

2.32	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
stealing whether or not there is an actual removal of it from the owner's premises.

[To “embezzle” means to wrongfully, intentionally take money or property of another after the money or property has lawfully come within the possession or control of the person taking it. No particular type of moving or carrying away is required.]
Note

If there is an issue as to whether the employee benefit plan is subject to Title I of ERISA, see United States v. Wofford, 560 F.3d 341, 346–50 (5th Cir. 2009). The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the plan was an “employee benefi plan” subject to Title I of ERISA. In this regard, an “employee benefit plan” subject to Title I of ERISA is: (1) any plan, fund or program,
(2)	which is established or maintained by an employer or by an employee organization, (3) that by its express terms or as a result of surrounding circumstances either (a) provides retirement income to employees, or (b) results in a deferral of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employment or beyond. An employee benefit plan subject to Title I of ERISA does not cease being subject to the requirements of Title I of ERISA because of the failure of a plan sponsor, administrator, or other fi- duciary of the plan to maintain the plan in accordance with ap- plicable laws and regulations. See Wofford, 560 F.3d at 346 (“[A] qualifi  plan that loses tax qualifi  status remains subject to Title I of ERISA.”).

It is unsettled whether the Fifth Circuit requires an “intent to injure or defraud” under 18 U.S.C. § 664, although the Fifth Circuit does require an “intent to injure or defraud” under 18 U.S.C. § 656. See United States v. McCord, 33 F.3d 1434, 1448 (5th Cir. 1994). The Fifth Circuit has found it unnecessary to address the question of the required intent under 18 U.S.C. § 664 when “sufficient evi- dence was available for a conviction even if specifi intent were required.” See United States v. Osorio, 482 F.2d 1343, 1344 (5th Cir. 1973).

In cases involving abstraction or conversion from an employee benefi plan, the instructions should be modifi to include the mens rea of willfulness.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.33A

2.33A

THEFT CONCERNING PROGRAMS RECEIVING FEDERAL FUNDS
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 666(a)(1)(A), makes it a crime for anyone who is an agent of an orga- nization, or of a State, local or Indian tribal govern- ment, or any agency thereof, that receives more than
$10,000 in federal assistance in any one year period, to embezzle, steal, obtain by fraud, knowingly convert without authority, or intentionally misapply property that is valued at $5,000 or more, and is owned by, or is under the care, custody, or control of, such organiza- tion, government, or agency.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant was an agent of ————— (name of organization, State, local or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof);

Second: That ————— (name of organization, State, local, or Indian tribal government, or agency thereof) was a[n] organization [State government] [local government] [Indian tribal government] [any agency thereof] that received in any one-year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving
a grant [contract] [subsidy] [loan] [guarantee] [insur- ance] [other form of Federal assistance];

Third: That the defendant embezzled [stole] [ob- tained by fraud] [knowingly converted to the use of any person other than the rightful owner without authority] [intentionally misapplied] property that was owned by [under the care, custody, or control of] ————— (name of organization, State, local or Indian tribal govern- ment, or any agency thereof); and

2.33	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Fourth: That the property had a value of $5,000 or more.

The term “agent” means a person authorized to act on behalf of another person or a government and, in the case of an organization, or government, includes a ser- vant or employee, and a partner, director, offi manager, and representative.

[The term “government agency” means a subdivi- sion of the executive, legislative, judicial, or other branch of government, including a department, inde- pendent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board and bureau, and a corporation or other legal entity established, and subject to control, by a government or governments for the execution of a governmental or intergovernmental program.]

[The term “local” means of or pertaining to a politi- cal subdivision within a State.]

[The term “State” includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any common- wealth, territory, or possession of the United States.]

The term “in any one-year period” means a continu- ous period that commences no earlier than twelve months before the commission of the off  or that ends no later than twelve months after the commission of the offense. Such period may include time both before and after the commission of the offense.

[To “embezzle” means to wrongfully, intentionally take money or property of another after the money or property has lawfully come within the possession or control of the person taking it. No particular type of moving or carrying away is required.]

[To “steal” or “convert” means to wrongfully take money or property belonging to another with intent to

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.33A

deprive the owner of its use and benefit either temporar- ily or permanently. Any appreciable change of the loca- tion of the property with the intent to deprive consti- tutes a stealing whether or not there is an actual removal of it from the owner's premises.]

[To “obtain by fraud” means to act knowingly and with intent to deceive or cheat, usually for the purpose of causing fi	loss to someone else or bringing about a financial gain to oneself or another.]

[To “intentionally misapply” money or property means to intentionally convert such money or property for one's own use and benefit, or for the use and benefit of another, knowing that one had no right to do so.]

The word “value” means the face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail, which- ever is greater.

It is not necessary to prove that the defendant's conduct directly aff	the funds received by the agency under the Federal program. However, there must be some connection between the criminal conduct and the organization [State government] [local govern- ment] [Indian tribal government] [any agency thereof] receiving federal assistance.

In determining whether the defendant is guilty of this off    do not consider bona fi    salary, wages, fees, or other compensation paid, or expenses paid or reimbursed, in the usual course of business.
Note
The statute broadly defines “agent” as “a person authorized to act on behalf of another person or a government and, in the case of an organization or government, includes a servant or employee, and a partner, director, officer, manager, and representative.” 18
U.S.C. § 666(d)(1). However, the Fifth Circuit has held that “the statutory term ‘agent’ should not be given the broadest possible

2.33A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
meaning . . . but instead should be construed in the context of
§ 666 to tie the agency relationship to the authority that a defendant has with respect to control and expenditure of the funds of an entity that receives federal monies.” United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 2000). The Fifth Circuit has stated that “for an individual to be an ‘agent’ for the purposes of § 666, he must be ‘authorized to act on behalf of [the agency] with respect to its funds.’ ’’ United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 344 (5th Cir. 2009) (reversing all convictions for federal program bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666 but affirming convictions for mail and wire fraud, and remanding for re-sentencing), aff after re-sentencing sub nom. United States v. Teel, 691 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2012). However,
§ 666 does not require the “agent” to have “direct authority over the ultimate decision targeted by the bribe.” United States v. Shoemaker, 746 F.3d 614, 621–22 (5th Cir. 2014).
Direct involvement of federal funds in a transaction is not an essential element of bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666(b). See Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1946 (2004); Salinas v. United
States, 118 S. Ct. 469, 476 (1997); United States v. Westmoreland,
841 F.2d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 1988). The funds need not be purely federal, nor must the conduct in question have a direct effect on federal funds, as long as there is some nexus between the criminal conduct and the agency receiving federal assistance. See Whitfield, 590 F.3d at 345; United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 308–16
(5th Cir. 2002); Phillips, 219 F.3d at 411, 413–14; United States v.
Moeller, 987 F.2d 1134, 1137 (5th Cir. 1993); Westmoreland, 841 F.2d at 578. There is no reason to distinguish between § 666(a)(1) and 666(a)(2) on the issue of whether a nexus between the theft or bribery and the federal funds is required. See United States v. Harris, 296 F. App'x 402, 404 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing United States
v. Spano, 401 F.3d 837, 840 n.2 (7th Cir. 2005)).
The term “benefi is not limited to monies received in the form of payments or disbursements. See United States v. Hildeb- rand, 527 F.3d 466, 476–78 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that benefits received in the form of discounts fall within the scope of the statute).
“The plain language of § 666(b) is ambiguous in defi
‘Federal program’ and ‘Federal assistance.’ ’’ United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1189 (5th Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom.
Salinas, 118 S. Ct. at 476; see Hildebrand, 527 F.3d at 477.
“Any receipt of federal funds can, at some level of generality, be characterized as a benefi The statute does not employ this broad, almost limitless use of the term. Doing so would turn almost every act of fraud or bribery into a federal offense, upsetting the proper federal balance. To determine whether an organization

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.33A

participating in a federal assistance program receives “benefits,” an examination must be undertaken of the program's structure, operation, and purpose. The inquiry should examine the conditions under which the organization receives the federal payments. The answer could depend, as it does here, on whether the recipient's own operations are one of the reasons for maintaining the program.” Fischer v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1780, 1788 (2000) (holding that a health care provider participating in the Medicare program received “benefi within the meaning of the statute); See also Marmolejo, 89 F.3d at 1189–90 (holding that a Federal grant to improve local jails qualifi as Federal assistance even though the Federal government received something in return for the assistance) (citing United States v. Rooney, 986 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1993)).

The Fifth Circuit has expressly held that § 666(a)(1)(B) covers bribery in connection with transactions involving either tangible or intangible property. See Marmolejo, 89 F.3d at 1191–94 (holding that accepting bribes in exchange for permitting and arranging for conjugal visits fell within the plain meaning of the statute). Al- though the Sixth Circuit has held that 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(A) also covers both tangible and intangible stolen property, United States v. Sanderson, 966 F.2d 184, 188–89 (6th Cir. 1992), the Fifth Circuit has not yet determined whether theft of intangible property falls within the scope of § 666(a)(1)(A). To decide whether a transaction involving intangibles has a value of $5,000 or more, courts should look to traditional valuation methods. See Marmolejo, 89 F.3d at 1193–94 (finding that the conjugal visits had a value which exceeded $5,000 by analyzing how much a person in the market would be willing to pay for such visits).

The defi	in the instruction is derived from 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(d)(5). In Marmolejo, 89 F.3d at 1189–90, the Fifth Circuit held that separate agreements to provide federal funding to a county jail at different times were so interrelated that they could be construed together to create a single Federal program providing Federal assistance to the county jail during the one-year period in question.

The last paragraph in the instruction concerning wages is taken from 18 U.S.C. § 666(c). Whether wages are bona fide and earned in the usual course of business is a question of fact for the jury to decide. See United States v. Williams, 507 F.3d 905 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Subsection (c) of § 666 does not serve to absolve the Defendant of wrongdoing merely because the funds were used to pay a ‘salary,’ especially where that ‘salary’ is not bona fide.”) (cit- ing United States v. Shelton, 816 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (W.D. Tex. 1993)).

2.33A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The definitions in the instruction are derived from 18 U.S.C.
§§ 666(d)(2) through 666(d)(4). 18 U.S.C. § 666 criminalizes behavior aff	funds owned by or under the care, custody or control of State, local or Indian tribal governments, or an agency, thereof, not the Federal government or any agency thereof. See S. Rep. No. 225 at 369–71, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3510–3511 (18 U.S.C. § 666 was “designed to create new offenses to augment the ability of the United States to vindicate significant acts of theft, fraud, and bribery involving Federal monies that are disbursed to private organization or state and local governments pursuant to a Federal program”).

The definitions of “steal” and embezzle” in this instruction are derived from United States v. Pruett, 681 F.3d 232, 247 (5th Cir. 2012), and United States v. Dowl, 619 F.3d 494, 501 (5th Cir. 2010).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.33B

2.33B

BRIBERY CONCERNING PROGRAMS RECEIVING FEDERAL FUNDS (SOLICITING A BRIBE)
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 666(a)(1)(B), makes it a crime for anyone who is an agent of an orga- nization, or of a State, local or Indian tribal govern- ment, or any agency thereof, that receives more than
$10,000 in federal assistance, in any one year period, to corruptly solicit or demand for the benefit of any person, or to accept or agree to accept anything of value from any person, intending to be influenced or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First:  That  the  defendant  was  an  agent  of
——————————— (name of organization, State, local, or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof);

Second: That ——————————— (name of organi- zation, State, local or Indian tribal government, or agency thereof) was a[n] organization [State govern- ment] [local government] [Indian tribal government] [any agency thereof] that received in any one-year pe- riod, benefi in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant [contract] [subsidy] [loan] [guarantee] [insurance] [other form of Federal assis- tance];

Third: That the defendant corruptly solicited [demanded for the benefi of any person] [accepted] [agreed to accept] anything of value from any person with the intent to be influenced [rewarded] in connec-

2.33B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
tion with any business [transaction] [series of transac- tions] of such ——————————— (name of organiza- tion, State, local or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof); and

Fourth: That the business [transaction] [series of transactions] involved anything of value of $5,000 or more.

The term “agent” means a person authorized to act on behalf of another person or a government and, in the case of an organization or government, includes a ser- vant or employee, and a partner, director, offi manager and representative.

[The term “government agency” means a subdivi- sion of the executive, legislative, judicial or other branch of government, including a department, inde- pendent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board, and bureau, and a corporation or other legal entity established, and subject to control, by a government or governments for the execution of a governmental or intergovernmental program.]

[The term “local” means of or pertaining to a politi- cal subdivision within a State.]

[The term “State” includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any common- wealth, territory, or possession of the United States.]

The term “in any one-year period” means a continu- ous period that commences no earlier than twelve months before the commission of the off  or that ends no later than twelve months after the commission of the offense. Such period may include time both before and after the commission of the offense.

An act is “corruptly” done if it is done intentionally with an unlawful purpose.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.33B

The word “value” means the face, par, market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail, which- ever is greater.

It is not necessary to prove that the defendant's conduct directly affected the federal funds received by the agency under the federal program. However, there must be some connection between the criminal conduct and the organization [State government] [local govern- ment] [Indian tribal government] [any agency thereof] receiving federal assistance.

In determining whether the defendant is guilty of this off    do not consider bona fi    salary, wages, fees, or other compensation paid, or expenses paid or reimbursed, in the usual course of business.
Note

Additional definitions can be found in the Note to Instruction No. 2.33A, Theft Concerning Programs Receiving Federal Funds.

In United States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 346 (5th Cir. 2009), aff'd after re-sentencing sub nom. United States v. Teel, 691 F.3d 578 (5th Cir. 2012), the Fifth Circuit considered whether two for- mer Mississippi state judges had accepted bribes “in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions” of the federally funded Mississippi Administrative Offi of the Courts (“AOC”). Because the purpose of the AOC was to “assist in the ef- ficient administration of the nonjudicial business of the courts of the state,” the court held that the defendants' decisions as presid- ing judges in two lawsuits had no connection with any business, transaction, or series of transaction of the AOC. Id.

The definition of “corruptly” is derived from United States v. Brunson, 882 F.2d 151, 154 n.2 (5th Cir. 1989) (“The district court carefully explained the meaning of corruptly as ‘an act done volun- tarily and intentionally and with the bad purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means. The motive to act corruptly is ordinar- ily a hope or expectation of either financial gain or other benefit to oneself or some profit or benefit to another.’ ’’).

In United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1191–92 (5th Cir. 1996), the court held that “anything of value” includes

2.33B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
intangible items, such as furnishing sexual services.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.33C

2.33C

BRIBERY CONCERNING PROGRAMS RECEIVING FEDERAL FUNDS (OFFERING A BRIBE)
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 666(a)(2), makes it a crime for anyone to corruptly give, offer, or agree to give anything of value to any person, with intent to influence or reward an agent of an organiza- tion or of a State, local, or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof, that receives more than $10,000 in federal assistance in any one year period, in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of such organization, government, or agency involving anything of value of $5,000 or more.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That ——————————— (name of agent)
was an agent of ——————————— (name of organiza- tion, State, local or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof);

Second: That ——————————— (name of organi- zation, State, local or Indian tribal government, or agency thereof) was a[n] organization [State govern- ment] [local government] [Indian tribal government]
[any agency thereof] that received in any one-year pe- riod, benefi in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program involving a grant [contract] [subsidy] [loan] [guarantee] [insurance] [other form of Federal assis- tance];

Third: That the defendant corruptly gave [offered] [agreed to give] ——————————— (describe thing of
value) to ——————————— (name any person) with
the intent to infl	[reward] ———————————

2.33	C	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
(name of agent) in connection with any business [trans- action] [series of transactions] of ——————————— (name of organization, State, local or Indian tribal government, or any agency thereof); and

Fourth: That the business [transaction] [series of transactions] involved anything of value of $5,000 or more.

The term “agent” means a person authorized to act on behalf of another person, or a government and, in the case of an organization or government, includes a servant or employee, and a partner, director, offi manager, and representative.

[The term “government agency” means a subdivi- sion of the executive, legislative, judicial, or other branch of government, including a department, inde- pendent establishment, commission, administration, authority, board, and bureau, and a corporation or other legal entity established, and subject to control, by a government or governments for the execution of a governmental or intergovernmental program.]

[The term “local” means of or pertaining to a politi- cal subdivision within a State.]

[The term “State” includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any common- wealth, territory, or possession of the United States.]

The term “in any one-year period” means a continu- ous period that commences no earlier than twelve months before the commission of the off  or that ends no later than twelve months after the commission of the offense. Such period may include time both before and after the commission of the offense.

An act is “corruptly” done if it is done intentionally with an unlawful purpose.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.33C

The word “value” means the face, par, market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail, which- ever is greater.

It is not necessary to prove that the defendant's conduct directly affected the federal funds received by the agency under the federal program. However, there must be some connection between the criminal conduct and the organization [State government] [local govern- ment] [Indian tribal government] [any agency thereof] receiving federal assistance.

In determining whether the defendant is guilty of this off    do not consider bona fi    salary, wages, fees, or other compensation paid, or expenses paid or reimbursed, in the usual course of business.
Note

See Notes to Instruction Nos. 2.33A and 2.33B, Theft or Brib- ery Concerning Programs Receiving Federal Funds.

2.34	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.34

ESCAPE
18 U.S.C. § 751(a)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 751(a), makes it a crime for anyone to [attempt to] escape from federal custody. For you to fi the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:
First: That the defendant was in federal custody;

Second: That the defendant was in federal custody due to a lawful arrest on a felony charge or due to a conviction for any offense;

Third: That the defendant left [attempted to leave] federal custody without permission; and

Fourth: That the defendant knew leaving would result in his absence from custody without permission.

To be “in federal custody” within the meaning of this statute, an individual must be detained by the At- torney General or his authorized representative or confined in an institution or facility by direction of the Attorney General or by virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United States by any court, judge, or magistrate judge, or by lawful arrest by an officer or employee of the United States.

Note

For the elements of this off and required mens rea, see United States v. Bailey, 100 S. Ct. 624 (1980). See also United States v. Taylor, 933 F.2d 307, 309–10 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Harper, 901 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1990). This instruction charges a felony offense. If a misdemeanor is charged, the second element should be modified accordingly. See 18 U.S.C. § 751(a); see also United States v. Edrington, 726 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1984) (the underlying basis of the defendant's custody is an essential element

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.34

of this crime); United States v. Smith, 534 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1976) (the validity of the conviction for which the defendant has been confined is not an element of this offense).
“To prove an attempt, the Government must show that ‘the defendant acted with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of the underlying substantive offense’ and that ‘the defendant had engaged in conduct which constitutes a substantial step toward commission of a crime.’ ’’ United States v. Franco, 430
F. App'x 299, 300 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Partida, 385 F.3d 546, 560 (5th Cir. 2004)).

A frequent issue in cases under § 751(a) is the defense of duress or necessity. However, a threshold requirement must be met: “In order to be entitled to an instruction on duress or neces- sity as a defense to the crime charged, an escapee must first offer evidence justifying his continued absence from custody as well as his initial departure and [] an indispensable element of such an of- fer is testimony of a bona fi eff to surrender or return to custody as soon as the claimed duress or necessity had lost its coercive force.” Bailey, 100 S. Ct. at 635–36 (“escape from federal custody as defi       in § 751(a) is a continuing off	see also Dixon v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2437 (2006); United States v. Smithers, 27 F.3d 142, 145 n.18 (5th Cir. 1994); Instruction No. 1.36, Justification, Duress, or Coercion.

2.35	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.35

AIDING ESCAPE 18 U.S.C. § 752(a)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 752(a), makes it a crime for anyone to rescue or attempt to rescue or instigate, aid, or assist the escape or attempt to escape of any person who is in federal custody.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That ————— (name of individual escapee or intended escapee) was in federal custody;

Second: That ————— (name of individual escapee or intended escapee) was in federal custody pursuant to a lawful arrest, warrant, or other process issued under any law of the United States at an institution or facility where the defendant was confi by direction of the Attorney General [for conviction of an offense] [for ex- tradition] [for exclusion or expulsion proceedings];

Third: That ————— (name of individual escapee or intended escapee) knew that he did not have permis- sion to leave federal custody;

Fourth: That ————— (name of individual escapee or intended escapee) left [attempted to leave] federal custody without permission; and

Fifth: That the defendant knew that ————— (name of individual escapee or intended escapee) was leaving [attempting to leave] federal custody without permission and intentionally helped him do so.

“Custody” means the detention of an individual by virtue of lawful process or authority.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.35

“Escape” means absenting oneself from custody without permission.

Aiding an escape ends once immediate active pursuit of the escapee has ended, or once the escapee has reached temporary safety.
Note

See Note following Instruction No. 2.34, 18 U.S.C. § 751(a), Escape.

The definition of “escape” comes from United States v. Bailey, 100 S. Ct. 624, 633 (1980).

The instruction defining when aiding an escape ends may be needed to define the boundary between the offense of instigating or assisting an escape in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 752, and harboring a fugitive in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1072. In United States v. Smith- ers, 27 F.3d 142, 144–45 (5th Cir. 1994), the Fifth Circuit held that aiding an escape ends once immediate active pursuit of the escapee has ended, or once the escapee has reached temporary safety.

2.36	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.36A

DEALING IN EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS WITHOUT LICENSE
18 U.S.C. § 842(a)(1)

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 842(a)(1) and 844(a)(1), make it a crime to be in the business of [importing] [manufacturing] [dealing in] explosive materials without a federal license.

————— (name explosive material) is an explosive material within the meaning of this law.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant was a person engaged in the business of [importing] [manufacturing] [dealing in] explosive materials as named in the indictment at wholesale or retail on ————— (date listed in the indict- ment); and

Second: That the defendant engaged in such busi- ness without a license issued under federal law.

“Importer” means any person engaged in the busi- ness of importing or bringing explosive materials into the United States for purposes of sale or distribution.

“Manufacturer” means any person engaged in the business of manufacturing explosive materials for purposes of sale or distribution or for his own use.

“Dealer” means any person engaged in the busi- ness of distributing explosive materials at wholesale or retail.
Note

The defi	of “explosive material” is found in 18 U.S.C.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.36A

§ 841(c)–(f). It does not include commonly used mixtures such as gasoline or fertilizer, which do not typically function by explosion. See United States v. Lorence, 706 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1983) (cit- ing legislative history). Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 841(d) and 27
C.F.R. § 555.23, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) publishes a list of explosive materials covered under § 841 annually in the Federal Register. The list from 2014 may be found at 79 Fed. Reg. 60496 (Oct. 7, 2014), and ATF posts the Federal Register entry each year at www.atf.gov.

Although the list is “comprehensive, it is not all-inclusive. The fact that an explosive material is not on the list does not mean that it is not within the coverage of the law if it otherwise meets the statutory definitions in 18 U.S.C. [§ ]841.” 79 Fed. Reg. 60496 (Oct. 7, 2014). Thus, if the indictment alleges dealing in an explo- sive material not listed in the Federal Register entry, delete the second sentence and include the following after the second element:

The term “explosive material” means explosives, blasting agents, and detonators. The term “explosive” means any chemical compound mixture or device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by explosion. The term “blasting agent” means any material or mixture, consisting of fuel and oxidizer, intended for blasting. The term “detonator” means any device containing a detonating charge that is used for initiating detonation in an explosive.

A defendant may be convicted of multiple counts of engaging in the business of dealing in explosive materials if the counts are spatially and temporally distinct such that they constitute differ- ent courses of conduct. Cf. United States v. Womack, 654 F.2d 1034, 1041 (5th Cir. 1981) (discussing manufacturing explosive materials under § 842(a)(1)).

2.36B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.36B

FALSE STATEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS
18 U.S.C. § 842(a)(2)

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 842(a)(2) and 844(a)(1), make it a crime for anyone to knowingly make a false statement for the purpose of obtaining ex- plosive materials.

————— (name explosive material) is an explosive material within the meaning of this law.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant made a false [fictitious] oral [written] statement;

Second: That the defendant knew the statement was false;

Third: That the statement was made for the purpose of obtaining an explosive material; and

Fourth: That the statement was intended to deceive or likely to deceive the listener.

A statement is “false” [“fictitious”] if it was untrue when made and was then known to be untrue by the person making it.

A false [fictitious] statement is “likely to deceive” if the nature of the statement, considering all of the sur- rounding circumstances at the time it is made, is such that a reasonable person of ordinary prudence would have been actually deceived or misled.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

Note

2.36B

Section 842(a)(2) also prohibits additional conduct, such as knowingly withholding information for the purpose of obtaining explosive materials and making false statements for the purpose of obtaining an explosive-material license. Therefore, this instruction may need to be altered according to the indictment.

The defi	of “explosive material” is found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 841(c)–(f). It does not include commonly used mixtures such as gasoline or fertilizer, which do not typically function by explosion. See United States v. Lorence, 706 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1983) (citing legislative history). See Instruction No. 2.36A.

Although the list is “comprehensive, it is not all-inclusive. The fact that an explosive material is not on the list does not mean that it is not within the coverage of the law if it otherwise meets the statutory definitions in 18 U.S.C. [§ ]841.” 79 Fed. Reg. 60496 (Oct. 7, 2014). Thus, if the indictment alleges false statements in connection with an explosive material not listed in the Federal Register entry, delete the second sentence and include the follow- ing after the third element:

The term “explosive material” means explosives, blasting agents, and detonators. The term “explosive” means any chemical compound mixture or device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by explosion. The term “blasting agent” means any material or mixture, consisting of fuel and oxidizer, intended for blasting. The term “detonator” means any device containing a detonating charge that is used for initiating detonation in an explosive.

2.36C	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.36C

UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF EXPLOSIVE MATERIALS
18 U.S.C. § 842(d)

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 842(d) and 844(a)(1), make it a crime for a person to knowingly distribute explosive materials to [a person in the prohibited category, e.g., a convicted felon] when the distributor knows that such a person is [a member of a prohibited category, e.g., a convicted felon].

————— (name explosive material) is an explosive material within the meaning of this law.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly distributed an explosive material as named in the indictment to
————— (name of person receiving the explosive mate- rial);

Second: That at the time of the distribution to
————— (name of person receiving the explosive mate- rial), he was ————— (identify prohibited category into which the person falls; e.g., a convicted felon); and

Third: That at the time of the distribution, the defendant knew that ————— (name of the person receiving the explosive material) was ————— (identify prohibited category into which the person falls; e.g., a convicted felon).

To “distribute” something simply means to deliver or transfer possession of it to someone else, with or without any financial interest in the transaction.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

Note

2.36C

The instruction mentions convicted felons, but there are eight other prohibited classes of people, for example certain kinds of aliens. See 18 U.S.C. § 842(d)(1)–(9). The instruction may have to be altered based upon the indictment.

The defi	of “explosive material” is found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 841(c)–(f). It does not include commonly used mixtures such as gasoline or fertilizer, which do not typically function by explosion. See United States v. Lorence, 706 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1983) (cit- ing legislative history). See Instruction No. 2.36A.

Although the list is “comprehensive, it is not all-inclusive. The fact that an explosive material is not on the list does not mean that it is not within the coverage of the law if it otherwise meets the statutory definitions in 18 U.S.C. [§ ]841.” 79 Fed. Reg. 60496 (Oct. 7, 2014). Thus, if the indictment alleges distribution of an ex- plosive material not listed in the Federal Register entry, delete the second sentence and include the following after the third element:

The term “explosive material” means explosives, blasting agents, and detonators. The term “explosive” means any chemical compound mixture or device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by explosion. The term “blasting agent” means any material or mixture, consisting of fuel and oxidizer, intended for blasting. The term “detonator” means any device containing a detonating charge that is used for initiating detonation in an explosive.

2.36	D	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.36D

POSSESSION OF EXPLOSIVES BY A PROHIBITED PERSON
18 U.S.C. § 842(i)(1)

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 842(i)(1) and 844(a)(1), make it a crime for a person convicted of a felony to knowingly possess an explosive that has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

————— (name explosive) is an explosive within the meaning of this law.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly possessed an explosive as named in the indictment;

Second: That before the defendant possessed the explosive, the defendant had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term in excess of one year; and

Third: That the explosive possessed traveled in [af- fected] interstate [foreign] commerce; that is, before the defendant possessed the explosive, it had traveled at some time from one state to another [between any part of the United States and any other country].
Note

The instruction mentions convicted felons, but there are other prohibited classes of people, for example certain kinds of aliens. See 18 U.S.C. § 842(i)(1)–(7). The instruction may have to be altered based upon the indictment.
This instruction is substantially similar to Instruction No. 2.43D, Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon. Section 842

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.36D

can be read in pari materia with 18 U.S.C. § 922, the analogous fi	statute. United States v. Fillman, 162 F.3d 1055, 1057 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that although § 842(i) and related statutes do not defi	“indictment,” its defi	is the same as the one given in § 921(a)(14)); see also United States v. Markey, 393 F.3d 1132, 1135 (10th Cir. 2004) (“A further word is required as to the second element of the statute (i.e., that the defendant knowingly possessed an explosive) . . . . Indeed, we have found a mens rea requirement in the felon-in-possession-of-a-firearm stat- ute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which is nearly identical to § 842(i)(1).”).

“Explosives” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 841(d). See also Instruc- tion No. 2.36A.

However, the term “explosives” is narrower than the term “ex- plosive materials” as used in that statute. The list published each year contains “not only explosives, but also blasting agents . . . which are defined as explosive materials in 18 U.S.C. [§ ]841(c).” See 79 Fed. Reg. 60496 (Oct. 7, 2014). The list also states that it includes “detonators,” which are separately defined as “explosive materials” under § 841(c), but “detonators” are explicitly listed as examples of “explosives” under the defi	in § 841(d). When reading the list to determine whether a particular chemical compound or device is an “explosive,” note that “[m]aterials constituting blasting agents are marked by an asterisk.” See id.

Although the list is “comprehensive, it is not all-inclusive. The fact that an explosive material is not on the list does not mean that it is not within the coverage of the law if it otherwise meets the statutory defi	in 18 U.S.C. [§ ]841.” Id. Thus, if the indictment alleges possession of an explosive not listed in the Federal Register entry, delete the following:

“————— (name explosive) is an explosive within the meaning of this law.”

After the third element, include the following:

“The term ‘explosive’ means any chemical compound mixture or device, the primary or common purpose of which is to function by explosion.”

2.37	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.37

ARSON OF PROPERTY USED IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE OR USED IN AN ACTIVITY AFFECTING INTERSTATE COMMERCE
18 U.S.C. § 844(i)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(i) makes it a crime for anyone maliciously to damage or destroy [attempt to damage or destroy] by means of fire [an ex- plosive] any building [vehicle] [real or personal prop- erty] used in interstate [foreign] commerce or used in any activity affecting interstate [foreign] commerce.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant maliciously damaged [destroyed] [attempted to damage or destroy] ————— (name real or personal property alleged in the indict- ment);

Second: That the defendant did so [attempted to do so] by means of fire [an explosive]; and

Third: That at the time of the fi [explosion] [defendant's attempt], ————— (name real or personal property alleged in the indictment) was used in inter- state [foreign] commerce or was used in an activity af- fecting interstate [foreign] commerce.

[Fourth: That ————— (name person alleged in the indictment) suffered personal injury [died] as a foresee- able result of the fire [explosion] [defendant's attempt].]

To “maliciously” damage or destroy a piece of prop- erty means to damage or destroy the property intention- ally or with willful disregard of the likelihood that dam- age to the property or destruction of the property will result from one's actions.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.37

A piece of property is “used in an activity affecting interstate [foreign] commerce” if the property is actively employed for commercial purposes and that active employment has  an eff on  interstate  [foreign] commerce. A piece of property is not used in an activity affecting interstate [foreign] commerce if the property merely has a passive, passing, or past connection to commerce. The defendant need not have been aware that the property was used in an activity affecting in- terstate [foreign] commerce for you to find him guilty.

Note

Defi	of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41, respectively.

The elements of the offense are discussed in United States v. Nguyen, 28 F.3d 477, 480–81 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Pazos, 24 F.3d 660, 664–65 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. El-Zoubi,
993 F.2d 442, 445–46 (5th Cir. 1993); and United States v. Triplett,
922 F.2d 1174, 1177–80 (5th Cir. 1991).

The offense carries a base imprisonment range of 5–20 years. It carries enhanced penalties (1) “if personal injury results to any person, including any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this subsection” (imprisonment range of 7–40 years), or (2) “if death results to any person, including any public safety officer performing duties as a direct or proximate result of conduct prohibited by this subsection” (defendant “shall also be subject to imprisonment for any term of years, or to the death penalty, or to life imprisonment”). 18 U.S.C.
§ 844(i). If the indictment contains one of these enhancements, the trial judge should either add personal injury or death as a fourth element to the charge or include a special instruction on the verdict form asking the jury whether they fi the supporting fact of personal injury or death. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162 (2013); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2363–66 (2000). For a brief discussion of the personal injury enhancement, see United States v. Severns, 559 F.3d 274, 281–82 (5th Cir. 2009).

In a drug case resulting in death, the Supreme Court consid- ered questions of “but for” causation in United States v. Burrage, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1720–22 (2014).

2.37	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
“Explosive” for the purposes of this instruction is defined in 18
U.S.C. § 844(j). This definition differs from the definition of “explo- sive” used in 18 U.S.C. § 842. See United States v. Lorence, 706 F.2d 512, 515 (5th Cir. 1983); Instruction Nos. 2.36B, and 2.36C.

“Maliciously” is not defined by the statute, but it retains its common-law meaning. United States v. Monroe, 178 F.3d 304, 307–08 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Corona, 108 F.3d 565, 571 (5th Cir. 1997). The statute does not require knowledge of the pro- perty's relation to interstate commerce. United States v. Jimenez, 256 F.3d 330, 338 n.9 (5th Cir. 2001).

The use of the damaged or destroyed property need only have “an effect on interstate commerce, not a substantial effect” to be covered under the statute. United States v. Dawes, 80 F. App'x 325, 327 (5th Cir. 2003).

An issue that may arise in prosecutions under § 844(i) is whether a kind of property, particularly residential property, is “used in an activity affecting interstate commerce.” See Jimenez, 256 F.3d at 336–38 (discussing various Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit cases). The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Russell
v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 2455 (1985), where the Court held that a two-unit rental property was “used in an activity affecting inter- state commerce” because “the local rental of an apartment unit is merely an element of a much broader commercial market in rental properties.” Id. at 2457. Later, in Jones v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1904 (2000), the Court read the word “used” in § 844(i) “to mean active employment for commercial purposes, and not merely a pas- sive, passing, or past connection to commerce.” Id. at 1910. Al- though the homeowner in that case used the home as collateral to obtain and secure a mortgage from an out-of-state lender, used the home to obtain a casualty insurance policy from an out-of-state insurer, and obtained natural gas for the home from an out-of- state company, the Court held that the home was not “used” in an activity affecting interstate commerce because the home was only “actively employed” as a private residence for the owner. Id. The Fifth Circuit held in Jimenez, 256 F.3d at 339, that an owner- occupied home with a one-room office was “used in an activity af- fecting interstate commerce” when the home offi was “where business records and supplies were stored, where employee paychecks were written and picked up, and where business vehicles occasionally parked overnight” for the resident-owner's company. A seemingly critical fact in Jimenez was that the home's address was listed on the company's tax forms, which made the case “quickly distinguishable from the garden-variety situation of a lawyer or salesperson who occasionally works from home.” Id.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.38

THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT 18 U.S.C. § 871

2.38

Title 18, United States Code, Section 871, makes it a crime for anyone knowingly and willfully to make a threat to injure, kill, or kidnap the President of the United States.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant mailed [wrote] [said] the words alleged to be the threat against the President as charged in the indictment;

Second: That the defendant understood and meant the words mailed [written] [said] as a threat; and

Third: That the defendant mailed [wrote] [said] the words knowingly and willfully, that is, intending them to be taken seriously.

A “threat” is a serious statement expressing an intention to kill, kidnap, or injure the President, which under the circumstances would cause apprehension in a reasonable person, as distinguished from words used as mere political argument, idle talk, exaggeration, or something said in a joking manner.

It is not necessary to prove that the defendant actu- ally intended to carry out the threat.
Note

On the meaning of “threat,” see United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 2001) (“[I]n the context of ‘threatening in- terstate communications,’ 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), a statement is a threat if in its context [it] would have a reasonable tendency to create apprehension that its originator will act according to its

2.38	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
tenor.”) (quoting United States v. Myers, 104 F.3d 76, 79 (5th Cir. 1997)), and United States v. Bozeman, 495 F.2d 508, 510 (5th Cir.
1974).

For cases that discuss the elements of this offense, see United States v. Howell, 719 F.2d 1258, 1260–61 (5th Cir. 1983) (per curiam), and United States v. Robin, 693 F.2d 376, 379–80 (5th Cir. 1982); Rogers v. United States, 488 F.2d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1974), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Rogers, 95 S. Ct. 2091 (1975).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.39

INTERSTATE TRANSMISSION OF EXTORTIONATE COMMUNICATION 18 U.S.C. § 875(B)

2.39

Title 18, United States Code, Section 875(b), makes it a crime for anyone to send [transmit] an extortionate communication in interstate or foreign commerce.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly sent [transmit- ted] a communication containing a threat to injure [kidnap] the person of another, as charged;

Second: That the defendant sent [transmitted] that communication with intent to extort money [something of value] from any person [firm] [association] [corpora- tion]; and

Third: That the communication was sent in inter- state [foreign] commerce.

A “threat” is a serious statement expressing an intent to injure [kidnap] any person, which under the circumstances would cause apprehension in a reason- able person, as distinguished from mere idle or careless talk, exaggeration, or something said in a joking manner.

To act with intent to “extort” means to act with the intent to obtain money or something of value from someone else, with that person's consent, but induced by the wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear.

The term “thing of value” is used in the everyday,

2.39	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
ordinary meaning and is not limited to money or tangible things with an identifiable price tag.

It is not necessary to prove that the defendant actu- ally succeeded in obtaining the money or other thing of value, or that the defendant actually intended to carry out the threat made.
Note

See United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002, 1015 n.9 (5th Cir.
1987) (discussing breadth of “thing of value”).

See United States v. Skelton, 514 F.3d 433, 445–46 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing this instruction); United States v. Daughenbaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 173 n.2 (5th Cir 1995) (approving this instruction on the defi	of threat with respect to 18 U.S.C. § 876); United States v. Turner, 960 F.2d 461, 464 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1992) (same).

A lesser offense may be charged pursuant to 18 U.S.C § 875(c) if the defendant did not intend to extort money or a thing of value with the threatening communication. See United States v. Morales, 272 F.3d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 2001) (uses a definition of “threat” for purposes of § 875(c) similar to the one defined in Daughenbaugh). The Supreme Court recently discussed the necessary mens rea for threats under § 875(c) in Elonis v. United States, No. 13–983, 2015 WL 2464051 (U.S. June 1, 2015). The Committee has not changed the definition of threat in this instruction to comport with Elonis because the Committee could not reach agreement whether the same mens rea issue exists for offenses charged under 875(b). Judges and attorneys should continue to monitor cases under 875(b) for developments.

See Notes to Instruction Nos. 2.38 and 2.40 on 18 U.S.C. § 871, Threats Against the President, and 18 U.S.C. § 876, Mailing Threatening Communications, respectively.

See Note to Instruction No. 2.54 on 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) for the definition of “kidnap.”
Defi	of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.40

2.40

MAILING THREATENING COMMUNICATIONS 18 U.S.C. § 876(b)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 876(b), makes it a crime for anyone to use the mails to transmit an extortionate communication.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly deposited [caused to be delivered] in the mail, for delivery by the Postal Service, a communication containing a threat, as charged;

Second: That the nature of the threat was to kidnap [injure] any person; and

Third: That the defendant made the threat with the intent to extort money [something of value].

A “threat” is a serious statement expressing an intention to injure [kidnap] any person, which under the circumstances would cause apprehension in a rea- sonable person, as distinguished from idle or careless talk, exaggeration, or something said in a joking manner.

To “extort” means to wrongfully induce someone else to pay money or something of value by threatening a kidnaping or injury if such payment is not made.

The term “thing of value” is used in the everyday, ordinary meaning and is not limited to money or tangible things with an identifiable price tag.

2.40	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
It is not necessary to prove that any money or other thing of value was actually paid or that the defendant actually intended to carry out the threat made.

It is not necessary to prove that the defendant actu- ally wrote the communication. What the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant mailed, or caused to be delivered by mail, a communication containing a “threat” as defined in these instructions.
Note

The elements of this offense are discussed in United States v. Stoker, 706 F.3d 643 (5th Cir. 2013). See also United States v. Stotts, 792 F.2d 1318, 1323 (5th Cir. 1986) (proof that defendant wrote communication is not element of the offense); United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002, 1015 n.9 (5th Cir. 1987) (discusses breadth of “thing of value”); United States v. DeShazo, 565 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1978) (present intent to actually do injury is not required, and § 876 is a general intent crime); see also United States v. Daughenbaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 173 n.2 (5th Cir. 1995) (ap- proving this instruction on the definition of threat); United States v. Turner, 960 F.2d 461, 464 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1992) (same).

See Notes to Instruction Nos. 2.38 and 2.39 on 18 U.S.C. § 871, Threats Against the President, and 18 U.S.C. § 875(b), Interstate Transmission of Extortionate Communication, respectively.

See Note to Instruction No. 2.54 on 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) for the definition of “kidnap.”

A lesser offense may be charged pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 876(c) if the defendant did not intend to extort money or a thing of value with the threatening communication. The Supreme Court recently discussed the necessary mens rea for threats under a closely re- lated statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), in Elonis v. United States, No. 13–983, 2015 WL 2464051 (U.S. June 1, 2015). The Committee has not changed the definition of threat in this instruction to comport with Elonis because the Committee could not reach agreement whether the same mens rea issue exists for offenses charged under 876(b). Judges and attorneys should continue to monitor cases under 876(b) for developments.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.41

2.41

MISREPRESENTATION OF CITIZENSHIP 18 U.S.C. § 911

Title 18, United States Code, Section 911, makes it a crime to represent oneself falsely and willfully to be a citizen of the United States.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant represented that he was a citizen of the United States;

Second: That the defendant was not a citizen of the United States at the time he made the representation; and

Third: That the defendant knew he was not a citi- zen and deliberately made this false representation with intent to disobey or disregard the law.
Note

See United States v. Harrell, 894 F.2d 120, 126 (5th Cir. 1990) (listing of the elements). The statute requires that the false repre- sentation be willful. See 18 U.S.C. § 911. The Ninth Circuit requires that the statement be made to someone with good reason to inquire. See United States v. Anguiano-Morfin, 713 F.3d 1208, 1210 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Romero-Avila, 210 F.3d 1017,
1020 (9th Cir. 2000).

See Instruction Nos. 1.37 “Knowingly”—To Act and 1.38 “Will- fully”—To Act.

2.42	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.42

FALSE IMPERSONATION OF FEDERAL OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE—DEMANDING OR OBTAINING ANYTHING OF VALUE
18 U.S.C. § 912

Title 18, United States Code, Section 912, makes it a crime for anyone to demand [obtain] money [paper] [documents] [something of value] while falsely assum- ing [pretending] to be an offi or employee of the United States.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant falsely assumed [pre- tended] to be an offi [employee] acting under the authority of the United States;

Second: That while acting in such assumed [pre- tended] character, the defendant demanded [obtained] money [paper] [documents] [something of value]; and

Third: That the defendant did so knowingly with intent to defraud.

To act “with intent to defraud” means to act with intent to wrongfully deprive another of property.
Note
This statute encompasses two separate offenses. This instruc- tion pertains only to one of them, namely demanding or obtaining property through a pretended character. See United States v. Lepow- itch, 63 S. Ct. 914 (1943). The Fifth Circuit requires allegation and proof of an intent to defraud. See United States v. Cortes, 600 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Pollard, 491 F.2d 1387 (5th
Cir. 1974).
The other off	is merely to act in a pretended character.
See Honea v. United States, 344 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1965). It

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.42

requires an intent to deceive. See United States v. Randolph, 460 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1972).

2.43	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.43A

DEALING IN FIREARMS WITHOUT LICENSE 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A)

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(a)(1)(A) and 924(a)(1)(D), make it a crime to be in the business of dealing in firearms [ammunition] without a federal license.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant was a person engaged in the business of selling fi	at wholesale or retail on ————— (date listed in the indictment);
Second: That the defendant engaged in such busi- ness without a license issued under federal law; and

Third: That the defendant did so willfully, that is, that the defendant was dealing in firearms with knowl- edge that his conduct was unlawful.

The term “firearm” means any weapon which will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. The term “firearm” also includes the frame or receiver of any such weapon, or any firearm muffler or firearm silencer, or destructive device.

A person is “engaged in the business of selling fire- arms at wholesale or retail,” if that person devotes time, attention, and labor to dealing in firearms as a regular course of trade or business with the principle objective of livelihood and profit through the repetitive purchase and resale of fi	Such term does not include a person who makes occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms for the enhancement of a personal

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.43A

collection or for a hobby, or who sells all or part of that person's personal collection of firearms.

The term “with the principle objective of livelihood and profit” means that the intent underlying the sale or disposition of firearms is predominantly one of obtain- ing livelihood and pecuniary gain, as opposed to other intents, such as improving or liquidating a personal fi	collection. However, proof of profi is not required as to a person who engages in the regular and repetitive purchase and disposition of firearms for crim- inal purposes or terrorism.
Note

The statute contains two additional definitions of dealer. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(11)(B)–(C). Also, a defendant can violate 18
U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) by importing or manufacturing fi without a license. Therefore, this instruction may need to be altered according to the indictment. Likewise, if the defendant is charged with selling ammunition, the provisions of 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(a)(1)(B) are applicable, and the instruction would need to be altered. The defi	of ammunition is found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 921(a)(17)(A).
Willfulness is an element of this off	See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(1)(D). United States v. Bryan, 118 S. Ct. 1939 (1998), describes the mens rea for the offense of dealing in firearms without a license and other firearms offenses such as 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). The Government does not need to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of the federal licensing requirement. See Bryan, 118 S. Ct. at 1947. However, knowledge that the conduct is unlaw- ful is required. Id.

2.43B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.43B

FALSE STATEMENT TO FIREARMS DEALER 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6)

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(a)(6) and 924(a)(2), make it a crime for anyone to knowingly make a false statement to a firearms dealer in order to buy a firearm [ammunition].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant made a false [fictitious] oral [written] statement;

Second: That the defendant knew the statement was false;

Third: That the statement was made in connection with the acquisition of a firearm [ammunition] from a licensed firearms [ammunitions] dealer;

Fourth: That the statement was intended or was likely to deceive a licensed fi	[ammunitions] dealer; and

Fifth: That the alleged false statement was mate- rial to the lawfulness of the sale or disposition of the firearm [ammunition].

The term “firearm” means any weapon that will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. The term “firearm” also includes the frame or receiver of any such weapon, or any firearm muffler or firearm silencer, or destructive device.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.43B

A statement is “false or fictitious” if it was untrue when made and was then known to be untrue by the person making it.

A false statement is “likely to deceive” if the nature of the statement, considering all of the surrounding cir- cumstances at the time it is made, is such that a rea- sonable person of ordinary prudence would have been actually deceived or misled.
Note

United States v. Guerrero, 234 F.3d 259 (5th Cir. 2000), holds that this statute does not intend to distinguish between acquisi- tion and attempted acquisition and creates only one offense—the making of a false statement with respect to the eligibility of a person to obtain a firearm from a licensed dealer.

“Straw purchases” violate § 922(a)(6). See Abramski v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2259 (2014); United States v. Ortiz-Loya, 777
F.2d 973, 979 (5th Cir. 1985).

The definition of “ammunition” may also need to be included based upon the indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(17)(A). Likewise, in addition to making a false statement to a fi	dealer, a defendant can violate 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) by making a false state- ment to an importer, manufacturer, or collector in order to buy a fi	or ammunition. See § 921(a)(9) (defi “importer”), 921(a)(10) (defining “manufacturer”), 921(a)(11) (defining “dealer”), and 921(a)(13) (defining “collector”). Therefore, the instruction may need to be altered according to the indictment.

2.43C	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.43C

UNLAWFUL SALE OR DISPOSITION OF FIREARM OR AMMUNITION
18 U.S.C. § 922(d)

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(d) and 924(a)(2), make it a crime for a person knowingly to sell or otherwise dispose of a fi	to [a person in a prohibited category, e.g., a convicted felon] when the seller knows or has reasonable cause to believe that such a person is [a member of a prohibited category, e.g., a convicted felon].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly sold [disposed of] a fi	[ammunition] to ——————————— (name of person receiving the firearm);

Second: That at the time of the sale [disposal] to
————— (name of person receiving the firearm), he was
————— (identify prohibited category into which the person falls, e.g., a convicted felon); and

Third: That at the time of the sale, the defendant knew  or  had  reasonable  cause  to  believe  that
——————————— (name of person receiving the
fi	was ——————————— (identify prohibited category into which the person falls, e.g., a convicted felon).

The term “firearm” means any weapon that will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. The term “firearm” also includes the frame or receiver of any such weapon, or any firearm muffler or firearm silencer, or destructive device.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

Note

2.43C

The instruction mentions convicted felons, but there are eight other prohibited classes of people, for example controlled substance users. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(2)–(9). The instruction may have to be altered based upon the indictment. To have “reasonable cause to believe” that someone is a member of a prohibited class within the meaning of § 922(d) means to have knowledge of facts which, although not amounting to direct knowledge, would cause a rea- sonable person, knowing the same things, reasonably to conclude that the person was in the charged category. See United States v. Peters, 403 F.3d 1263, 1268–69 (11th Cir. 2005); see also United
States v. Murray, 988 F.2d 518, 521 (5th Cir. 1993) (discussing the quantum of proof regarding defendant's knowledge of purchaser's status as a felon).

“Otherwise dispose of” means “to transfer a firearm so that the transferee acquires possession of the fi	United States v. Jeff       , 334 F.3d 670, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2003); see also United
States v. Monteleone, 77 F.3d 1086, 1092 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding that “disposal of” occurs when a transferee “comes into possession, control, or power of disposal of a firearm”).
The defi	of ammunition may also need to be included based upon the indictment. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(17)(A).
The mens rea requirement is set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).

2.43D	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.43D

POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY A CONVICTED FELON
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), make it a crime for a convicted felon to knowingly possess a firearm [ammunition].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm [ammunition] as charged;

Second: That before the defendant possessed the firearm [ammunition], the defendant had been convicted in a court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term in excess of one year; and

Third: That the fi	[ammunition] possessed traveled in [affected] interstate [foreign] commerce; that is, before the defendant possessed the fi	it had traveled at some time from one state to another [be- tween any part of the United States and any other country].

The term “firearm” means any weapon that will or is designed to or may readily be converted to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive. The term “firearm” also includes the frame or receiver of any such weapon, or any firearm muffler or firearm silencer, or destructive device.
Note

Elements of this offense are listed in United States v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 418 (5th Cir. 2012), United States v. Broadnax, 601
F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Guidry, 406

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.43D

F.3d 314, 318 (5th Cir. 2005)), and United States v. Anderson, 559
F.3d 348, 353 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Ybarra, 70
F.3d 362, 365 (5th Cir. 1995)).
Willfulness is not an element of this off	See 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(a)(2). The government must only prove the defendant knew he possessed a firearm or ammunition, but not that the defendant had knowledge of his status as a qualifying felon or that the firearm was “in or affecting” interstate or foreign commerce. See United States v. Potts, 644 F.3d 233, 237 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Rose, 587 F.3d 695 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Schmidt, 487 F.3d 253, 254–55 (5th Cir. 2007). The nexus is between the possession, transportation, or receipt of the firearm and the phrase “in commerce or aff	commerce.” United States v. Scarbor- ough, 97 S. Ct. 1963, 1964 (1977). The government is not required to establish a link between the defendant and interstate or foreign commerce. See United States v. Bass, 92 S. Ct. 515, 522 (1971).

Simultaneous possession by a felon of multiple fi	or firearm(s) and ammunition, is only one offense. See Meza, 701 F.3d at 433; United States v. Villegas, 494 F.3d 513, 515 (5th Cir. 2007). Thus, when multiple firearms are described in the indictment, it is not necessary to instruct the jury that it must be unanimous as to which firearm the defendant possessed on the occasion in question. Id.; see United States v. Talbert, 501 F.3d 449, 450 (5th Cir. 2007).

The determination whether the defendant has a prior convic- tion is for the jury. But, whether a conviction qualifies as a predi- cate offense under this statute is a legal question for the judge, not the jury. See Broadnax, 601 F.3d at 345. The issue is informed by the defi	in 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(A)–(B). See also United States v. Chenowith, 459 F.3d 635, 636–38 (5th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Huff, 370 F.3d 454, 458–59 (5th Cir. 2004); Gill v. Ashcroft,
335 F.3d 574, 575 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Richardson, 168
F.3d 836 (5th Cir. 1999).

If a defendant admits or stipulates that he has been previ- ously convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year imprisonment, the following language may be included in the charge:

The parties have stipulated that the defendant has been convicted of a crime which is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. You are to take that fact as proven.

See Old Chief v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 644 (1997); United States v. Chevere, 368 F.3d 120 (3d Cir. 2004) (the defendant's stipulation to a prior conviction does not eliminate the need to

2.43	D	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
charge on that element; it only prevents the jury from hearing about the nature and underlying facts of the prior conviction).

The element of possession can be satisfied by proof of actual or constructive possession. See Meza, 701 F.3d at 419–22; United States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 1999); see also Instruction No. 1.31, Possession.

“[T]he statute requires only a ‘minimal nexus’ between the firearm and interstate commerce.” United States v. Gresham, 118 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir. 1997). This element is met where the government proves the firearm possessed was manufactured out of state. See Guidry, 406 F.3d at 318; see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(2). In United States v. Chambers, 408 F.3d 237 (5th Cir. 2005), the Fifth Circuit overturned a defendant's conviction on the grounds that the government constructively amended the indictment when the indictment charged that the ammunition passed through inter- state commerce, but the evidence presented at trial only showed that the component parts of the ammunition passed through inter- state commerce. The jury charge also only required the jury to find that the component parts traveled in interstate commerce. Id. at 246; see also Broadnax, 601 F.3d at 343–44 (discussing which charged items must travel in interstate commerce).

Defi	of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.44

2.44

USING/CARRYING A FIREARM DURING COMMISSION OF A DRUG TRAFFICKING CRIME OR CRIME OF VIOLENCE
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 924(c)(1), makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly use or carry a fi	during and in relation to a drug traffi
crime [crime of violence] [to possess a fi	in furtherance of such a crime].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proven each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant committed the crime al- leged  in  Count  —————.  I  instruct  you  that
——————————— is a drug trafficking crime [crime of violence]; and

Second: That the defendant knowingly used or car- ried a firearm during and in relation to the defendant's commission of the crime charged in Count ———.
To prove the defendant “used” a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime [crime of violence], the government must prove that the defendant actively employed the firearm in the commission of Count ———, such as a use that is intended to or brings about a change in the circumstances of the commission of Count
———. “Active employment” may include brandishing, displaying, referring to, bartering, striking with, firing, or attempting to fi    the fi	“Use” is more than mere possession of a firearm or having it available dur- ing the drug trafficking crime [crime of violence].

To prove the defendant “carried” a firearm during and in relation to a drug traffi	crime [crime of

2.44	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
violence], the government must prove that the defen- dant carried the firearm in the ordinary meaning of the word “carry,” such as by transporting a firearm on the person or in a vehicle. The defendant's carrying of the firearm cannot be merely coincidental or unrelated to the drug trafficking crime [crime of violence].

“In relation to” means that the firearm must have some purpose, role, or eff with respect to the drug trafficking crime [crime of violence].

[Second: That the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm in furtherance of the defendant's commission of the crime charged in Count —————.]
[To prove the defendant possessed a fi	“in furtherance,” the government must prove that the defendant possessed a firearm that furthers, advances, or helps forward the drug traffi	crime [crime of violence].]
Note

In response to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bailey v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 501 (1995), Congress broadened the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) to prohibit possession of a fi	in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) was amended by the Criminal Use of Guns Act, Pub.L. No. 105-386,
§ 1(a)(1), 112 Stat. 3469 (1998), effective November 13, 1998. Sec- tion 924(c)(1) now applies to “any person who, during and in rela- tion to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime uses or car- ries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm.” See United States v. O'Brien, 130 S. Ct. 2169 (2010), and United States v. McGilberry, 480 F.3d 326 (5th Cir. 2007), for discussion of the evolution of § 924(c)(1). The structure and ele- ments of this statute are discussed in Dean v. United States, 129
S. Ct. 1849, 1853–54 (2009), and United States v. Franklin, 561 F.3d 398, 402 (5th Cir. 2009). This instruction was approved in United States v. Montes, 602 F.3d 381, 386–87 (5th Cir. 2010).

The Supreme Court's decision to define “use” with its ‘‘ ‘ordi- nary and natural’ meaning” are discussed in Watson v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 579 (2007), Bailey, 116 S. Ct. at 506, and Smith
v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050 (1993). The Bailey Court gave

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.44

sample definitions of “use,” such as ‘‘ ‘[t]o convert to one's service,’ ‘to employ,’ ‘to avail oneself of,’ and ‘to carry out a purpose or ac- tion by means of.’ ’’ 116 S. Ct. at 506. The Court also set a mini- mum threshold of “use” as requiring more than mere possession, instead requiring “evidence suffi   to show an active employ- ment of the firearm by the defendant, a use that makes the firearm an operative factor in relation to the predicate offense.” Id. at 505–
06. “The active-employment understanding of ‘use’ certainly includes brandishing, displaying, bartering, striking with, and, most obviously, firing or attempting to fire a firearm.” Id. at 508. See United States v. Chavez, 119 F.3d 342 (5th Cir. 1997), for an approved instruction on the difference between “use” and “carry.”

Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911 (1998), and United States v. Smith, 481 F.3d 259, 264 (5th Cir. 2007), hold that “carry” includes carry on the person as well as in the trunk or glove box of an automobile. The term “carry” contemplates movement. See United States v. Sanders, 157 F.3d 302 (5th Cir. 1998). The firearm need not be easily accessible to be “carried”; instead, “the firearm must either be transported by the defendant or within his reach during and in relation to the predicate crime.” Smith, 481 F.3d at 264.
At a minimum, “in relation to” means “the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to a drug trafficking crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence.” Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 2059. It must ‘‘ ‘facilitat[e] or ha[ve] the potential of facilitating,’ the drug trafficking offense.” Id. (quoting United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 539 (9th Cir. 1985)); see United States v. Guidry, 456 F.3d 493, 508 (5th Cir. 2006) (crime of violence). Muscarello v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1918 (1998), notes that “Congress added these words in part to prevent prosecution where guns ‘played’ no part in the crime.” The Fifth Circuit upheld the pattern jury charge's definition of this element. See United States v. Harris, 477 F.3d 241, 243–44 (5th Cir. 2007).

United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 415 (5th Cir. 2000), analyzes the meaning of “in furtherance” at length and decides that “using the dictionary definition of ‘in furtherance’ is the appropriate way to construe the statute.” Thus, firearm posses- sion that furthers, advances or helps forward the drug trafficking offense violates the statute. Id.
A number of factors may be considered in determining whether a firearm is possessed “in furtherance” of a drug trafficking offense:
(1) the type of drug activity being conducted; (2) the accessibility of the fi	(3) the type of weapon; (4) whether the weapon is stolen; (5) whether the possession is lawful; (6) whether the firearm is loaded; (7) the weapon's proximity to drugs or drug profits; and
(8) the time and circumstances under which the firearm is found.

2.44	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
See, e.g., United States v. Nunez-Sanchez, 478 F.3d 663, 669 (5th Cir. 2007); see also United States v. Rose, 587 F.3d 695, 702
(5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Charles, 469 F.3d 402, 406 (5th Cir. 2006); Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d at 414–15. See United States
v. Yanez-Sosa, 513 F.3d 194, 203–04 (5th Cir. 2008), for additional instructions on this element.

This instruction presumes that the predicate drug offense is charged in another count of the indictment. If the predicate drug offense is not so charged, this instruction must be amended to list the elements of the uncharged drug trafficking crime. See United States v. Mendoza, 11 F.3d 126 (9th Cir. 1993). A drug trafficking crime is “any felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801 et seq.), the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. 951 et seq.), or chapter 705 of title 46.” 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(2).

What constitutes a “crime of violence” is a matter of statutory interpretation for the court. See United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Credit, 95 F.3d 362 (5th
Cir. 1996). Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), was decided seven days after certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court in Jennings. The district judge is cautioned that Apprendi may alter this holding.

In determining what constitutes a “crime of violence,” the Fifth Circuit uses a “categorical approach” in which the particular off is viewed in the abstract, without considering the facts underlying the defendant's conviction. See United States v. Williams, 343 F.3d 423, 431 (5th Cir. 2003). The underlying off  must have elements of violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3); see also Credit, 95 F.3d at 364. Carjacking is always a “crime of violence” as defined in § 924(c)(3). See United States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 208–09 (5th Cir. 2007). In Williams, 343 F.3d at 433–34, the Fifth Circuit held that deprivation of civil rights resulting in bodily injury or involv- ing dangerous weapons are always crimes of violence as defined in
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii).

Each of the penalty enhancements in § 924(c)(1)(A) or (B) should be charged as an element of an off	See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). Enhancements for prior convictions under § 924(c)(1)(C) need not be charged as elements of the offense.

If the defendant is also charged with aiding and abetting a violation of § 924(c)(1), the government must prove that the defendant “actively participated in the underlying . . . violent crime with advance knowledge that a confederate would use or

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.44

carry a gun during crime’s commission.” United States v. Smith, 2015 WL 1951903 (5th Cir. May 1, 2015) (citing Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014). “Advance knowledge” means “knowledge at a time the accomplice can do something with it – most notably, opt to walk away.” Rosemond, 134 S. Ct. at 1249-50. “A defendant ‘actively participates’ in a crime for aiding and abet- ting where the ‘aid relates to . . . one (or some) of a crime’s phases or elements.” Id. at 1247.

The Fifth Circuit has held that, if the government seeks more than one § 924(c) conviction, it must prove that there was more than one firearm involved. United States v. Phipps, 319 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Campbell, 775 F. 3d 664 (5th Cir. 2014). However, if one off is alleged, jurors do not have to unanimously agree which weapon was used in connection with the drug trafficking crime. See United States v. Correa-Ventura, 6 F.3d 1070, 1076–77 (5th Cir. 1993).

For the definition of “Possession,” see Instruction No. 1.31.

2.45	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.45

FALSE STATEMENTS TO FEDERAL AGENCIES AND AGENTS
18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(a)(2) and (a)(3)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1001, makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly and willfully make a false or fraudulent statement in any matter within the jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the government of the United States.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant made a false statement [made or used any false writing or document] to
——————————— (name executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the United States government) regarding a matter within its jurisdiction;

Second: That the defendant made the statement intentionally, knowing that it was false [knowing the same contained a false, fictitious, or fraudulent state- ment or entry];

Third: That the statement was material [the false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry was mate- rial]; and

Fourth: That the defendant made the false state- ment    for    the    purpose    of    misleading    the
——————————— (name of executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the United States government).

A statement is material if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, a decision of
——————————— (name of executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the United States government).

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2.45

It	is	not	necessary	to	show	that	the
——————————— (name of executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the United States government) was in fact misled.
Note

See United States v. Jara-Favela, 686 F.3d 289, 301 (5th Cir. 2012), United States v. Richardson, 676 F.3d 491 (5th Cir. 2012), and United States v. Hoover, 467 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2006), for the elements of this offense.
Subsection (b) partially preserves the so-called “judicial func- tion exception.” If the indictment charges a false statement to the legislature, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001(c)(1) and (2) for limitations.
Some courts have held that “reckless disregard” or “reckless indifference” may satisfy the scienter element, at least where the defendant makes a false material statement, and consciously avoids learning the true facts. See United States v. Puente, 982 F.2d 156 (5th Cir. 1993).

The “exculpatory no” doctrine exception to 18 U.S.C. § 1001 has been abolished. See Brogan v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 805 (1998); United States v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 650 (5th Cir. 1997). The indictment need not allege that a false statement was made with actual knowledge of federal agency jurisdiction. See United States v. Yermian, 104 S. Ct. 2936, 2943 n.14 (1984) (upholding conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001 where the jury was instructed, without objection, that “the Government must prove that the re- spondent ‘knew or should have known’ that his false statements were made within the jurisdiction of a federal agency”).
The question of whether or not a false statement is made in a “matter within the jurisdiction” of a federal branch of the United States is one of fact. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 582 F.3d 558, 562 (5th Cir. 2009). Under certain circumstances, a false statement to a state, local, or even private agency can comprise a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001. In Taylor, the court held that the defendant, who made a false statement to the Mississippi Develop- ment Authority (“MDA”) on an application, made a false statement to a federal agency within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 because the federal Housing and Urban Development agency oversaw MDA's affairs and provided some of its funding. Taylor, 582 F.3d at 562. In United States v. Smith, the court reaffi	the expansive approach taken in Taylor relative to whether a false statement is within the jurisdiction of a federal agency, finding the requirement established notwithstanding that the federal agency

2.45	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
in question “had no direct authority over disbursement of the funds and no power to punish individuals making fraudulent claims.” Smith, 519 F. App'x 853, 857–58 (5th Cir. 2013) (“We recognized in Taylor that a false statement may fall ‘within the jurisdiction of a federal agency’ if it has the potential to ‘contravene the intent’ of an agency program.”). The Smith court further emphasized and explained its rejection of the more narrow approach reportedly taken by the Ninth and Sixth Circuits, while also noting the Eleventh Circuit's similar rejection. Id. at 857 n. 2 and n. 3.

The definition of materiality is from United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2313 (1995). Further, “[a]ctual influence or reli- ance by a government agency is not required. The statement may still be material ‘even if it is ignored or never read by the agency receiving the misstatement.’ ’’ Puente, 982 F.2d at 159 (quoting United States v. Swaim, 757 F.2d 1530, 1534 (5th Cir. 1985)); see
United States v. Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 505 (5th Cir. 2012).

A defendant need not personally make the false statement, it is sufficient that he intentionally caused the false statement to be made. See United States v. Elashyi, 554 F.3d 480, 497 (5th Cir. 2008) (holding that there was suffi     evidence that defendant had either signed the required Shipper Export Declaration with the Commerce Department or had the freight forwarder sign them on his behalf using false values defendant provided and intended to be used).

This instruction does not cover violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1001(a)(1), falsely concealing or covering up by trick. To charge concealment, most circuits hold that the prosecution must prove that the defendant had a duty to disclose the information to the government. See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 528 F.3d 957, 964 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United States v. Moore, 446 F.3d 671, 678 (7th
Cir. 2006).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.46

2.46

FALSE STATEMENTS IN BANK RECORDS 18 U.S.C. § 1005 (THIRD PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1005, makes it a crime for anyone to make a false entry in any book [report] [statement] of a federally insured bank, know- ing the entry is false, with intent to injure or defraud the bank.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the ——————————— (name bank) was a federally insured bank;

Second: That the defendant made a false entry in a book [report] [statement] of ——————————— (name bank);

Third: That the defendant did so knowing it was false; and

Fourth: That the defendant did so intending to injure or defraud ——————————— (name bank).
Note

See United States v. Munna, 871 F.2d 515 (5th Cir. 1989), rel- ative to the deprivation of intangible rights as constituting bank fraud.
Specific intent to injure or defraud the bank or its public of- fi is an express element of this section. See United States v. Campbell, 64 F.3d 967 (5th Cir. 1995). It is not necessary to prove intent to deceive the bank. Intent to deceive an officer, agent, audi- tor, or examiner is sufficient. See United States v. McCord, 33 F.3d 1434 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v. Chaney, 964 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1992). If the case involves alleged injury to or deceit of an of- ficer or other entity, the instruction must be tailored accordingly.
Materiality is not an element of this off	when the

2.46	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
defendant is charged with a false statement, but it is an element where the defendant is charged with a false entry resulting from an omission of information. See United States v. Harvard, 103 F.3d 412, 417–20 (5th Cir. 1997). In such a case, materiality would be a jury question. See United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2314 (1995).

In an “omission” case, the second element of the instruction should be replaced with the following:

[That the defendant deliberately omitted a material fact in a book [record] [statement] of ——————————— (name bank).
A material omission is one that would naturally tend to influ- ence,   or   was   capable   of   infl	the   decision   of
——————————— (name bank).]
In an “omission” case, the third element is omitted, but the fourth element is retained.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.47

FALSE STATEMENT TO A BANK 18 U.S.C. § 1014

2.47

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1014, makes it a crime for anyone knowingly to make a false state- ment to a federally insured bank for the purpose of influencing the lending activities of a federally insured bank.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant made a false statement to ————— (name bank), as charged;
Second: That the defendant knew the statement was false when the defendant made it;

Third: That the defendant did so for the purpose of influencing a lending action of the institution, ————— (describe purpose, e.g., convincing the bank to give the defendant a loan); and

Fourth: That ————— (name bank) was federally insured.

It is not necessary, however, to prove that the institution involved was, in fact, influenced or misled. What must be proven is that the defendant intended to influence the lending decision of the bank by the false statement. To make a false statement to a federally insured bank, the defendant need not directly submit the false statement to the institution. It is sufficient if the defendant submits the statement to a third party, knowing that the third party will submit the false state- ment to the federally insured bank.

2.47	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Note

See United States v. Huntress, 956 F.2d 1309, 1319 (5th Cir. 1992) (approving this instruction and fi	that no further elaboration on the word “influence” is needed because it is “used in its everyday meaning in the statute”).

United States v. Wells, 117 S. Ct. 921, 927–31 (1997), held that materiality is not an element in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1014. See also United States v. Dupre, 117 F.3d 810, 818 (5th Cir. 1997). Among other reasons, the decision of the Supreme Court in Wells relied on the text's “natural reading,” i.e., the absence of “material” within the text of the statute, on its statutory history, and on other elements of proof required by the statute. Wells, 117 S. Ct. at 927–31.
Judges should be aware that United States v. Sandlin has condensed the scienter requirement of this statute to “knowing and willfully,” though the language of the statute separates these two intent requirements, with “knowing” modifying the action of making a “false statement or report,” while “willfully” modifies the action of overvaluing “any land, property or security.” 589 F.3d 749, 753 (5th Cir. 2009) (“The elements of guilt under Section 1014 are these: (1) the defendant knowingly and willfully made a false statement to the bank, (2) the defendant knew that the statement was false when he made it, (3) the defendant made the false state- ment for the purpose of influencing the bank to extend credit, and
(4) the bank to which the false statement was made was federally insured.”).

Further, the statute requires an intent to influence the bank's lending activities. See United States v. Devoll, 39 F.3d 575, 579–80 (5th Cir. 1994) (“[S]ection 1014 applies only to actions involving lending transactions.”); see also United States v. Matthews, 31 F. App'x 838, *10 (5th Cir. 2002); but see United States v. Boren, 278 F.3d 911, 914–16 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing split between circuits on whether offense is limited to lending transactions). However, an intent to harm the bank or to bring financial gain to the defendant is not required. See United States v. Waldrip, 981 F.2d 799, 806 (5th Cir. 1993) (upholding district court's exclusion of evidence on loss, because loss is not an element). Neither reliance by the bank nor an actual defrauding is required. Id.
The defendant need not make the false statement directly to an institution covered by the statute, nor must the defendant know which particular institution was involved or that it is federally insured. See United States v. McDow, 27 F.3d 132, 136 (5th Cir. 1994). But the defendant must know “that it was a bank that he

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2.47

intended to influence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). If the institution involved is not a federally insured bank, this charge must be modified to reflect the particular type of institution listed in the statute and as charged in the indictment.

Note that failure to disclose may constitute a false statement. See United States v. Trice, 823 F.2d 80, 86 (5th Cir. 1987); see also Dupre, 117 F.3d at 819. An alleged “debt” or “liability” must first be enforceable under state law before failure to disclose or the making of a false statement regarding such finances is able to be prosecuted under this statute. See United States v. Fontenot, 665 F.3d 640, 645–47 (5th Cir. 2011). Also note that “forgetting” does not meet the intent requirement of knowledge. See Sandlin, 589 F.3d at 753.

See Instruction Nos. 1.37 “Knowingly”—To Act and 1.38 Delib- erate Ignorance.

2.48	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.48A

PRODUCTION OF FALSE DOCUMENT 18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(1)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028(a)(1), makes it a crime for anyone knowingly and without lawful authority to produce an identification document, authentication feature, or false identification document under certain specified circumstances.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly produced an identification document [an authentication feature] [a false identification document];

and

Second: That he did so without lawful authority;

Third: That the identification document [authenti- cation feature] [false identification document] is or ap- pears to be issued by or under the authority of the United States [a sponsoring entity of an event desig- nated as a special event of national significance].

[Third: That the identification document [authenti- cation feature] [false identifi	document] was knowingly possessed with the intent that it be used to defraud the United States.]

[Third: That the production of the identifi document [authentication feature] [false identification document] is in or affects interstate [foreign] commerce, including the transfer of a document by electronic means, or the identification document [false identifica- tion document] is transported in the mail in the course of the production.]

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.48A

The term “identification document” means a docu- ment made or issued by or under the authority of the United States Government, a State, a political subdivi- sion of a State, a sponsoring entity of an event desig- nated as a special event of national signifi	a foreign government, a political subdivision of a foreign government, an international governmental or an international quasi-governmental organization which, when completed with information concerning a particu- lar individual, is of a type intended or commonly ac- cepted for the purpose of identification of individuals.

[The term “false identification document” means a document of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purposes of identification of individuals that is not issued by or under the authority of a governmental entity [was issued under the authority of a governmen- tal entity but was subsequently altered for purposes of deceit] and appears to be issued by or under the author- ity of the United States Government [a State] [a politi- cal subdivision of a State] [a sponsoring entity of an event designated by the President as a special event of national significance] [a foreign government] [a political subdivision of a foreign government] [an international governmental or quasi-governmental organization].]

[The term “authentication feature” means any hologram, watermark, certifi	symbol, code, im- age, sequence of numbers or letters, or other feature ei- ther individually or in combination with another feature used by the issuing authority on an identification docu- ment, document-making implement, or means of identification to determine if the document is counter- feit, altered, or otherwise falsified.]

The term “produce” includes alter, authenticate, or assemble.

[The phrase “intent that it be used to defraud the United States” means a specific intent to use the docu-

2.48A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
ment to deceive the United States in order to cause some harm to the United States or bring about some personal gain. Harm to the United States includes any impairment to the administration of governmental functions.]
Note

This statute is a model of complexity. Subsection (a) describes eight diff	violations and subsection (b) provides diff maximum sentences ranging from one year to thirty years depend- ing on various facts. The instruction must be carefully tailored, therefore, to comply with the Apprendi doctrine. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2351–63 (2000). For example, in United
States v. Villarreal, 253 F.3d 831, 839 (5th Cir. 2001), a sentence in excess of three years' confi	was reversed because the trial court's instructions did not ask the jury to fi that the identifi	document  in  question  was  one  listed  in
§ 1028(b)(1)(A). Additionally, the Apprendi doctrine would require a fourth element if the indictment alleges any facts that would result in enhanced penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2326. If these are disputed issues, the court should consider giving a lesser included instruction. See Instruction No. 1.33.
Interstate or foreign commerce may be affected even when the document transfer occurred entirely in a local venue. The focus is whether the document would have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce if the defendant had accomplished his intended goal. Thus, the commerce element is satisfied when a fraudulent docu- ment is sold to a foreign citizen who presumably desires to remain in this country and possibly travel into other states or countries. See Villarreal, 253 F.3d at 834–35.
Defi	of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41.

The definition of the phrase “intent that it be used to defraud the United States” is adapted from the defi	for “intent to defraud” in the mail and wire fraud context. See United States v. Jimenez, 77 F.3d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Intent to defraud requires an intent to (1) deceive, and (2) cause harm to result from the deceit.”); United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 746 (5th Cir. 1999) (“An intent to defraud for the purpose of personal gain satisfies the ‘harm’ requirement.”). The elaboration on what counts as harm to the United States comes from the Fourth Circuit. See United States
v. Luke, 628 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Goldsmith, 68 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1933)).

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2.48A

In United States v. Achaval, 547 F. App'x 470, 473 (5th Cir. 2013), the court declined (as unnecessary) to decide whether to adopt the definition of “appears to be issued by or under the author- ity of the United States Government” utilized by the Fourth and Seventh Circuits. See United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 91–93 (4th Cir. 2011) (a document “appears to be issued by or under the authority of the United States Government” when “a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would believe [it] was issued by or under the authority of the United States government”); see also United States v. Spears, 697 F.3d 592, 599–600 (7th Cir. 2012) (same), vacated on other grounds and reinstated in part, 729 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).

2.48B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.48B

POSSESSION OF FALSE DOCUMENT WITH INTENT TO DEFRAUD UNITED STATES
18 U.S.C. § 1028(a)(4)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1028(a)(4), makes it a crime for anyone knowingly and without lawful authority to possess an identification document [an authentication feature] [a false identification docu- ment] with the intent such document or feature be used to defraud the United States.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly possessed an identification document [an authentication feature] [a false identification document];

and

Second: That he did so without lawful authority;

Third: That the identification document [authenti- cation feature] [false identification document] was pos- sessed with the intent that it be used to defraud the United States.

The term “identification document” means a docu- ment made or issued by or under the authority of the United States Government, a State, a political subdivi- sion of a State, a sponsoring entity of an event desig- nated as a special event of national signifi	a foreign government, a political subdivision of a foreign government, an international governmental or an international quasi-governmental organization which, when completed with information concerning a particu- lar individual, is of a type intended or commonly ac- cepted for the purpose of identification of individuals.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.48B

[The term “false identification document” means a document of a type intended or commonly accepted for the purposes of identification of individuals that is not issued by or under the authority of a governmental entity [was issued under the authority of a governmen- tal entity but was subsequently altered for purposes of deceit] and appears to be issued by or under the author- ity of the United States Government [a State] [a politi- cal subdivision of a State] [a sponsoring entity of an event designated by the President as a special event of national significance] [a foreign government] [a political subdivision of a foreign government] [an international governmental or quasi-governmental organization.]

[The term “authentication feature” means any hologram, watermark, certifi	symbol, code, im- age, sequence of numbers or letters, or other feature ei- ther individually or in combination with another feature used by the issuing authority on an identification docu- ment, document-making implement, or means of identification to determine if the document is counter- feit, altered, or otherwise falsified.]

The phrase “intent that it be used to defraud the United States” means a specific intent to use the docu- ment to deceive the United States in order to cause some harm to the United States or bring about some personal gain. Harm to the United States includes any impairment to the administration of governmental functions.
Note
This statute is a model of complexity. Subsection (a) describes eight diff	violations and subsection (b) provides diff maximum sentences ranging from one year to thirty years depend- ing on various facts. The instruction must be carefully tailored, therefore, to comply with the Apprendi doctrine. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2351–63 (2000). For example, in United
States v. Villarreal, 253 F.3d 831, 839 (5th Cir. 2001), a sentence in excess of three years' confi	was reversed because the

2.48	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
trial court's instructions did not ask the jury to fi that the identifi	document  in  question  was  one  listed  in
§ 1028(b)(1)(A). Additionally, the Apprendi doctrine would require a fourth element if the indictment alleges any facts that would result in enhanced penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2326. If these are disputed issues, the court should consider giving a lesser included instruction. See Instruction No. 1.33.
Interstate or foreign commerce may be affected even when the document transfer occurred entirely in a local venue. The focus is whether the document would have traveled in interstate or foreign commerce if the defendant had accomplished his intended goal. Thus, the commerce element is satisfied when a fraudulent docu- ment is sold to a foreign citizen who presumably desires to remain in this country and possibly travel into other states or countries. See Villarreal, 253 F.3d at 834–35.

Defi	of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41.

The definition of the phrase “intent that it be used to defraud the United States” is adapted from the defi	for “intent to defraud” in the mail and wire fraud context. See United States v. Jimenez, 77 F.3d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Intent to defraud requires an intent to (1) deceive, and (2) cause harm to result from the deceit.”); United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 746 (5th Cir. 1999) (“An intent to defraud for the purpose of personal gain satisfies the ‘harm’ requirement.”). The elaboration on what counts as harm to the United States comes from the Fourth Circuit. See United States
v. Luke, 628 F.3d 114 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Goldsmith, 68 F.2d 5, 7 (2d Cir. 1933)).

In United States v. Achaval, 547 F. App'x 470, 473 (5th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1566 (2014) the court declined (as unnecessary) to decide whether to adopt the definition of “appears to be issued by or under the authority of the United States Govern- ment” utilized by the Fourth and Seventh Circuits. See United States v. Jaensch, 665 F.3d 83, 91–93 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2118 (2012) (a document “appears to be issued by or under the authority of the United States Government” when “a reasonable person of ordinary intelligence would believe [it] was issued by or under the authority of the United States govern- ment”); United States v. Spears, 697 F.3d 592, 599–600 (7th Cir. 2012) (same), vacated on other grounds and reinstated in part, Spears, 729 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.49A

2.49A

USE OF UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS DEVICE 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(2)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1029(a)(2), makes it a crime for anyone to traffi in or use, with intent to defraud, one or more unauthorized access de- vices during any one-year period and by such conduct obtain anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more during that period.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly traffi in [used] one or more unauthorized access devices;

Second: That by one or more such uses during the one-year period beginning ——————————— (date),
and ending ——————————— (date), the defendant obtained anything of value aggregating $1,000 or more;

Third: That the defendant acted with intent to defraud; and

Fourth: That the defendant's conduct aff in- terstate [foreign] commerce.

The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that his conduct would affect interstate [foreign] commerce. It is not necessary for the govern- ment to show that the defendant actually intended or anticipated an eff   on interstate [foreign] commerce by his actions or that commerce was actually affected. All that is necessary is that the natural and probable consequence of the acts the defendant took would be to affect interstate [foreign] commerce. If you decide that there would be any effect at all on interstate [foreign]

2.49	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
commerce, then that is enough to satisfy this element. The effect can be minimal.

The term “access device” means any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, mobile identification number, personal identification number, or other telecommunications service, equipment, or instrument identifi or other means of gaining ac- count access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access device, to obtain money, goods, ser- vices, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds (other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument).

The term “unauthorized access device” means any access device that is lost, stolen, expired, revoked, canceled, or obtained with intent to defraud.

To act with “intent to defraud” means to act with the specifi intent to deceive in order to cause some harm or bring about some personal gain.
Note

This instruction is limited to use of an access device in
§ 1029(a)(2). It provides a model for drafting instructions in cases under other subsections which contain diff	elements and maximum punishments.

If an issue is raised that the card or plate or account is not an “access device,” it may be necessary to submit that issue to the jury. See United States v. Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that whether a gold certifi was a security is a jury issue).

The term “access device” is broad enough to encompass technological advances and includes long-distance telephone access codes. Also, “counterfeit” and “unauthorized” are not mutually exclusive terms. See United States v. Brewer, 835 F.2d 550 (5th Cir. 1987).

A “counterfeit access device” under § 1029(a)(1) includes an otherwise  legitimate  device  procured  by  the  use  of  false

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.49A

information. See United States v. Soape, 169 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 1999).

On “unauthorized access device,” see United States v. Inman, 411 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 2005) (differentiating between a counterfeit access device and an unauthorized access device).
For cases describing the “intent to defraud,” see United States
v. Jimenez, 77 F.3d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Intent to defraud requires an intent to (1) deceive, and (2) cause harm to result from the deceit.”); United States v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 746 (5th Cir. 1999) (“An intent to defraud for the purpose of personal gain satis- fies the ‘harm’ requirement.”).

On “affecting commerce,” see United States v. Jarrett, 705 F.2d 198, 203 (7th Cir. 1983). On “interstate or foreign commerce,” see United States v. Young, 730 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1984), and United States v. Massey, 827 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1987).
Defi	of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41.

A fifth element, prompted by the Apprendi doctrine, is required when the indictment alleges any facts that would result in enhanced penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2326. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2351–63 (2000). If these are disputed is- sues, the court should consider giving a lesser included instruction. See Instruction No. 1.33.

2.49B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.49B

POSSESSION OF COUNTERFEIT OR UNAUTHORIZED ACCESS DEVICES 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1029(a)(3), makes it a crime for anyone to possess fifteen or more counterfeit or unauthorized access devices with the intent to defraud.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly possessed fifteen or more access devices;

Second: Those devices were counterfeit or unautho- rized;

Third: The defendant possessed those devices with the intent to defraud; and

Fourth: The defendant's conduct affected interstate or foreign commerce.

The term “access device” means any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, mobile identification number, personal identification number, or other telecommunications service, equipment, or instrument identifier, or other means of account access that can be used, alone or in conjunction with another access device, to obtain money, goods, services, or any other thing of value, or that can be used to initiate a transfer of funds (other than a transfer originated solely by paper instrument).

The term “counterfeit access device” means any ac- cess device that is counterfeit, fi	altered, or

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.49B

forged, or an identifiable component of an access device or a counterfeit access device.

[The term “unauthorized access device” means any access device that is lost, stolen, expired, revoked, canceled, or obtained with intent to defraud.]

The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that his conduct would affect interstate [foreign] commerce. It is not necessary for the govern- ment to show that the defendant actually intended or anticipated an eff   on interstate [foreign] commerce by his actions or intended or anticipated that commerce was actually affected. All that is necessary is that the natural and probable consequence of the acts the defendant took would be to aff interstate [foreign] commerce. If you decide that there would be any effect at all on interstate [foreign] commerce, then that is enough to satisfy this element. The eff can be minimal.

To act with “intent to defraud” means to act with the specifi intent to deceive in order to cause some harm or bring about some personal gain.
Note

The term “access device” is broad enough to encompass technological advances and includes long-distance telephone access codes. Also, “counterfeit” and “unauthorized” are not mutually exclusive terms. See United States v. Brewer, 835 F.2d 550, 553–54 (5th Cir. 1987).
A “counterfeit access device” under § 1029(a)(1) includes an otherwise legitimate device procured by the use of false information. See United States v. Soape, 169 F.3d 257, 262–64 (5th Cir. 1999).

On “unauthorized access device,” see United States v. Inman, 411 F.3d 591, 594–95 (5th Cir. 2005) (diff	between a counterfeit access device and an unauthorized access device).
For “intent to defraud,” see United States v. Umawa Oke Imo,

2.49	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
739 F.3d 226, 236 (5th Cir. 2014) (stating in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1341 that a defendant “acts with the intent to defraud when he acts knowingly with the specific intent to deceive for the purpose of causing pecuniary loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to himself”), United States v. Jimenez, 77 F.3d 95, 97 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding in a prosecution under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 that “[i]ntent to defraud requires an intent to (1) deceive, and (2) cause harm to result from the deceit.”), and United States
v. Powers, 168 F.3d 741, 746 (5th Cir. 1999) (“An intent to defraud for the purpose of personal gain satisfies the ‘harm’ requirement of the wire fraud statute.”). “Intent to defraud” may be established with circumstantial evidence. United States v. Ismoila, 100 F.3d 380, 387 (5th Cir. 1996).

The definitions of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41. For “affecting commerce,” see United States v. Anderson, 560 F.3d 275, 279 (5th Cir. 2009).

A fifth element, prompted by the Apprendi doctrine, is required when the indictment alleges any facts that would result in enhanced penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2326. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2351–63 (2000). If these are disputed is- sues, the court should consider giving a lesser included instruction. See Instruction No. 1.33.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.50

2.50

FALSE STATEMENTS RELATING TO HEALTH CARE MATTERS
18 U.S.C. § 1035

Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1035, makes it a crime for anyone, in any matter involving a health care benefit program, to knowingly and willfully (1) falsify, conceal, or cover up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; or (2) make any materially false, fi	or fraudulent statements or representations, or make or use any materially false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or services.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant falsifi [concealed, or covered up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact] [made a materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation] [made or used any materi- ally false writing or document knowing the same to contain any materially false, fi	or fraudulent statement or entry];

Second: That the defendant did so in connection with the delivery of [payment for] health care benefits, items, or services involving a health care benefi program; and

Third: That the defendant did so knowingly and willfully.

A “health care benefit program” is defined as “any public or private plan or contract, affecting commerce, under which any medical benefi   item, or service is

2.50	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
provided to any individual, and includes any individual or entity who is providing a medical benefi item, or service, for which payment may be made under the plan or contract.”

A representation is “false” if it is known to be untrue or is made with reckless indiff	as to its truth or falsity. A representation is also “false” when it constitutes a half truth, or effectively omits or conceals a material fact, provided it is made with intent to defraud.

A false representation is “material” if it has a natu- ral tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the institution to which it is addressed.
Note

For cases that set forth the elements of an off charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1035, see United States v. Crow, 504 F. App'x 285, 286 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Delgado, 668 F.3d 219,
226 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Jones, 664 F.3d 966, 981 (5th
Cir. 2011).
By statutory defi	the only type of health care benefi programs covered by the statute are those that affect commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1035(b) (incorporating by reference 18 U.S.C.
§ 24(b)). Congress used the phrase “affecting commerce” to provide the federal jurisdictional element that connects the offense to in- terstate commerce. See United States v. Mann, 493 F.3d 484, 494 (5th Cir. 2007) (reading “affecting commerce” in 18 U.S.C. § 1951, the Hobbs Act, to require proof of an effect on interstate commerce); see also United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995) (statutes containing a “jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the [prohibited act] in question aff interstate commerce” pass muster under the Commerce Clause). Since the object of § 1035 must be a “health care benefit program,” and since health care benefit programs must, by defini- tion, “affect commerce,” it would appear that proof of an effect on interstate commerce is both a jurisdictional requirement and an essential element of the offense. United States v. Klein, 543 F.3d 206, 211 (5th Cir. 2008) (discussing whether the “aff	com- merce” element in § 1347 is fairly included in “health care benefit program” or must be separately included as an element in the jury charge); United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1191 (5th Cir.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.50

1997) (holding in the context of a money laundering prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 that the Government is required to provide proof of some effect on interstate commerce when a statute has an “affecting commerce” like requirement); United States v. Ogba, 526 F.3d 214, 238 (5th Cir. 2008) (interstate commerce showing satis- fied for offense charged under 18 U.S.C. § 1347 because payments were received through Medicare system).

See Instruction Nos. 1.37 and 1.38 for a discussion of “know- ingly” and “willfully.”

The definition of “health care benefit program” is provided in 18 U.S.C. § 24(b).

The definition of “false” comes from United States v. Dillman, 15 F.3d 384, 392 (5th Cir. 1994).

The definition of materiality is from United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2313, 2319–20 (1995) (holding that when material- ity is an element of the charged offense, the issue of materiality must be submitted to the jury). See also United States v. Radley, 632 F.3d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The test for materiality is whether a misrepresentation ‘has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision-making body to which it was addressed.’ ’’) (citations omitted).

2.51	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.51

TRANSMISSION OF WAGERING INFORMATION 18 U.S.C. § 1084

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1084, makes it a crime for anyone to transmit bets or wagers on sports gambling in interstate or foreign commerce.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant was in the business of betting or wagering. That is, the defendant was pre- pared on a regular basis to accept bets placed by oth- ers;

Second: That the defendant, as a part of that busi- ness, purposely used a wire communication facility to receive or transmit bets on sports gambling;

Third: That the transmission was made between
—————_  and  —————  (name  states  or  state  and foreign place); and

Fourth: That the defendant knew the transmission was made from one state to another or from one state to a foreign place.

This statute is intended to reach the activities of professional gamblers who knowingly conduct their activities through the use of interstate wire communica- tion facilities, or wire communication facilities between a state and a foreign place, regardless of which party sent and which received the wager.

To prove that the defendant is in the betting busi- ness, the government must show beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in a regular course of conduct or series of transactions involving time, atten-

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.51

tion, and labor devoted to betting or wagering for profit. The government must show more than casual, isolated, or sporadic transactions. On the other hand, it is not necessary that making bets or wagers, or dealing in wagering information, constitutes a person's primary source of income. The government need not show that the defendant has made any prescribed number of bets or that the defendant has actually earned a profit.
Note

This statute applies to bets or wagers on sporting events or contests. See In re Mastercard Int'l Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 262 (5th Cir. 2002).

The First and Second Circuits have held that the defendant's knowledge of the interstate nature of the wire facility transmission is an element of the crime that must be proved. See United States
v. Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 24 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Barone, 467 F.2d 247, 249 (2d Cir. 1972). The Ninth Circuit held, without discussion, that “the knowing use of interstate facilities is not an essential element” of § 1084. See United States v. Swank, 441 F.2d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1971). The issue was raised, but not decided, in United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 45 (5th Cir. 1973). The Com- mittee has included the element of knowledge of the interstate nature of the transmission.

Defi	of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41. The issue of whether the transmission was in interstate or foreign com- merce must be submitted to the jury. See United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2319–20 (1995) (holding that when materiality is an element of the charged offense, the issue of materiality must be submitted to the jury).

See also United States v. Montford, 27 F.3d 137 (5th Cir. 1994), (holding that gambling ship excursions a few miles offshore of the United States coast do not amount to “foreign commerce” within the meaning of § 1084 and that “foreign commerce” requires some form of contact with a foreign state).
The Committee notes that, as technology advances, the defini- tion of what constitutes a “wire” becomes unclear, and the instruc- tion may need to be altered accordingly.

2.52	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.52A

MURDER (FIRST DEGREE) 18 U.S.C. § 1111

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1111, makes it a crime for anyone to murder another human being with premeditation.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First:  That  the  defendant  unlawfully  killed
———————————;
Second :	That	the	defendant	killed 
——————————— with malice aforethought;
Third: That the killing was premeditated; and

Fourth: That the killing took place within the ter- ritorial [special maritime] jurisdiction of the United States.

To kill “with malice aforethought” means either to kill another person deliberately and intentionally, or to act with callous and wanton disregard for human life.

To fi malice aforethought, you need not be convinced that the defendant hated the person killed, or felt ill will toward the victim at the time.

In determining whether the killing was with malice aforethought, you may consider the use of a weapon or instrument and the manner in which death was caused.

A killing is “premeditated” when it is the result of planning or deliberation. The amount of time needed for premeditation of a killing depends on the person and the circumstances. It must be long enough for the

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.52A

killer, after forming the intent to kill, to be fully con- scious of that intent.

You should consider all the facts and circumstances preceding, surrounding, and following the killing which tend to shed light upon the condition of mind of the defendant, before and at the time of the killing. No fact, no matter how small, no circumstance, no matter how trivial, which bears upon the questions of malice afore- thought and premeditation, should escape your careful consideration.
Note

This instruction applies to a premeditated killing only.

There are other methods of committing fi degree murder, including a killing in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate certain felonies, or perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or torture against a child or children. The instruction must be adjusted accordingly in those cases.

Additional definitions were added in subsection (c) in a 2003 amendment, including defi	of “assault,” “child,” “child abuse,” “pattern or practice of assault or torture,” “serious bodily injury,” and “torture.”

See Lizama v. United States Parole Com'n, 245 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2001), and United States v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 1371 (5th Cir. 1996), aff'd in part, 118 S. Ct. 1135 (1998), for discussion of this statute.

The instruction regarding “premeditated” was cited with ap- proval in United States v. Agofsky, 516 F.3d 280 (5th Cir. 2008). In addition, the instruction was cited with approval in United States v. Reff, 479 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2007).

In the proper case, use Instruction No. 1.33 for Lesser Included Off Instruction No. 2.52B for Second Degree Murder, and Instruction No. 2.53 for Voluntary Manslaughter. See United States
v. Snarr, 704 F.3d 368, 388–92 (5th Cir. 2013) (analyzing and af- firming trial court's refusal to give lesser-included-offense instruc- tion); Reff, 479 F.3d at 402; United States v. Harris, 420 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Browner, 889 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1989).

2.52A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
If there is evidence that the defendant acted lawfully, e.g., in self-defense, by accident, or in defense of property, a fifth element should be added and explained. For example: “That the defendant did not act in self-defense,” plus an explanation of self-defense. See United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Instruction No. 1.36A, Self-Defense.

For a discussion of malice, see United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1979).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.52B

MURDER (SECOND DEGREE) 18 U.S.C. § 1111

2.52B

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1111, makes it a crime for anyone to murder another human being.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First:  That  the  defendant  unlawfully  killed
—————_ (name of victim);
Second: That the defendant killed —————_ (name of victim) with malice aforethought; and

Third: That the killing took place within the ter- ritorial [special maritime] jurisdiction of the United States.

To kill “with malice aforethought” means either to kill another person deliberately and intentionally, or to act with callous and wanton disregard for human life. To find malice aforethought, you need not be convinced that the defendant hated the person killed, or felt ill will toward the victim at the time.

In determining whether the killing was with malice aforethought, you may consider the use of a weapon or instrument and the manner in which death was caused.

You should consider all the facts and circumstances preceding, surrounding, and following the killing which tend to shed light upon the condition of mind of the defendant, before and at the time of the killing. No fact, no matter how small, no circumstance, no matter how trivial, which bears upon the issue of malice afore- thought should escape your careful consideration.

2.52	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Note

In the proper case, use Instruction Nos. 1.33 and 2.53 for Lesser Included Offense and Voluntary Manslaughter.

“The intent required for second-degree murder is malice afore- thought; it is distinguished from fi	murder by the absence of premeditation.” United States v. Browner, 889 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1989); see United States v. Harrelson, 766 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1985).

If there is evidence that the defendant acted lawfully, e.g., in self-defense, by accident, or in defense of property, a fifth element should be added and explained. For example: “That the defendant did not act in self-defense,” plus an explanation of self-defense. See United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Instruction No. 1.36A, Self-Defense.

For a discussion of this statute, see Lizama v. United States Parole Com'n, 245 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2001). See also United States
v. Reff, 479 F.3d 396 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Harris, 420 F.3d 467 (5th Cir. 2005).
See United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1983), and
United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700 (5th Cir. 1979).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.53

VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER 18 U.S.C. § 1112

2.53

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1112, makes it a crime for anyone to unlawfully kill another human being, without malice.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First:  That  the  defendant  unlawfully  killed
—————_ (name of victim);
Second: That the defendant did so without malice, that is, upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion; and

Third: That the killing took place within the ter- ritorial [special maritime] jurisdiction of the United States.

The term “heat of passion” means a passion of fear or rage in which the defendant loses his normal self- control as a result of circumstances that would provoke such a passion in an ordinary person, but which did not justify the use of deadly force.
Note

The language of this instruction was cited in United States v.
Harris, 420 F.3d 467, 476 (5th Cir. 2005).
This instruction applies only to voluntary manslaughter. 18
U.S.C. § 1112 also covers involuntary manslaughter. See United States v. Browner, 937 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1991) (Browner II) (conviction for assault with a deadly weapon upon retrial reversed because that offense is not a lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 31(c)); United States v. Browner, 889 F.2d 549 (5th Cir. 1989) (Browner I) (conviction for voluntary manslaughter reversed and new trial ordered for failure to instruct on lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter).

2.53	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
For a discussion of “heat of passion,” see Lizama v. United States Parole Comm'n, 245 F.3d 503 (5th Cir. 2001).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.54

KIDNAPPING
18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)

2.54

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1201(a)(1), makes it a crime for anyone to unlawfully kidnap an- other person in or affecting interstate or foreign com- merce for some purpose or benefit.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant, knowingly acting con- trary to law, kidnapped [seized] [confi        [inveigled]
——————————— (the person described in the indict- ment), as charged;

Second: That the defendant held the person for ransom [reward] [some purpose or benefit]; and

Third: That ——————————— (name of victim) was willfully transported without ———————————’s (name of victim) consent, in interstate [foreign] commerce.

To “kidnap” a person means to unlawfully hold, keep, detain, or confine the person against that person's will. Involuntariness or coercion in connection with the victim's detention is an essential part of the offense.

[To “inveigle” a person means to lure, or entice, or lead the person astray by false representations or promises, or other deceitful means.]

You need not unanimously agree on why the defendant kidnapped the person in question, so long as you each find that he had some purpose or derived some benefit from the kidnapping.

2.54	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The government need not prove that the defendant knew that he was transporting the victim in interstate [foreign] commerce, only that he did.
Note

This section provides for several jurisdictional circumstances, including but not limited to, that which is stated above, as well as that the defendant travels in interstate or foreign commerce, or that the defendant “uses the mail or any means, facility, or instrumentality of interstate or foreign commerce in committing or in furtherance of the commission of the off	18 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a). Other jurisdictional circumstances may be found in subsection (e) or subsections (a) (2)–(4). If these are charged, the instruction should be modifi accordingly. There are also a number of penalty enhancements within the statute that should be included as elements, if charged. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a), (g); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). If these are disputed issues, the court should consider giving a lesser included instruction. See Instruction No. 1.33.

Defi	of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41. Transporting a victim from a foreign country to the United States constitutes transportation in “foreign commerce” within the mean- ing of 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1). See United States v. De La Rosa, 911 F.2d 985, 990–91 (5th Cir. 1990).

For the elements of this crime, see United States v. Garza- Robles, 627 F.3d 161, 166–68 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Guidry, 456 F.3d 493, 510 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Barton,
257 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2001); and United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308 (5th Cir. 1998). The unpublished opinion of United States
v. Cabrera Saucedo, 384 F. App'x 312, 318–19 (5th Cir. 2010), states the need to separate the mens rea of this off and jurisdiction. See also Webster, 162 F.3d at 330.

Non-physical restraint may be sufficient to support a convic- tion under this section. See Garza-Robles, 627 F.3d at 167–68; see also United States v. Carrion-Caliz, 944 F.2d 220, 225–26 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing United States v. Wesson, 779 F.2d 1143, 1144 (9th
Cir. 1986); United States v. Hoog, 504 F.2d 45, 50–51 (8th Cir.
1974)).

In Webster, 162 F.3d at 328–30, the court held that the phrase “for ransom, reward or otherwise” in the statute comprehends any purpose at all. See also United States v. Williams, 998 F.2d 258

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(5th Cir. 1993) (approving a charge using the term “for immoral purposes,” because “some benefit” can include sexual gratification). There need not be jury unanimity on this point, as long as each juror finds that the defendant had some purpose or derived some benefit. See Webster, 162 F.3d at 328–30; see also United States v. Dixon, 273 F.3d 636 (5th Cir. 2001).

Pursuant to the 2006 Amendments, the victim need not be alive when he or she is transported in interstate [foreign] commerce. See Pub.L. 109-248, § 213(1). Furthermore, a defendant does not have to transport the victim personally in interstate com- merce so long as the victim is transported in interstate commerce by confederates. See United States v. Jackson, 978 F.2d 903, 910 (5th Cir. 1992).

Section 1201(b) provides that failure to release a victim within twenty-four hours after the unlawful seizure creates a rebuttable presumption that the victim had been transported in interstate or foreign commerce. This presumption should be invoked with great caution, if at all. At least one circuit has held it to be unconstitutional. See United States v. Moore, 571 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1978). The Supreme Court allows permissive presumptions only when the presumed fact flows more likely than not from the proved fact. See Cnty. Court of Ulster Cnty. v. Allen, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2224 (1979); Leary v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 1532 (1969).

2.55	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.55

HOSTAGE TAKING 18 U.S.C. § 1203

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1203(a), makes it a crime for anyone to seize or detain, and threaten to kill, injure or continue to detain another person in order to compel a third person or governmen- tal organization to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of the person detained.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant seized or detained an- other person;

Second: That the defendant threatened to kill, injure, or continue to detain another person; and

Third: That the defendant made the threat[s] with the purpose of compelling a third person or government entity to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release of another person.

[Fourth: Said actions resulted in the death of any person.]

A person is seized or detained when the person is held or confined against his will by physical restraint, fear, or deception for an appreciable period of time. The fact that a person may initially agree to accompany the hostage taker does not prevent a later seizure or detention.
Note

The Fifth Circuit held that to “seize” or “detain” is not limited

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2.55

to violence, physical force, or threat. To frighten or deceive as a form of mental restraint are sufficient to satisfy this element of the crime. See United States v. Ibarra-Zelaya, 465 F.3d 596, 603 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that an armed defendant who transferred ille- gal aliens from one location to another will satisfy the element to “seize” or “detain” element); United States v. Sanchez-Angeles, 138
F. App'x 642, 644 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that illegal aliens who did not pay their smuggling fee and were locked in a room guarded by armed individuals to prevent their escape was sufficient to have been seized or detained); United States v. Carrion-Caliz, 944 F.2d 220, 225 (5th Cir. 1991). The term “detention” has been used by courts as a synonym for confinement. See Carrion-Caliz, 944 F.2d at 225 (stating “The act of holding a person for a proscribed purpose necessarily implies an unlawful physical or mental re- straint for an appreciable period against that person's will and with a willful intent so to confine the victim”). The Fifth Circuit in Carrion-Caliz, 944 F.2d at 225, concluded that it is not necessary to be seized or detained at inception, it is sufficient when a person voluntarily accompanies the hostage taker and is later held against his will.
An implicit inference can be made to threaten or continue to detain. See Ibarra-Zelaya, 465 F.3d at 603 (holding that the appel- lants' demand to the aliens' families that they send money was a threat that the aliens would not be released if payment was not received and the presence of guns was an implicit threat of continued detention); United States v. Rivera-Benito, 136 F. App'x 690, 692 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that an illegal alien was later confi   when her initial smuggling fee had been increased and she would not be released until the fee was paid).
The threat made to compel a third person does not have to be directly communicated. See Ibarra-Zelaya, 465 F.3d at 604 (hold- ing that evidence showed a communication was attempted to the aliens' relatives when the appellants told the aliens to call their families telling them to pay their smuggling fee and on one occa- sion called the relatives themselves requesting payment); United States v. De Jesus-Batres, 410 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the defendants demanding the aliens call their relatives to demand additional smuggling fees was suffi to constitute a threat to compel a third person to act).
The offense carries a maximum penalty of life imprisonment. It carries an enhanced penalty of death “if the death of any person results.” If the indictment contains this enhancement, the trial judge should add a fourth element to the charge.
In a drug case resulting in death, the Supreme Court consid-

2.55	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
ered questions of “but for” causation. United States v. Burrage, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1720–22 (2014).

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2.56

MAIL FRAUD; MONEY/PROPERTY OR HONEST SERVICES
18 U.S.C. § 1341
[18 U.S.C. § 1346]

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, makes it a crime for anyone to use the mails [any private or commercial interstate carrier] in carrying out a scheme to defraud.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly devised or intended to devise a scheme to defraud, that is ————— (describe scheme from the indictment);

Second: That the scheme to defraud employed false material representations [false material pretenses] [false material promises];

Third: That the defendant mailed something [caused something to be [sent] [delivered]] through the United States Postal Service [a private or commercial interstate carrier] for the purpose of executing such scheme or attempting so to do; and

Fourth: That the defendant acted with a specifi intent to defraud.

A “scheme to defraud” means any plan, pattern, or course of action intended to deprive another of money or property. [It can also involve any scheme to deprive an employer [shareholders] [citizens] [government agency] of the intangible right to honest services through soliciting or accepting bribes or kickbacks. [Defi     “bribery” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b) or

2.56	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
665(a)(2) or state law; define “kickback” pursuant to 41
U.S.C. § 52(2) or state law].]

A “specifi intent to defraud” means a conscious, knowing intent to deceive or cheat someone.

A representation [pretense] [promise] is “false” if it is known to be untrue or is made with reckless indiffer- ence as to its truth or falsity. A representation [pre- tense] [promise] would also be “false” if it constitutes a half truth, or eff	omits or conceals a material fact, provided it is made with the intent to defraud.

A representation [pretense] [promise] is “material” if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the person or entity to which it is addressed.

It is not necessary that the government prove all of the details alleged in the indictment concerning the precise nature and purpose of the scheme. What must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant knowingly devised or intended to devise a scheme to defraud by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises that was substantially the same as the one alleged in the indictment.

It is also not necessary that the government prove that the mailed material [material sent by private or commercial interstate carrier] was itself false or fraud- ulent, or that the use of the mail [a private or com- mercial interstate carrier] was intended as the specific or exclusive means of accomplishing the alleged fraud. What must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is that the use of the mails [private or commercial interstate carrier] was closely related to the scheme because the defendant either mailed something or caused it to be mailed [defendant either sent or delivered something or caused it to be sent or delivered by a private or com-

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2.56

mercial interstate carrier] in an attempt to execute or carry out the scheme.

The alleged scheme need not actually have suc- ceeded in defrauding anyone.

To “cause” the mails [private or commercial inter- state carrier] to be used is to do an act with knowledge that the use of the mails [private or commercial inter- state carrier] will follow in the ordinary course of busi- ness or where such use can reasonably be foreseen even though the defendant did not intend or request the mails [private or commercial interstate carrier] to be used.

Each separate use of the mails [a private or com- mercial interstate carrier] in furtherance of a scheme to defraud by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises constitutes a separate offense.
Note

This instruction incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which states that, “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or arti- fice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” That language should be in the jury charge only if the indictment alleges § 1346. See United States v. Griffin, 324 F.3d 330, 356 (5th Cir. 2003). In Skilling v. United States, the Supreme Court held that “honest services” fraud under § 1346 consists only of bribery and kickbacks, not undis- closed self-dealing. 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931–32 (2010); see also United
States v. Barraza, 655 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir. 2011). Section 1346 reaches both private and public sector fraud. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2934 n.45. The Fifth Circuit has held that § 1346 prosecu- tions may involve bribery and kickbacks as defined by federal or state law. See United States v. Teel, 691 F.3d 578, 584 (5th Cir. 2012).
“The government need not establish that the defendant used the mails himself or that he actually intended that the mails be used. The government need only prove that the scheme depended for its success in some way upon the information and documents which passed through the mail.” United States v. Akpan, 407 F.3d

2.56	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
360, 370 (5th Cir. 2005); see also Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 128 S. Ct. 2131, 2138 (2008) (“Any mailing that is incident to an essential part of the scheme satisfies the mailing element, even if the mailing itself contains no false information.”) (internal quota- tion marks omitted); United States v. Traxler, 764 F.3d 486, 488–91 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Ingles, 445 F.3d 830, 835 (5th Cir. 2006) (discussing requirement that mail be “incidental” to an es- sential part of the scheme and the meaning of “causing” the mail to be used). This may also include a post-purchase mailings “designed to lull the victim into a false sense of security, postpone inquiries or complaints, or make the transaction less suspect.” See United States v. Strong, 371 F.3d 225, 230 n.3 (5th Cir. 2004); but
see United States v. Evans, 148 F.3d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 1998) (a mailing after the scheme to defraud already “reached fruition” did not constitute mail fraud).
The Fifth Circuit has also held that there is no requirement that “the victim who loses money or property in a mail fraud scheme also be the party that was deceived by the defendant's scheme.” United States v. McMillan, 600 F.3d 434, 449 (5th Cir. 2010). It is irrelevant to whom the misrepresentations are directly made, as long as the object of the fraud is the victim's property and  the  victim's  property  rights  were  aff	by the misrepresentations. Id.; see also Ingles, 445 F.3d at 837 (“Both in- nocent mailings (i.e. those that do not contain a misrepresenta- tion) and mailings between innocent parties can support a mail fraud conviction.”). Actual loss by the victim need not be proven. See McMillan, 600 F.3d at 450.

For the elements of mail fraud, see United States v. Imo, 739 F.3d 226, 236 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Read, 710 F.3d 219,
227 (5th Cir. 2012); McMillan, 600 F.3d at 447. See also United
States v. Stephens, 571 F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 2009) (“To prove a scheme to defraud, the Government must show fraudulent activity and that the defendant had a conscious, knowing intent to defraud.”); United States v. Dillman, 15 F.3d 384, 392 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating defi	of “false statement”); United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating defi	of “scheme to defraud” and “intent to defraud”).
Where use of private or commercial interstate carrier is involved, the government need not prove that state lines were crossed, only that the carrier engages in interstate deliveries. See United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 318 (5th Cir. 2001).
The requirement of “materiality of falsehood” is derived from Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1841 (1999) (“We hold that materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes.”). See also United States v.

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Radley, 632 F.3d 177, 185 (5th Cir. 2011). “The test for materiality is whether a misrepresentation ‘has a natural tendency to influ- ence, or is capable of influencing, the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.’ ’’ Radley, 632 F.3d at 185 (quoting United States v. Valencia, 600 F.3d 389, 426 (5th Cir. 2010)).

Because the language of the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes are so similar, cases construing one are applicable to the other. See United States v. Phipps, 595 F.3d 243, 245 (5th Cir. 2010). Accord- ingly, the Note to Instruction No. 2.57, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, Wire Fraud, should also be consulted.

A fifth element, prompted by the Apprendi doctrine, is required when the indictment alleges any facts that would result in enhanced penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2326. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2351–63 (2000). If these are disputed is- sues, the court should consider giving a lesser included instruction. See Instruction No. 1.33.

2.57	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.57

WIRE FRAUD; MONEY/PROPERTY OR HONEST SERVICES
18 U.S.C. § 1343
[18 U.S.C. § 1346]

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1343, makes it a crime for anyone to use interstate [foreign] wire [radio] [television] communications in carrying out a scheme to defraud.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly devised or intended to devise any scheme to defraud, that is
————— (describe scheme from the indictment);
Second: That the scheme to defraud employed false material representations [false material pretenses] [false material promises];

Third: That the defendant transmitted [caused to be transmitted] by way of wire [radio] [television] com- munications, in interstate [foreign] commerce, any writ- ing [sign] [signal] [picture] [sound] for the purpose of executing such scheme; and

Fourth: That the defendant acted with a specifi intent to defraud.

A “scheme to defraud” means any plan, pattern, or course of action intended to deprive another of money or property. [It can also involve any scheme to deprive an employer [shareholders] [citizens] [government agency] of the intangible right to honest services through soliciting or accepting bribes or kickbacks. [Defi     “bribery” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b) or

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.57

665(a)(2) or state law; define “kickback” pursuant to 41
U.S.C. § 52(2) or state law].]

A “specifi intent to defraud” means a conscious, knowing intent to deceive or cheat someone.

A representation [pretense] [promise] is “false” if it is known to be untrue or is made with reckless indiffer- ence as to its truth or falsity. A representation [pre- tense] [promise] would also be “false” if it constitutes a half truth, or eff	omits or conceals a material fact, provided it is made with the intent to defraud.

A representation [pretense] [promise] is “material” if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision of the person or entity to which it is addressed.

It is not necessary that the government prove all of the details alleged in the indictment concerning the precise nature and purpose of the scheme. What must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is that the defendant knowingly devised or intended to devise a scheme to defraud by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises that was substantially the same as the one alleged in the indictment.

It is also not necessary that the government prove that the material transmitted by wire [radio] [televi- sion] communications was itself false or fraudulent, or that the use of the interstate [foreign] wire communica- tions facilities was intended as the specific or exclusive means of accomplishing the alleged fraud. What must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is that the use of the interstate [foreign] wire communications facilities was closely related to the scheme because the defendant either wired something or caused it to be wired in in- terstate [foreign] commerce in an attempt to execute or carry out the scheme.

2.57	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The alleged scheme need not actually succeed in defrauding anyone.

To “cause” interstate [foreign] wire [radio] [televi- sion] communications facilities to be used is to do an act with knowledge that the use of the wire [radio] [tele- vision] communications facilities will follow in the ordinary course of business or where such use can rea- sonably be foreseen.

Each separate use of the interstate [foreign] wire [radio] [television] communications facilities in further- ance of a scheme to defraud by means of false or fraud- ulent pretenses, representations, or promises consti- tutes a separate offense.
Note

On the elements of a wire fraud offense, see United States v. Radley, 632 F.3d 177, 184–85 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v.
Dowl, 619 F.3d 494, 499–500 (5th Cir. 2010); and United States v.
Valencia, 600 F.3d 389, 430–31 (5th Cir. 2010). See also United
States v. Stephens, 571 F.3d 401, 404 (5th Cir. 2009); United States
v. Ford, 558 F.3d 371, 375 (5th Cir. 2009); United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 518 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 377 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rivera, 295 F.3d 461, 466 (5th Cir. 2002).
In wire fraud schemes, “the wire need not be an essential ele- ment of the scheme; rather, it is suffi for the wire to be incident to an essential part of the scheme or a step in the plot. The underlying question is whether the [use of the wire] somehow contributed to the successful continuation of the scheme—and, if so, whether [it was] so intended by the defendant.” United States
v. Barraza, 655 F.3d 375, 383 (5th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (holding that an email was sufficient to sustain a wire fraud convic- tion); see also United States v. Phipps, 595 F.3d 243, 246–47 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding a single fax, not sent by the defendant and incidental to the scheme, to be suffi   to support a charge of wire fraud). The Committee notes that, as technology advances, the definition of what constitutes a “wire” becomes unclear and the instruction may need to be altered accordingly. See United States
v. Nunez, 78 F. App'x 989, 991 (5th Cir. 2003) (upholding wire fraud conviction when scheme used cell phone).
“Once membership in a scheme to defraud is established, a

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2.57

knowing participant is liable for any wire communication which subsequently takes place or which previously took place in connec- tion with the scheme.” United States v. Dula, 989 F.2d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Arledge, 553 F.3d 881, 892 (5th Cir. 2008).

The requirement of “materiality of falsehood” is derived from Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1841 (1999) (“[W]e hold that materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes.”). See also Radley, 632 F.3d at 185. “The test for materiality is whether a misrepresenta- tion ‘has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influenc- ing, the decision-making body to which it was addressed.’ ’’ Id. (quoting Valencia, 600 F.3d at 426).

This instruction incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which states that, “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or arti- fice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” That language should be in the jury charge only if the indictment alleges § 1346. See United States v. Griffin, 324 F.3d 330, 356 (5th Cir. 2003). In Skilling v. United States, the Supreme Court held that “honest services” fraud under § 1346 consists only of bribery and kickbacks, not undis- closed self-dealing. 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931–32 (2010); see also United
States v. Barraza, 655 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir. 2011). Section 1346 reaches both private and public sector fraud. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2934 n. 45. The Fifth Circuit has held that § 1346 prosecu- tions may involve bribery and kickbacks as defined by federal or state law. See United States v. Teel, 691 F.3d 578, 584 (5th Cir. 2012).

The Note to Instruction No. 2.56, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, Mail Fraud, should also be consulted generally. Because the language of the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes are so similar, cases construing one are applicable to the other. See Phipps, 595 F.3d at 245.

A fifth element, prompted by the Apprendi doctrine, is required when the indictment alleges any facts that would result in enhanced penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2326. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2351–63 (2000). If these are disputed is- sues, the court should consider giving a lesser included instruction. See Instruction No. 1.33.

2.58	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.58A

BANK FRAUD 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1)
[18 U.S.C. § 1346]

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344(1) makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly execute a scheme or artifice to defraud a financial institution.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly executed a scheme or artifice;

Second: That the scheme or artifice was to defraud a financial institution, as alleged in the indictment;

Third: That the defendant had the intent to defraud the financial institution;

Fourth: That the scheme or artifice to defraud was material [employed a false material representation] [concealed a material fact]; and

Fifth: That the defendant placed the fi institution at risk of civil liability or financial loss.

A “scheme or artifice” means any plan, pattern, or course of action intended to deceive others in order to obtain something of value, such as money, from the institution to be deceived. [Such a scheme or artifi can involve a scheme to deprive a financial institution of the intangible right to honest services through solicit- ing or accepting bribes or kickbacks. [Define “bribery” pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(b) or 665(a)(2) or state law; define “kickback” pursuant to 41 U.S.C. § 52(2) or state law].]

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2.58A

It is not necessary that the government prove all of the details alleged in the indictment concerning the precise nature of the alleged scheme or artifice, or that the alleged scheme or artifice actually succeeded. What must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt is that the accused knowingly executed a scheme that was substan- tially similar to the scheme alleged in the indictment.

[A representation is “false” if it is known to be untrue or is made with reckless indiff	as to its truth or falsity. A representation is also “false” when it constitutes a half truth, or effectively omits or conceals a material fact, provided it is made with intent to defraud.]

A scheme [representation] [concealment] is “mate- rial” if it has a natural tendency to infl	or is capable of infl	the institution to which it is addressed.

A defendant acts with the requisite “intent to defraud” if the defendant acted knowingly and with the specific intent to deceive, ordinarily for the purpose of causing some financial loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to the defendant.

“Financial institution” means [insert appropriate defi	from 18 U.S.C. § 20]. To prove that “the defendant placed the financial institution at risk of civil liability or fi	loss,” it is not necessary for the government to demonstrate that the financial institu- tion actually suffered civil liability or financial loss, or that it faced a substantial likelihood of risk of loss.
Note

In Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384 (2014), the Supreme Court distinguished between off	under § 1344(1) and § 1344(2). In light of Loughrin, the Committee separated and substantially revised the instructions for the two offenses.
The Loughrin Court made clear that “the whole sum and

2.58A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
substance” of § 1344(1) is the requirement that “a defendant intend to ‘defraud a financial institution.’ ’’ 134 S. Ct. at 2389–90. For of- fenses charged under § 1344(2), however, the Court similarly made clear that the government need prove neither intent to defraud nor that the defendant placed the fi	institution at risk. See Loughrin, 134 S. Ct. at 2387, 2395 n.9. Accordingly, these two ele- ments have been removed from the instruction for that offense. See Instruction No. 2.58B.

For pre-Loughrin cases discussing the elements of § 1344 of- fenses, see United States v. Odiodio, 244 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. McCauley, 253 F.3d 815, 819–20 (5th Cir.
2001); United States v. Dadi, 235 F.3d 945, 950–51 (5th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Harvard, 103 F.3d 412, 421 (5th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Blackburn, 9 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1993). These cases and those discussed below should be consulted until the Fifth Circuit has the opportunity to reaffi modify, or repudiate its precedent in light of Loughrin.

Because materiality is an element of the § 1344, the court must submit the question of materiality to the jury. See Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1841 (1999) (“[W]e hold that materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes.”). In Neder, the Supreme Court stated that the scheme to defraud in § 1344 “must employ material falsehoods.” Id. at 1839. However, the Ninth Circuit has held that, under § 1344(1) “[i]t is the materiality of the scheme or artifi that must be alleged; the materiality of a specifi state- ment need not be pleaded.” Cf. United States v. Omer, 395 F.3d 1087, 1089 (9th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Doherty, 969 F.2d 425, 429 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[O]ne need not make a false repre- sentation to execute a scheme to defraud.”). Bracketed material is included in the instruction for use depending on whether false representations are at issue.

The definition of “materiality” in this instruction was described as the “general” definition by the Supreme Court. Neder, 119 S. Ct. at 1837. The definition of materiality in this instruction was also adopted in a bank fraud context in United States v. Campbell, 64 F.3d 967, 975 (5th Cir. 1995) (§ 1344(2) case) (citing United States
v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397, 1403 (5th Cir. 1992)).
The definitions of “intent to defraud” and “scheme or artifice” are derived from United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1518 (5th Cir.
1992)). See also United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1512–13 (5th Cir. 1996). The Fifth Circuit has followed the Fourth Circuit in holding that § 1344 may be violated even when the principal

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2.58A

target is a third party. United States v. Morganfield, 501 F.3d 453, 464 (5th Cir. 2007).

This instruction incorporates 18 U.S.C. § 1346, which states that, “[f]or the purposes of this chapter, the term ‘scheme or arti- fice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services.” That language should be in the jury charge only if the indictment alleges a violation of
§ 1346. See United States v. Griffi , 324 F.3d 330, 356 (5th Cir. 2003). In Skilling v. United States, the Supreme Court held that “honest services” fraud under § 1346 consists only of bribery and kickbacks, not undisclosed self-dealing. 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931–32
(2010); see also United States v. Barraza, 655 F.3d 375, 382 (5th Cir. 2011). Section 1346 reaches both private and public sector fraud. See Skilling, 130 S. Ct. at 2934 n. 45. The Fifth Circuit has held that § 1346 prosecutions may involve bribery and kickbacks as defined by federal or state law. See United States v. Teel, 691 F.3d 578, 584 (5th Cir. 2012).

The defi	of a “false statement” is derived from United States v. Dillman, 15 F.3d 384, 392–93 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing United
States v. Gunter, 876 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir. 1989)). See also
United States v. Loeff , 172 F. App'x 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2006) (reiterating that “this circuit has previously accepted this defini- tion of ‘false statement’ in the context of jury instructions for a bank fraud cause under 18 U.S.C. § 1344.”).

For a definition of “financial institution,” see 18 U.S.C. § 20. The appropriate definition should be included in the instruction, depending on the sort of fi	institution alleged in the indictment. The requirement of FDIC insurance, which is part of the defi	of “fi	institution” found in § 20(1), may be proved by the testimony of a bank officer. United States v. Sanders, 343 F.3d 511, 516–17 (5th Cir 2003).

The discussion of the “financial risk” element is derived from Morganfield, 501 F.3d at 465–66. See also United States v. McCau- ley, 253 F.3d 815, 820 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing cases).
For a definition of “knowingly,” see Instruction No. 1.37 “Know- ingly — to Act.”

Section 1344 includes attempts. If an attempt is charged, see
Instruction No. 1.32 “Attempt.”

A sixth element, prompted by the Apprendi doctrine, is required when the indictment alleges any facts that would result in enhanced penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2326. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2351–63 (2000). If these are disputed

2.58A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
issues,  the  court  should  consider  giving  a  lesser  included instruction. See Instruction No. 1.33.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS
2.58B BANK FRAUD
18 U.S.C. § 1344(2)

2.58B

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1344(2) makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly execute a scheme or artifice to obtain any money[ies], funds, assets, securi- ties, or other property owned by or under the custody or control of an insured financial institution by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly executed a scheme or artifice;

Second: That the scheme or artifi  was executed to obtain money[ies] or other property from a financial institution, as alleged in the indictment; and

Third: That the scheme or artifice was executed by means of false or fraudulent pretenses [false or fraudu- lent representations] [false or fraudulent promises]; and

Fourth: That the false or fraudulent pretenses [representations] [promises] were material.

A “scheme or artifice” means any plan, pattern, or course of action intended to deceive others in order to obtain something of value, such as money, from the institution to be deceived. It is not necessary that the government prove all of the details alleged in the indict- ment concerning the precise nature of the alleged scheme or artifice, or that the alleged scheme or artifice actually succeeded. What must be proved beyond a rea- sonable doubt is that the accused knowingly executed a

2.58B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
scheme that was substantially similar to the scheme al- leged in the indictment.

A scheme or artifice is executed “by means” of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises when the false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises were the mechanism inducing the bank to part with the money[ies], funds, assets, securities, or other property under its control.

A representation [pretense] [promise] is “false” if it is known to be untrue or is made with reckless indiffer- ence as to its truth or falsity. A representation is also “false” when it constitutes a half truth, or eff
omits or conceals a material fact, provided it is made with intent to defraud.

A representation [pretense] [promise] is “material” if it has a natural tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the institution to which it is addressed.

“Financial institution” means [insert appropriate definition from 18 U.S.C. § 20].
Note

In Loughrin v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2384 (2014), the Supreme Court distinguished between off	under § 1344(1) and § 1344(2). In light of Loughrin, the Committee separated and substantially revised the instructions for the two offenses.

The Loughrin Court made clear that, for off	charged under § 1344(2), the Government need prove neither intent to defraud nor that the defendant placed the financial institution at risk. See id., 134 S. Ct. at 2387, 2395 n.9. Accordingly, these ele- ments have not been included in this instruction. Cf. Instruction No. 2.58A (retaining these elements for charges under § 1344(1)).

For cases pre-Loughrin discussing the elements of § 1344 of- fenses, see United States v. Odiodio, 244 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. McCauley, 253 F.3d 815, 819–20 (5th Cir.
2001); United States v. Dadi, 235 F.3d 945, 950–51 (5th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Harvard, 103 F.3d 412, 421 (5th Cir. 1997); United

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.58B

States v. Blackburn, 9 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 1993). These cases and those discussed below should be consulted until the Fifth Circuit has the opportunity to reaffi modify, or repudiate its precedent in light of Loughrin.

Because materiality is an element of the § 1344, the court must submit the question of materiality to the jury. See Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1841 (1999) (“[W]e hold that materiality of falsehood is an element of the federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud statutes.”). The definition of “material- ity” in this instruction was described as the “general” definition by the Supreme Court. Neder, 119 S. Ct. at 1837. The defi	of materiality in this instruction was also adopted in a bank fraud context in United States v. Campbell, 64 F.3d 967, 975 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397, 1403 (5th Cir.
1992)).

The defi	of “scheme or artifi is derived from United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United
States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1518 (5th Cir. 1992)). See also United
States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1512–13 (5th Cir. 1996).
While a defendant may not be convicted of bank fraud under
§ 1344(2) merely for presenting a check for payment on accounts with insufficient funds, bank fraud may properly rest on a scheme that involves misrepresentations to banks that directly influence the bank's decision-making process. See United States v. Morgan- field, 501 F.3d 453, 462–64 (5th Cir. 2007). The Fifth Circuit has followed the Fourth Circuit in holding that § 1344 may be violated even when the principal target is a third party. Id. at 464–65.

The definition for a “false statement” is derived from United States v. Dillman, 15 F.3d 384, 392–93 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing United
States v. Gunter, 876 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir. 1989)). See also
United States v. Loeff , 172 F. App'x 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2006) (reiterating that “this circuit has previously accepted this defini- tion of ‘false statement’ in the context of jury instructions for a bank fraud cause under 18 U.S.C. § 1344”).

For a definition of “financial institution,” see 18 U.S.C. § 20. The appropriate definition should be included in the instruction, depending on the sort of fi	institution alleged in the indictment. The requirement of FDIC insurance, which is part of the defi	of “fi	institution” found in § 20(1), may be proved by the testimony of a bank officer. United States v. Sanders, 343 F.3d 511, 516–17 (5th Cir 2003).
For a defi	of “knowingly,” see Instruction No. 1.37 “Knowingly—to Act.”

2.58	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Section 1344 includes attempts. If an attempt is charged, see Instruction No. 1.32 “Attempt.”

A fifth element, prompted by the Apprendi doctrine, is required when the indictment alleges any facts that would result in enhanced penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 2326. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2351–63 (2000). If there are disputed is- sues, the court should consider giving a lesser included instruction. See Instruction No. 1.33.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.59

HEALTH CARE FRAUD 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a)

2.59

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1347(a), makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly and willfully execute or attempt to execute a scheme or artifice (1) to defraud any health care benefit program, or (2) to obtain any of the money or property owned by or under the custody or control of any health care benefi program by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representa- tions, or promises.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly and willfully executed [attempted to execute] a scheme or artifice to defraud a health care benefit program, ————— (name the health care benefi program) [to obtain money or property from a health care benefit program, ————— (name the health care benefit program)], by means of false or fraudulent pretenses [false or fraudulent representations] [false or fraudulent promises] in con- nection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or services;

Second: That the defendant acted with a specifi intent to defraud a health care benefit program;

Third: That the false or fraudulent pretenses [representations] [promises] that the defendant used were material; and

Fourth: That the operation of the health care bene- fit program affected interstate commerce.

[Fifth: That serious bodily injury [death] resulted from the defendant's conduct.]

2.59	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The word “knowingly” as that term is used in these instructions, means that the act was done voluntarily and intentionally, not because of mistake or accident.

The word “willfully” as that term is used in these instructions, means that the act was committed volun- tarily and purposefully, with the specifi intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.

A “scheme or artifice” means any plan, pattern, or course of action involving a false or fraudulent pretense, representation, or promise intended to deceive others in order to obtain something of value, such as money, from the institution to be deceived.

A “health care benefit program” is defined as “any public or private plan or contract, affecting commerce, under which any medical benefi item, or service is provided to any individual, and includes any individual or entity who is providing a medical benefi item, or service, for which payment may be made under the plan or contract.”

A defendant acts with the requisite “intent to defraud” if the defendant acted knowingly and with the specific intent to deceive, ordinarily for the purpose of causing some financial loss to another or bringing about some financial gain to the defendant.

The government does not have to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of or specific intent to violate the applicable health care fraud statutes.

A representation is “false” if it is known to be untrue or is made with reckless indiff	as to its truth or falsity. A representation is also “false” when it constitutes a half truth, or effectively omits or conceals a material fact, provided it is made with intent to defraud.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.59

A false representation is “material” if it has a natu- ral tendency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the institution to which it is addressed.

“Interstate commerce” means commerce or travel between one state, territory, or possession of the United States and another state, territory, or possession of the United States, including the District of Columbia. “Commerce” includes travel, trade, transportation, and communication. Only a minimal effect is required in or- der to show that the health care benefi  program “af- fected commerce.” Proof that the money obtained through execution of the scheme was paid through a financial institution insured by the FDIC, for example, is suffi	to establish that the activity “aff commerce.”

[“Serious bodily injury” means bodily injury which involves a substantial risk of death, extreme physical pain, protracted and obvious disfigurement; or pro- tracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.]

It is not necessary that the government prove all of the details alleged in the indictment concerning the precise nature of the alleged scheme, or that the al- leged scheme actually succeeded in defrauding someone. What must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt is that the accused knowingly executed or attempted to exe- cute a scheme that was substantially similar to the scheme alleged in the indictment.
Note

For cases that set forth the elements of § 1347, see United States v. Imo, 739 F.3d 226, 236 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v.
Hickman, 331 F.3d 439, 445–46 (5th Cir. 2003).
See Instruction Nos. 1.37 and 1.38 for a discussion of “know- ingly” and “willfully.”
The definition of ‘health care benefit program’ is provided in 18 U.S.C. § 24(b).

2.59	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The Government does not have to prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of or specifically intended to violate the ap- plicable health care fraud statutes. Imo, 739 F.3d at 236.

Materiality is included as an element of the offense under the rationale of Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827 (1999). Because under that rationale materiality is an element of the charged of- fense, the court must submit the question of materiality to the jury. See United States v. Foster, 229 F.3d 1196, 1197 n.1 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[W]e read Neder to require a materiality instruction.”).
The “intent to defraud” and “scheme or plan to defraud” defini- tions are derived from United States v. Restivo, 8 F.3d 274, 280 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing United States v. Saks, 964 F.2d 1514, 1518 (5th Cir. 1992)). See also United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1513 (5th Cir. 1996).

The definition for a “false statement” is derived from United States v. Dillman, 15 F.3d 384, 392 (5th Cir. 1994); United States
v. Gunter, 876 F.2d 1113, 1120 (5th Cir. 1989); and United States
v. Chavis, 772 F.2d 100, 109–10 (5th Cir. 1985). See United States
v. Loeffel, 172 F. App'x 612, 617 (5th Cir. 2006) (reiterating that “this circuit has previously accepted this definition of ‘false state- ment’ in the context of jury instructions for a bank fraud cause under 18 U.S.C. § 1344”).
By statutory defi	the only type of health care benefi programs covered by the statute are those that affect commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 24(b). Congress used the phrase “affecting commerce” to provide the federal jurisdictional element that connects the of- fense to interstate commerce. See United States v. Mann, 493 F.3d 484, 494 (5th Cir. 2007) (reading “affecting commerce” in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951, the Hobbs Act, to require proof of an effect on interstate commerce); see also United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624, 1631 (1995) (statutes containing a “jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the [prohibited act] in question affects interstate commerce” pass muster under the Com- merce Clause). Since the object of the fraud must be a “health care benefit program,” and since health care benefit programs must, by definition, “affect commerce,” it would appear that proof of an af- fect on interstate commerce is both a jurisdictional requirement and an essential element of the offense. United States v. Klein, 543 F.3d 206, 211 (5th Cir. 2008) (the “affecting commerce” language in § 1347 creates an element which the Government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v. Ogba, 526 F.3d 214, 238 (5th Cir. 2008) (interstate commerce showing satisfied because payments received through Medicare system); United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1191 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding in the context of a money laundering prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 1956

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.59

that the Government is required to provide proof of some effect on interstate commerce when a statute has an “affecting commerce” like requirement).
The definition of “serious bodily injury” comes from 18 U.S.C.
§ 1365(h)(3), which is referenced in § 1347.

A fifth element, prompted by the Apprendi doctrine, is required when the indictment alleges any facts that would result in enhanced penalties, e.g., where the violation “results in serious bodily injury” or “results in death.” 18 U.S.C. § 1347(a); see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2351–63 (2000).

2.60	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.60

MAILING OBSCENE MATERIAL 18 U.S.C. § 1461

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1461, makes it a crime for anyone to use the United States mail to transmit obscene material.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly used the mail for the conveyance [delivery] of certain material [caused certain material to be delivered by mail], as charged;

Second: That the defendant knew at the time of the mailing that the material was of a sexually oriented nature; and

Third: That the material was obscene.

Although the government must prove that the defendant generally knew the mailed material was of a sexually oriented nature, the government does not have to prove that the defendant knew the material was legally obscene.

Freedom of expression has contributed much to the development and well-being of our free society. In the exercise of the fundamental constitutional right to free expression which all of us enjoy, sex may be portrayed, and the subject of sex may be discussed, freely and publicly. Material is not to be condemned merely because it contains passages or sequences that are descriptive of sexual activity. However, the constitu- tional right to free expression does not extend to that which is obscene.

To prove a matter is “obscene,” the government

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.60

must satisfy three tests: (1) that the work appeals predominantly to prurient interest; (2) that it depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently off	way; and (3) that the material, taken as a whole, lacks seri- ous literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.

An appeal to “prurient” interest is an appeal to a morbid, degrading, and unhealthy interest in sex, as distinguished from an ordinary interest in sex.

The first test, therefore, is whether the predomi- nant theme or purpose of the material, when viewed as a whole and not part by part, and when considered in relation to the intended and probable recipients, is an appeal to the prurient interest of an average person in the community as a whole [to the prurient interest of members of a deviant sexual group]. In making this de- cision, you must examine the main or principal focus of the material, when assessed in its entirety and based on its total effect, not on incidental themes or isolated passages or sequences.

The second test is whether the material depicts or describes, in a patently off	way, sexual conduct such as ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, actual or simulated; masturbation; excretory functions; or lewd exhibition of the genitals.

These first two tests which I have described are to be decided by you, applying contemporary community standards. This means that you should make the deci- sion in the light of contemporary standards that would be applied by the average person in this community, with an average and normal attitude toward—and interest in—sex. Contemporary community standards are those accepted in this community as a whole. You must decide whether the material would appeal pre- dominantly to prurient interests and would depict or describe sexual conduct in a patently off	way when viewed by an average person in this community

2.60	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
as a whole, that is, by the community at large or in general. Matter is patently offensive by contemporary community standards if it so exceeds the generally ac- cepted limits of candor in the entire community as to be clearly off	You must not judge the material by your own personal standards, if you believe them to be stricter than those generally held, nor should you determine what some groups of people may believe the community ought to accept or refuse to accept. Rather, you must determine the attitude of the community as a whole.

[However, the prurient-appeal requirement may also be assessed in terms of the sexual interest of a clearly defined deviant sexual group if the material in question was intended to appeal to the prurient inter- est of that group, as distinguished from the community in general.]

If you fi  that the material meets the fi  two tests of the obscenity defi	your fi decision is whether the material, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Unlike the fi two tests, this third test is not to be decided on contemporary community standards but rather on the basis of whether a reasonable person, considering the material as a whole, would find that the material lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. An item may have serious value in one or more of these ar- eas even if it portrays sexually oriented conduct. It is for you to say whether the material in this case has such value.

All three of these tests must be met before the ma- terial in question can be found to be obscene. If any one of them is not met, the material would not be obscene within the meaning of the law.
Note

Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607, 2615 (1973), establishes a

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.60

three-pronged test to determine whether material is obscene. The prosecution has the burden of proving each element of the Miller test. See United States v. Ragsdale, 426 F.3d 765, 771 (5th Cir. 2005) (citing Pope v. Illinois, 107 S. Ct. 1918, 1924 (1987)).

For a discussion on “prurient” interest, see Pinkus v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 1808, 1814 (1978); Hamling v. United States, 94
S. Ct. 2887, 2913 (1974); Mishkin v. New York, 86 S. Ct. 958,
962–63 (1966); Roth v. United States, 77 S. Ct. 1304, 1310–11
(1957); and United States v. Guglielmi, 819 F.2d 451, 455 (4th Cir.
1987).

For a discussion on “patently offensive,” see Hoover v. Byrd, 801 F.2d 740 (5th Cir. 1986), and United States v. Easley, 927 F.2d 1442, 1449 (8th Cir. 1991). Although the fi two prongs of the Miller test are to be judged by contemporary community stan- dards, the third prong is to be judged by a “reasonable person” standard, a nationally uniform objective standard. See Pope, 107 S. Ct. at 1920–21; United States v. Easley, 942 F.2d 405, 411 (6th Cir.
1991).
In cases involving material designed for and primarily dis- seminated to a clearly defined deviant sexual group, the prurient- appeal requirement is satisfied if the dominant theme of the mate- rial taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex of the members of that group. See Mishkin, 86 S. Ct. at 963.

The Supreme Court has stated that, “[w]e adjust the prurient- appeal requirement to social realities by permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms of the sexual interests of its intended and probable recipient group . . . .” Id. at 964.

Hamling, 94 S. Ct. at 2908–11, and United States v. Inv. Enters. Inc., 10 F.3d 263, 267 n.5 (5th Cir. 1993), indicate that knowledge of the sexually explicit nature of material is the required scienter for 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461 and 1462. See also United States v. Schmeltzer, 20 F.3d 610, 612 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that knowledge that the material is sexually oriented is the scienter requirement for conviction under § 1462); United States v. Sulai- man, 490 F.2d 78, 79 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that proof that the defendant knew the material was sexually oriented is sufficient to establish scienter under § 1461). A specific intent to mail something known to be obscene is not required. See Hamling, 94 S. Ct. at 2908–11; United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 733, 740 (5th Cir. 1974) (asserting that knowledge that the material is sexually oriented is the only scienter required for conviction under §§ 1462 and 1465).

2.61	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.61

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATERIAL (BY COMMON CARRIER)
18 U.S.C. § 1462

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1462, makes it a crime for anyone to use a common carrier to trans- mit obscene material in interstate [foreign] commerce.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly used a com- mon carrier [interactive computer service] to transport
——————————— (describe material in the indict- ment) in interstate [foreign] commerce, as charged;

Second: That the defendant knew, at the time of such transportation, the sexually oriented content of the material; and

Third: That the material was obscene.

[Here include defi	of obscenity as stated in Instruction No. 2.60, 18 U.S.C. § 1461, Mailing Obscene Material.]
A “common carrier” includes any person or corpora- tion engaged in the business of carting, hauling, or transporting goods and commodities for members of the public for hire.

[“Interactive computer service” means any informa- tion service, system, or access to software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer service, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services off by libraries or educational institutions.]

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.61

One of the specific facts the government must prove is that the defendant knew of the sexually oriented contents of the material that was transported in inter- state commerce. The government is not obligated to prove that the defendant knew that such material was legally obscene, only that the content was sexually oriented.
Note

For definitions of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce,” see Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41.

“Interactive  computer  service”  is  defi	in  47  U.S.C.
§ 230(f)(2).

See Note following Instruction No. 2.60, 18 U.S.C. § 1461, Mail- ing Obscene Material.

2.62	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.62

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATERIAL (FOR PURPOSE OF SALE OR DISTRIBUTION)
18 U.S.C. § 1465

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1465, makes it a crime for anyone to transport obscene material in interstate [foreign] commerce for the purpose of selling [distributing] it.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly transported in interstate [foreign] commerce certain material, as charged;

Second: That the defendant transported such mate- rial for the purpose of selling [distributing] it;

Third: That the defendant knew, at the time of such transportation, of the sexually oriented content of the material; and

Fourth: That the material was obscene.

[Here include defi	of obscenity as stated in Instruction No. 2.60, 18 U.S.C. § 1461, Mailing Obscene Material.]

To transport “for the purpose of sale or distribu- tion” is to move the material with the intent to transfer the material to someone else, even if no money is involved.

[If two or more copies of any publication or two or more of any article of the character described in the indictment have been transported, you may presume

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2.62

that the materials were intended for sale or distribution. That presumption, however, may be rebutted, or overcome, by other evidence.]

[If a combined total of five publications or articles described in the indictment have been transported, you may presume that the materials were intended for sale or distribution. That presumption, however, may be rebutted, or overcome, by other evidence.]

One of the facts that the government must prove is that the defendant knew of the sexually oriented content of the material which was transported in inter- state commerce. The government does not have the obligation of showing that the defendant knew that such material was in fact legally obscene, only that the defendant knew that it was sexually oriented.
Note

For definitions of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce,” see Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41.

See Note following Instruction No. 2.60, 18 U.S.C. § 1461, Mail- ing Obscene Material.

In United States v. Coil, 442 F.3d 912 (5th Cir. 2006), the Fifth Circuit held that § 1465 is not rendered unconstitutional by Stanley v. Georgia, 89 S. Ct. 1243 (1969), which recognized the right of individuals to possess obscene materials in their homes, or by Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), which held that homosexuals have a right to engage in certain consensual sexual activity in their home without government intervention.

2.63	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.63A

CORRUPTLY OBSTRUCTING ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503, makes it a crime for anyone corruptly to infl	[obstruct] [impede] [endeavor to influence [obstruct] [impede]] the due administration of justice in connection with a pend- ing judicial proceeding.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That there was a proceeding pending before a federal court [grand jury];

Second: That the defendant knew of the pending judicial proceeding and influenced [obstructed] [im- peded] [endeavored to influence [obstruct] [impede]] the due administration of justice in that proceeding; and

Third: That the defendant's act was done “cor- ruptly,” that is, the defendant acted knowingly and dishonestly, with the specifi intent to subvert or undermine the due administration of justice.

[When an “endeavor” is charged, add the following: It is not necessary to show that the defendant was suc- cessful in achieving the forbidden objective, only that the defendant corruptly tried to achieve it in a manner which he knew was likely to infl	[obstruct] [impede] the due administration of justice due to the natural and probable effect of the defendant's actions.]
Note

Under the Apprendi doctrine, a fourth element is needed if the case involves any enhancements under § 1503(b). See Apprendi v.

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2.63A

New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). See Note to Instruction No. 2.63B, 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a), Obstructing Administration of Justice by Threats or Force.
This charge applies to the omnibus clause of the statute. See United States v. Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. 2357 (1995). For a discussion of the elements of this off     see United States v. Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 501–04 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Brown, 459
F.3d 509, 530–31 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. De La Rosa, 171 F.3d 215, 221–22 (5th Cir. 1999); and United States v. Williams, 874 F.2d 968, 977 (5th Cir. 1989).
With respect to the fi element, § 1503 requires a pending judicial proceeding, as opposed to a police or agency investigation. See Richardson, 676 F.3d at 502–03; United States v. Cihak, 137 F.3d 252, 263 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Casel, 995 F.2d 1299, 1306 (5th Cir. 1993), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Reed v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1289 (1994); United States v. Vesich, 724 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1984). To establish “pendency,” the court must decide whether a reasonable jury could conclude that “the investigating agency has acted ‘in furtherance of an actual grand jury investigation, i.e., to secure a presently contemplated presentation of evidence before the grand jury.’ ’’ Vesich, 724 F.2d at 455 (quoting United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1975)).
The omnibus clause of § 1503 intends to cover all proscribed endeavors without regard to the technicalities of the law of at- tempt or the doctrine of impossibility. See Richardson, 676 F.3d at 503; United States v. Neal, 951 F.2d 630, 632 (5th Cir. 1992).
In Aguilar, 115 S. Ct. at 2362, the Supreme Court read the statute as requiring a “nexus” relationship in time, causation, or logic with the judicial proceeding so that the proscribed endeavor “must have the ‘natural and probable effect’ of interfering with the due administration of justice.” See also Richardson, 676 F.3d at 502; United States v. Sharpe, 193 F.3d 852, 865 (5th Cir. 1999).
The term “due administration of justice” is defined as “the per- formance of acts required by law in the discharge of duties such as appearing as a witness and giving truthful testimony when subpoenaed.” Sharpe, 193 F.3d at 864; see also Richardson, 676 F.3d at 502–03; Williams, 874 F.2d at 976 n.24 (citing United States v. Partin, 552 F.2d 621 (5th Cir. 1977)).
The Fifth Circuit expressly approved this instruction's defini- tion of “corruptly” in Richardson, 676 F.3d at 506–08.
A trial court did not commit plain error by failing to give a

2.63A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
unanimity instruction, at least when the defendant failed to show prejudice. See Sharpe, 193 F.3d at 870–71.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.63B

2.63B

OBSTRUCTING ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE BY THREATS OR FORCE
18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503, makes it a crime for anyone by threats or force to infl
[obstruct] [impede] [endeavor to infl	[obstruct] [impede]] the due administration of justice in connec- tion with a pending judicial proceeding.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That there was a proceeding pending before a federal court [grand jury];

Second: That the defendant knew of the pending judicial proceeding;

Third: That the defendant threatened physical force [used physical force], as charged in the indict- ment; and

Fourth: That the defendant's conduct infl [obstructed]  [impeded]  [endeavored  to  influence  [ob- struct] [impede]] the due administration of justice in that proceeding.

[When an “endeavor” is charged, add the following: It is not necessary to show that the defendant was suc- cessful in achieving the forbidden objective, only that the defendant tried to achieve it in a manner which he knew was likely to influence [obstruct] [impede] the due administration of justice as to the natural and probable effect of the defendant's actions.]

2.63B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Note

See Note to Instruction No. 2.63A, 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a), Cor- ruptly Obstructing Administration of Justice.

This offense provides for an enhanced sentence in the case of a killing, or attempted killing of the juror or court offi  or in a case “in which the offense was committed against a petit juror and in which a class A or B felony was charged.” 18 U.S.C. § 1503(b). Another possible enhancement occurs when there is a use or threat of force in connection with the trial of any criminal case. The maximum sentence becomes the higher of that provided in § 1503 or that provided for the criminal off charged in the trial in which the juror is participating. An additional element, prompted by the Apprendi doctrine, would be required in all such cases. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.63C

2.63C

CORRUPTLY INFLUENCING A JUROR 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1503(a), makes it a crime for anyone corruptly to endeavor to influence [intimidate] [impede] any petit [grand] juror of a federal court.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That ——————————— was a petit [grand] juror of a federal court;

Second: That the defendant endeavored to infl ence [intimidate] [impede] the juror in the discharge of his duty as a petit [grand] juror; and

Third: That the defendant acted “corruptly,” that is, knowingly and dishonestly, with the specific intent to subvert or undermine the integrity of the court proceeding in which the juror served.

It is not necessary for the government to prove that the juror was in fact swayed or changed or prevented in any way, but only that the defendant corruptly tried to do so.
Note
This instruction charges only the corrupt endeavor to infl ence a juror. The statute also prohibits the use of threats or force as well as such action against an offi	of the United States or magistrate. See 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a); Instruction No. 2.63B, 18
U.S.C. § 1503(a), Obstructing Administration of Justice by Threats or Force. If this conduct is charged, or if the defendant is accused of injuring a juror, officer, or magistrate, the instruction should be modified accordingly.
An additional element, prompted by the Apprendi doctrine, is

2.63	C	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
required if the off         involves penalty enhancements under
§ 1503(b) or “occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case, and the act in violation of this section involves the threat of physi- cal force or physical force.” See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503(a)–(b). See also Note to Instruction No. 2.63A, Corruptly Obstructing Administra- tion of Justice.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.64

2.64

INTIMIDATION TO INFLUENCE TESTIMONY 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1512(b)(1), makes it a crime for anyone knowingly to use intimida- tion [threaten] [corruptly persuade] another person, or attempt to do so, with the intent to infl	[delay] [prevent] the testimony of any person in an offi federal proceeding.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant used intimidation [threats] against another person [attempted to intimi- date [threaten] another person]; and

[First: That the defendant corruptly persuaded [at- tempted to persuade] another person; and]

Second: That the defendant acted knowingly and with intent to dishonestly infl	[delay] [prevent] the testimony of ——————————— with respect to
——————————— (describe official proceeding named in indictment), an official proceeding.

[An act is done “corruptly” if the defendant acted knowingly and dishonestly, with the specific intent to subvert or undermine the due administration of justice.]

The term “intimidation” means the use of any words or actions intended or designed to make another person timid or fearful or make that person refrain from doing something the person would otherwise do, or do something that person would otherwise not do.

To “act with intent to influence the testimony of a witness” means to act for the purpose of getting the

2.64	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
witness to change, color, or shade his or her testimony in some way, but it is not necessary for the government to prove that the witness's testimony was, in fact, changed in any way.
Note
This crime allows for an enhancement of punishment where the violation “occurs in connection with a trial of a criminal case.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(j); see United States v. Salazar, 542 F.3d 139, 146 (5th Cir. 2008). In such cases, therefore, the second element of the offense should specify that the official proceeding was a trial of a criminal case.
For a general discussion of § 1512 and a particular discussion of the “intent to infl	and “offi proceeding,” see United States v. Ramos, 537 F.3d 439, 462–64 (5th Cir. 2008) (reversing convictions of two Border Patrol Agents for violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512(c) because an internal, informal investigation conducted by the Department of Homeland Security did not constitute an “of- fi proceeding”), and United States v. Shively, 927 F.2d 804, 810–13 (5th Cir. 1991).
This instruction presumes an allegation that the intent to influence was accomplished through knowing intimidation, threats, or corrupt persuasion. However, § 1512(b)(1) can also be violated if one knowingly uses “misleading conduct” toward another person to influence testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Gabriel, 125 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by United States
v. Quattrone, 441 F.3d 153, 176 (2d Cir. 2006). In such a case, this instruction must be modifi The term “misleading conduct” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1515(a)(3).
The mens rea requirement of “knowingly” applies equally to all the acts that immediately follow in the statutory language. See Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 2129, 2136 (2005) (“Only persons conscious of wrongdoing can be said to ‘knowingly
. . . corruptly persuad[e].’ ’’).
It was error for the district court to exclude the term “dishon- esty” from the definition of “corruptly” in a case involving allega- tions that an accounting firm obstructed a Securities and Exchange Commission proceeding in violation of § 1512(b) by destroying documents. See Arthur Andersen LLP, 125 S. Ct. at 2136. Specifi- cally, the Court held that by omitting the concept of “dishonesty” from the definition of “corruptly,” the jury was permitted to convict based on “innocent conduct,” i.e., “innocently persuad[ing] another to withhold information from the Government.” Id. at 706–07.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.64

This instruction also presumes an offi proceeding was pending. The statute specifically provides that an “official proceed- ing” need not be pending or about to be instituted at the time of the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(f)(1); United States v. Greenwood, 974 F.2d 1449, 1460 (5th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, it is necessary for a “nexus” to exist between the intimidating act and the proceeding. That is, at the time of the violative act, the defendant must have foreseen an official proceeding in which the testimony may be proffered. See Arthur Andersen LLP, 125 S. Ct. at 2137.
Any proceeding before a United States district judge, United States bankruptcy judge, United States magistrate judge, or a federal grand jury is an “official proceeding” within the meaning of this law. The term “offi       proceeding” is defi       in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1515(a)(1).
If the case involves an attempt to intimidate, add Instruction No. 1.32, Attempt.

18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(c), 1512(a)(2)(c), and 1512(b)(3), prohibit
killing a person, using physical force against a person, or know- ingly using intimidation, threats, or corrupt persuasion against a person with the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the communica- tion to a law enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the possible commission of a federal offense. A jury should be instructed in a § 1512(a)(1)(c) offense on the fol- lowing two elements: (1) a killing, (2) committed with the intent to prevent a communication about the possible commission of a federal offense. See Fowler v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2045, 2049 (2011); United States v. Causey, 185 F.3d 407, 422–23 (5th Cir. 1999). Resolving a circuit split, the Fowler Court held that evi- dence must establish that there was a reasonable likelihood that a relevant communication would have been made to a federal law enforcement officer. 131 S. Ct. at 2049–53.

2.65	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.65

DESTROYING, ALTERING, OR FALSIFYING A DOCUMENT IN A FEDERAL INVESTIGATION 18 U.S.C. § 1519

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1519 makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly alter [destroy] [muti- late] [conceal] [cover up] [falsify] [make a false entry in] a record [document] [tangible object] with the intent to impede [obstruct] [infl	the investigation of [the proper administration of] a matter within the jurisdic- tion of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to [in con- templation of] such a matter.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly altered [de- stroyed] [mutilated] [concealed] [covered up] [falsified] [made a false entry in] a record [document] [tangible object];

Second: That the defendant acted with the intent to impede [obstruct] [infl	the investigation [the proper administration of] in relation to [in contempla- tion of] a matter; and

Third: That the matter was within the jurisdiction of ——————————— (name of agency or department), which is an agency [a department] of the United States.

There is no requirement that the matter or investi- gation have been pending or imminent at the time of the obstruction, but only that the acts were taken in re- lation to or in contemplation of any such matter or investigation.

In order to meet its burden, the government does

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.65

not have to prove that the defendant specifically knew that the matter or investigation was within the juris- diction of a department or agency of the United States. In other words, you need not fi that the defendant knew he was obstructing [impeding] [infl	a matter that was federal in nature.

A “tangible object” is one used to record or preserve information.
Note
Section 1519 has been construed as criminalizing three cir- cumstances involving a matter within the jurisdiction of a federal agency and a defendant acting with an obstructive intent: “(1) when a defendant acts directly with respect to the investigation or proper administration of any matter, that is, a pending matter, (2) when a defendant acts in contemplation of any such matter, and
(3) when a defendant acts in relation to any such matter.” See United States v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806, 837 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Kernell, 667 F.3d 746, 753 (6th Cir. 2012) and United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 711 (8th Cir. 2011), and reviewing for plain error defendant's argument concerning the vagueness of the statute).
The Fifth Circuit has held that a defendant need not know that the investigation is pending or that the matter he obstructs be of a federal nature. See United States v. Moore, 708 F.3d 639, 649 (5th Cir. 2013) (holding that the government need not prove that a defendant intended to obstruct a specific federal investiga- tion); McRae, 702 F.3d at 836 (“In light of the statute's text and the available precedent from other circuits, we hold that it is nei- ther clear nor obvious that a defendant must know or intend that the investigation he obstructs be of a federal nature in order to be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1519.”). The relationship between the United States and the matter being obstructed is a jurisdictional one, which is significant in that the mens rea of a federal criminal statute does not ordinarily extend to jurisdictional elements. See McRae, 702 F.3d at 835.
The Fifth Circuit has held that § 1519 does not require the obstruction of a pending investigation, see Moore, 708 F.3d at 649, and has also implied that the investigation need not even be im- minent, see McRae, 702 F.3d at 836–37; however, it has also not explicitly rejected a defendant's concern that the failure to require a pending or imminent investigation “might criminalize conduct

2.65	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
with a highly tenuous connection to any investigation at all,” and even punish innocent conduct. See id. at 837 (noting its receptivity to—but refusing to rule on—the defendant's “well-presented argu- ment” that § 1519 is vague because, unlike other obstruction of justice statutes, it does not require a “relationship in time, causa- tion, or logic” between a defendant's conduct and an investigation). Other courts considering the issue have turned to the legislative history of § 1519 in which Senator Patrick Leahy clarified that the statute “is specifically meant not to include any technical require- ment . . . to tie the obstructive conduct to a pending or imminent proceeding or matter . . . . It is also meant to do away with the distinctions . . . between court proceedings, investigations, regula- tory or administrative proceedings (whether formal or not), and less formal government inquires, regardless of their title.” S. Rep. No. 107-146, at 14–15 (2002).

The Eighth Circuit has noted that, despite there being no requirement of a pending matter or knowledge of the federal nature of a matter, § 1519 still requires proof of intent to obstruct, impede, or influence a matter; otherwise, the statute would forbid innocent conduct such as destruction of records “that a person consciously and in good faith determines are irrelevant to a fore- seeable federal matter.” United States v. Yielding, 657 F.3d 688, 711 (8th Cir. 2011). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has stated that, al- though the statute on its face does not require a “corrupt” intent like other obstruction of justice statutes (compare § 1519 with 18
U.S.C. §§ 1512(b) and 1503), “it still requires some form of obstruc- tive intent, specifically a knowing destruction undertaken with the ‘intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of [a] matter.’ ’’ McRae, 702 F.3d at 838 (citing 18
U.S.C. § 1519). The Fifth Circuit in McRae pointed to the Sixth Circuit's suggestion that criminal liability under § 1519 requires some corrupt intent, but ultimately declined to opine one way or the other on the issue. Id. (citing Kernell, 667 F.3d at 754).

In Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015), the Court held that because of § 1519's origin as a provision of the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002, a law designed to protect investors and restore trust in financial markets, “[a] tangible object captured by section 1519 . . . must be one used to record or preserve information.” Id. at 1079. Thus, the majority reversed the defendant's § 1519 convic- tion for destroying undersized red grouper after an offi deputized as a federal agent by the National Marine Fisheries Ser- vice boarded his vessel and cited him for possession of undersized fish.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.66

MISUSE OF A PASSPORT 18 U.S.C. § 1544
(FIRST AND SECOND PARAGRAPHS)

2.66

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1544, makes it a crime for anyone willfully and knowingly to use [at- tempt to use] a passport issued or designed for the use of another [in violation of the conditions or restrictions contained in the passport] [in violation of the rules governing the issuance of passports].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant used [attempted to use] a passport;

Second: That the passport was issued or designed for the use of someone other than the defendant [that the use or attempted use violated the conditions or restrictions contained in the passport] [that the use or attempted use violated the rules governing the issu- ance of passports]; and

Third: That the defendant used [attempted to use] the passport willfully and knowingly, that is, deliber- ately, voluntarily, and knowing that the passport was issued or designed for the use of someone other than the defendant [with the intent to violate the conditions or restrictions contained in the passport] [with the intent to violate the rules governing the issuance of passports].

[Fourth: That the defendant used [attempted to use] the passport to facilitate an act of international terrorism [a drug trafficking crime].]

2.66	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Note

The off carries enhanced maximum penalties if the defendant used or attempted to use the passport to facilitate an act of international terrorism or a drug traffi	crime. If the indictment contains one of these enhancements, the trial judge should define “an act of international terrorism” or “a drug traf- ficking crime” as given in the statute and add facilitation of the ap- propriate crime as a fourth element or include a special instruction on the verdict form asking the jury whether they find the support- ing fact of facilitation. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2363–66 (2000).
For a general discussion of what it means to act “willfully,” see Instruction No. 1.38.

In cases involving the furnishing of a passport under para- graph three of this statute, other elements must be considered.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.67A

2.67A

COUNTERFEITING IMMIGRATION DOCUMENTS
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)
(FIRST PARAGRAPH, FIRST CLAUSE)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1546(a), makes it a crime for anyone knowingly to forge [counter- feit] [alter] [falsely make] any immigrant or nonim- migrant visa [permit] [border crossing card] [alien registration receipt card] [document prescribed by stat- ute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of autho- rized stay or employment in the United States].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly forged [coun- terfeited] [altered] [falsely made] ————— (name docu- ment alleged in the indictment); and

Second: That ————— (name document alleged in the indictment) is an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa [permit] [border crossing card] [alien registration receipt card] [document prescribed by statute or regula- tion for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States].

[Third: That the defendant forged [counterfeited] [altered] [falsely made] ————— (name document al- leged in the indictment) to facilitate an act of interna- tional terrorism [a drug trafficking crime].]
Note
The off carries enhanced maximum penalties if the defendant counterfeited the document to facilitate an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime. If the indict- ment contains one of these enhancements, the trial judge should defi     “an act of international terrorism” or “a drug traffi

2.67	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
crime” as given in the statute and add facilitation of the appropri- ate crime as a fourth element or include a special instruction on the verdict form asking the jury whether they find the supporting fact of facilitation. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2363–66 (2000).

A “document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into” the United States includes foreign passports. United States v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1993).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.67B

2.67B

USE OR POSSESSION OF FRAUDULENT IMMIGRATION DOCUMENTS
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a)
(FIRST PARAGRAPH, SECOND CLAUSE)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1546(a), makes it a crime for anyone to use [attempt to use] [possess] any immigrant or nonimmigrant visa [permit] [border crossing card] [alien registration receipt card] [document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States] knowing that it was forged [counter- feited] [altered] [falsely made] [procured by means of a false statement] [procured by fraud] [unlawfully obtained].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly [uttered] [used] [attempted to use] [possessed] [obtained] [ac- cepted] [received] an immigrant or nonimmigrant visa [permit] [border crossing card] [alien registration receipt card] [document prescribed by statute or regula- tion for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States];

Second: That the immigrant or nonimmigrant visa [permit] [border crossing card] [alien registration receipt card] [document prescribed by statute or regula- tion for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States] was forged [counter- feited] [altered] [falsely made] [procured by means of a false statement] [procured by fraud] [unlawfully obtained]; and

Third: That the defendant knew the immigrant or nonimmigrant visa [permit] [border crossing card]

2.67B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
[alien registration receipt card] [document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States] was forged [counterfeited] [altered] [falsely made] [procured by means of a false statement] [procured by fraud] [unlawfully obtained].

[Fourth: That the defendant used [attempted to use] [possessed] the immigrant or nonimmigrant visa [permit] [border crossing card] [alien registration receipt card] [document prescribed by statute or regula- tion for entry into or as evidence of authorized stay or employment in the United States] to facilitate an act of international terrorism [a drug trafficking crime].]
Note

The elements of the offense are mentioned in United States v. Gonzalez-Figueroa, 590 F. App'x 404 (5th Cir. 2014); United States
v. Uvalle-Patricio, 478 F.3d 699, 702 (5th Cir. 2007); and United States v. Osifo, 33 F.3d 1379, 1994 WL 487151, *2 (5th Cir. 1994) (unpublished).

A “document prescribed by statute or regulation for entry into” the United States includes foreign passports. United States v. Osiemi, 980 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1993).

The off	carries enhanced maximum penalties if the defendant used or possessed the document to facilitate an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime. If the indict- ment contains one of these enhancements, the trial judge should defi	“an act of international terrorism” or “a drug traffi crime” as given in the statute and add facilitation of the appropri- ate crime as a fourth element or include a special instruction on the verdict form asking the jury whether they find the supporting fact of facilitation. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2363–66 (2000).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.67C

2.67C

FALSE STATEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH IMMIGRATION DOCUMENTS
18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (FOURTH PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1546(a), makes it a crime for anyone knowingly to make any false statement of material fact in any application [affi- davit] [other document] required by the immigration laws or regulations of the United States.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly made a false statement on an application [affidavit] [other document] required by the immigration laws or regulations of the United States;

Second: That the statement was material; and

Third: That the statement was made under oath or as permitted under penalty of perjury.

[Fourth: That the defendant made the statement to facilitate an act of international terrorism [a drug traf- ficking crime].]

A statement is “material” if it has a natural ten- dency to influence, or is capable of influencing, a deci- sion of the governmental agency to which it is addressed.
Note
This paragraph also prohibits knowingly presenting any ap- plication, affi	or other document that contains a false statement. If the indictment alleges that the defendant knowingly presented such a document, the introductory paragraph and the first element should be modified accordingly.

2.67	C	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The defi	of “material” is derived from United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310, 2313 (1995) (defining a “material state- ment” in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, making false statements of material fact to federal agencies or agents, as a statement that has “a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decision-making body to which it was ad- dressed”) (quoting Kungys v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1537, 1546 (1988); United States v. Al-Kurna, 808 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that a statement was material under § 1546(a) because “it was capable of affecting the functioning of a governmen- tal agency”).

The off	carries enhanced maximum penalties if the defendant made the false statement to facilitate an act of international terrorism or a drug trafficking crime. If the indict- ment contains one of these enhancements, the trial judge should defi	“an act of international terrorism” or “a drug traffi crime” as given in the statute and add facilitation of the appropri- ate crime as a fourth element or include a special instruction on the verdict form asking the jury whether they find the supporting fact of facilitation. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2363–66 (2000).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.68

SEX TRAFFICKING 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1)

2.68

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1591(a)(1), makes it a crime or offense for anyone knowingly, in or aff	interstate or foreign commerce, to recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide, obtain or maintain a person knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud or coercion, or any combination, would be used to cause such person to engage in a commercial sex act or knowing that the person was under the age of 18 and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly recruited [enticed] [harbored] [transported] [provided] [obtained] or [maintained] by any means ————— (individual named in the indictment);

Second: That the defendant committed such act knowing or in reckless disregard of the fact that means of force, threats of force, fraud coercion, or any combina- tion of such means, would be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act [the person had not attained the age of 18 years and would be caused to engage in a commercial sex act]

Third: That the defendant's acts were in or affected interstate [foreign] commerce.

“Commercial sex act” means any sex act, on ac- count of which anything of value is given to or received by any person.

In determining whether the defendant's conduct

2.68	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
was “in or affected interstate or foreign commerce,” you may consider whether the defendant used means or fa- cilities of interstate commerce, such as telephones, the internet, or hotels that serviced interstate travelers, or whether his conduct substantially aff	interstate commerce by virtue of the fact that he purchased items that had moved in interstate commerce.

[If the Government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the person recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained, or maintained, then the Government does not have to prove that the defendant knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.]

[“Coercion” means:

(A)	threats of serious harm to or physical restraint against any person;

(B)	any scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act would result in serious harm to or physical restraint against any person; or

(C)	the abuse or threatened abuse of law or the legal process, whether administrative, civil, or criminal, in any manner or for any purpose for which the law was not designed, in order to exert pressure on another person to cause that person to take some action or refrain from taking some action.]

[“Serious harm” means any harm, whether physi- cal or nonphysical, including psychological, financial, or reputational harm, that is sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the same cir- cumstances to perform or to continue performing com-

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2.68

mercial sexual activity in order to avoid incurring that harm.]
Note

A similar jury instruction was approved as correct in United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2013)

A sex act does not have to actually occur to find the defendant guilty of § 1591(a). See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, 714 F.3d 306, 312 (5th Cir. 2013).

“A conviction may be obtained against a defendant who reck- lessly disregards a victim's age even if the defendant did not have a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim. Facts other than the victim's appearance or behavior may support a finding of reck- less disregard of the victim's age, such as information from the victim, or others, or documentation that would cause a reasonable person to question whether the victim was actually eighteen years old. Circumstances of which a defendant was aware, such as the victim's grade level in school, or activities in which the victim engaged, could also constitute the basis for a fi	of reckless disregard.” United States v. Phea, 755 F.3d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 2014).
If multiple acts of diff	types are charged in the indict- ment (e.g. recruit, entice, harbor, transport) a unanimity instruc- tion may be appropriate. See Instruction No. 1.25.

2.69	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.69

FALSE DECLARATION BEFORE GRAND JURY OR COURT
18 U.S.C. § 1623

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1623, makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly make a false mate- rial statement under oath to a court [grand jury].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the statement was made while the defendant was under oath before the court [grand jury] as charged;

Second: That such statement was false in one or more of the respects charged;

Third: That the defendant knew such statement was false when the defendant made it; and

Fourth: That the false statement was material to the court proceeding [grand jury's inquiry].

A statement is “material” if it has a natural ten- dency to influence, or is capable of influencing, the deci- sion of the court [grand jury].

In reviewing the statement which is alleged to have been false, you should consider such statement in the context of the sequence of questions asked and answers given, and the words used should be given their com- mon and ordinary meaning unless the context clearly shows that a different meaning was mutually under- stood by the questioner and the witness.

If you should fi that a particular question was ambiguous and that the defendant truthfully answered

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.69

one reasonable interpretation of the question under the circumstances presented, then such answer would not be false. Similarly, if you should find that the question was clear but the answer was ambiguous, and one rea- sonable interpretation of such answer would be truth- ful, then such answer would not be false.

[Where the defendant has under oath in proceed- ings before the court [grand jury] knowingly made two or more declarations which are inconsistent to the degree that one of them is necessarily false, the govern- ment need not specify which was false, so long as each was material to the point in question.]
Note
The materiality of the alleged false statement is a question for the jury. See United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995).
The definition of “materiality” in this instruction was described as the “general” definition by the Supreme Court in Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1837 (1999). For a discussion on material- ity and ambiguity, see United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 529–30 (5th Cir. 2006).

18 U.S.C. § 1623(c) eliminated the traditional requirement that a perjury conviction could not rest on proving two irreconcil- able statements. See, e.g., United States v. McAfee, 8 F.3d 1010, 1014 (5th Cir. 2006).

18 U.S.C. § 1623(d) provides an affirmative defense of recanta- tion where the defendant, in the same court or grand jury proceed- ing where he makes the declaration, admits it to be false. This defense is effective only if, at the time the admission of falsity is made, the declaration has not substantially affected the proceeding and it has not become clear that the falsity will be exposed. See United States v. Scrimgeour, 636 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that the defendant must meet both prongs before a recantation defense is available, despite the use of the disjunctive in the statute).
A statement that is literally true cannot establish the basis for a perjury conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1621, even if it is evasive and non-responsive. See Bronston v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 595, 602 (1973). A jury is entitled to disbelieve a defendant's claim that he “does not recall” an answer where falsity is established by

2.69	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
circumstantial evidence. See United States v. Abrams, 568 F.2d 411, 418 (5th Cir. 1978).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.70A

2.70A

THEFT OF MAIL MATTER
18 U.S.C. § 1708 (FIRST PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1708, makes it a crime to steal mail from a United States mailbox [post office] [letter box] [mail receptacle] [authorized de- pository for mail matter].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the letter described in the indictment was in the mail [post office] [letter box] [mail receptacle] [authorized depository for mail matter], as described in the indictment; and

Second: That the defendant stole the letter from the mail [post office] [letter box] [mail receptacle] [au- thorized depository for mail matter], as described in the indictment.

Mail matter is “stolen” when it has been wrong- fully taken from an authorized depository for mail mat- ter with intent to deprive the owner, temporarily or permanently, of its use and benefit. That intent must exist at the time the mail matter is taken from the mails.
Note
The fi	paragraph of the statute describes two off
theft of a letter from the mail as well as removal of the contents of a letter in the mail.
Many circuits appear to agree that § 1708 covers mail that has been accidently delivered by the Postal Service to an address dif- ferent from that on the envelope (misdelivered mail). The circuits are split, however, on whether the statute also covers mail that has been delivered by the Postal Service to the address on the en-

2.70	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
velope, but the address is in fact incorrect, either because it was misaddressed by the sender or because the recipient has moved from that address. The question is whether someone at that ad- dress who then takes the mail for himself has violated the statute. The Fifth Circuit takes the position that § 1708 does not cover such a situation—that once the mail is delivered to the address on the envelope, the custody of the Postal Service ceases and the en- velope is no longer in “the mail.” See United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1972) (holding that taking money order from pharmacy desk violated statute because money order remained in “the mail” as misdelivered, rather than misaddressed). Other circuits disagree. See United States v. Coleman, 196 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 1999) (collecting cases and holding that the statute covered mail that was addressed to the addressee's prior address).

The statute also includes unlawfully taking, abstracting, or obtaining mail by fraud as well as secreting, embezzling, or destroying mail. In such a case, the instruction should be so modified.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.70B

2.70B

POSSESSION OF STOLEN MAIL
18 U.S.C. § 1708 (THIRD PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1708, makes it a crime to possess any letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail known by the defendant to have been stolen from the United States mail.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the ——————————— (e.g., checks) had been stolen from the mail [post office] [letter box] [mail receptacle] [authorized depository for mail mat- ter];

Second: That the defendant knew the item was stolen; and

Third: That the defendant possessed the ————— (e.g., checks) described in the indictment and intended to do so unlawfully.

A private mailbox or mail receptacle is an “autho- rized depository for mail matter.”

Mail matter is “stolen” when it has been wrong- fully taken from an authorized depository for mail mat- ter with intent to deprive the owner, temporarily or permanently, of its use and benefit.

The government does not have to prove that the defendant stole the letter, or that the defendant knew the letter was stolen from the mail, only that the defendant knew that it was stolen.
Note

United States v. Hall, 845 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding

2.70	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
that evidence was sufficient to support guilty verdict where there was evidence that the check in question had been deposited in mail, that the addressee never received the check, and that the defendant's fi	were found on the check), cites the ele- ments of the offense.
The statute also makes illegal the possession of mail which the defendant knows to have been unlawfully taken, embezzled, or abstracted. In such a case, the instruction should be modified.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.71

2.71

EMBEZZLEMENT/THEFT OF MAIL MATTER BY POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEE
18 U.S.C. § 1709

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1709, makes it a crime for a Postal Service employee to embezzle any mail matter possessed by the employee during employment.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant was a Postal Service em- ployee at the time stated in the indictment;

Second: That as a Postal Service employee the defendant had been entrusted with [had lawfully come into possession of] the mail matter described in the indictment, which mail matter was intended to be conveyed by mail; and

Third: That the defendant embezzled such mail matter.

A letter is “intended to be conveyed by mail” if a reasonable person who saw the letter would think it was a letter intended to be delivered through the mail.

The fact that a particular letter may have been a “decoy” letter which was not meant to go anywhere would not prevent your finding that it was intended to be conveyed by mail if a reasonable person who saw the letter would think it was a normal letter which was intended to be delivered.

To “embezzle” means to wrongfully and intention- ally take money or property of another after the money

2.71	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
or property has lawfully come into the possession or control of the person taking it.
Note

Section 1709 charges two crimes: the embezzlement of letters or articles contained therein and theft of the contents of letters, as distinguished from the letter itself. The statute does not cover stealing a letter. See United States v. Trevino, 491 F.2d 74, 75 (5th Cir. 1974) (holding that where indictment charged defendant with stealing a letter and not an article contained in a letter, stealing could not be equated with embezzlement and therefore the indict- ment failed to state an offense under the statute). For theft of a letter, use Instruction No. 2.70A, 18 U.S.C. § 1708 (First Para- graph), Theft of Mail Matter.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.72A

2.72A

PROVIDING CONTRABAND IN PRISON 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(1)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1791 makes it a crime for anyone to provide, or attempt to provide, in violation of a statute or a rule or order issued under a statute, a prohibited object to an inmate of a prison.

For you to find the defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly provided, or attempted to provide, an object to an inmate of a prison;

Second: That providing of the object violated a stat- ute, or a rule or order issued under a statute; and

Third: That the object is a prohibited object.

The term “prison” means a Federal correctional, detention, or penal facility or any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direc- tion of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the Attorney General.
Note
The definition of “prohibited object” (and certain terms utilized therein) is found in 18 U.S.C. § 1791(d). An appropriate definition of this term, considering the particular allegations of the indict- ment or bill of information, should be provided.

The regulation found at 28 C.F.R. § 6.1 prohibits the introduc- tion, or attempted introduction, of anything “into or upon the grounds of any Federal penal or correctional institution . . . without the knowledge and consent of the warden or superinten- dent” of the facility. See 28 C.F.R. § 6.1. In United States v. Roybal, 795 F.2d 382 (5th Cir. 1986), the court rejected an argument that the warden's awareness, as part of an undercover investigation, that the defendant, a prison offi might bring a controlled substance into the prison, precluded a violation of the regulation

2.72	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
and, thus, 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(1). The court explained: “That the warden may have suspected, or even known that a person would attempt to illegally bring contraband into the institution, where that person does not himself rely on the warden's consent or knowl- edge, would not defeat a conviction under the statute.” Roybal, 795 F.2d at 383 (quoting United States v. Adams, 768 F.2d 1276, 1277 (11th Cir. 1985)). “The warden's testimony that he did not autho- rize appellant to bring in the pills sufficiently establishes that ap- pellant did not have the ‘immunizing consent or knowledge of the warden.’ ’’ Id. (quoting Adams, 768 F.2d at 1277).
“Knowingly” is defined in Instruction No. 1.37.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.72B

2.72B

POSSESSING CONTRABAND IN PRISON 18 U.S.C. § 1791(a)(2)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1791 makes it a crime for an inmate of a prison to make, possess, or obtain, or to attempt to make, possess, or obtain, a prohibited object.

For you to find the defendant guilty, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant was an inmate of a prison;

Second: That the defendant knowingly made [pos- sessed] [obtained] [attempted to make] [attempted to obtain] [attempted to possess] an object; and

Third: That the object is a prohibited object.

The term “prison” means a Federal correctional, detention, or penal facility or any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direc- tion of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the Attorney General.
Note

The definition of “prohibited object” (and certain terms utilized therein) is found in 18 U.S.C. § 1791(d). An appropriate definition of this term, considering the particular allegations of the indict- ment or bill of information, should be provided.

“Knowingly” is defined in Instruction No. 1.37.

2.73	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.73A

EXTORTION BY FORCE, VIOLENCE, OR FEAR 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (HOBBS ACT)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951(a), makes it a crime for anyone to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce by extortion. Extortion means the obtaining of or attempting to obtain property from another, with that person's consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant obtained [attempted to obtain] [conspired to obtain] property from another with that person's consent;

Second: That the defendant did so by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear; and

Third: That the defendant's conduct in any way or degree obstructed [delayed] [aff	commerce [the movement of any article or commodity in commerce].

The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that his conduct would obstruct [delay] [affect] commerce [the movement of any article or com- modity in commerce]. It is not necessary for the govern- ment to show that the defendant actually intended or anticipated an eff on commerce by his actions. All that is necessary is that the natural and probable con- sequence of the acts the defendant took would be to af- fect commerce. If you decide that there would be any ef- fect at all on commerce, then that is enough to satisfy this element.

The term “property” includes money and other tangible and intangible things of value.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.73A

The term “fear” includes fear of economic loss or damage, as well as fear of physical harm.

It is not necessary that the government prove that the fear was a consequence of a direct threat; it is suf- ficient for the government to show that the victim's fear was reasonable under the circumstances.

The use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear is “wrongful” if its purpose is to cause the victim to give property to someone who has no legitimate claim to the property.

The term “commerce” means commerce within the District of Columbia [commerce within the Territory or Possession of the United States] [all commerce between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point outside thereof] [all commerce between points within the same State through any place outside such State] [all other com- merce over which the United States has jurisdiction].
Note
Interference with commerce is the “express jurisdictional ele- ment” of the Hobbs Act. United States v. Robinson, 119 F.3d 1205, 1215 (5th Cir. 1997).
That the defendant's conduct affected commerce is an essential element of the off	and must be submitted to the jury for determination. See United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995); United States v. Hebert, 131 F.3d 514, 521–22 (5th Cir. 1997);
United States v. Miles, 122 F.3d 235, 239–40 (5th Cir. 1997).
“Commerce” is defi  in § 1951(b)(3). The statute requires that commerce or the movement of goods in commerce be affected “in any way or degree.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). However, Fifth Circuit jurisprudence reveals tension regarding the degree of proof required to establish the element of effect on commerce. See United States v. Mann, 493 F.3d 484, 494 (5th Cir. 2007) (“A Hobbs Act prosecution requires the government to prove that the defendant committed, or attempted or conspired to commit, a robbery or act of extortion that caused an interference with interstate commerce.”); United States v. McFarland, 311 F.3d 376 (5th Cir.

2.73A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2002) (en banc) (affirming the constitutionality of the federal Hobbs Act robbery and extortion statute by an equally divided court); United States v. Hickman, 179 F.3d 230 (5th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (conviction affirmed by equally divided vote).
The Hobbs Act proscribes attempts and conspiracies as well as substantive off	In a prosecution for attempt or conspiracy, proof that a successful completion of the scheme would have af- fected commerce may suffice, but substantive convictions require proof that each act of robbery or extortion affected commerce. See Mann, 493 F.3d at 494–96; United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 801–02 (5th Cir. 1999); Robinson, 119 F.3d at 1215.
It is not necessary to prove that the defendant caused the victim's fear by a direct threat, so long as the victim's fear was actual and reasonable, and the defendant took advantage of that fear to extort property. See United States v. Rashad, 687 F.3d 637, 642 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Tomblin, 46 F.3d 1369, 1384
(5th. Cir. 1995); United States v. Quinn, 514 F.2d 1250, 1266–67
(5th Cir. 1975).

For a discussion of the meaning of “wrongful,” see United States v. Enmons, 93 S. Ct. 1007 (1973) (holding that the Hobbs Act “does not apply to the use of force to achieve legitimate labor ends”).
Extortion requires not only deprivation, but also acquisition of property. The Supreme Court held that anti-abortion protesters did not violate the Hobbs Act by using violence or threats of violence against a clinic, their employees, or their patients because the defendants did not “obtain” property from the plaintiff See Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1057, 1066 (2003) (dismissing injunction because defendants “neither pursued nor received something of value from respondents that they could exercise, transfer, or sell”).

The Hobbs Act does not apply where the federal government is the intended benefi of the alleged extortion. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2607 (2007) (holding that Congress did not intend to expose all federal employees “to extortion charges whenever they stretch in trying to enforce Government property claims”).
This instruction addresses extortion by force, violence, or fear, not robbery. If the indictment charges robbery, the second element should be amended to replace “extortion” with “robbery.” In that circumstance, the judge may also wish to define “robbery” pursu- ant to 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(1).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.73B

2.73B

EXTORTION UNDER COLOR OF OFFICIAL RIGHT
18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (HOBBS ACT)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1951(a), makes it a crime for anyone to obstruct, delay, or affect commerce by extortion. Extortion includes the wrongful obtaining of or attempting to obtain property from an- other, with that person's consent, under color of official right.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant wrongfully obtained [at- tempted to obtain] [conspired to obtain] property from another with that person's consent;

Second: That the defendant did so under color of of- ficial right; and

Third: That the defendant's conduct in any way or degree obstructed [delayed] [aff	commerce [the movement of any article or commodity in commerce].

The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that his conduct would obstruct [delay] [affect] commerce [the movement of any article or com- modity in commerce]. It is not necessary for the govern- ment to show that the defendant actually intended or anticipated an eff on commerce by his actions. All that is necessary is that the natural and probable con- sequence of the acts the defendant took would be to af- fect commerce. If you decide that there would be any ef- fect at all on commerce, then that is enough to satisfy this element.

However, the effect on commerce must be real. It is

2.73	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
not suffi to show that commerce was somehow implicated in the course of events.

The term “property” includes money and other tangible and intangible things of value.

“Wrongfully obtaining property under color of of- ficial right” is the taking or attempted taking by a pub- lic offi       of property not due to him or his offi
whether or not the public offi employed force, threats, or fear. In other words, the wrongful use of otherwise valid offi  power may convert dutiful ac- tion into extortion.  If a public offi accepts or demands property in return for promised performance or nonperformance of an official act, the official is guilty of extortion. This is true even if the official was already duty bound to take or withhold the action in question, or even if the official did not have the power or author- ity to take or withhold the action in question, if the victim reasonably believed that the offi had that authority or power.

The term “commerce” means commerce within the District of Columbia [commerce within any Territory or Possession of the United States] [all commerce between any point in a State, Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point outside thereof] [all commerce between points within the same State through any place outside such State] [all other com- merce over which the United States has jurisdiction].
Note

See Note following Instruction No. 2.73A, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), Extortion by Force, Violence, or Fear.
Extortion under color of official right does not require proof of force, violence, threats, or use of fear, nor is it required that the defendant induced or solicited the payment by the victim. It is suf- ficient to prove that the defendant received a payment to which he was not entitled with knowledge that the payment was made in

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2.73B

return for the performance or nonperformance of an offi	act.
See Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1889 (1992); United
States v. Millet, 123 F.3d 268, 275 (5th Cir. 1997).

The government is not required to prove that the defendant had the power or authority to take or refrain from taking the promised action so long as the victim reasonably believed that the official had the authority or power. See United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1983). Further, a private individual who holds no official position but who conspires with a public official, masquerades as a public official, or speaks for a public official may be convicted of extortion under color of official right. United States v. Reagan, 725 F.3d 471, 484 (5th Cir. 2013).

The phrase “wrongful use of otherwise valid offi  power” was cited with approval in United States v. Partida, 385 F.3d 546, 559 (5th Cir. 2004).

2.74	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.74

INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN TRAVEL OR TRANSPORTATION IN AID OF RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES
18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1952 makes it a crime for anyone to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or to use the mail, or any facility in inter- state or foreign commerce, with intent to commit or fa- cilitate certain unlawful activity, and thereafter perform or attempt to perform that unlawful activity.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant traveled in interstate commerce [foreign commerce] or that he used [the mail] [any facility] in [interstate commerce][foreign com- merce];

Second: That the defendant did so with the specific intent to promote, manage, establish, or carry on [dis- tribute the proceeds of] [commit any crime of violence to further] unlawful activity; and

Third: That subsequent to the act of travel [use of the mail] [use of any facility] in interstate commerce [foreign commerce] the defendant did knowingly and willfully promote, manage, establish, or carry on [dis- tribute the proceeds of] [commit any crime of violence to further] such unlawful activity.

“Commerce” includes travel, trade, transportation and communication.

“Interstate commerce” means commerce or travel between one state, territory, or possession of the United

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.74

States and another state, territory, or possession of the United States, including the District of Columbia.

“Foreign commerce” means commerce or travel be- tween any part of the United States, including its ter- ritorial waters, and any other country, including its ter- ritorial waters.
Note

The elements for the offense are set forth in United States v. Tovar, 719 F.3d 376, 389–90 (5th Cir. 2013), United States v. Logan,
949 F.2d 1370, 1381 (5th Cir. 1991), and United States v. Hernandez-
Palacios, 838 F.2d 1346, 1350 (5th Cir. 1988).
Defi	of “Commerce”, “Interstate Commerce”, and “Foreign Commerce” are found in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41.

Definitions of “Knowingly” and “Willfully” are found in Instruc- tion Nos. 1.37 and 1.38.

Intrastate use of certain facilities of interstate commerce has been found to provide the necessary interstate commerce nexus for purposes of § 1952 and the related “murder-for-hire” statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1958 (formerly 18 U.S.C. § 1952A). See, e.g., United States v. Nader, 542 F.3d 713, 717–20 (9th Cir. 2008) (intrastate telephone call satisfied § 1952); United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310, 316–22 (5th Cir. 2001) (intrastate wire transfer satisfi
§ 1958); United States v. Heacock, 31 F.3d 249, 254–55 (5th Cir.
1994) (intrastate mailing satisfied § 1952).
There is no requirement that the interstate travel or use of in- terstate facilities be essential to the scheme. It is enough if the in- terstate travel or use of interstate facilities made the unlawful activity easier. See United States v. Garrett, 716 F.2d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 1983); United States v. Pecora, 693 F.2d 421, 423 (5th Cir.
1982); United States v. Perrin, 580 F.2d 730, 736 (5th Cir. 1978). Nor is it necessary for the defendant to have had knowledge of the use of interstate facilities or specifi   intend to use the inter- state facilities. Perrin, 580 F.2d at 737; see also United States v. Edelman, 873 F.2d 791, 794–95 (5th Cir. 1989) (construing former
18 U.S.C. § 1952A, currently 18 U.S.C. § 1958).

“Unlawful activity” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1952(b). The ap- propriate one(s) should be specified and addressed, as necessary, in the instructions provided to the jury.

2.74	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
For purposes of § 1952(b), satisfying the “business enterprise” aspect of “unlawful activity” requires a “continuous course of busi- ness – one that already exists as of the time of the overt act or is intended thereafter. Evidence of an isolated criminal act, or even sporadic acts, will not suffice.” United States v. Roberson, 6 F.3d 1088, 1094–95 (5th Cir. 1993). The government need not prove, however, that the defendant personally engaged in a continuous course of conduct; it is sufficient for the defendant to have simply participated in such conduct. See United States v. Ruiz, 987 F.2d 243, 251 (5th Cir. 1993).

In United States v. Clark, the court distinguished circum- stances in which government conduct taken solely for the purpose of ensuring the existence of an interstate nexus may provide the necessary interstate element from those in which it may not. 62 F.3d 110, 111–15 (5th Cir. 1995) (defendant's voluntary, interstate conduct taken in response to a government request provided inter- state element whereas unilateral conduct by government agent would not).

For purposes of the third element, the court in Hernandez- Palacios found that that defendant could not have committed “an act in furtherance of the unlawful activity subsequent to the act of travel since he was detained during the very act of travel.” Hernandez-Palacios, 838 F.2d at 1350 (defendant detained at El Paso, Texas border checkpoint in bus being utilized to transport marijuana from Mexico into the United States). The subsequent act need not itself be unlawful; rather, it need only make the unlawful activity easier. See United States v. Jones, 642 F.2d 909, 913 (5th Cir. 1981).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.75

ILLEGAL GAMBLING BUSINESS 18 U.S.C. § 1955

2.75

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1955, makes it a crime for anyone to conduct a gambling business that violates ——————————— (name state) law.
For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That fi or more persons, including the defendant, knowingly conducted [fi	[managed] [supervised] [directed] [owned] all or part of a gambling business, as charged;

Second: That such gambling business violated the laws of the state of ——————————— or some politi- cal subdivision thereof. ——————————— (specify prohibited activity, e.g., bookmaking) is against the laws of the state of ———————————; and
Third: That such gambling business was in sub- stantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days [had a gross revenue of $2,000 or more on any one day].

[“Bookmaking” is a form of gambling, and involves the business of establishing certain terms and condi- tions applicable to given bets or wagers, usually called a line or odds, and then accepting bets from customers on either side of the wagering proposition with a view toward making a profit not from betting itself, but from a percentage or commission collected from the bettors or customers for the privilege of placing the bets.]

The words “finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns” are all used in their ordinary sense and include

2.75	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
those who fi	manage, or supervise a business. The word “conduct” is a broader term and would include anyone working in the gambling business who is neces- sary or helpful to it, whether paid or unpaid, or has a voice in management, or a share in profits. A mere bet- tor or customer, however, would not be participating in the “conduct” of the business.

While it must be proved, as previously stated, that five or more people conducted, financed, or supervised an illegal gambling business that remained in substan- tially continuous operation for at least thirty days [had a gross revenue of at least $2,000 on any single day], it need not be shown that five or more people have been charged with an offense; nor that the same five people, including the defendant, owned, financed, or conducted such gambling business throughout a thirty-day period; nor that the defendant even knew the names or identi- ties of any given number of people who might have been so involved. Neither must it be proved that bets were accepted every day over a thirty-day period, nor that such activity constituted the primary business or employment of the defendant.
Note

For cases that set forth the elements of the offense, see United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 330, 332 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Threadgill, 172 F.3d 357, 372–73 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Heacock, 31 F.3d 249, 251–54 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Follin, 979 F.2d 369, 371–73 (5th Cir. 1992); and United States v.
Tucker, 638 F.2d 1292, 1294–98 (5th Cir. 1981).

18 U.S.C. § 1955 is not a specific intent crime. Davis, 690 F.3d at 340. Thus, intent to violate federal law is not a necessary ele- ment of the crime, nor is intent to violate state law. United States
v. Hawes, 529 F.2d 472, 481 (5th Cir. 1976) (“It is sufficient that appellants intended to do all of the acts prohibited by the statute and proceeded to do them.”).
The government need not prove that the defendant himself performed any act prohibited by state law; the focus is on the ille- gal nature of the gambling business, which the government must

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.75

prove the defendant “conducted,” financed,” etc. under § 1955(a). Sanabria v. United States, 98 S. Ct. 2170, 2182 (1978) (“It is participation in the gambling business that is a federal off
and it is only the gambling business that must violate state law
. . . . [P]articipation in a single gambling business is but a single off	no matter how many state statutes the enterprise violated.”); see also Hawes, 529 F.2d at 478 (holding that the defendants themselves need not engage in illegal gambling in or- der to operate a gambling business).

Although a mere bettor or customer does not participate in the “conduct” of the business for purposes of § 1955, a bookmaker who regularly exchanges line information or places/accepts layoff bets with another bookmaker may fall under the statute. See United States v. Box, 530 F.2d 1258, 1265–67 (5th Cir. 1976) (“[T]he regu- lar direct exchange of lay off bets and line information can connect otherwise independent gambling operations, which alone would be illegal under state but not federal law (because less than fi participants were involved), into one business.”). See id. for a detailed discussion of factors the Fifth Circuit considers in determining whether an exchange of lay off bets is enough to link two separate bookmaking operations into one business for the purposes of meeting the § 1955 jurisdictional requirement of five participants in one business.

A conviction can be sustained only on the basis of a violation of the specifi state prohibition alleged in the government's indictment. See United States v. Truesdale, 152 F.3d 443, 447 (5th Cir. 1998) (where indictment alleged only bookmaking under Texas gambling statute, none of the provision's remaining four prohibi- tions could form basis of conviction).

An indictment under this section is not defective for failure to allege that the off had a substantial eff on interstate commerce. See Threadgill, 172 F.3d at 372–73.

The “violation of the law of a State” element is satisfi by conducting a gambling business without a license in a state where the gambling activity charged has been made legal subject to state regulation and the requirement that a state license be obtained. See United States v. Stewart, 205 F.3d 840, 841–44 (5th Cir. 2000) (rejecting defendant's argument that the Mississippi Gaming Control Act's prohibition of unlicensed bookmaking was regulatory rather than criminal and thus that a violation thereof does not satisfy the “violation of the law of a State” requirement of § 1955). Also, considering that “bookmaking” is defi by state law, it would seem advisable for the district court to check this definition against the relevant state statute. See, e.g., Tex. Penal Code

2.75	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§ 47.01(2). It is the gambling business that must violate state law—not the individual acts of a particular defendant. Sanabria, 98 S. Ct. at 2182.

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2.76A

2.76A

LAUNDERING MONETARY INSTRUMENTS— PROCEEDS OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(1), makes it a crime for anyone to conduct [attempt to conduct] a fi	transaction with the proceeds of specified unlawful activity, knowing that the property involved represents the proceeds of some form of illegal activity with the intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity [knowing that the transac- tion is designed to conceal or disguise the nature, loca- tion, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly conducted [at- tempted to conduct] a financial transaction;

Second: That the financial transaction [attempted financial transaction] involved the proceeds of a speci- fied unlawful activity, namely ——————————— (de- scribe the specified unlawful activity);

Third: That the defendant knew that the property involved in the fi	transaction represented the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity; and

Fourth: That the defendant intended to promote the carrying on of the specified unlawful activity.

[Fourth: That the defendant knew that the transac- tion was designed in whole or in part to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of the specifi unlawful activity.]

2.76	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
With respect to the second element, the govern- ment must show that, in fact, the property was the proceeds of ————— (describe specifi unlawful activ- ity), which is a specifi unlawful activity under the statute.

With respect to the third element, the government must prove that the defendant knew that the property involved in the transaction were the proceeds of some kind of crime that is a felony under federal, state, or foreign law; although, it is not necessary to show that the defendant knew exactly what crime generated the funds. I instruct you that ——————————— is a felony.

The term “transaction” includes a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery or other disposition [with respect to a financial institution, a deposit, with- drawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of cur- rency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certifi of deposit, or other monetary instrument] [any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by whatever means effected].

The term “fi	transaction” includes any “transaction,” as that term has just been defi [choose the first or second option below:

1.	which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce, involving the movement of funds by wire or other means, one or more monetary instru- ments, or the transfer of title to any real property, vehi- cle, vessel, or aircraft; or

2.	which involves the use of a financial institution that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, in- terstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree.]

[If necessary, include the defi	of “monetary

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

instruments,” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(5), or “fi institutions,” 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(6).]

2.76A

It is not necessary for the government to show that the defendant actually intended or anticipated an effect on interstate commerce by his actions or that commerce was actually affected. All that is necessary is that the natural and probable consequence of the acts the defendant took would be to affect interstate commerce. If you decide that there would be any effect at all on in- terstate commerce, then that is enough to satisfy this element. The effect can be minimal.

The term “conduct” includes initiating or conclud- ing, or participating in initiating or concluding, a transaction.

The term “proceeds” means any property derived from or obtained or retained, directly or indirectly, through some form of unlawful activity, including the gross receipts of such activity.
Note

The most commonly charged money laundering statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1956, consists of three subsections. Subsection (a)(1) (to which this instruction applies) covers domestic financial transac- tions; subsection (a)(2) covers international transportations; and subsection (a)(3) (Instruction No. 2.76B) covers undercover investigations.

This charge applies to the two more frequently charged subsec- tions of § 1956(a)(1)–(a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i)—but would have to be adjusted for indictments charging other subsections of (a)(1). The difference between (a)(1)(A)(i) and (a)(1)(B)(i) is in the mens rea element. For subsection (a)(1)(A)(i), the mens rea is intent to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity (the “promo- tion” element). For subsection (a)(1)(B)(i), the mens rea is knowl- edge that the transaction was designed to conceal the proceeds of specified unlawful activity (the “designed to conceal” element).

The elements for an off charged under § 1956(a)(1) are discussed in United States v. Valdez, 726 F.3d 684, 689 (5th Cir.

2.76A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2013); United States v. Pennell, 409 F.3d 240, 243 (5th Cir. 2005);
and United States v. Rivera, 295 F.3d 461, 468 (5th Cir. 2002). The elements for an offense charged under § 1956(a)(2), which criminal- izes certain kinds of transportation, are discussed in Cuellar v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1994, 2002 (2008).

The definition of “proceeds” was amended by Congress in 2009 in reaction to United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020, 2025 (2008). See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(9).
The judge must determine that the charged “specified unlaw- ful activity” is actually one covered by 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(c)(7)(A)– (F), and that the charged “some form of unlawful activity” is actu- ally a felony under federal, state, or foreign law.

For a case establishing that a financial transaction involved the proceeds of a specifi unlawful activity, see United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1191 (5th Cir. 1997) (evidence that defendant's cash fl exceeded his legitimate income, together with evidence of defendant's extensive drug dealing, is sufficient to show that the transaction involved the proceeds of specified unlaw- ful activity). “Money does not become the proceeds of illegal activ- ity until the unlawful activity is complete.” United States v. Harris, 666 F.3d 905, 909 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the mere payment of the purchase price for drugs does not constitute money laundering).

For a discussion of the element “knowingly attempting to conduct a financial transaction,” see United States v. Delgado, 256 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting that the element can be proven even if the defendant has not personally handled the funds in question).

For a useful discussion of the scienter element, “knowing that the property involved represents the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity,” see United States v. Ogle, 328 F.3d 182, 187 n.3 (5th Cir. 2003) (“A conviction for money laundering does not require that the defendant know the precise source of the illegal funds, but only that the defendant know that the funds are ‘proceeds of some form of illegal activity.’ ’’) (emphasis in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)).
For  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  promotion  element  of
§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), see United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Essentially, the government must show the trans- action at issue was conducted with the intent to promote the car- rying on of a specified unlawful activity.”); United States v. Miles, 360 F.3d 472, 477–79 (5th Cir. 2004) (reversing convictions of busi- ness principals when payments represent customary costs of run-

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2.76A

ning legal business versus payments that promote illegal money laundering with ill-gotten gains); United States v. Valuck, 286 F.3d 221, 225–28 (5th Cir. 2002) (subscribing to broad interpretation of word “promote”); and United States v. Dovalina, 262 F.3d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 2001) (evidence of promotion sufficient where defendant used proceeds of drug traffi	to purchase barrels to ship marijuana and to pay for cellular phone bills and airfare related to his drug distribution business).

The Cuellar Court considered the “designed to conceal” ele- ment under § 1956(a)(2)(B), and held that the government need not show that the defendant's acts created the appearance of legit- imate wealth or converted dirty money into clean. Cuellar, 128 S. Ct. at 2000. However, the Court added that “merely hiding the funds during transportation is not sufficient to violate the statute, even if substantial eff have been expended to conceal the money.” Id. at 2003. The Court noted a distinction between conceal- ing something to transport it, and transporting something to conceal it. Id. at 2005. In other words, “how one moves the money is distinct from why one moves the money.” Id. The Court found that the defendant in the case was hiding the money to transport it, but no evidence indicated that he was transporting the money to conceal the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the money. Id. “[A] conviction under this provision requires proof that the purpose—not merely the effect—of the transportation was to conceal or disguise” the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the illegal proceeds. Id. See United States v. Brown, 553 F.3d 768, 786–87 (5th Cir. 2008) (applying Cuellar's statutory in- terpretation of § 1956(a)(2)(B) to § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)), and United States v. Demmitt, 706 F.3d 665, 678–79 (5th Cir. 2013), for a detailed discussion of the “designed to conceal” element. See also United States v. Cessa, 2015 WL 2151831 (5th Cir. May 7, 2015) (district court abused its discretion by giving the jury a mandatory presumption commingling instruction).

Also, for a defendant charged with conspiracy to commit a violation of § 1956(a)(1), the “defendant need not have specifically intended to conceal or disguise the proceeds of the unlawful activ- ity” as “[i]t is sufficient for the defendant merely to be aware of the perpetrator's intent to conceal or disguise the nature or source of the funds.” United States v. Adair, 436 F.3d 520, 524 (5th Cir. 2006). For a further detailed analysis of § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)'s alterna- tive fourth element, i.e., the “conceal or disguise” requirement, see United States v. Griffin, 324 F.3d 330, 351 (5th Cir. 2003).
With respect to the interstate commerce aspect, the govern- ment need only show a slight link to interstate or foreign com-

2.76A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
merce because § 1956 regulates conduct that, in the aggregate, has a substantial effect on such commerce. See Westbrook, 119 F.3d at 1191; see also United States v. Ogba, 526 F.3d 214, 239 (5th Cir.
2008).

For a case involving a transaction that does not involve a fi	institution or its facilities, see United States v. Garza, 118 F.3d 278, 284–85 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that when some “transaction” does not involve a financial institution or its facili- ties, the government must show a “disposition” took place, i.e., a placing elsewhere or a giving over to the care or possession of another). The Fifth Circuit has rejected a defendant's argument that storing funds given to him by a co-conspirator and later returning the funds was not a “disposition” sufficient to constitute a transaction under § 1956. United States v. Holt, 493 F. App'x 515, 520 (5th Cir. 2012).

A jury instruction on conspiracy to commit money laundering, which described the substantive offense as involving both an intent to promote illegal activity and also to conceal or disguise the nature and source of the proceeds, was not plain error for failing to require the jury to unanimously agree on which of the two mental states the defendant possessed. See United States v. Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 571 (5th Cir. 2000), amended on reh'g in part by 244 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam), abrogated in part by United States v. Longoria, 298 F.3d 367 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). Similarly, a jury instruction on the substantive offense which did not require the jury to unanimously agree on which of the two mental states the defendant possessed was not plain error. See Valdez, 726 F.3d at 691–92.

A conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) does not require proof of an overt act in further- ance of the conspiracy. See Whitfield v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 687, 691 (2005); see also United States v. Guillermo Balleza, 613 F.3d 432, 433 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010). A conviction under § 1956(h) also does not require proof of the elements of the substantive offense under § 1956(a)(1). See United States v. Threadgill, 172 F.3d 357, 367 (5th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, although § 1956(a)(1) requires that the funds be actual proceeds of illegal activity, a defendant can be convicted of conspiracy to violate § 1956(a)(1) even if the funds were not actually proceeds of illegal activity, i.e., a sting operation. See Adair, 436 F.3d at 525–26.
Use Instruction Nos. 1.32, 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41 on Attempt, In- terstate Commerce, Foreign Commerce, and Commerce, respectively.

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2.76B

2.76B

LAUNDERING MONETARY INSTRUMENTS— PROPERTY REPRESENTED TO BE PROCEEDS OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY
18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(3)(A) AND 1956(a)(3)(B)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1956(a)(3), makes it a crime for anyone to conduct [attempt to conduct] a fi	transaction involving property represented to be the proceeds of specifi unlawful activity to promote the carrying on of specified unlawful activity [to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or control of the proceeds of specified unlawful activity].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly conducted [at- tempted to conduct] a financial transaction;

Second: That the financial transaction [attempted financial transaction] involved property represented to be the proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, namely
——————————— (describe the specifi	unlawful activity); and

Third: That the defendant intended to promote the carrying on of a specified unlawful activity.

[Third: That the defendant intended to conceal or disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, or the control of property believed to be the proceeds of a speci- fied unlawful activity.]

The term “transaction” includes a purchase, sale, loan, pledge, gift, transfer, delivery or other disposition [with respect to a financial institution, a deposit, with- drawal, transfer between accounts, exchange of cur-

2.76	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
rency, loan, extension of credit, purchase or sale of any stock, bond, certifi of deposit, or other monetary instrument] [any other payment, transfer, or delivery by, through, or to a financial institution, by whatever means effected].

The term “fi	transaction” includes any “transaction,” as that term has just been defi [choose the first or second option below:

1.	which in any way or degree affects interstate or foreign commerce, involving the movement of funds by wire or other means, one or more monetary instru- ments, or the transfer of title to any real property, vehi- cle, vessel, or aircraft; or

2.	which involves the use of a financial institution that is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, in- terstate or foreign commerce in any way or degree.]

It is not necessary for the government to show that the defendant actually intended or anticipated an effect on interstate commerce by his actions or that commerce was actually affected. All that is necessary is that the natural and probable consequence of the acts the defendant took would be to affect interstate commerce. If you decide that there would be any effect at all on in- terstate commerce, then that is enough to satisfy this element. The effect can be minimal.

The term “conduct” includes initiating or conclud- ing, or participating in initiating or concluding, a transaction.

The term “represented” means any representation made by a law enforcement officer or by another person at the direction of, or with the approval of, a federal of- ficial authorized to investigate or prosecute violations of this section. The evidence need not show that the property involved was expressly described as being the

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.76B

proceeds of specified unlawful activity at or before each transaction. It is suffi    if the government proves that the officers made enough representations to cause a reasonable person to understand that the property involved in the transaction[s] was the proceeds of
——————————— (describe specified unlawful activ- ity), which is the specified unlawful activity named in the indictment.

The term “proceeds” includes any property, or any interest in property, that one would acquire or retain as a result of the commission of the underlying speci- fied unlawful activity. Proceeds can be any kind of prop- erty, not just money.
Note

The most commonly charged money laundering statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1956, consists of three subsections. Subsection (a)(1) (Instruction No. 2.76A) covers domestic fi	transactions; subsection (a)(2) covers international transportations; and subsec- tion (a)(3) (to which this Instruction applies) covers undercover investigations.
This foregoing charge applies to two subsections of § 1956(a)(3), but would have to be adjusted for indictments charging a violation of § 1956(a)(3)(C). Also, this charge contemplates a representation of “proceeds,” which covers the vast majority of cases. The charge must be adjusted if the representation was that the property was “used to conduct or facilitate” specifi unlawful activity. This charge deals with cases of undercover “sting” operations, where the government represents that the property is the proceeds of specifi unlawful activity. See United States v. Adair, 436 F.3d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 2006).
For a discussion of the elements of a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1956(a)(3), see United States v. Castaneda-Cantu, 20 F.3d 1325, 1330 (5th Cir. 1994).
The judge must determine that the charged “specified unlaw- ful activity” is actually one covered by 18 U.S.C. §§ 956(c)(7)(A)– (F). The charged specified unlawful activity in the second element can be diff	from that in the third element, at least in a
§ 1956(a)(3)(A) case.
If a money laundering prosecution is based on a “conceal or

2.76	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
disguise” theory, the government need not show that defendant's acts created the appearance of legitimate wealth or converted dirty money into clean. See Cuellar v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1994, 2000 (2008) (“Although this element does not require proof that the defendant attempted to create the appearance of legitimate wealth, neither can it be satisfi solely by evidence that a defendant concealed the funds during their transport.”).

Law enforcement agents do not have to make express represen- tations that the funds to be laundered were proceeds of specified unlawful activity; it is enough that the officer or other authorized person made the defendant aware of circumstances from which a reasonable person would infer that the property was drug proceeds. See Casteneda-Cantu, 20 F.3d at 1331 (“[W]hen evaluating the representations made by law enforcement agents, language used by a law enforcement agent that might be ambiguous to a person unfamiliar with illicit activity may not be ambiguous to a person involved in an illicit activity.”).

With respect to the interstate commerce aspect, the govern- ment need only show a slight link to interstate or foreign com- merce because § 1956 regulates conduct that, in the aggregate, has a substantial eff on such commerce. See United States v. Westbrook, 119 F.3d 1176, 1191 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United
States v. Ogba, 526 F.3d 214, 239 (5th Cir. 2008).

See also Instruction Nos. 1.32, 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41 on Attempt, Interstate Commerce, Foreign Commerce, and Commerce, respectively.

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2.77

2.77

ENGAGING IN MONETARY TRANSACTIONS IN PROPERTY DERIVED FROM SPECIFIED UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY
18 U.S.C. § 1957

Title 18, United State Code, Section 1957, makes it a crime for a person to knowingly engage in, or attempt to engage in, a monetary transaction involving crimi- nally derived property, in excess of $10,000, that is derived from specified criminal activity.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: that the defendant knowingly engaged [at- tempted to engage] in a monetary transaction;

Second: that the monetary transaction was of a value greater than $10,000;

Third: that the monetary transaction involved criminally derived property;

Fourth: that criminally derived  property was derived from specified unlawful activity;

Fifth: that the defendant knew that the monetary transaction involved criminally derived property; and

Sixth: that the monetary transaction took place within the United States [the special maritime and ter- ritorial jurisdiction of the United States.]

[Sixth: that the monetary transaction took place outside the United States and the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States but the defendant is a United States person.]

2.77	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The term “criminally derived property” means any property constituting or derived from, proceeds obtained from a criminal offense.

The government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that the offense from which the “crimi- nally derived property” was derived constituted “specific unlawful activity” as defi  by the statute creating this offense. The government must prove, however, that the defendant knew that the involved property was obtained or derived from the commission of a crime.
Note

The definition of “monetary transaction” is found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957(f), which adopts by reference the defi	of “fi institution” found in 18 U.S.C. § 1956. An appropriate definition of these terms, considering the particular allegations of the indict- ment or bill of information, should be provided.

The definitions of “specified unlawful activity” and “proceeds” are found in 18 U.S.C. § 1957(f), which adopts the meanings given to those terms in 18 U.S.C. § 1956. An appropriate defi	of “specified unlawful activity,” considering the particular allegations of the indictment or bill of information, should be provided.

The definition of “United States person” is found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1957(d)(2), which adopts the meaning given to that term in 18
U.S.C. § 3077 (except that the class of persons described in paragraph (2)(D) of § 3077 is excluded). An appropriate definition of the term, considering the particular allegations of the indict- ment or bill of information, should be provided.
“Knowingly” is defined in Instruction No. 1.37.

Under § 1957(c), there is no requirement that the government prove that the defendant knew that the off from which the criminally derived property was derived was “specifi unlawful activity,” as defi       by § 1957 (incorporating the defi	set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1956). See United States v Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1513 (5th Cir. 1996).

See United States v. Fuchs, 467 F.3d 889, 907 (5th Cir. 2006), regarding elements of the offense and discussing financial transac- tions involving an account in which “clean” and “tainted” funds have been commingled.

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2.77

See United States v. Davis, 226 F.3d 346, 356 (5th Cir. 2000)
and United States v. Allen, 76 F.3d 1348, 1360–62 (5th Cir. 1996), regarding when a scheme is deemed to have produced “proceeds.”

2.78	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.78

VIOLENT CRIMES IN AID OF RACKETEERING 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1959(a), makes it a crime for anyone to commit, threaten to com- mit, attempt to commit, or conspire to commit a violent crime in aid of an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the enterprise existed as alleged in the indictment;

Second: That the enterprise was engaged in inter- state [foreign] commerce or that its activities affected interstate [foreign] commerce;

Third: That the enterprise was engaged in rack- eteering activity;

Fourth: That the defendant committed [threatened to commit] [attempted to commit] [conspired to commit] the following crime[s] of violence (specify crime[s] of violence). I will [have already] instruct[ed] you on what the government must prove to establish that the defendant committed this [these] act[s]; and

[If the violent crime(s) are not charged in separate counts, instructions on the elements of each crime will need to be given as part of this VICAR charge.]

Fifth: That the defendant's purpose in committing [threatening to commit] [attempting to commit] [con- spiring to commit] the crime[s] of violence was to gain entrance to, or to maintain, or to increase his position in the enterprise [as consideration for the receipt of, or

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.78

as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from the enterprise].

[If the purpose  is to  “gain entrance  to, or  to maintain, or to increase his position in the enterprise,” include the following language: It is not necessary for the government to prove that this was the sole purpose of the defendant in committing the charged crime. You need only find that it was a substantial purpose, or that the defendant committed the charged crime as an inte- gral aspect of membership in the enterprise. In deter- mining the defendant's purpose in committing the al- leged crime, you must determine what he had in mind. Because you cannot look into a person's mind, you have to determine purpose by considering all of the facts and circumstances before you.]

An “enterprise” includes any partnership, corpora- tion, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.

Although the enterprise must be separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity in which the enterprise allegedly engaged, it is not necessary to find that the enterprise had some function wholly unre- lated to the racketeering activity. The enterprise must be proved to have been an ongoing organization, formal or informal, that functioned as a continuing unit.

The enterprise is “engaged in interstate [foreign] commerce” if it directly engaged in the production, dis- tribution, or acquisition of goods or services in such commerce. The enterprise's conduct “aff	inter- state [foreign] commerce if the conduct had a demon- strated connection or link with such commerce.

It is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendant knew or intended that the enterprise

2.78	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
was engaged in commerce or that its conduct would af- fect commerce. It is only necessary that the natural consequences of the enterprise's conduct affected com- merce in some way. Only a minimal effect on commerce is necessary.

“Racketeering activity” means the commission of certain crimes, including ——— (insert crime[s] alleged as racketeering activities in the indictment, e.g., narcot- ics trafficking), in violation of ————— (insert statute of crime, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846).

There must be some nexus between the enterprise and the racketeering activity being conducted by members and/or associates of the enterprise.

[Insert instructions on the elements of each rack- eteering activity.]
Note

For a discussion of the elements of this off see United States v. Smith, 413 F.3d 1253, 1277 (10th Cir. 2005), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Hutchinson, 573 F.3d 1011, 1021 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Hinojosa, 463 F. App'x 432, 449 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Stinson, 647 F.3d 1196, 1204 (9th Cir. 2011)); and United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 842 (9th Cir. 1994).

“Enterprise” is defi in 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2); Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2243–46 (2009); and United States
v. Turkette, 101 S. Ct. 2524, 2528–29 (1981). While the definition provided in § 1959 is substantially the same as that provided in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961, there are two notable diff	between the two definitions. First, § 1961, unlike § 1959, includes “any individ- ual” in its list of possible legal entities that may make up an enterprise. Second, in § 1959, the commerce requirement is included in the enterprise definition; whereas, in RICO, the com- merce requirement “appears in each of the sections stating substantive prohibitions of activities with respect to enterprises.” United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 380–81 (2d Cir. 1992); see United States v. King, 850 F. Supp. 750, 751 (C.D. Ill. 1994), aff sub nom. United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326 (7th Cir. 1996).

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2.78

The above instruction provides the required elements with the minimum additional information needed to assist the jury in understanding those elements. If the district judge or the attorneys deem it necessary, the following language may be inserted to explain further the element of “enterprise”:

An enterprise is a group of people who have associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct over a period of time. The personnel of the enterprise, however, may change and need not be associated with the enterprise for the entire period alleged in the indictment. Therefore, the government must prove the existence of an association-in-fact enterprise by ev- idence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evi- dence that the various associates functioned as a continuing unit. The enterprise must have the three following structural features:
(1) a purpose; (2) relationships among those associated with the enterprise; and (3) longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise's purpose. The name of the organization itself is not an element of the off and does not have to be proved. The government need not prove that the enterprise had any particular organizational structure.

The group need not have a hierarchical structure or a “chain of command”; decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis and by any number of methods—by majority vote, consensus, a show of strength, etc. Members of the group need not have fixed roles; dif- ferent members may perform different roles at different times. The group need not have a name, regular meetings, dues, established rules and regulations, disciplinary procedures, or induction or ini- tiation ceremonies. While the group must function as a continuing unit and remain in existence long enough to pursue a course of conduct, you may nonetheless find that the enterprise element is satisfied by finding a group whose associates engage in spurts of activity punctuated by periods of quiescence [inactivity].

See Turkette, 101 S. Ct. at 2527.
The following language may be included in the first element to elaborate on the issue of whether the enterprise existed “separate and apart” from the alleged racketeering activity:
Common sense dictates that the existence of an association-in- fact enterprise is oftentimes more readily proven by what it does rather than by an abstract analysis of its structure. Thus, the evi- dence used to prove the racketeering activity and the enterprise may coalesce.

2.78	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
For definitions of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce,” see Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41.

See United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1732–33 (1995), for the definition of “engaging in” interstate commerce, and United States v. Delgado, 401 F.3d 290, 297 (5th Cir. 2005), for a discussion of “affecting” interstate commerce. The required nexus with interstate commerce is “minimal,” and instrumentalities of interstate commerce, including pagers, telephones, and mobile phones, may be sufficient to affect interstate commerce. Delgado, 401 F.3d at 297 (citation omitted).
The crimes considered “racketeering activity” are listed in 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1).
There is no case law discussing unanimity as to the specifi type of racketeering activity committed by the enterprise with re- spect to a VICAR charge. Although required if the substantive RICO off	is charged, unanimity as to the specifi  predicate racketeering acts is not required for a RICO conspiracy charge. See United States v. Randall, 661 F.3d 1291, 1297–99 (10th Cir. 2011) (agreeing with the Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in hold- ing that unanimity as to the specific predicate racketeering acts is not required when a RICO conspiracy is charged, as long as the jury is unanimous on the type or types of racketeering activity).
The crimes of violence listed in § 1959(a) are murder, kidnap- ping, maiming, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault result- ing in serious bodily injury, threatening to commit a crime of violence against any individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United States, and attempting or conspiring to com- mit any such crime.

When the charge alleges an attempt or conspiracy to commit a crime of violence, include an appropriate instruction regarding ei- ther attempt or conspiracy in conjunction with the violent crime instruction. See Instruction Nos. 1.32, Attempt, and 2.15A, Conspiracy. Note that a conviction for conspiracy to violate 18
U.S.C. § 1959 does not require an overt act. See United States v. Pascacio-Rodriguez, 749 F.3d 353, 364 n.48 (5th Cir. 2014).
The government does not have to prove that maintaining or increasing position was the defendant's sole or principal motive. See United States v. Wilson, 116 F.3d 1066, 1078 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Concepcion, 983 F.2d at 381–82 (2d Cir. 1992)), vacated on other grounds sub nom. by United States v. Brown, 123 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1997). Maintenance or enhancement, however, must be a substantial purpose. See United States v. Banks, 514 F.3d 959, 965

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2.78

(9th Cir. 2008). “Murder while a gang member is not necessarily a murder for the purpose of maintaining or increasing position in a gang, even if it would have the effect of maintaining or increasing position in a gang.” Id. at 969 (emphasis in original). Further, this requirement is met if “the jury could properly infer that the defendant committed his violent crime because he knew it was expected of him by reason of his membership in the enterprise or that he committed it in furtherance of that membership.” See United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635, 671 (2d Cir. 2001).

2.79	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.79

RACKETEER INFLUENCED CORRUPT ORGANIZATIONS
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 1962(c), makes it a crime for anyone employed by or associated with an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce to conduct or to participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the aff of that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.
The defendant, —————, is charged in Count ——— with committing this crime from on or about —————, to on or about —————, in that the defendant is alleged to have ———————————.
For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant was a person employed by or associated with the enterprise charged;

Second: That the enterprise existed as alleged in the indictment.

An enterprise includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact, al- though not a legal entity. The term enterprise includes both legal and illegal associations. The enterprise must be separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity in which the defendant allegedly engaged. The enterprise must be proven to have been an ongoing or- ganization, formal or informal, that functioned as a continuing unit;

Third: That the defendant, either directly or indirectly, conducted or participated in the conduct of

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.79

the aff of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity.

The defendant must have participated in the opera- tion or management of the enterprise, but need not be a member of upper management. Racketeering activity includes the acts charged as separate crimes in Counts
———, ———, and ———. You have been instructed on what the government must prove to establish that the defendant committed these acts.

[If the predicate acts are not charged in separate counts, instructions on the elements of each racketeer- ing activity will need to be given as part of the rack- eteering charge.]

To prove a pattern of racketeering activity, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
(1) the acts of racketeering activity are related to each other, and (2) they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. To prove the racketeering acts are related to one another, the government must prove that the criminal conduct charged embraces crim- inal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commis- sion, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.

At a minimum, a pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten years of each other; provided, however, that the government proves the relationship and continuity of those acts as defined. All of you must be unanimous as to which racketeering acts you each believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed. Unless you are unanimous in fi	beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a racketeering act charged, you must disregard that act in deciding whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of racketeering. It is not sufficient that some of the jurors

2.79	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
find that the defendant committed two of the acts while others of you find that the defendant committed differ- ent acts.

The government must prove that the defendant, directly or indirectly through the pattern of racketeer- ing activity charged, conducted or participated in the conduct of the aff of the enterprise. To do so, the government must additionally demonstrate a relation- ship among the defendant, the pattern of racketeering activity, and the enterprise. The defendant and the enterprise cannot be the same. To prove that the defendant conducted or participated as alleged, the government must prove that the defendant in fact com- mitted the racketeering acts as alleged, the defendant's position in the enterprise facilitated his commission of the acts, and these acts had some effect on the enter- prise; and

Fourth: That the enterprise was engaged in inter- state [foreign] commerce or that its activities affected interstate [foreign] commerce.

The enterprise “engaged in commerce” if it directly engaged in the production, distribution, or acquisition of goods or services in interstate [foreign] commerce.

The enterprise's conduct “aff	interstate [foreign] commerce if the conduct had a demonstrated connection or link with such commerce.

It is not necessary for the government to prove that the defendant knew or intended that the enterprise was engaged in commerce or that its conduct would af- fect commerce. It is only necessary that the natural consequences of the enterprise's conduct affected com- merce in some way. Only a minimal effect on commerce is necessary.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

Note

2.79

Defi	of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41.

The elements of this offense are discussed in United States v. Nieto, 721 F.3d 357, 365–66 (5th Cir. 2013); and United States v.
Delgado, 401 F.3d 290, 297 (5th Cir. 2005). For a discussion of “pattern of racketeering,” see H.J., Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 109 S. Ct. 2893, 2899–2903 (1989); In re Burzynski, 989 F.2d 733, 742–44
(5th Cir. 1993); and Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Illinois, 946 F.2d 1160, 1168 (5th Cir. 1991).

For a discussion of the definition of “enterprise,” see Boyle v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2237, 2244 (2009) (holding that while an association-in-fact enterprise must have structural features, it does not follow that a district court must use the term “structure” in its jury instructions).

A § 1962(d) RICO conspiracy allegation may involve consider- ations different from the typical conspiracy. See Salinas v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 469, 477–78 (1997); see also Delgado, 401 F.3d at
296; United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 773–74 (5th Cir. 1994);
United States v. Jensen, 41 F.3d 946, 956–57 (5th Cir. 1994); United
States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1341–45 (5th Cir. 1983).

See United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F.3d 1185, 1196–97 (5th Cir. 1996), aff , Salinas v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 469 (1997) (holding that a RICO conspirator need not agree personally to commit the pattern of racketeering activities but instead must simply agree to the objective of the RICO violation). See also Delgado, 401 F.3d at 296.

See United States v. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. 1732, 1733 (1995) (per curiam), for a definition of “engaging in” interstate commerce, and Delgado, 401 F.3d at 297, for a discussion of “affecting” inter- state commerce.

For a discussion on establishing the existence of two separate entities, a “person” and a distinct “enterprise” under § 1962(c), see Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 121 S. Ct. 2087 (2001). In King, the Supreme Court held that the “distinctness” principle under § 1962(c) requires no more than the formal legal distinction between “person” and “enterprise” (namely, incorporation). Id. at 2091. Therefore, the RICO provision applies when a corporate em- ployee unlawfully conducts the affairs of the corporation of which he is the sole owner—whether he conducts those affairs within the scope, or beyond the scope, of corporate authority. Id.; see also Abraham v. Singh, 480 F.3d 351, 357 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that

2.79	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
the RICO person, an individual employee of the corporation, was distinct from the RICO enterprise, the corporation itself); Whelan
v. Winchester Prod. Co., 319 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 2003) (no distinct enterprise where defendant corporation, in association with its officers and employees, allegedly committed predicate acts in the ordinary course of corporation's own business). A sole proprietorship may also be an “enterprise” under RICO so long as it is not a “one man show.” See Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, 954 F.2d 278 (5th Cir. 1992).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS
2.80A BANK ROBBERY
18 U.S.C. §§ 2113(a) and (d)

2.80A

Title 18, United States Code, Sections 2113(a) and 2113(d), make it a crime for anyone to take from a person [the presence of someone] by force and violence [by intimidation] any money [property] in the posses- sion of a federally insured bank [credit union] [savings and loan association], and in the process of so doing to assault any person [put in jeopardy the life of any person] by the use of a dangerous weapon or device.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant intentionally took from the person [the presence of another] money [property];

Second: That the money [property] belonged to or was in the possession of a federally insured bank, credit union, or savings and loan association at the time of the taking;

Third: That the defendant took the money [prop- erty] by means of force and violence [by means of intimidation]; and

Fourth: That the defendant assaulted some person [put in jeopardy the life of some person] by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, while engaged in taking the money [property].

A “federally insured bank” means any bank with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

[A “federally insured credit union” means any federal credit union and any state-chartered credit

2.80	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
union the accounts of which are insured by the National Credit Union Administration Board. A state-chartered credit union includes a credit union chartered under the laws of a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any commonwealth, territory, or posses- sion of the United States.]

[A “federally insured savings and loan association” means any savings and loan association the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.]

[To take “by means of intimidation” is to say or do something in such a way that a person of ordinary sensibilities would be fearful of bodily harm. It is not necessary to prove that the alleged victim was actually frightened, and neither is it necessary to show that the behavior of the defendant was so violent that it was likely to cause terror, panic, or hysteria. However, a taking would not be by “means of intimidation” if the fear, if any, resulted from the alleged victim's own ti- midity rather than some intimidating conduct on the part of the defendant. The essence of the offense is the taking of money or property accompanied by intentional, intimidating behavior on the part of the defendant.]

[An “assault” may be committed without actually striking or injuring another person. An assault occurs whenever one person makes a threat to injure someone else and also has an apparent, present ability to carry out the threat such as by brandishing or pointing a dangerous weapon or device at the other.]

A “dangerous weapon or device” includes anything capable of being readily operated or wielded by one person to inflict severe bodily harm or injury upon an- other person.

[To “put in jeopardy the life of any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device” means to expose

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.80A

someone else to a risk of death by the use of a danger- ous weapon or device.]
Note

Richardson v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1707, 1710 (1999),
United States v. Dentler, 492 F.3d 306, 309–10 (5th Cir. 2007),
United States v. Burton, 425 F.3d 1008, 1010–11 (5th Cir. 2005),
and United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1997), list the elements of the offense, breaking them down differently than this instruction but including the same information.
The statute creates various methods of committing the offense. Care must be taken in adapting the instruction to the allegations of the indictment. See United States v. Bizzard, 615 F.2d 1080, 1081–82 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that the district court committed reversible error in including instruction on assault in connection with bank robbery when assault was not charged in the indictment). This instruction also presupposes that the indictment charges a violation of subsections (a) and (d) in the same count. If a subsection (d) violation is not alleged, the fourth element and its corresponding definitions would be deleted. Also, when a violation of subsections (a) and (d) is alleged in one count, the jury should be instructed in an appropriate case that a violation of subsection
(a) alone, i.e., the first three elements above, is a lesser included offense of the alleged violation of subsections (a) and (d) combined, i.e., all four elements. See Instruction No. 1.33 on Lesser Included Offense. On the other hand, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b), bank theft, is not a lesser included offense of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), bank robbery. See Carter v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2159 (2000) (distinguishing be- tween the elements of a § 2113(a) offense and a § 2113(b) offense). Likewise, possession of stolen bank property, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(c), is not a lesser included offense of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). See United States v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149 (5th Cir. 1993).
According to the Fifth Circuit, a dangerous weapon for purposes of this statute includes “an object reasonably perceived to be a dangerous weapon.” United States v. Ferguson, 211 F.3d 878, 883 (5th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, in the same case, the Fifth Circuit stated that “[a] robber who does not display a dangerous weapon or an ostensibly dangerous weapon or device cannot be found guilty of aggravated bank robbery under § 2113(d) unless the evidence establishes that he had a concealed weapon and that he used it in the course of the bank robbery.” Id. (holding that al- though the defendant did not show a dangerous weapon, evidence supported conviction for aggravated robbery under the theory that he used a concealed weapon in the course of robbery).
For cases dealing with “intimidation,” see United States v.

2.80A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Valentine, 439 F. App'x 309 (5th Cir. 2011), United States v. Baker, 17 F.3d 94 (5th Cir. 1994), and United States v. McCarty, 36 F.3d
1349 (5th Cir. 1994).
The definitions of “federally insured credit union” and “feder- ally insured savings and loan association” are based on definitions found in 18 U.S.C. § 2113(g)–(h).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS
2.80B BANK THEFT
18 U.S.C. § 2113(b)

2.80B

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2113(b), makes it a crime for anyone to take and carry away, with intent to steal or purloin, any property or money or any other thing of value exceeding $1,000 belonging to or in the care, custody, control, management, or pos- session of any federally insured bank [credit union] [savings and loan association].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant took and carried away money [property] [a thing of value] belonging to [in the care, custody, control, management, possession of]
——————————— (name bank, credit union, or in- sured savings and loan association);

Second: That at that time ——————————— (name bank, credit union, or insured savings and loan association), a bank [credit union] [savings and loan as- sociation] had its deposits insured by the Federal De- posit Insurance Corporation;

Third: That the defendant took and carried away such money [property] [thing of value] with the intent to steal; and

Fourth: That such money [property] [thing of value] exceeded $1,000 in value.

A “federally insured bank” means any bank with deposits insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.

[A “federally insured credit union” means any

2.80	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
federal credit union and any state-chartered credit union the accounts of which are insured by the National Credit Union Administration Board. A state-chartered credit union includes a credit union chartered under the laws of a state of the United States, the District of Columbia, or any commonwealth, territory, or posses- sion of the United States.]

[A “federally insured savings and loan association” means any savings and loan association the deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.]
Note
A “hot” check can constitute a violation of § 2113(b) if there is sufficient evidence, other than the bad check itself, to prove intent to steal. See United States v. Aguilar, 967 F.2d 111, 114–15 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Khamis, 674 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1982), and explaining that a “hot” check can constitute a violation of § 641 as long as the prosecution proves that the defendant did not intend to honor the check when he wrote it).
The conduct and expectations of a defendant and his associ- ates can be considered in determining value. See United States v. Hooten, 933 F.2d 293, 297 (5th Cir. 1991) (upholding conviction upon concluding that reasonable trier of fact could have found that the value of a nonnegotiable note for $1.5 million owed to a credit union exceeded the minimum statutory value of $1,000, consider- ing that the defendant attempted to sell the note for $150,000).

Bank theft under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) requires a specific intent to steal or purloin. See United States v. Daniels, 252 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Carter v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2159 (2000)). A defendant has the requisite intent under § 2113(b) if he enters a bank with no intent to commit a crime but thereafter develops an intent to steal. See United States v. Jones, 993 F.2d 58, 61 (5th Cir. 1993).

In Bell v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2398, 2401–02 (1983), the Supreme Court upheld the defendant's conviction for depositing another's check into his account and later withdrawing funds, explaining that § 2113(b) is not limited to common law larceny, but also proscribes obtaining money under false pretenses.
For a definition of “steal,” see Instruction No. 2.27, 18 U.S.C.
§ 641, Theft of Government Money or Property.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.80B

18 U.S.C. § 2113(b) is not a lesser included offense of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2113(a). See Carter, 120 S. Ct. at 2165–68 (distinguishing be- tween the elements of a § 2113(a) offense and a § 2113(b) offense).
If whether the property stolen had a value of more than $1,000 is disputed, the court should consider giving Instruction No. 1.33, Lesser Included Offense.

2.81	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.81

CARJACKING 18 U.S.C. § 2119

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2119, makes it a crime for anyone to take [attempt to take] a motor vehicle that has been transported in interstate [foreign] commerce from a person [the presence of someone] by force and violence [by intimidation] with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant intentionally took [at- tempted to take] from a person [presence of another] a motor vehicle described in the indictment;

Second: That the motor vehicle had been trans- ported in interstate [foreign] commerce;

Third: That the defendant did so by means of force and violence [intimidation];

Fourth: That the defendant intended to cause death or serious bodily harm; and

Fifth: That the defendant possessed such intent when he took [attempted to take] the victim's vehicle.

[Sixth: That serious bodily injury [death] resulted.]

[Serious bodily injury means bodily injury which involves (A) a substantial risk of death; or (B) extreme physical pain; or (C) protracted and obvious disfigure- ment; or (D) protracted loss or impairment of the func- tion of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty.]

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

Note

2.81

18 U.S.C. § 2119 describes three possible separate off depending on the outcome: a carjacking in which (1) neither a seri- ous injury nor a death occurs; (2) a serious injury occurs; or (3) a death occurs. In the latter two instances, the outcomes are ele- ments of the offense and must be charged in the indictment and presented to the jury. See Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1215 (1999) (reversing conviction where jury was instructed only on ele- ments of § 2119(1) and judge sentenced defendant to 25 years under § 2119(2)). The carjacking statute specifi	refers to 18
U.S.C. § 1365 for the definition of “serious bodily injury.”
Like other circuits, the Fifth Circuit defines “presence of an- other” broadly to encompass situations where the victim may be some distance from his or her vehicle, even inside a building. See United States v. Edwards, 231 F.3d 933, 937 (5th Cir. 2000) (ap- plying definition of “presence” used in robbery statutes to uphold conviction where victim was 15 feet away from vehicle because a reasonable jury could infer that the victim was close enough that he could have prevented his car being taken had he not been in fear for his safety); United States v. Servarese, 385 F.3d 15, 20 (1st Cir. 2004) (“In the carjacking context courts have required the victim to have both a degree of physical proximity to the vehicle and an ability to control or immediately obtain access to the vehicle.”); United States v. Lopez, 271 F.3d 472, 486 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the “presence” requirement of the carjacking statute was satisfi when the victims were attacked and beaten inside their house and keys to a van parked outside the house were taken); United States v. Moore, 198 F.3d 793, 797 (10th Cir. 1999) (upholding conviction where defendants took keys from the victim inside a bank, and the car was in the parking lot outside the bank); United States v. Kimble, 178 F.3d 1163, 1168 (11th Cir. 1999) (upholding conviction where defendants took the keys from the victim in the restaurant, and the car was parked outside the restaurant).
With respect to the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, the Supreme Court has held that the element is fulfi even if the intent is conditional, that is, the defendant intended to do such harm only if the vehicle was not relinquished. See Hollo- way v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 966, 974 (1999). However, the defendant must possess the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury at the precise moment he demanded or took control of the car by force, violence, or intimidation. See United States v. Harris, 420 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Frye,
489 F.3d 201, 208–09 (5th Cir. 2007).
In Ramirez-Burgos v. United States, 313 F.3d 23, 30, n.9 (1st

2.81	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Cir. 2002), the court stated “[w]e do not here set forth the temporal limits of a carjacking under section 2119. But we reaffirm, without hesitation, that the commission of a carjacking continues at least while the carjacker maintains control over the victim in her car.”
Defi	of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41.

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2.82A

2.82A

SEXUAL ABUSE—THREATS OR FEAR 18 U.S.C. § 2242(1)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2242(1), makes it a crime for anyone to cause another person to engage in a sexual act by threatening or placing that person in fear.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: The defendant knowingly caused ——— (name of alleged victim) to engage in a sexual act by threaten- ing or placing ————— (name of alleged victim) in fear; and

Second: The off was committed within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States [a federal prison] [a prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direc- tion of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the head of any federal department or agency].

The term “sexual act” means: (A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus; (B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus; (C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital open- ing of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or (D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.

2.82	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Note

The term “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7.
This instruction requires that the government prove the jurisdictional element beyond a reasonable doubt.

In United States v. Bell, the Fifth Circuit held that the govern- ment need only prove by a preponderance of the evidence that an offense occurred within the “special maritime and territorial juris- diction of the United States.” 993 F.2d 427, 429 (5th Cir. 1993). Subsequent panel decisions, however, have questioned that holding. See United States v. Reff, 479 F.3d 396, 400 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Bailey, 169 F. App'x 815, 821 (5th Cir.
2006); United States v. Perrien, 274 F.3d 936, 939 n.1 (5th Cir. 2001). In these cases, the court acknowledged that Bell is inconsis- tent with the Supreme Court's holding that “any element included in the offense-defining part of a criminal statute must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Perrien, 274 F.3d at 939 n.1 (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2356 (2000)); Bailey, 169
F. App'x at 821. No panel has explicitly overruled Bell because the evidence in each case was sufficient to establish the jurisdictional element beyond a reasonable doubt. See Reff 479 F.3d at 400; Bailey, 169 F. App'x at 821; Perrien, 274 F.3d at 939.
The definition of “sexual act” is found in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2).
This instruction can be modifi to instruct the jury on the elements of abusive sexual contact under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(2).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.82B

2.82B

SEXUAL ABUSE—VICTIM INCAPABLE 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2242(2), makes it a crime for anyone to engage in a sexual act with another person if that person is incapable of ap- praising the nature of the conduct, incapable of declin- ing to participate in the sexual act, or incapable of com- municating unwillingness to engage in the sexual act.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: The defendant knowingly engaged in a sexual act with ——— (name of alleged victim);
Second: The defendant knew that ——— (name of al- leged victim) was incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct [physically incapable of declining participa- tion in that sexual act] [physically incapable of com- municating unwillingness to engage in that sexual act]; and

Third: The off was  committed  within  the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States [a federal prison] [a prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direc- tion of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the head of any federal department or agency].

The term “sexual act” means: (A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus; (B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus; (C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital open- ing of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or

2.82B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or (D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
Note

The term “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7.

This instruction requires mens rea as to incapacitation. There is a circuit split as to whether a defendant must know that the victim was incapacitated to be guilty of this offense. The Eighth Circuit has held that a defendant must know that the victim is incapacitated. United States v. Horse, 747 F.3d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 2014); United States v. Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754, 763 (8th Cir. 2013). While the Seventh Circuit intimated that a defendant must know that the victim was incapable of declining participation in the sexual act, its holding did not specifi address the issue. United States v. Peters, 277 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir. 2002) (revers- ing the district court's denial of judgment of acquittal, remarking that the evidence was insufficient not only to show that the victim was incapacitated, but also that the defendant knew that the victim was incapacitated); but see Pattern Criminal Jury Instruc- tions of the Seventh Circuit 574 (2012) (excluding knowledge requirement for the incapacitation element). The Ninth Circuit's pattern jury instruction on 18 U.S.C. § 2242 does not include a knowledge requirement. Manual of Model Criminal Jury Instruc- tions for the District Courts of the Ninth Circuit, § 8.172 (2010). The Fifth Circuit has not addressed this issue.

For a general discussion of scienter, see United States v.
X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 469 (1994).
The definition of “sexual act” is found in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2). For a discussion of the burden of proof on the jurisdictional el-
ement, see Instruction 2.82A.

This instruction can be modifi to instruct the jury on the elements of abusive sexual contact under 18 U.S.C. § 2244(a)(2).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.82C

SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a)

2.82C

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2243(a), makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly engage in a sexual act with another person who has attained the age of twelve years, but has not attained the age of sixteen years, and is at least four years younger than the person so engaging.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly engaged in a sexual act with ——— (name of victim);
Second: At the time of the sexual act, ————— (name of victim) had reached the age of twelve years but had not yet reached the age of sixteen years;

Third: At the time of the sexual act, ——— (name of victim) was at least four years younger than the defendant; and

Fourth: That the defendant's actions took place within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States [in a Federal prison] [in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the head of any Federal department or agency].

The government need not prove that the defendant knew the age of the other person engaging in the sexual act [that the requisite age diff	existed between the persons so engaging].

The term “sexual act” means: (A) contact between

2.82C	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus; (B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus; (C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital open- ing of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or (D) the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
Note

The term “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7.

The term “sexual act” is defi in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2). See Perez-Gonzalez v. Holder, 667 F.3d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 2012).
It is a defense to the charge of sexual abuse of a minor that the defendant reasonably believed that the victim had attained the age of 16 years. The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he reasonably believed that the victim had attained the age of 16 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(c)(1).
It is a defense to the charge of sexual abuse of a minor that the persons engaging in the sexual act were at the time married to each other. The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the persons engaging in the sexual act were married to each other. See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(c)(2).
Use the definition of “Knowingly” in Instruction No. 1.37.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.82D

SEXUAL ABUSE OF A WARD 18 U.S.C. § 2243(b)

2.82D

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2243(b), makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly engage in a sexual act with another person who is in official deten- tion and under the custodial, supervisory, or disciplin- ary authority of the person so engaging.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly engaged in a sexual act with ——— (name of victim);
Second: At the time, ——— (name of victim) was in official detention at the ——— (name of institution);
Third: At the time, ——— (name of victim) was under the custodial, supervisory, or disciplinary authority of the defendant; and

Fourth: That the defendant's actions took place within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States [in a Federal prison] [in any prison, institution, or facility in which persons are held in custody by direction of or pursuant to a contract or agreement with the head of any Federal department or agency].

The term “sexual act” means: (A) contact between the penis and the vulva or the penis and the anus; (B) contact between the mouth and the penis, the mouth and the vulva, or the mouth and the anus; (C) the penetration, however slight, of the anal or genital open- ing of another by a hand or finger or by any object, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person; or (D)

2.82	D	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the genitalia of another person who has not attained the age of 16 years with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person.
Note

The term “special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7.

The term “sexual act” is defi in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(2). See Perez-Gonzalez v. Holder, 667 F.3d 622, 626 (5th Cir. 2012).
The term “official detention” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2246(5).
It is a defense to the charge of sexual abuse of a ward that the persons engaging in the sexual act were at the time married to each other. The defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the persons engaging in the sexual act were married to each other. See 18 U.S.C. § 2243(c)(2).

Consent is not a defense. See United States v. Smith, 336 F. App'x 978, 985 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Benais, 460 F.3d
1059, 1063 (8th Cir. 2006).
Use the definition of “Knowingly” in Instruction No. 1.37.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.83

2.83

FAILURE TO REGISTER AS A SEX OFFENDER 18 U.S.C. § 2250

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2250, makes it a crime for a person who is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, and who travels in interstate [foreign] commerce, to know- ingly fail to register as required by the Act.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proven each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant was required to register under the Sex Off	Registration and Notifi
Act, as charged;

Second: That the defendant traveled in interstate [foreign] commerce; and

Third: That the defendant knowingly failed to reg- ister and keep a current registration as required by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act.

These three elements must be proven to have oc- curred in sequence.

A person is required to register if he is a sex of- fender, which means a person convicted of a sex offense.
——————————— is a sex offense.
A sex off	is required to register where he resides, which is the location of his home or other place where he habitually lives.

The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he had to register and that he intentionally did not do so, but the government

2.83	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
does not have to prove that the defendant knew he was violating federal law.
Note

This is a basic instruction for a state convicted sex off charged with failure to register in the place in which he resides. The elements for federal sex offenders are slightly different. Sex of- fenders are also required to update their registration. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2250. The Sex Off	Registration and Notifi	Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 16911–29, and its implementing regula- tions, 28 C.F.R. 72.1–72.3, contain requirements and defi
that will be pertinent to the crime charged. See United States v. Wampler, 703 F.3d 815, 817–20 (5th Cir. 2013) (affirming district court's jury instruction which expanded the definition of “resides” provided in SORNA); see also The National Guidelines for Sex Of- fender Registration and Notifi	73 Fed. Reg. 38030, 38063
(July 2, 2008).

See generally Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229 (2010). The Fifth Circuit has stated that failure to register under SORNA is not a specific intent crime and therefore does not require knowl- edge that the defendant's failure to register violated federal law. See United States v. Whaley, 577 F.3d 254, 262 n.6 (5th Cir. 2009).

A fourth element is necessary under the Apprendi doctrine if there is an enhancement for a crime of violence found in § 2250(c). Affirmative defenses to this charge are listed in § 2250(b). Defini- tions of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Com- merce” may be found in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41, respectively.

The following cases address SORNA's application to offenders with pre-SORNA sex offenses: United States v. Kebodeaux, 133 S. Ct. 2496 (2014), Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975 (2012), and Carr, 130 S. Ct. at 2235–41.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.84

2.84

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN— PRODUCING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
18 U.S.C. § 2251(a)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2251(a), makes it a crime to employ, use, persuade, induce, entice, or coerce any minor to engage in sexually ex- plicit conduct for the purpose of producing a visual depiction or transmitting a live visual depiction of such conduct.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant employed [used] [per- suaded] [induced] [enticed] [coerced] a minor to engage in sexually explicit conduct;

Second: That the defendant acted with the purpose of producing a visual depiction [transmitting a live vi- sual depiction] of such conduct; and

Third: That the visual depiction was actually transported [transmitted] using any means or facility of interstate [foreign] commerce [in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce] or mailed.

[Third: That the visual depiction was produced [transmitted] using materials that have been mailed [shipped] [transported] in [affecting] interstate [foreign] commerce by any means, including by computer.]

[Third: That the defendant knew [had reason to know] that the visual depiction would be transported [transmitted] using any means or facility of interstate [foreign] commerce [in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce] or mailed.]

2.84	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
[The term “computer” means an electronic, mag- netic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or stor- age functions, and includes any data storage facility or communication facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a porta- ble hand held calculator, or other similar device.]

The term “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years.

“Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simu- lated sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral- genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; bestiality; sadistic or masochistic abuse; or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person. Be cautioned that not every exposure of the genitals or pubic area consti- tutes lascivious exhibition. Whether a visual depiction constitutes such a lascivious exhibition requires a consideration of the overall content of the material. You may consider such factors as whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child's genitalia or pubic area; whether the setting of the depiction is sexually suggestive, that is, in a place or pose associated with sexual activity; whether the child is depicted in an un- natural pose or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; whether the child is fully or partially nude; whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coy- ness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity; or whether the depiction is designed to elicit a sexual re- sponse in the viewer. This list is not exhaustive, and no single factor is dispositive.

The term “producing” means producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing, or advertising.

“Visual depiction” includes undeveloped fi and videotape, data stored on computer disk or by electronic

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.84

means which is capable of conversion into a visual im- age, and data which is capable of conversion into a vi- sual image that has been transmitted by any means, whether or not stored in a permanent format.
Note

Note that this offense includes a possible Apprendi issue due to the “resulting in death” enhancement in subsection (e). See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
Knowledge of the age of the minor victim is not an element of the offense. See United States v. Crow, 164 F.3d 229, 236 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464, 471 n.5–6, 471–72 (1994), and United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct.,
858 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir. 1988)); but see United States v. Steen,
634 F.3d 822, 824 n.4 (5th Cir. 2011) (commenting that the scien- ter requirement has not been discussed in the context of voyeurs and child pornography production under § 2251(a)).
Section 2251 “does not require that a defendant know the in- terstate nature of an instrument on which a depiction of child pornography is produced.” United States v. Terrell, 700 F.3d 755, 760 (5th Cir. 2012). Nor is it required that the individual who exploited the minor be the same person who produced the visual depiction which traveled in interstate commerce. Id. at 760–61.

The explanation of “lascivious exhibition” is derived from United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), and has been adopted by the Fifth Circuit. See Steen, 634 F.3d at 826; United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2001).

The term “producing” is defi in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(3). For further discussion of the term “production,” see United States v. Dickson, 632 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 2011), in which the Fifth Circuit held that images were “produced” when they were copied or downloaded onto hard drives, disks, or compact discs.
“Transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2251.” United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239
(5th Cir. 2002).
“[E]vidence of a defendant's intent to distribute child pornogra- phy via interstate commerce is adequate to satisfy the jurisdictional element of § 2251.” Runyan, 290 F.3d at 243; see also United States v. Diehl, 775 F.3d 714 (5th Cir. 2015).

2.84	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A defendant who simply possesses, transports, reproduces, or distributes child pornography does not sexually exploit a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251, even though the materials possessed, transported, reproduced, or distributed “involve” such sexual exploitation by the producer. See United States v. Horn, 187 F.3d 781 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Kemmish, 120 F.3d 937, 942
(9th Cir. 1997).
Use the defi	of “Interstate Commerce” and “Foreign Commerce” as defi in Instruction Nos. 1.39 and 1.40, respectively.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.85A

2.85A

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND OTHER ABUSES OF CHILDREN—RECEIVING AND DISTRIBUTING MATERIAL INVOLVING SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF MINORS
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2252(a)(2), makes it a crime to knowingly receive [distribute] [reproduce for distribution] any visual depiction of a minor engaging in a sexually explicit conduct.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly received [distributed] a visual depiction, as alleged in the indict- ment, using any means or facility of interstate or foreign commerce [that has been mailed];

[First: That the defendant knowingly received [distributed] a visual depiction, as alleged in the indict- ment, that has been shipped [transported] in or affect- ing interstate or foreign commerce;]

[First: That the defendant knowingly received [distributed] a visual depiction, as alleged in the indict- ment, that contained materials which had been mailed;]

[First: That the defendant knowingly received [distributed] a visual depiction, as alleged in the indict- ment, that contained materials which had been shipped or transported in or affecting interstate or foreign com- merce by any means, including by computer;]

[First: That the defendant knowingly reproduced any visual depiction for distribution, as alleged in the indictment, using any means or facility of [in or affect-

2.85	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
ing] interstate or foreign commerce or through the mail;]

Second: That the production of such visual depic- tion involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct;

Third: That such visual depiction was of a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct; and

Fourth: That the defendant knew that such visual depiction was of sexually explicit conduct and that at least one of the persons engaged in sexually explicit conduct in such visual depiction was a minor.

To “receive” something means to knowingly accept or take possession of something. Receipt does not require proof of ownership.

[To “distribute” something simply means to deliver or transfer possession of it to someone else, with or without any financial interest in the transaction.]

“Visual depiction” includes undeveloped fi and videotape, data stored on computer disk or by electronic means which is capable of conversion into a visual im- age, and data which is capable of conversion into a vi- sual image that has been transmitted by any means, whether or not stored in a permanent format.

The term “computer” means an electronic, mag- netic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or stor- age functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a porta- ble hand held calculator, or other similar device.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.85A

The term “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years.

“Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simu- lated sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral- genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; bestiality; sadistic or masochistic abuse; or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person. Be cautioned that not every exposure of the genitals or pubic area consti- tutes lascivious exhibition. Whether a visual depiction constitutes such a lascivious exhibition requires a consideration of the overall content of the material. You may consider such factors as whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child's genitalia or pubic area; whether the setting of the depiction is sexually suggestive, that is, in a place or pose associated with sexual activity; whether the child is depicted in an un- natural pose or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; whether the child is fully or partially nude; whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coy- ness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity; or whether the depiction is designed to elicit a sexual re- sponse in the viewer. This list is not exhaustive, and no single factor is dispositive.

The term “production” includes copying or down- loading visual depictions from another source.
Note
For a general discussion of “knowingly” as it relates to § 2252 and the general scienter requirement of this section, see United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994). See also United States v. Kimbrough, 69 F.3d 723, 733 (5th Cir. 1995) (recognizing that the term knowingly “extends to both the sexually explicit nature of the material and to the age of the performers” and affirming the language regarding the defendant's knowledge “that at least one of the persons depicted was a minor”).

The explanation of “lascivious exhibition” is derived from United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), and has

2.85A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
been adopted by the Fifth Circuit. See United States v. Steen, 634 F.3d 822, 826 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d
375, 380 (5th Cir. 2001).
The term “computer” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1). The term “minor” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1).
The term “producing” is defi in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(3). For further discussion of the term “production,” see United States v. Dickson, 632 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 2011), in which the Fifth Circuit held that images were “produced” when they were copied or downloaded onto hard drives, disks, or compact discs.
The term “sexually explicit conduct” is defi	in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(2).
“Transmission of photographs by means of the Internet is tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce.” United States
v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 2251); see United States v. Winkler, 639 F.3d 692, 701 (5th Cir. 2011) (extending Runyan holding to § 2252).
Each separate transportation or shipping of violative material constitutes a separate offense under the statute. See United States v. Gallardo, 915 F.2d 149, 151 (5th Cir. 1990).
Possession of child pornography is not a lesser-included of- fense of distribution of child pornography. See United States v. Woerner, 709 F.3d 527, 539 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 146
(2013).
A multiplicity issue may arise if a defendant is charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a) and 2252A for the same incident or conduct. See United States v. Reedy, 304 F.3d 358, 364–65, 365
n.3 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the Supreme Court's holding in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002), rendered the two statutes “functionally identical”).
In some circumstances, downloading images and videos containing child pornography from a peer-to-peer network and storing them in a shared folder accessible to other users on the network  may  amount  to  “distribution”  under  18  U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(2)(B), even in the absence of proof that anyone else ac- cessed the files. See United States v. Richardson, 713 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 2013).
Each “distribution” of a minor engaged in sexually explicit

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.85A

conduct is a violation of § 2252(a)(2). See Woerner, 709 F.3d at 541 (“The unit of prosecution for § 2252(a)(2) is each transaction in which one or more depictions of a minor engaged in sexually ex- plicit conduct are distributed.”).

The term “receipt” is explained in United States v. Clark, 741 F.2d 699, 703 (5th Cir. 1984). For a discussion of “knowing receipt” in the context of § 2252, see Winkler, 639 F.3d at 695–99.
Use the defi	of “Knowingly,” “Interstate Commerce,” and “Foreign Commerce” in Instruction Nos. 1.37, 1.39, and 1.40, respectively.

2.85B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.85B

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN— POSSESSION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2252(a)(4)(B), makes it a crime to knowingly possess [access with intent to view] matter that contains any visual depic- tion of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct that has been mailed [shipped] [transported] using any means or facility of [in or affecting] interstate or foreign commerce, or which was produced using materials that had been so mailed [shipped] [transported], by any means including by computer.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly possessed [ac- cessed with the intent to view] one or more books [magazines] [periodicals] [fi [videotapes] [other matter] that contained any visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct, as alleged in the indictment;

Second: That the item[s] was [were] mailed [shipped] [transported] using any means or facility of [in or affecting] interstate or foreign commerce];

[Second: That the item[s] was [were] produced us- ing material that had been mailed [shipped] [trans- ported] by any means of [in or affecting] interstate or foreign commerce, including by computer];]

Third: That the producing of such visual depiction involved the use of a minor engaging in sexually ex- plicit conduct;

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.85B

Fourth: That such visual depiction was of a minor engaged in a sexually explicit conduct; and

Fifth: That the defendant knew that such visual depiction was of sexually explicit conduct and that at least one of the persons engaged in sexually explicit conduct in such visual depiction was a minor.

The term “computer” means an electronic, mag- netic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or stor- age functions, and includes any data storage facility or communications facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a porta- ble hand held calculator, or other similar device.

The term “visual depiction” includes undeveloped film and videotape, data stored on computer disk or by electronic means which is capable of conversion into a visual image, and data which is capable of conversion into a visual image that has been transmitted by any means, whether or not stored in a permanent format.

The term “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years.

“Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simu- lated sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral- genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; bestiality; sadistic or masochistic abuse; or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person. Be cautioned that not every exposure of the genitals or pubic area consti- tutes lascivious exhibition. Whether a visual depiction constitutes such a lascivious exhibition requires a consideration of the overall content of the material. You may consider such factors as whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child's genitalia or pubic area; whether the setting of the depiction is sexually

2.85B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
suggestive, that is, in a place or pose associated with sexual activity; whether the child is depicted in an un- natural pose or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; whether the child is fully or partially nude; whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coy- ness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity; or whether the depiction is designed to elicit a sexual re- sponse in the viewer. This list is not exhaustive, and no single factor is dispositive.

The term “production” includes copying or down- loading visual depictions from another source.

The term “producing” means producing, directing, manufacturing, issuing, publishing, or advertising.
Note

See  Note  following  Instruction  No.  2.85A,  18  U.S.C.
§ 2252(a)(2), Sexual Exploitation of Children-Receiving and Distributing Material Involving Sexual Exploitation of Minors.
The term “computer” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1). The term “minor” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1).
The term “sexually explicit conduct” is defi	in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(2).

Constructive possession is suffi to sustain a conviction under § 2252(a)(4)(B). See United States v. Villasenor, 236 F.3d 220, 223 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Layne, 43 F.3d 127, 131
(5th Cir. 1995).

Post-production computer alterations of a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct that placed pixel blocks over the girl's genitals does not take depictions outside of the reach of the statute. See United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2001).

For a discussion on when images are “produced” for purposes of § 2252(a)(4)(B), see United States v. Dickson, 632 F.3d 186, 189 (5th Cir. 2011).

Section 2252(a)(4)(B) is facially valid and falls within Con-

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.85B

gress's power under the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2000).
It is an affi	defense to the above off that a defendant possessed “less than three matters containing any vi- sual depiction” proscribed by § 2252(a)(4)(B) and promptly and in good faith took reasonable steps to destroy each depiction, without retaining or allowing any person, other than a law enforcement agency, to access it or reported the matter to a law enforcement agency and allowed that agency access to each such visual depiction. See 18 U.S.C. § 2252(c).
Use the defi	of “Possession,” “Knowingly,” “Interstate Commerce,” and “Foreign Commerce” in Instruction Nos. 1.31, 1.37, 1.39, and 1.40, respectively.

2.85C	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.85C

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN— TRANSPORTING OR SHIPPING OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
(VISUAL DEPICTION OF ACTUAL MINOR) 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2252A(a)(1), makes it a crime to knowingly mail, transport, or ship any child pornography by any means or facility of [in or affecting] interstate or foreign commerce, including by computer.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly mailed an item or items of child pornography as alleged in the indict- ment; and

[First: That the defendant knowingly transported [shipped] by any means or facility of [in or affecting] in- terstate or foreign commerce, including by computer, an item or items of child pornography, as alleged in the indictment; and]

Second: That when the defendant mailed [trans- ported] [shipped] the item[s], the defendant knew the item[s] was [were] child pornography.

The term “computer” means an electronic, mag- netic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or stor- age functions, and includes any data storage facility or communication facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a porta- ble hand held calculator, or other similar device.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.85C

The term “child pornography” means any visual depiction, including any photograph, fi	video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.

The term “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years.

“Visual depiction” includes undeveloped fi and videotape, data stored on computer disk or by electronic means which is capable of conversion into a visual im- age, and data which is capable of conversion into a vi- sual image that has been transmitted by any means, whether or not stored in a permanent format.

“Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simu- lated sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral- genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; bestiality; sadistic or masochistic abuse; or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person. Be cautioned that not every exposure of the genitals or pubic area consti- tutes lascivious exhibition. Whether a visual depiction constitutes such a lascivious exhibition requires a consideration of the overall content of the material. You may consider such factors as whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child's genitalia or pubic area; whether the setting of the depiction is sexually suggestive, that is, in a place or pose associated with sexual activity; whether the child is depicted in an un- natural pose or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; whether the child is fully or partially nude; whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coy- ness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity; or whether the depiction is designed to elicit a sexual re- sponse in the viewer. This list is not exhaustive, and no single factor is dispositive.

2.85C	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Note

The mens rea of “knowingly” extends both to the age of the performers and the sexually explicit nature of the material. See United States v. Moreland, 665 F.3d 137, 141 (5th Cir. 2011) (cit- ing United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994)).
The term “computer” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1). The term “minor” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1).
The term “sexually explicit conduct” is defi	in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(2).

In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002), the Supreme Court struck down two defi		terms of “child pornography” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) as vague and overbroad. Accordingly, only the defi	listed in 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2256(8)(A) and (C) should be utilized.

The Fifth Circuit has recognized that “Free Speech Coalition did not establish a broad requirement that the Government must present expert testimony to establish that the unlawful image depicts a real child.” United States v. McNealy, 625 F.3d 858, 865 (5th Cir. 2010); see United States v. Slanina, 359 F.3d 356, 357 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); United States v. Salcido, 506 F.3d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (“With respect to the quantum of evidence necessary to support a conviction, there seems to be general agreement among the circuits that pornographic images themselves are sufficient to prove the depictions of actual minors.”); United States v. Farrelly, 389 F.3d 649, 652 (6th Cir. 2004), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Williams, 411 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Free Speech Coalition does not require the Government to do more in the context of this case than present images to the jury for a determination that the depictions were of actual children.”). Rather, juries are “capable of distinguishing be- tween real and virtual images.” McNealy, 625 F.3d at 865 (internal quotation marks omitted).

The explanation of “lascivious exhibition” is derived from United States v. Dost, 636 F. Supp. 828, 832 (S.D. Cal. 1986), and has been adopted by the Fifth Circuit. See United States v. Steen, 634 F.3d 822, 826 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Grimes, 244 F.3d
375, 380 (5th Cir. 2001).
A multiplicity issue may arise if a defendant is charged with a violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a) and 2252A for the same incident or conduct. See United States v. Reedy, 304 F.3d 358, 364–65, 365
n.3 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that the Supreme Court's holding in

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.85C

Free Speech Coalition rendered the two statutes “functionally identical”).

The transmission of images by means of the Internet is “tantamount to moving photographs across state lines and thus constitutes transportation in interstate commerce for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 2251.” United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 239 (5th Cir. 2002). When the government alleges downloading images via the Internet as the jurisdictional nexus, the evidence must “in- dependently link all the images upon which a conviction is based to the Internet.” Id. at 242–43; see also United States v. Winkler, 639 F.3d 692, 700–01 (5th Cir. 2011); United States v. Henriques,
234 F.3d 263, 266 (5th Cir. 2000).
Use the defi	of “Knowingly,” “Interstate Commerce,” and “Foreign Commerce” in Instruction Nos. 1.37, 1.39, and 1.40, respectively.

2.85D	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.85D

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN— RECEIVING OR DISTRIBUTING CHILD PORNOGROPHY
(VISUAL DEPICTION OF ACTUAL MINOR) 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(A)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2252A(a)(2)(A), makes it a crime to knowingly receive [distribute] any child pornography that has been mailed or, using any means or facility of interstate [foreign] commerce, shipped [transported] in or aff	inter- state [foreign] commerce by any means, including by computer.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly received [distributed] an item or items of child pornography, as alleged in the indictment;

Second: That the item[s] of child pornography had been mailed; and

[Second: That the item[s] of child pornography had been shipped [transported] in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer; and]

Third: That when the defendant received [distrib- uted] the item[s], the defendant knew the item[s] was [were] [contained] child pornography.

To “receive” something means to knowingly accept or take possession of something. Receipt does not require proof of ownership.

[To “distribute” something means to deliver or

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.85D

transfer possession of it to someone else, with or without any financial interest in the transaction.]

The term “computer” means an electronic, mag- netic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or stor- age functions, and includes any data storage facility or communication facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a porta- ble hand held calculator, or other similar device.

The term “child pornography” means any visual depiction, including any photograph, fi	video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.

The term “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years.

“Visual depiction” includes undeveloped fi and videotape, data stored on computer disk or by electronic means which is capable of conversion into a visual im- age, and data which is capable of conversion into a vi- sual image that has been transmitted by any means, whether or not stored in a permanent format.

“Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simu- lated sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral- genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; bestiality; sadistic or masochistic abuse; or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person. Be cautioned that not every exposure of the genitals or pubic area consti- tutes lascivious exhibition. Whether a visual depiction constitutes such a lascivious exhibition requires a consideration of the overall content of the material. You

2.85D	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
may consider such factors as whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child's genitalia or pubic area; whether the setting of the depiction is sexually suggestive, that is, in a place or pose associated with sexual activity; whether the child is depicted in an un- natural pose or in inappropriate attire, considering the age of the child; whether the child is fully or partially nude; whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coy- ness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity; or whether the depiction is designed to elicit a sexual re- sponse in the viewer. This list is not exhaustive, and no single factor is dispositive.
Note

See  Note  following  Instruction  No.  2.85C,  18  U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(1), Sexual Exploitation of Children–Transporting or Shipping of Child Pornography.
The term “computer” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(1).
The term “child pornography” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). The term “minor” is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1).
The term “sexually explicit conduct” is defi	in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(2).
Intent to distribute is not a required element in a “receipt” case. See United States v. Olander, 572 F.3d 764, 770 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Watzman, 486 F.3d 1004, 1009–10 (7th Cir.
2007).
The Fifth Circuit has held that possession of child pornography is not a lesser-included offense of distribution of child pornography. See United States v. Woerner, 709 F.3d 527, 539 (5th Cir. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 990 (2014).
In some circumstances, downloading images and videos containing child pornography from a peer-to-peer network and storing them in a shared folder accessible to other users on the network  may  amount  to  “distribution”  under  18  U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(2)(B), even in the absence of proof that anyone else ac- cessed the files. See United States v. Richardson, 713 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 2013).
For a discussion of whether a person “knowingly receives”

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.85D

child pornography, see United States v. Pruitt, 638 F.3d 763, 766–67 (11th Cir. 2011).

When a defendant is charged with receiving or distributing child pornography, each separate receipt or distribution violates the statute. See United States v. Planck, 493 F.3d 501, 505 (5th Cir. 2007).

Use the defi	of “Knowingly,” “Interstate Commerce,” and “Foreign Commerce” in Instruction Nos. 1.37, 1.39, and 1.40, respectively.

2.85E	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.85E

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN— RECEIVING OR DISTRIBUTING MATERIAL THAT CONTAINS CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2)(B)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2252A(a)(2)(B), makes it a crime to knowingly receive [distribute] any material that contains child pornogra- phy that has been mailed or, using any means or facil- ity of interstate [foreign] commerce, shipped [trans- ported] in or affecting interstate [foreign] commerce by any means, including by computer.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly received [distributed] material that contained child pornography, as alleged in the indictment;

Second: That the material containing child pornog- raphy had been mailed; and

[Second: That the material containing child pornog- raphy was shipped [transported] in or affecting inter- state [foreign] commerce by any means, including by computer; and]

Third: That when the defendant received [distrib- uted] the material, the defendant knew it contained child pornography.

To “receive” something means to knowingly accept or take possession of something. Receipt does not require proof of ownership.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.85E

[To “distribute” something means to deliver or transfer possession of it to someone else, with or without any financial interest in the transaction.]

The term “computer” means an electronic, mag- netic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or stor- age functions, and includes any data storage facility or communication facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a porta- ble hand held calculator, or other similar device.

The term “child pornography” means any visual depiction, including any photograph, fi	video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.

The term “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years.

“Visual depiction” includes undeveloped fi and videotape, data stored on computer disk or by electronic means which is capable of conversion into a visual im- age, and data which is capable of conversion into a vi- sual image that has been transmitted by any means, whether or not stored in a permanent format.

“Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simu- lated sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral- genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; bestiality; mastur- bation; sadistic or masochistic abuse; or lascivious exhi- bition of the genitals or pubic area of any person. Be cautioned that not every exposure of the genitals or pubic area constitutes lascivious exhibition. Whether a visual depiction constitutes such a lascivious exhibition

2.85E	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
requires a consideration of the overall content of the material. You may consider such factors as whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child's genitalia or pubic area; whether the setting of the depic- tion is sexually suggestive, that is, in a place or pose associated with sexual activity; whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose or in inappropriate at- tire, considering the age of the child; whether the child is fully or partially nude; whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity; or whether the depiction is designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. This list is not exhaustive, and no single factor is dispositive.
Note

See Note following Instruction Nos. 2.85C and 2.85D for 18
U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(1) and 2252A(a)(2)(A), respectively.
Use the defi	of “Knowingly,” “Interstate Commerce,” and “Foreign Commerce” in Instruction Nos. 1.37, 1.39, and 1.40, respectively.

In some circumstances, downloading images and videos containing child pornography from a peer-to-peer network and storing them in a shared folder accessible to other users on the network  may  amount  to  “distribution”  under  18  U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(2)(B), even in the absence of proof that anyone else ac- cessed the files. See United States v. Richardson, 713 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 2013).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.85F

2.85F

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN— POSSESSING OR ACCESSING CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
(VISUAL DEPICTION OF AN ACTUAL MINOR) 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2252A(a)(5)(B), makes it a crime to knowingly possess [access with intent to view] any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape, computer disk, or any other material that contains an image of child pornography that has been mailed [shipped [transported] using any means or facility of [in or affecting] interstate or foreign commerce, including by computer, or that was produced using materials that have been mailed or so shipped [transported] in or aff	interstate commerce by any means, including by computer].
For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly possessed [ac- cessed with the intent to view] an item or items that contains an image of child pornography, as alleged in the indictment;

Second: That the material was mailed [shipped [transported] using any means or facility of [in or af- fecting] interstate or foreign commerce [by any means], including by computer]; and

[Second: That the material was produced using materials that had been mailed [shipped [transported] in or aff	interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer]; and]

Third: That when the defendant possessed [ac- cessed with the intent to view] the material, the

2.85F	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
defendant knew the material was [contained] child pornography.

The term “computer” means an electronic, mag- netic, optical, electrochemical, or other high speed data processing device performing logical, arithmetic, or stor- age functions, and includes any data storage facility or communication facility directly related to or operating in conjunction with such device, but such term does not include an automated typewriter or typesetter, a porta- ble hand held calculator, or other similar device.

The term “child pornography” means any visual depiction, including any photograph, fi	video, picture, or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct.

The term “minor” means any person under the age of eighteen years.

“Visual depiction” includes undeveloped fi and videotape, data stored on computer disk or by electronic means which is capable of conversion into a visual im- age, and data which is capable of conversion into a vi- sual image that has been transmitted by any means, whether or not stored in a permanent format.

“Sexually explicit conduct” means actual or simu- lated sexual intercourse, including genital-genital, oral- genital, anal-genital, or oral-anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex; bestiality; mastur- bation; sadistic or masochistic abuse; or lascivious exhi- bition of the genitals or pubic area of any person. Be cautioned that not every exposure of the genitals or pubic area constitutes lascivious exhibition. Whether a visual depiction constitutes such a lascivious exhibition requires a consideration of the overall content of the

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.85F

material. You may consider such factors as whether the focal point of the visual depiction is on the child's genitalia or pubic area; whether the setting of the depic- tion is sexually suggestive, that is, in a place or pose associated with sexual activity; whether the child is depicted in an unnatural pose or in inappropriate at- tire, considering the age of the child; whether the child is fully or partially nude; whether the visual depiction suggests sexual coyness or a willingness to engage in sexual activity; or whether the depiction is designed to elicit a sexual response in the viewer. This list is not exhaustive, and no single factor is dispositive.
Note

See  Note  following  Instruction  No.  2.85C,  18  U.S.C.
§ 2252A(a)(1), Sexual Exploitation of Children–Transporting or Shipping of Child Pornography.

For a discussion of “knowing possession” in relation to
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B), see United States v. Smith, 739 F.3d 843, 846–48 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Woerner, 709 F.3d 527, 535–537 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 146 (2013), and United States v. Moreland, 665 F.3d 137, 149–51 (5th Cir. 2011).

The term “producing” means producing, directing, manufactur- ing, issuing, publishing, or advertising. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(3).

Videos that have traveled on the Internet have moved in in- terstate   commerce   within   the   meaning   of   18   U.S.C. 
§ 2252A(a)(5)(B). See United States v. Winkler, 639 F.3d 692, 700–01 (5th Cir. 2011).

“[P]ossession of child pornography is not the lesser-included offense of distribution of child pornography.” Woerner, 709 F.3d at 539–40.

“Where a defendant has a single envelope or book or magazine containing many images of minors engaging in sexual activity, the government often should charge only a single count.” United States
v. Reedy, 304 F.3d 358, 367 (5th Cir. 2002). When, however, a defendant has images stored in “separate materials,” as defined in
§ 2252A, such as a “computer, book, and a magazine,” the govern- ment may charge multiple counts for each type of material or media possessed, “as long as the prohibited images were obtained

2.85	F	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
through the result of different transactions.” United States v. Planck, 493 F.3d 501, 504 (5th Cir. 2007).

The Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that the possession of child pornography proscribed by § 2252A(a)(5)(B) is a lesser-included off of the crime of receiving child pornography contained in § 2252A(a)(2), such that convicting a defendant of possessing and receiving the same image of child pornography constitutes double jeopardy. See United States v. Ehle, 640 F.3d 689, 698 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Bobb, 577
F.3d 1366, 1372–75 (11th Cir. 2009); United States v. Miller, 527
F.3d 54, 71–72 (3d Cir. 2008); United States v. Davenport, 519 F.3d 940, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2008). The Fifth Circuit, in Winkler, recognized in dicta that several of its sister circuits had character- ized the possession of child pornography as a lesser-included of- fense of receipt, but noted that there are certain circumstances in which “possession can be proven but receipt cannot,” although the court declined to opine further. 639 F.3d at 696 n.2; see also United States v. Dobbs, 629 F.3d 1199, 1206 (10th Cir. 2011) (declining to comment on the difference between knowing possession and know- ing receipt); United States v. Irving, 554 F.3d 64, 78 (2d Cir. 2009) (leaving open the question of whether possession of child pornogra- phy is a lesser-included off of receiving such pornography). Where, however, a defendant's convictions are based on two distinct off	occurring, for example, on diff	dates or involving different images of child pornography, conviction under both sections of the statute is permissible. See Bobb, 577 F.3d at 1375.
Section 2252A(c) and (d) provide affi	defenses to the above offense.

Use the defi	of “Possession,” “Knowingly,” “Interstate Commerce,” and “Foreign Commerce” in Instruction Nos. 1.31, 1.37, 1.39, and 1.40, respectively.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.86

2.86

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF A STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE, VESSEL, OR AIRCRAFT
18 U.S.C. § 2312

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2312, makes it a crime for anyone to transport in interstate or foreign commerce a stolen motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft, knowing it to have been stolen.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the motor vehicle [vessel] [aircraft] was stolen;

Second: That, after the motor vehicle [vessel] [aircraft] was stolen, the defendant transported it in in- terstate [foreign] commerce; and

Third: That, at the time the defendant transported the motor vehicle [vessel] [aircraft] in interstate [foreign] commerce, he [she] knew the motor vehicle [vessel] [aircraft] was stolen.

The word “stolen” as used in the indictment in this case means all wrongful and dishonest takings of motor vehicles, vessels, or aircraft, with the intent to deprive the owner, temporarily or permanently, of the rights and benefits of ownership.
Note

The Fifth Circuit, in dicta, has cited with approval a broad definition of “stolen” under this statute. See United States v. Aguilar, 967 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that where an automobile is purchased with a worthless check and is transported interstate, it is “stolen” under § 2312).
Defi	of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,”

2.86	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41.

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.87

2.87

RECEIPT OF A STOLEN MOTOR VEHICLE, VESSEL, OR AIRCRAFT
18 U.S.C. § 2313

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2313, makes it a crime for anyone to receive any motor vehicle, ves- sel, or aircraft which has crossed a state or United States boundary after being stolen, knowing it to have been stolen.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the motor vehicle [vessel] [aircraft] in question was stolen;

Second: That the motor vehicle [vessel] [aircraft] had crossed a state or United States boundary after be- ing stolen;

Third: That the defendant received the stolen mo- tor vehicle [vessel] [aircraft]; and

Fourth: That the defendant knew the motor vehicle [vessel] [aircraft] to have been stolen at the time the defendant received it.

Before a defendant can be convicted of the offense charged, the government must prove beyond a reason- able doubt that the defendant knew that the property had been stolen, but it is not required to prove that the defendant knew that the property had crossed a state or United States boundary after being stolen.

The word “stolen” means all wrongful and dishon- est takings of motor vehicles, vessels, or aircrafts with the intent to deprive the owner, temporarily or perma- nently, of the rights and benefits of ownership.

2.87	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Note

United States v. Mitchell, 876 F.2d 1178, 1180 (5th Cir. 1989), states the elements of the off    In Mitchell, the Fifth Circuit held that testimony that defendant purchased the vehicles did not preclude a finding that defendant knew the vehicles were stolen. 876 F.2d at 1180.

Although this instruction pertains only to a “receipt” offense, an indictment often alleges that the defendant “received, pos- sessed, concealed, sold, and disposed of” a particular motor vehicle, vessel, or aircraft. In such cases, it is not necessary for the govern- ment to prove that all of these acts were in fact committed, as any one of them is a violation of the statute. The Fifth Circuit has held, however, in a case that appears to have been abrogated by a later Supreme Court opinion, that the statute describes two distinct conceptual groupings or types of wrongdoing—housing of the vehicle (receiving, concealing, and storing) and marketing of the vehicle (bartering, selling, and disposing)—and the jury must agree unanimously upon which way the off   was committed. See United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 458 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that jury instruction that allowed conviction based on finding that defendant committed any of six acts listed in the then- current version of 18 U.S.C. § 2313 violated unanimity rule); see also United States v. Trupin, 117 F.3d 678, 687 (2nd Cir. 1997) (holding that instruction on 18 U.S.C. § 2115 which required jury unanimity regarding “whether the defendant possessed, concealed, or stored the property,” or “whether the defendant bartered, sold or disposed of the property,” was not erroneous). In Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2498 (1999), however, a plurality of the Supreme Court criticized Gipson’s classification of alternative means of com- mitting a crime into “distinct conceptual groupings” as “conclusory,” and “too indeterminate to provide concrete guidance to courts faced with verdict specificity questions.”

See also Instruction No. 1.25 on Unanimity of Theory.

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2.88

INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY
18 U.S.C. § 2314 (FIRST PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2314, makes it a crime for anyone to transport [cause to be trans- ported] in interstate [foreign] commerce stolen property having a value of $5,000 or more, knowing it to have been stolen [converted] [taken by fraud].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant transported [caused to be transported] in interstate [foreign] commerce items of stolen property as described in the indictment;

Second: That at the time of such transportation, the defendant knew that the property had been stolen [converted] [taken by fraud]; and

Third: That the property had a value of $5,000 or more.

Knowledge or reasonable foreseeability of inter- state [foreign] transport is not required to convict. It is enough if the defendant set in motion a series of events which in the normal course led to the transportation.

“Property” means goods, wares, merchandise, secu- rities, or money.

The word “stolen” means all wrongful and dishon- est taking of property with the intent to deprive the owner of the rights and benefits of ownership, temporar- ily or permanently.

[The phrase “taken by fraud” means to deceive or

2.88	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
cheat someone out of property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises.]

The word “value” means the face, par, or market value, whichever is the greatest [and the aggregate value of all goods, wares, and merchandise, securities, and money referred to in a single indictment shall con- stitute the value thereof].
Note

United States v. Anderson, 174 F.3d 515, 522 (5th Cir. 1999), sets out the elements of the off See also Dowling v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 3127, 3131 (1985); United States v. Mackay, 33 F.3d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 1994). A conviction requires that the goods actually travel in interstate or foreign commerce. See United States
v. Payan, 992 F.2d 1387 (5th Cir. 1993). Since the $5,000 value is jurisdictional, the property must have that value at the time it was stolen or at some point during its receipt, transportation, or concealment. See United States v. Watson, 966 F.2d 161, 163 (5th Cir. 1992).
“In cases of fraudulently-obtained goods, such as the instant case, the government must establish defendant's knowledge that the goods were procured by fraud, although it need not prove the knowledge or foreseeability that such goods crossed state lines.” United States v. Vonsteen, 872 F.2d 626, 630 (5th Cir. 1989); see
United States v. Lennon, 751 F.2d 737, 740 (5th Cir. 1985) (“[S]ec- tion 2314 does not require knowledge or reasonable foreseeability of interstate transport of the money obtained by fraud.”); see also United States v. McIntosh, 280 F.3d 479, 483 (5th Cir. 2002) (it is unnecessary to show the defendant actually transported anything himself—it need only be shown that he caused the interstate transportation by duping out-of-state investors into sending him checks procured by fraud) (citing Pereira v. United States, 74 S. Ct. 358, 363 (1954)).

United States v. Wright, 791 F.2d 133, 135–36 (10th Cir. 1986), highlights the point that this offense is not limited to the physical movement of money obtained by fraud from one state to another. It is also a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2314 to cause an interstate electronic transfer of the funds. See also United States v. Levy, 579 F.2d 1332, 1336 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding § 2314 conviction where defendant obtained money by fraud, deposited those funds into a Louisiana bank account, and then transported his ill-gotten gains by writing checks on the Louisiana account and depositing them into a Texas bank). Real property and rights associated with copy-

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right ownership are not “within the ambit of transporting goods, wares, or merchandise that have been stolen, converted, or taken by fraud.” United States v. Smith, 686 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Coleman v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 48 F. App'x 918, at *2 (5th Cir. 2002).
“Money” and “securities” are further defi	in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2311.

Where meager property is transformed into valuable property by the theft or deceit of the defendant, the value assigned to meet the jurisdictional requirement is generally the face, fair, or market value of the item, whichever is higher. See United States v. Onyiego, 286 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2002) (amounts written by defendant on the blank stolen airline tickets could be used as “face” value to meet the statutory jurisdictional minimum dollar amount under 18
U.S.C. § 2314, just as the value requirement for a blank money or- der can be met “by the face value of, or the amount received for, filled in blank money orders, or the value of the blanks in a thieves' market for blank money orders”); United States v. Robinson, 553 F.2d 429, 431 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that the “face” value of a fraudulently secured promissory note does not depend on the amount of money eventually obtained in a litigation settlement on that note).
Defi	of “Interstate Commerce,” “Foreign Commerce,” and “Commerce” are in Instruction Nos. 1.39, 1.40, and 1.41.

If the indictment charges commission of the off  in more than one manner, see Instruction No. 1.25 on Unanimity of Theory.

2.89	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.89

RECEIPT, POSSESSION, OR SALE OF STOLEN PROPERTY
18 U.S.C. § 2315 (FIRST PARAGRAPH)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2315, makes it a crime for anyone knowingly to receive, conceal, sell, or dispose of stolen property which has a value of $5,000 or more and which has crossed a state or United States boundary.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the property named in the indictment was stolen [unlawfully taken or converted];

Second: That such property had crossed a state or United States boundary after being stolen [unlawfully taken or converted];

Third: That the defendant received [concealed] [sold] [disposed of] items of the stolen property;

Fourth: That the defendant knew the property was stolen [unlawfully taken or converted] at the time the defendant received [concealed] [sold] [disposed of] it; and

Fifth: That such items had a value of $5,000 or more.

Before a defendant can be convicted of the offense charged, the government must prove beyond a reason- able doubt that the defendant knew that the property had been stolen, but it is not required to prove that the defendant knew that the property had crossed a state or United States boundary after being stolen.

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“Property” means goods, wares, merchandise, secu- rities, or money.

The term “value” means the face, par, or market value, whichever is the greatest [and the aggregate value of all goods, wares, merchandise, securities, and money referred to in a single indictment shall consti- tute the value thereof].
Note

United States v. Anderson, 174 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1999), sets forth the elements of the offense.
An indictment often alleges that the defendant “received, pos- sessed, concealed, sold, and disposed of” certain stolen property. In such cases, it is not necessary for the government to prove that all of these acts were in fact committed, as any one of them is a viola- tion of the statute. The Fifth Circuit has held, however, in a case that appears to have been abrogated by a later Supreme Court opinion, that the analogous statute of § 2313 describes two conceptual types of wrongdoing—harboring the stolen property and marketing the property—and the jury must agree unanimously upon which way the offense was committed. See United States v. Gipson, 553 F.2d 453, 458 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that jury instruction that allowed conviction based on finding that defendant committed any of six acts listed in the then version of 18 U.S.C.
§ 2313 violated unanimity rule); see also United States v. Trupin, 117 F.3d 678, 687 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that instruction on 18
U.S.C. § 2115 which required jury unanimity regarding “whether the defendant possessed, concealed, or stored the property,” or “whether the defendant bartered, sold or disposed of the property,” was not erroneous). In Schad v. Arizona, 111 S. Ct. 2491, 2489 (1999), however, a plurality of the Supreme Court has criticized Gipson’s classification of alternative means of committing a crime into “distinct conceptual groupings” as “too indeterminate” to provide concrete guidance to courts.

By statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2314 applies solely to “goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money.” Thus, in Coleman v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 48 F. App'x 918, *2 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding that easement rights do not fall under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314 or 2315 and therefore there was no predicate criminal activity which could sup- port RICO claim), the court stated that “real property and estates or rights in real property do not fall within the definition of ‘goods, wares, merchandise, securities or money.’ ’’ The court further noted that “an incorporeal, intangible right or privilege to engage in or to

2.89	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
authorize certain activity is not generally considered to be goods, wares, or merchandise.” Id.

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2.90A

TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT GOODS OR SERVICES
18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(1)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2320 makes it a crime for a person to intentionally traffic in goods or services and knowingly use a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods or services.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant trafficked in goods or ser- vices;

Second: That such trafficking was intentional;

Third: That the defendant used a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such goods and services; and

Fourth: That the defendant knew that the mark so used was counterfeit.

“Traffic” means to transport, transfer, or dispose of, to another, for purposes of commercial advantage or private fi	gain, or to import, export, obtain control of, or possess with intent to do transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of.

“Financial gain” includes the receipt, or expected receipt, of anything of value.
Note

The elements of this offense are addressed in United States v. Xu, 599 F.3d 452, 453 (5th Cir. 2010) (addressing the elements and requiring proof of a mark registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Offi and United States v. Hanafy, 302 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2002) (also addressing the exception for “gray market” goods).

2.90	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The definition of “traffic” is found in 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(5).
The defi	of “fi	gain” is found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320(f)(2).
The defi	of “counterfeit mark” is found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320(f)(1). An appropriate definition of this term, considering the particular allegations of the indictment or bill of information, should be provided. Under United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 132–33 (5th Cir. 1989), the “counterfeit mark” requires the “potential to deceive or cause confusion,” but does not require that the jury find actual confusion.

Enhanced penalties are provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b). If the indictment contains an enhancement for serious bodily injury or death, the trial judge should add a fifth element to the charge. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162 (2013); Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2363–66 (2000).
For defenses under the Lanham Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d).

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2.90B

TRAFFICKING IN GOODS OR SERVICES BEARING A COUNTERFEIT MARK LIKELY TO CAUSE CONFUSION, MISTAKE, OR DECEPTION 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(2)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2320 makes it a crime for a person to intentionally traffi in certain goods knowing that a counterfeit mark has been ap- plied thereto that is likely to cause confusion, mistake, or deception.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant traffi in labels, patches, stickers, wrappers, badges, emblems, medal- lions, charms, boxes, containers, cans, cases, hangtags, documentation, or packaging of any type or nature to which a counterfeit mark has been applied;

Second: That the use of the counterfeit mark is likely to cause confusion [to cause mistake] [to deceive];

Third: That the defendant knows that the mark is counterfeit and that its use is likely to cause confusion [to cause mistake] [to deceive]; and
Fourth: That such trafficking was intentional. “Traffic” means to transport, transfer, or dispose of,
to another, for purposes of commercial advantage or private fi	gain, or to import, export, obtain control of, or possess with intent to do transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of.

“Financial gain” includes the receipt, or expected receipt, of anything of value.

2.90B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Note

The elements of this offense are addressed in United States v. Xu, 599 F.3d 452, 453 (5th Cir. 2010) (addressing the elements and requiring proof of a mark registered with the United States Patent and Trademark Offi and United States v. Hanafy, 302 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2002) (also addressing the exception for “gray market” goods).
The definition of “traffic” is found in 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(5).
The defi	of “fi	gain” is found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320(f)(2).
The defi	of “counterfeit mark” is found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320(f)(1). An appropriate definition of this term, considering the particular allegations of the indictment or bill of information, should be provided. Under United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 132–33 (5th Cir. 1989), the “counterfeit mark” requires the “potential to deceive or cause confusion,” but does not require that the jury find actual confusion.

Enhanced penalties are provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b). If the indictment contains an enhancement for serious bodily injury or death, the trial judge should add a fifth element to the charge. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162 (2013); Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2363–66 (2000).
For defenses under the Lanham Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d).

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2.90C

TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT MILITARY GOODS OR SERVICES
18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(3)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2320 makes it a crime for a person to intentionally traffic in counterfeit military goods or services for which the use, malfunc- tion, or failure is likely to cause serious bodily injury or death, the disclosure of classified information, impair- ment of combat operations, or other significant harm to a combat operation, a member of the Armed Forces, or to national security.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant trafficked in goods or ser- vices;

Second: That the defendant knew that such goods or services were counterfeit military goods or services;

Third: That the use, malfunction, or failure of such goods or services was likely to cause serious bodily injury [death] [the disclosure of classified information] [impairment of combat operations] [other signifi harm to a combat operation, a member of the Armed Forces, or to national security]; and
Fourth: That such trafficking was intentional. “Traffic” means to transport, transfer, or dispose of,
to another, for purposes of commercial advantage or private fi	gain, or to import, export, obtain control of, or possess with intent to do transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of.

2.90C	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
“Financial gain” includes the receipt, or expected receipt, of anything of value.

The term “counterfeit military good or service” means a good or service that uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with such good or service and that (A) is falsely identified or labeled as meeting military spec- ifi	or (B) is intended for use in a military or national security application.
Note

The definition of “traffic” is found in 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(5).
The defi	of “fi	gain” is found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320(f)(2).
The definition of “counterfeit military good or service” is found in 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(4).
The defi	of “counterfeit mark” is found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320(f)(1). An appropriate definition of this term, considering the particular allegations of the indictment or bill of information, should be provided. Under United States v. Yamin, 868 F.2d 130, 132–33 (5th Cir. 1989), the “counterfeit mark” requires the “potential to deceive or cause confusion,” but does not require that the jury find actual confusion.

Enhanced penalties are provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b). If the indictment contains an enhancement for serious bodily injury or death, the trial judge should add a fifth element to the charge. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162 (2013); Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2363–66 (2000).
For defenses under the Lanham Act, see 18 U.S.C. § 2320(d).

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2.90D

2.90D

TRAFFICKING IN COUNTERFEIT DRUGS 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a)(4)

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2320 makes it a crime for a person to intentionally traffic in a counter- feit drug.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant trafficked in a counterfeit drug;

Second: That the defendant knew the drug was counterfeit; and
Third: That such trafficking was intentional. “Traffic” means to transport, transfer, or dispose of,
to another, for purposes of commercial advantage or private fi	gain, or to import, export, obtain control of, or possess with intent to do transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of.

“Financial gain” includes the receipt, or expected receipt, of anything of value.

A “counterfeit drug” is a drug, as defined by section 201 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, that uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with the drug. You are instructed that [insert applicable drug name] is such a drug.
Note

The definition of “traffic” is found in 18 U.S.C. § 2320(f)(5).
The defi	of “fi	gain” is found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320(f)(2).

2.90	D	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The defi	of “counterfeit drug” is found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2320(f)(6).

The Committee included the mens rea of “knowingly” in the second element to mirror the drug traffi	instruction. See Instruction No. 2.93. The defi	of “Knowingly” is found in Instruction No. 1.37.

Enhanced penalties are provided for in 18 U.S.C. § 2320(b). If the indictment contains an enhancement for serious bodily injury or death, the trial judge should add a fifth element to the charge. See Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2162 (2013); Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2363–66 (2000).

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ENTICEMENT OF A MINOR 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)

2.91

Title 18, United States Code, Section 2422(b), makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly persuade [induce] [entice] [coerce] [attempt to persuade, induce, entice or coerce] a person under 18 years old to engage in any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with a criminal offense by use of any facility or means of interstate [foreign] commerce [the mail].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly persuaded [induced] [enticed] [coerced] [attempted to persuade, induce, entice or coerce] an individual to engage in any sexual activity, or prostitution, as charged;

Second: That the defendant used the Internet [the mail] [a telephone] [a cell phone] [any facility or means of interstate [foreign] commerce] to do so;

Third: That the defendant believed that such indi- vidual was less than 18 years of age; and

Fourth: That, had the sexual activity actually oc- curred, the defendant could be charged with the crimi- nal off         of ——————————— under the laws of
——————————— (insert state) [the United States].
It is not necessary for the government to prove the individual was in fact less than 18 years of age; but it is necessary for the government to prove the defendant believed such individual to be under that age.

It is not necessary for the government to prove that the individual was actually persuaded [induced] [en-

2.91	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
ticed] [coerced] into engaging in the described sexual activity [prostitution], as long as it proves the defendant intended to persuade [induce] [entice] [coerce] the indi- vidual to engage in some form of unlawful sexual activ- ity with the defendant and knowingly took some action that was a substantial step toward bringing it about. A substantial step is conduct that strongly corroborates the firmness of the defendant's criminal attempt. Mere preparation is not enough.

[“Prostitution” means engaging in or agreeing to or offering to engage in any sexual act with or for another person in exchange for money or other consideration.]

As a matter of law, the following is a crime [are crimes] under state law [federal law]: ——— (describe elements of the crime as alleged in the indictment).
Note

In United States v. Lundy, 676 F.3d 444, 450–51 (5th Cir. 2012), the Fifth Circuit approved instructional language similar to the two paragraphs above beginning with the phrase “[i]t is not necessary.” See also United States v. Wolford, 386 F. App'x 479,
483 (5th Cir. 2010) (a proper jury instruction that states a defendant must believe the person is under 18 years of age “ensures that conviction will not lie where speech is within the bounds of the First Amendment's protections”).

For the elements of the offense, see United States v. Rounds, 749 F.3d 326, 333 (5th Cir. 2014). For a discussion of “substantial step,” see United States v. Howard, 766 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 2014).

For a discussion of an attempted violation of § 2422, see United States v. Broussard, 669 F.3d 537, 547 (5th Cir. 2012). See also United States v. Caudill, 709 F.3d 444, 446 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2871 (2013) (holding that defendant commits a violation of § 2422(b) when he believes he is communicating with a minor child, even if the “minor” is an adult law-enforcement officer pos- ing as a minor); United States v. Olvera, 687 F.3d 645, 647–48 (5th Cir. 2012) (defendant need not communicate directly with the minor victim); United States v. Barlow, 568 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2009) (this statute does not require that sexual contact occur); United States v. Farner, 251 F.3d 510, 513 (5th Cir. 2001).
This section does not require “proof of travel across state

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lines”—instead, it only requires the use of “any facility or means of interstate or foreign commerce” and “it is beyond debate that the Internet and email are facilities or means of interstate commerce.” Barlow, 568 F.3d at 220; see also United States v. D'Andrea, 440 F. App'x 273, 274 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The facility or means of interstate commerce provision is an element of the off but interstate communication is not required by the statute.”).

2.92	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.92

FAILURE TO APPEAR 18 U.S.C. § 3146

Title 18, United States Code, Section 3146, makes it a crime for anyone to knowingly fail to appear in court [surrender for service of sentence] on a required date.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant was previously charged with [convicted of] ——————————— (name crime) in this court;

Second: That the defendant had been released on bond [his own recognizance] by a ——————————— (specify judicial officer) on condition that the defendant appear in court [surrender for service of sentence];

Third: That the defendant thereafter failed to ap- pear [surrender for service of sentence] as required; and

Fourth: That the defendant knew he was required to appear [surrender for service of sentence] on that date and purposefully and knowingly failed to do so.
Note
Under some circumstances, the fourth element of the instruc- tion should be modified. In United States v. Allison, 953 F.2d 870, 876 (5th Cir. 1992), modified on rehearing, 986 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1993), the trial court specifically refused to give the fourth element of the pattern instruction above, and instead substituted language that the defendant did so “willfully.” The Fifth Circuit found that this was appropriate under the facts of the particular case. Id. at 876–77. There, the defendant never received notice because it was mailed to a certain residence from which he had already absconded. Id. at 876. The Fifth Circuit held: “When a defendant purposefully

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engages in a course of conduct designed to prevent him from receiv- ing notice to appear, the conduct will fulfill the willful requirement just as clearly as when he receives and deliberately ignores a no- tice to appear.” Id.
The statutory language itself does not contain a requirement that the defendant act “willfully.” The statute does provide for the affi	defense of “uncontrollable circumstances.” See 18
U.S.C. § 3146(c).

2.93	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.93

CONTROLLED    SUBSTANCES—POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)

Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1), makes it a crime for anyone knowingly or intentionally to possess a controlled substance with intent to distrib- ute it.

——————————— (name controlled substance) is a controlled substance within the meaning of this law.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance;

Second:	That	the	substance	was	in	fact
——————————— (name controlled substance); and
Third: That the defendant possessed the substance with the intent to distribute it.

[Fourth: That the quantity of the substance was at least ——————————— (state quantity).]
To “possess with intent to distribute” simply means to possess with intent to deliver or transfer possession of a controlled substance to another person, with or without any financial interest in the transaction.

[SPECIAL VERDICT FORM FOR FOURTH QUESTION]

[Fourth: With respect to this Count, the amount of the mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of ——————————— (name controlled sub-

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stance) was (indicate answer by checking one line below):

————— (identify amount from § 841(b)(1)(A)) or more.

————— less than ——— (identify amount from
§ 841(b)(1)(A)) but more than ——— (identify amount from § 841(b)(1)(B)).

——————————— less than ————— (identify amount from § 841(b)(1)(B)).
Note

Instruction No. 1.31, defining “Possession,” should be included as needed.

For cases listing the elements of § 841(a)(1), see United States
v. Silva-DeHoyos, 702 F.3d 843, 848 (5th Cir. 2012), United States
v. Pompa, 434 F.3d 800, 806 (5th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Infante, 404 F.3d 376, 385 (5th Cir. 2005).
The fourth element is required when the indictment alleges a quantity that would result in an enhanced penalty under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b). See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000).
Generally, the exact quantity of the controlled substance need not be determined so long as the jury establishes a quantity at or above a given baseline amount in the appropriate subsection of
§ 841(b). Apprendi requires a jury fi		for any fact that increases the maximum statutory sentence a defendant may face. In Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), the Supreme Court extended the Apprendi rule to any fact that increases a statutory mandatory minimum penalty. The Fifth Circuit on multiple occasions has limited the application of Alleyne to statu- tory penalties. See, e.g., United States v. Tuma, 738 F.3d 681, 693 (5th Cir. 2013). Consequently, unless the amount in question would expose a defendant to the possibility of an increase in the maximum penalty or the imposition of or an increase in a manda- tory minimum sentence, no special fi	as to the amount is needed. Items that are merely sentencing factors under the United States Sentencing Guidelines do not require a beyond a reasonable doubt fi	by a jury. See United States v. Rodriguez, 559 F. App'x 332, 333 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Neuner, 535 F. App'x 373, 377 n.3 (5th Cir. 2013). Further, prior convictions, even

2.93	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
those that trigger enhanced penalties, do not require jury findings.
United States v. Wallace, 759 F.3d 486, 497 (5th Cir. 2014).
That being the case, the standard charge that has been sug- gested by the Committee for years should suffice for most cases. Nevertheless, in light of Apprendi and Alleyne, two alternative forms of determining amounts have been included for cases in which the exact delineation of the amount of the controlled substance is desired. If there is a fact dispute, however, as to whether the amount is above or below a particular baseline (e.g., 100 kilograms of marijuana versus 99 kilograms), the court may consider submitting the higher amount in the fourth element, ac- companied by Instruction No. 1.33, Lesser Included Off      for the lower amount. Alternatively, the court may substitute for the fourth element a special interrogatory asking the jury to indicate the total amount of the controlled substance it believes was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Arnold, 416 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 2005) (approving use of special interrogatory).
A fifth jury inquiry will be needed when the indictment alleges a serious bodily injury or death that would result in an enhanced penalty under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Subsections 841(b)(1)(A)-(C) provide enhanced penalties (maximums and mandatory minimums) in cases where “death or serious bodily injury results.” Apprendi and Alleyne require that this element be found by the jury. The statute requires that the death or serious bodily injury “results from” the use of such substance. The Supreme Court has ruled that the causation element requires a “but for” finding by the jury. Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 887 (2014). The Sentenc- ing Guideline enhancement for resulting death or bodily injury (§ 2D1.1(a)(2)) may only be applied when death or serious bodily injury is also part of the crime of conviction. United States v. Greenough, 669 F.3d 567, 575 (5th Cir. 2012).
“The term ‘distribute’ is broader in scope than the term ‘sale,’ ’’ United States v. Brown, 217 F.3d 247 (5th Cir. 2000), and means to deliver, other than by administering or dispensing. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 802(11).
In a marijuana case, if the indictment fails to allege a drug quantity, the default sentencing provision for a conviction is provided by § 841(b)(1)(D). See United States v. Gonzalez, 259 F.3d 355, 359 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Garcia, 242 F.3d 593, 599–600 (5th Cir. 2001)). Further, when a jury is not instructed to find the amount of cocaine base (crack cocaine), the statutory maximum is determined under § 841(b)(1)(C). See United States v. Clinton, 256 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2001); United States
v. Thomas, 246 F.3d 438, 439 (5th Cir. 2001).

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If the evidence warrants, the following instruction may be added:

The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he possessed a controlled substance, but need not prove that the defendant knew what particular controlled substance was involved.

See United States v. Gamez-Gonzalez, 319 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 2003).

“Knowledge” and “intent” are used in their common meaning in the conspiracy and possession statutes and therefore do not require further instruction. See United States v. Cano-Guel, 167 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1999) (“knowledge”); United States v. Sanchez-Sotello, 8 F.3d 202, 212 (5th Cir. 1993) (“knowledge” and “intent”). Intent to distribute may be inferred from a large quantity of illegal narcotics, the value and quality of the drugs, and the pos- session of drug paraphernalia. See United States v. Valdez, 453 F.3d 252, 260 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Cartwright, 6 F.3d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1999)); United States v. Redd, 355 F.3d
866, 873 (5th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Williamson, 533 F.3d 269, 270 (5th Cir. 2008) (intent to distribute could be inferred from possession of digital scales and 90.89 grams of cocaine base). If a “personal use” instruction is appropriate, it should inform “the jury of its task: i.e., to determine whether the quantity is consis- tent with personal use and, if so, to find no inference of an intent to distribute without other evidence.” United States v. Cain, 440 F.3d 672, 674–75 (5th Cir. 2006).

For a discussion on the requisite scienter of “knowledge” in “hidden compartment” cases, see United States v. Mireles, 471 F.3d 551, 556–57 (5th Cir. 2006).

For when to give an instruction on the lesser included offense of simple possession, see United States v. Fitzgerald, 89 F.3d 218, 220–21 (5th Cir. 1996), and United States v. Lucien, 61 F.3d 366,
373–74 (5th Cir. 1995).

For cases discussing when to give an instruction on deliberate ignorance, see United States v. Fuchs, 467 F.3d 889, 901–02 (5th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Freeman, 434 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2005). A deliberate ignorance instruction is found at Instruc- tion No. 1.37A.

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UNLAWFUL USE OF COMMUNICATION FACILITY
21 U.S.C. § 843(b)

Title 21, United States Code, Section 843(b), makes it a crime for anyone knowingly or intentionally to use a communication facility to commit [facilitate the com- mission of] [cause the commission of] a controlled sub- stances offense.
For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly or intention- ally used a “communication facility” as charged; and

Second: That the defendant used the “communica- tion facility” with the intent to commit [facilitate the commission of] [cause the commission of] the felony of- fense of ————— (describe the offense, e.g., possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance), as that offense has been defined in these instructions.

The term “communication facility” means any and all public and private instrumentalities used or useful in the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures, or sounds of all kinds and includes mail, telephone, wire, radio, and all other means of communication.

[To “facilitate” the commission of an offense means to make easier or less difficult, or to aid or assist in the commission of that offense.]
Note

The elements of the offense are discussed in United States v.
Mankins, 135 F.3d 946, 949 (5th Cir. 1998).
The Fifth Circuit has held that a conviction under 21 U.S.C.

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§ 843(b) “requires proof of the underlying [felony] drug offense that the defendant is accused of facilitating, even [if] it is not separately charged. The statute therefore requires that in the course of using a communications facility the defendant must either commit an in- dependent drug crime, or cause or facilitate such a crime.” Id. It is suffi if the defendant's use of the communication facility facilitates either the defendant's own or another person's commis- sion of the offense. United States v. Dixon, 132 F.3d 192, 200 (5th Cir. 1997).

In Abuelhawa v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2102 (2009), the Court held that the defendant did not “facilitate” his drug dealer's sale to him by using his cell phone to make a drug purchase from his dealer. The Court reasoned that when a drug transaction is ar- ranged using a “communications facility” and the seller's part in the transaction is a felony, but the buyer's conduct is only a misde- meanor, the buyer does not “facilitate” the dealer's felony solely because he or she used the communications facility to make the drug purchase. A buyer, who is a necessary party to a sale, cannot both make the transaction possible and at the same time “facili- tate” it, i.e., make it easier. Id. at 2105. The Court said “[t]he com- mon usage . . . limits ‘facilitate’ to the eff of someone other than a primary or necessary actor in the commission of a substan- tive crime . . . .” Id. at 2106.

The Fifth Circuit has held that “[t]here is no statutory require- ment that the indictment specify the drug involved in the offense, nor has our court imposed a jurisprudential one.” United States v. Guerra-Marez, 928 F.2d 665, 675 (5th Cir. 1991). The communica- tions forming the basis of a § 843(b) violation need not specifically refer to the drug trade as long as a reasonable jury could find that the defendant was discussing matters pertaining to the drug off See United States v. Gonzalez-Rodriguez, 966 F.2d 918, 922–23 (5th Cir. 1992).

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CONTROLLED    SUBSTANCES—CONSPIRACY 21 U.S.C. § 846

Title 21, United States Code, Section 846, makes it a crime for anyone to conspire with someone else to commit a violation of certain controlled substances laws of the United States. In this case, the defendant is charged with conspiring to ——————————— (de- scribe the object of the conspiracy as alleged in the indictment, e.g., possess with intent to distribute a con- trolled substance, and give elements of object crime un- less they are given under a diff	count of the indictment).

A “conspiracy” is an agreement between two or more persons to join together to accomplish some unlawful purpose. It is a kind of “partnership in crime” in which each member becomes the agent of every other member.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That two or more persons, directly or indi- rectly, reached an agreement to ——————————— (describe the object of the conspiracy);

Second: That the defendant knew of the unlawful purpose of the agreement;

Third: That the defendant joined in the agreement willfully, that is, with the intent to further its unlawful purpose; and

Fourth: That the overall scope of the conspiracy involved at least ——————————— (describe quantity) of ——————————— (name controlled substance).

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Fifth: That the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the scope of the conspiracy involved at least ——————————— (describe quantity) of ——————————— (name controlled substance).
One may become a member of a conspiracy without knowing all the details of the unlawful scheme or the identities of all the other alleged conspirators. If a defendant understands the unlawful nature of a plan or scheme and knowingly and intentionally joins in that plan or scheme on one occasion, that is suffi to convict him for conspiracy even though the defendant had not participated before and even though the defendant played only a minor part.

The government need not prove that the alleged conspirators entered into any formal agreement, nor that they directly stated between themselves all the details of the scheme. Similarly, the government need not prove that all of the details of the scheme alleged in the indictment were actually agreed upon or carried out, nor must it prove that all of the persons alleged to have been members of the conspiracy were such, or that the alleged conspirators actually succeeded in ac- complishing their unlawful objectives.

Mere presence at the scene of an event, even with knowledge that a crime is being committed, or the mere fact that certain persons may have associated with each other and may have assembled together and discussed common aims and interests, does not necessarily estab- lish proof of the existence of a conspiracy. A person who has no knowledge of a conspiracy, but who happens to act in a way that advances some purpose of a conspir- acy, does not thereby become a conspirator.
Note

This instruction is also applicable to an off	under 21
U.S.C. § 963 with appropriate modifications for a conspiracy alleg- ing importation as the object of the conspiracy.

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If the evidence warrants, the following instruction may be added: “The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he was possessing a controlled substance, but need not prove that the defendant knew what particular con- trolled substance was involved.” See United States v. Gamez- Gonzalez, 319 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 2003). If multiple objects of the conspiracy are charged in the indictment, the jury need not unanimously agree on the object of the conspiracy to convict, though the type of controlled substance will affect sentencing. See United States v. Patino-Prado, 533 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008).

The elements of a drug conspiracy are described in United States v. Vargas-Ocampo, 747 F.3d 299, 303 (5th Cir. 2014) (en banc), United States v. Thompson, 735 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 2013), and United States v. Ochoa, 667 F.3d 643, 648 (5th Cir. 2012).
The fourth element, prompted by the Apprendi doctrine, is required when the indictment alleges a quantity that would result in an enhanced penalty under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000); United States v. Turner, 319
F.3d 716, 721–22 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Clinton, 256
F.3d 311, 314 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. DeLeon, 247 F.3d 593, 597 (5th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit has described the inclu- sion of this fourth element as “preferable,” but not required in all situations. United States v. Daniels, 723 F.3d 562, 574 (5th Cir.), modified in part on reh'g, 729 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2013). Generally, the exact quantity of the controlled substance need not be determined so long as the jury establishes a quantity at or above a given baseline amount in the appropriate subsection of § 841(b). For example, in a marijuana case, if the amount is determined to be at least 100 kilograms, the maximum sentence would be the same  for  any  amount  up  to  999  kilograms.  See  21  U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(vii); DeLeon, 247 F.3d at 597 (holding that an indictment's allegation of a drug-quantity range, as opposed to a precise drug quantity, is suffi to satisfy Apprendi and its progeny). If there is a fact dispute, however, as to whether the amount is above or below a particular baseline (e.g., 100 kilograms of marijuana versus 99 kilograms), the court should consider submitting the higher amount in the fourth element, accompanied by Instruction No. 1.33, Lesser Included Off for the lower amount. Alternatively, the court may substitute for the fourth ele- ment a special interrogatory asking the jury to indicate the total amount of the controlled substance it believes was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Arnold, 416 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 2005) (approving use of special interrogatory). An alterna- tive manner of submitting maximum and minimum amounts of a controlled substance is included in the instructions concerning pos- session with intent to distribute (Instruction No. 2.93) and those may be tailored for use in a conspiracy charge should the court

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find them more desirable. Whatever approach is used, the jury's fi	as to the scope of the overall conspiracy establishes the maximum sentencing range.
In a drug conspiracy, however, two separate fi	are required. One is the quantity involved in the entire conspiracy, and the other is the quantity that each particular defendant knew or should have known was involved in the conspiracy. See United States v. Ruiz, 43 F.3d 985, 990 (5th Cir. 1995), overruled in part
by United States v. Doggett, 230 F.3d 160, 163–64 (5th Cir. 2000) (overruling unrelated sentencing issue); United States v. Puig-Infante, 19 F.3d 929, 942 (5th Cir. 1994); United States v.
Maseratti, 1 F.3d 330, 340 (5th Cir. 1993). In the past, the Com- mittee recommended that the second finding be made by the court as a sentencing factor. That may still be accurate for cases without Apprendi or Alleyne implications. In Alleyne v. United States, 133
S. Ct. 2151 (2013), the Supreme Court applied the Apprendi rule to any fact that increased a mandatory minimum sentence. That being the case, the quantity that each particular defendant knew or reasonably should have known was involved in the conspiracy must be included in any case involving the potential for triggering the application of a mandatory minimum sentence (or a greater mandatory minimum sentence). The Committee, in recognition of this potential, has added a fifth element to be used when the facts of a particular case require such a finding.
“Knowledge” and “intent” are used in their common meaning in the conspiracy and possession statutes and therefore do not require further instruction. See United States v. Cano-Guel, 167 F.3d 900, 906 (5th Cir. 1999) (“knowledge”); United States v. Sanchez-Sotello, 8 F.3d 202, 212 (5th Cir. 1993) “knowledge” and “intent”). Intent to distribute may be inferred from a large quantity of illegal narcotics, the value and quality of the drugs, and the pos- session of drug paraphernalia. See United States v. Valdez, 453 F.3d 252, 260 n.7 (5th Cir. 2006); United States v. Redd, 355 F.3d
866, 873 (5th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Williamson, 533 F.3d 269, 270 (5th Cir. 2008) (intent to distribute could be inferred from possession of digital scales and 90.89 grams of cocaine base). If a “personal use” instruction is appropriate, it should “adequately inform [ ] the jury of its task: i.e., to determine whether the quantity is consistent with personal use and, if so, to find no infer- ence of an intent to distribute without other evidence.” United States v. Cain, 440 F.3d 672, 674–75 (5th Cir. 2006).

Unlike under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, the government need not prove an overt act by the defendants in furtherance of a drug conspiracy. See United States v. Shabani, 115 S. Ct. 382, 383 (1994); United States v. Lewis, 476 F.3d 369,
383 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Turner, 319 F.3d at 721); United States
v. Montgomery, 210 F.3d 446, 449 (5th Cir. 2000).

2.95	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Proof that a defendant is guilty of a conspiracy does not sup- port a conviction that the defendant is guilty of a substantive count charging conduct committed by another conspirator in the absence of a Pinkerton instruction. See United States v. Polk, 56 F.3d 613, 619 (5th Cir. 1995); Instruction No. 2.17, Conspirator's Liability for Substantive Count.

Failure to instruct on the elements of the “object” crime of the conspiracy is at least “serious” error, if not plain error. See United States v. Vaglica, 720 F.2d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1983); see also United
States v. Smithers, 27 F.3d 142, 146 (5th Cir. 1994).

Where evidence at trial indicates that some of the defendants were involved only in separate conspiracies unrelated to the over- all conspiracy charged in the indictment, a defendant is entitled to an instruction on that theory. See United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Stowell, 947 F.2d 1251, 1258 (5th Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Carbajal, 290 F.3d 277, 291 n.25 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cyprian, 197 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that because the defendant made no request, the absence of a multiple conspiracies jury instruction was not “plain error”). See also Instruction No. 2.16, Multiple Conspiracies.

“Proof of the buyer-seller agreement, without more, is not suf- ficient to tie a buyer to a conspiracy.” United States v. Scroggins, 379 F.3d 233, 263 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). So long as the jury instruction given by the trial court accurately reflects the law on conspiracy, however, there need not be a separate instruction on the defense of a “mere buyer-seller relationship.” See United States v. Asibor, 109 F.3d 1023, 1034–35 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
Maseratti, 1 F.3d at 336); United States v. Mata, 517 F.3d 279 (5th Cir. 2008) (specifi approving this instruction as adequate, obviating the need for a specific buyer-seller instruction).

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CONTINUING CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE 21 U.S.C. § 848

2.96

Title 21, United States Code, Section 848, makes it a crime for anyone to engage in a continuing criminal enterprise.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant violated the Controlled Substances Act as charged in Counts ————— of the indictment;

Second: That such violations were part of a continu- ing series of violations, which means at least three violations of the Controlled Substances Act as charged in Counts ——————————— of the indictment. These violations must be connected together as a series of re- lated or ongoing activities as distinguished from isolated and disconnected acts. You must unanimously agree on which of these underlying violations has been proved;

Third: That the defendant obtained substantial income or resources from the series of violations; and

Fourth: That the defendant undertook such viola- tions in concert with five or more other persons with re- spect to whom the defendant occupied a position of organizer, supervisor, or manager. The fi other persons need not have acted at the same time or in concert with each other. You need not unanimously agree on the identity of any other persons acting in concert with the defendant so long as each of you finds that there were five or more such persons.

The term “substantial income or resources” means

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income in money or property that is significant in size or amount as distinguished from some relatively insig- nificant, insubstantial, or trivial amount.

The term “organizer, supervisor, or manager” means that the defendant was more than a fellow worker and that the defendant either organized or directed the activities of five or more other persons. The defendant need not be the only organizer or supervisor, and the “five or more persons” may include persons who are indirectly subordinate to the defendant through an intermediary.

Note

The statute does not state how many violations are required to satisfy the requirement of a “continuing series of violations,” but the Fifth Circuit has determined that at least three predicate felony drug violations are required. See United States v. Hicks, 945 F.2d 107, 108 (5th Cir. 1991). In Richardson v. United States, 119
S. Ct. 1707, 1710 (1999), the Supreme Court assumed, but did not decide, that three predicate violations were required. It further held that jury unanimity is required as to the predicate violations. Id. at 1709, 1713 (holding that each violation in the series is a sep- arate element of the off	and therefore, because “a jury in a federal criminal case cannot convict unless it unanimously fi that the Government has proved each element,” unanimity “in re- spect to each individual violation is necessary.”); see also United States v. Green, 293 F.3d 886, 889 (5th Cir. 2002); Jeffers v. Chandler, 253 F.3d 827, 829 (5th Cir. 2001). Current charges and prior convictions may constitute the requisite predicate violations. See Garrett v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 2407, 2418 (1985).

The jury need not unanimously agree, however, on the identity of the five participants in the fourth element as long as each juror finds there to be five participants. See United States v. Lewis, 476 F.3d 369, 382 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v. Short, 181 F.3d 620, 623–24 (5th Cir. 1999) (contrasting the Richardson case); United States v. Brito, 136 F.3d 397, 408 (5th Cir. 1998). The Richardson opinion assumed, without deciding, that unanimity is not required on this element. 119 S. Ct. at 1713.

The jury may conclude that the defendant managed at least five persons when the persons could be “considered either directly subordinate to [defendant] or indirectly subordinate through a [co-

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defendant].” United States v. Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d 142, 165 (5th Cir. 1998). An innocent participant, however, acting without criminal intent cannot be counted as one of the five individuals in the continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”). See United States v. Fuchs, 467 F.3d 889, 903 (5th Cir. 2006).

The Fifth Circuit has not yet had occasion to decide whether the term “organizer” in § 848 implies some degree of managerial authority, rather than mere coordination of various players. See Lewis, 476 F.3d at 376 (citing Garcia Abrego, 141 F.3d at 167 n.11); Fuchs, 467 F.3d at 903. It is clear, however, that a mere buyer-seller relationship, without additional indicia of control or authority, is insuffi to establish liability under § 848. See Lewis, 476 F.3d at 376–77; United States v. Bass, 310 F.3d 321, 325–26 (5th Cir. 2002). The government need not prove absolute control over “managed” persons; rather, “some evidence that when the defendant gave instructions, they were on some occasions obeyed is necessary to demonstrate indicia of control.” Lewis, 476 F.3d at 378 n.3. The defendant need not have personally exercised control over fi people; rather, it is suffi if the defendant delegates authority to lieutenants and enforcers who do so. See Bass, 310 F.3d at 326–27.
The Supreme Court has held that a § 846 drug conspiracy is a lesser included offense of the CCE. See Jeffers v. United States, 97
S. Ct. 2207, 2219–20 (1997); see also Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241, 1250–51 (1996); Brito, 136 F.3d at 408. A defendant may be indicted for conspiracy and CCE, but may not be sentenced on both charges. See United States v. Tolliver, 61 F.3d 1189, 1223 (5th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds sub nom. by Sterling v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 900 (1996) (vacated only as to defendants who appealed). Except for a drug conspiracy, however, predicate drug off	are not lesser included off	of the continuing criminal enterprise for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy clause and, thus, cumulative punishment for CCE and the predicate substantive offenses is permitted. See Gar- rett, 105 S. Ct. at 2419; United States v. Devine, 934 F.2d 1325, 1342–44 (5th Cir. 1991).

The term “substantial income or resources,” as defined in the instructions, adequately informs the jury, and the district court is not required to supplement its defi	with specifi monetary figures. See Brito, 136 F.3d at 407. The “substantial income” ele- ment is satisfi for example, if many thousands of dollars changed hands, and some was received by the defendant, United States v. Gonzales, 866 F.2d 781, 784 (5th Cir. 1989), or where the defendant had no legitimate income and was able to purchase drugs and finance his living expenses, Lewis, 476 F.3d at 379 (ap-

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plying the Second Circuit standard articulated in United States v. Joyner, 201 F.3d 61, 72 (2d Cir. 2000)).

Section 848(e) is not a penalty enhancement or sentencing provision; rather, it sets forth “an entirely new group of offenses— intentional murders committed during certain specified felonies.” United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 725, 728 (5th Cir. 1992). When the government seeks the death penalty under 21 U.S.C. § 848(e), the Apprendi doctrine requires the submission of additional elements. Furthermore, the statutory defi	of “law enforce- ment officer” may need to be included. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(2).

The increase from a twenty-year mandatory minimum penalty to a thirty-year mandatory minimum penalty in § 848(a) is based on prior convictions. The Fifth Circuit has held both before and af- ter Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), that prior convictions, despite increasing the statutory mandatory minimum, do not require a jury finding. United States v. Wallace, 759 F.3d 486, 497 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Akins, 746 F.3d 590, 611 (5th Cir. 2014), in which the Court rejected defendant's argument that Alleyne required the jury to find a prior conviction beyond a reasonable doubt in order to increase defendant's sentence)). Nevertheless, § 848(b), which imposes life imprison- ment and thus increases the statutory mandatory minimum, will require that the jury find the elements in subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) in order to satisfy the requirements of Alleyne.

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CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES— MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)

2.97

Title 21, United States Code, Section 856(a)(1), makes it a crime for anyone knowingly to open [lease] [rent] [use] [maintain] any place for the purpose of manufacturing [distributing] [using] any controlled substance.

——————————— is a controlled substance within the meaning of this law.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proven the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

That the defendant knowingly and intentionally opened [leased] [rented] [used] [maintained] a place for the purpose of manufacturing [distributing] [using] a controlled substance.

The government is not required to prove that the drug activity was the defendant's primary purpose, only that drug activity was a significant reason why defen- dant opened [leased] [rented] [used] [maintained] the place.

Note

The elements of § 856(a)(1) are discussed in United States v.
Meshack, 225 F.3d 556, 571 (5th Cir. 2000).

It is not required that drug activity be the primary purpose of defendant's opening or maintaining his establishment, only a sig- nifi purpose. See Meshack, 225 F.3d at 571; see also United States v. Aguilar, 237 F. App'x 956, 962 (5th Cir. 2007). The mean- ing of the phrase “the purpose” lies within the common understand- ing of jurors and needs no further defi	See Meshack, 225 F.3d at 571.

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The purpose must be the defendant's; merely maintaining the premises so that others may engage in the manufacture, distribu- tion, or use of any controlled substance is not a violation of
§ 856(a)(1). See United States v. Soto-Silva, 129 F.3d 340, 346 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1990)). For a useful discussion distinguishing the “purpose” requirement between §§ 856(a)(1) and 856(a)(2), see Chen, 913 F.2d at 189–91.

For a useful discussion of the meaning of “maintained,” see United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 855–58 (5th Cir. 1997). The Fifth Circuit has recently reiterated its holding in Morgan “that supervisory control over the premises was merely ‘one factor’ that should be considered probative of maintaining a premises” rather than the “sole determinative factor.” United States v. Cha- goya, 510 F. App'x 327, 328 (5th Cir. 2013). Nevertheless, supervisory control alone has been held to be sufficient to find that a defendant maintained a premises. See United States v. Soto-Silva, 129 F.3d 340, 346 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cooper, 548 F. App'x 114, 116 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing Soto-Silva as holding that supervisory control over the premises may satisfy the maintenance element of the statute). The issue of “whether a person maintained a premises is a fact-intensive issue that must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Soto-Silva, 129 F.3d at 346 (citing Morgan, 117 F.3d at 857). Depending on the evidence, the jury may be instructed on certain factors that would support a finding that a defendant maintained the premises within the scope of § 856(a)(1). In addition to the obvious factors of being the owner, leaseholder, and/or occupier, the Fifth Circuit has also looked at other factors including: access to private areas on the premises, ability to direct the occupants or activities on the premises, the duration of time during which the defendant exercised some supervisory status or connection with the premises, and the number of times the defendant used the premises for drug activities. Sota-Silva, 129 F.3d at 346; Morgan, 117 F.3d at 857.

The Fifth Circuit has held that a deliberate ignorance instruc- tion is inappropriate, and may constitute reversible error, if given in a § 856(a)(1) case. See United States v. Young, 282 F.3d 349, 353 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[A] ‘deliberate ignorance’ instruction was inap- propriate when the only fact at issue is the defendant's own intentions.”); Soto-Silva, 129 F.3d at 344; Chen, 913 F.2d at 190.

For a useful discussion distinguishing the “purpose” require- ment between §§ 856(a)(1) and 856(a)(2), see Chen, 913 F.2d at 189–91.

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2.98

CONTROLLED    SUBSTANCES—UNLAWFUL IMPORTATION
21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a) and 960(a)(1)

Title 21, United States Code, Sections 952(a) and 960(a)(1), make it a crime for anyone knowingly or intentionally to import a controlled substance.

——————————— (name controlled substance) is a controlled substance within the meaning of this law.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant brought (name controlled substance) into the United States from a place outside the United States;

Second: That the defendant knew the substance he was bringing into the United States was a controlled substance; and

Third: That the defendant knew that the substance would enter the United States.

[Fourth: That the quantity of the substance was at least (state quantity).]
Note
The fourth element, prompted by the Apprendi doctrine, is required when the indictment alleges a quantity that would result in an enhanced penalty under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). See, e.g., United States v. Reyes, 300 F.3d 555, 559 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Clinton, 256 F.3d 311, 313–14 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Slaughter, 238 F.3d 580, 583 (5th Cir. 2000) (21 U.S.C. § 846).
Generally, the exact quantity of the controlled substance need not be determined so long as the jury establishes a quantity at or above a given baseline amount in the appropriate subsection of 21

2.98	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
U.S.C. § 960(b). Apprendi requires a jury finding for any fact that increases the maximum statutory sentence a defendant may face. In Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), the Supreme Court extended the Apprendi rule to any fact that increases a statutory mandatory minimum penalty. The Fifth Circuit on multiple occasions has limited the application of Alleyne to statu- tory penalties. See, e.g., United States v. Tuma, 738 F.3d 681, 693 (5th Cir. 2013). Consequently, unless the amount in question would expose a defendant to the possibility of an increase in the maximum penalty or the imposition of or an increase in a manda- tory minimum sentence, no special findings as to the amount are necessary. Items that are merely sentencing factors under the United States Sentencing Guidelines do not require a beyond a reasonable doubt finding by a jury. See United States v. Rodriguez, 559 F. App'x 332, 333 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Neuner, 535
F. App'x 373, 377 n.3 (5th Cir. 2013). Further, prior convictions, even those that trigger enhanced penalties, do not require jury fi	United States v. Wallace, 759 F.3d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 2014).

That being the case, the standard charge that has been sug- gested by the Committee for years should suffice for most cases. Nevertheless, in light of Apprendi and Alleyne, a special verdict form for determining amounts has been included for cases in which a determination of the amount of the controlled substance is desired. If there is a fact dispute, however, as to whether the amount is above or below a particular baseline (e.g., 100 kilograms of marijuana versus 99 kilograms), the court may consider submit- ting the higher amount in the fourth element, accompanied by Instruction No. 1.33, Lesser Included Off	for the lower amount. Alternatively, the court may substitute for the fourth ele- ment a special interrogatory asking the jury to indicate the total amount of the controlled substance it believes was proved beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Arnold, 416 F.3d 349, 356 (5th Cir. 2005) (approving use of special interrogatory).
Although dealing with § 841 instead of §§ 952(a) and 960(b),
United States v. Garcia, 242 F.3d 593, 599–600 (5th Cir. 2001) and
United States v. Thomas, 246 F.3d 438, 439 (5th Cir. 2001) are instructive in determining the default sentencing provision when the indictment fails to allege a drug quantity.

The elements of this offense are discussed in United States v. Morena, 185 F.3d 465, 471 (5th Cir. 1999), in United States v.
Chavez-Ibarra, 494 F. App'x 416, 418 (5th Cir. 2012) and in United
States v. Vazquez, 370 F. App'x 459, 465 (5th Cir. 2010).
If the evidence warrants, the following instruction may be

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2.98

added: “The government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew he possessed a controlled substance, but need not prove that the defendant knew what particular controlled substance was involved.” See United States v. Gamez-Gonzalez, 319 F.3d 695, 700 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v. Restrepo-
Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 527–29 (5th Cir. 1978) (“Although knowl- edge that the substance imported is a particular narcotic need not be proven, 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) is a ‘specifi intent’ statute and requires knowledge that such substance is a controlled substance.”).

For a discussion of the third element, see United States v. Ojebode, 957 F.2d 1218, 1227 (5th Cir. 1992) (indicating that so long as defendant knows he is bringing a controlled substance into the United States, it is not necessary to prove that defendant intended the United States to be the fi destination of the substance).

2.99	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.99

EXPORTING ARMS WITHOUT A LICENSE 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c)

Title 22, United States Code, Section 2778(c), makes it a crime for anyone willfully to export from the United States any defense article which appears on the United States Munitions List without first obtaining a license or written approval from the Department of State.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant exported articles;

Second: That the articles were listed on the United States Munitions List at the time of export;

Third: That the defendant exported the articles without obtaining a license [written approval] from the Department of State; and

Fourth: That the defendant acted “willfully,” that is, that the defendant knew such license [approval] was required for the export of these articles and intended to violate the law by exporting them without such license [approval].
Note

The United States Munitions List is found at 22 C.F.R.
§ 1.21.1.
The statute's requirement of willfulness means that the defendant acted with the specific intent to violate a known legal duty. See United States v. Covarrubias, 94 F.3d 172, 175 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Hernandez, 662 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir. 1981). Evidence that defendant knew he was doing something ille- gal is not enough to show that he knew he was unlawfully export- ing weapons listed on the Munitions List. See Hernandez, 662 F.2d

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2.99

at 292. The defendant is entitled to an instruction on his ignorance of the law in that regard. Id. United States v. Rodriguez, 132 F.3d 208, 212 (5th Cir. 1997), follows the strict scienter rule of Covarru- bias and Hernandez. The Committee recognizes that United States
v. Bryan, 118 S. Ct. 1939 (1998), might not require strict scienter for offenses under the Firearms Owners' Protection Act, but recom- mends that Covarrubias be followed for offenses under 22 U.S.C.
§ 2778, as being a technical statute. For a discussion of the types of written notice that may satisfy the government's burden to prove specifi intent, see United States v. Caldwell, 295 F. App'x 689, 695–96 (5th Cir. 2008).
Actual exportation is not required for a violation of 22 U.S.C.
§ 2778; attempted exportation is also prohibited by the statute. See United States v. Castro-Trevino, 464 F.3d 536, 542 (5th Cir. 2006).

2.100	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.100

RECEIVING OR POSSESSING UNREGISTERED FIREARMS
26 U.S.C. § 5861(d)

Title 26, United States Code, Section 5861(d), makes it a crime for anyone knowingly to possess [receive] certain kinds of unregistered firearms such as
————— (describe firearm in the indictment).
For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly possessed [received] a firearm;

Second: That this firearm was a ————— (describe firearm under § 5845, e.g., shotgun having a barrel of less than 18 inches in length);

Third: That the defendant knew of the characteris- tics of the fi	————— (describe, e.g., a shotgun having a barrel of less than 18 inches in length);

Fourth: That this firearm was [could readily have been put] in operating condition; and

Fifth: That this firearm was not registered to the defendant in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record. It does not matter whether the defendant knew that the firearm was not registered or had to be registered.
Note

The elements of this statute may be found in United States v.
Tovar, 719 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2013).

Firearms are defined by 26 U.S.C. § 5845. This instruction as- sumes that the defendant is charged with possession of a shotgun

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2.100

less than 18 inches in barrel length. Substitute other fi characteristics as necessary.

Section 5861 requires no specific intent or knowledge that a firearm is unregistered. See United States v. Freed, 91 S. Ct. 1112, 1117 (1971); United States v. Moschetta, 673 F.2d 96, 100 (5th Cir.
1982).

The government must prove that the defendant knew of the features or characteristics of the firearm that are within the defi- nition at 26 U.S.C. § 5845. See Rogers v. United States, 118 S. Ct. 673 (1998); Staples v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1793 (1994); United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc). United States v. Reyna, 130 F.3d 104 (5th Cir. 1997), holds that the government is required to prove the defendant had knowledge of the characteristics of the firearm that violate the law.

Each firearm that meets the criteria of § 5861(d) is a unit of prosecution. See United States v. Tarrant, 460 F.2d 701, 702 (5th Cir. 1972).

See United States v. Hooker, 997 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1993), for similar treatment of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (firearms with altered or obliterated serial numbers).

It is not an element that the firearm be registerable. See United States v. Thomas, 15 F.3d 381 (5th Cir. 1994).

The government must prove that the firearm can be operated or readily restored to operating condition. See United States v. Woods, 560 F.2d 660, 664–65 (5th Cir. 1977).
Destructive devices are prosecuted as firearms under 26 U.S.C.
§ 5861(d). See United States v. York, 600 F.3d 347, 354–55 (5th Cir. 2010) (Molotov cocktail is a destructive device); United States
v. Hunn, 344 F. App'x 920, 921 (5th Cir. 2009) (homemade pipe bomb is a destructive device).

2.101	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.101

TAX EVASION 26 U.S.C. § 7201

Title 26, United States Code, Section 7201, makes it a crime for anyone willfully to attempt to evade or defeat the payment of any federal income tax.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That there exists a substantial tax deficiency owed by the defendant to the Internal Revenue Service, as charged;

Second: That the defendant committed at least one affi	act to evade or defeat assessment or pay- ment of the income tax[es] owed. An affi	act includes any conduct the likely effect of which would be to mislead or conceal; and

Third: That the defendant acted willfully, that is, the law imposed a duty on the defendant, the defendant knew of that duty, and the defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.
Note

For a list of elements, see United States v. Miller, 588 F.3d 897, 907 (5th Cir. 2009) (listing the elements as: “(1) existence of a tax deficiency; (2) an affirmative act constituting an evasion or an attempted evasion of the tax; and (3) willfulness.”); United States
v. Nolen, 472 F.3d 362, 377 (5th Cir. 2006); see also Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 1166, 1174 (2012); Boulware v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1168 (2008); Sansone v. United States, 85 S. Ct. 1004, 1010 (1965).
Accordingly, there must be a tax defi	meaning the government must prove taxes are actually owed beyond a reason- able doubt. See Boulware, 128 S. Ct. at 1172, 1178 (“Without the defi	there is nothing but some act expressing the will to

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2.101

evade, and, under § 7201, acting on ‘bad intentions, alone [is] not punishable.’ ’’).

There is a split of authority within this circuit on whether the deficiency must be substantial. See, e.g., Miller, 588 F.3d at 907; United States v. Masat, 896 F.2d 88, 97 (5th Cir. 1990). No recent Fifth Circuit cases have addressed the issue, though at least one court has held that “[t]he government need not prove the exact income alleged in the indictment nor evasion of the entire tax charged, so long as it is shown that a substantial portion of tax was evaded.” United States v. Parr, 509 F.2d 1381, 1385–86 (5th Cir. 1975). The Supreme Court recognizes the split of authority be- tween the circuits but has not addressed the issue. See Boulware, 128 S. Ct. at 1172 n.2; Sansone, 85 S. Ct. at 1010.
The government must prove an affirmative act and cannot rely upon a failure to act or failure to file a tax return, even if that fail- ure was willful. See Spies v. United States, 63 S. Ct. 364, 368 (1943); Nolen, 472 F.3d at 379–81; Masat, 896 F.2d at 97–99. An
affi	act includes “any conduct, the likely eff of which would be to mislead or to conceal.” Spies, 63 S. Ct. at 368. There are two possible routes of conduct under this statute: evading or defeating the payment of tax and evading or defeating the assess- ment of a tax. See Kawashima, 132 S. Ct. at 1175. Where the act alleged involves something other than filing a false tax return, the above instruction must be adapted to make sufficiently clear to the jury that an affi	act is required. See Nolen, 472 F.3d at 378–81; Masat, 896 F.2d at 99; see also United States v. Jones, 459 F. App'x 379, *2, *6 (5th Cir. 2012).
The third element, willfulness, has been defined in the context of tax offenses as the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty. See Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 609–11 (1991); United States v. Pomponio, 97 S. Ct. 22, 23–24 (1976); Miller, 588 F.3d at 907 (“To prove willfulness, the third element, the government must show that: (1) the law imposed a duty on the defendant; (2) the defendant knew of that duty; and (3) the defendant voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.”); United States v. Burton, 737 F.2d 439, 441 (5th Cir. 1984).
Good faith is a defense to willfulness, even if that good faith belief is objectively unreasonable. See Cheek, 11 S. Ct. at 609–12; United States v. Wisenbaker, 14 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1994). However, “a defendant's good-faith belief that the tax laws are un- constitutional or otherwise invalid” will not negate willfulness. United States v. Simkanin, 420 F.3d 397, 410 (5th Cir. 2005); see
also Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 612–13; Burton, 737 F.2d at 440.
A supplemental instruction on the good faith defense was not

2.101	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
required in a case where the judge charged additional language on willfulness:

The jury was instructed that respondents were not guilty of violating [§ ]7206(1) unless they had signed the tax returns know- ing them to be false, and had done so willfully. A willful act was defined in the instructions as one done ‘voluntarily and intention- ally and with the specifi intent to do something which the law forbids, that is to say with (the) bad purpose either to disobey or to disregard the law.’ Finally, the jury was instructed that ‘(g)ood motive alone is never a defense where the act done or omitted is a crime,’ and that consequently motive was irrelevant except as it bore on intent.

Pomponio, 97 S. Ct. at 23–24. In Simkanin, the Fifth Circuit held that an additional instruction on good faith was not required when the district court instructed jurors that “[t]o act willfully means to act voluntarily and deliberately and intending to violate a known legal duty.” 420 F.3d at 409–11. Consequently, if there is evidence that the defendant had a good faith belief that he was not violating the provisions of the tax laws, some courts include a good faith instruction.

The Fifth Circuit approved an instruction on the good faith defense to tax evasion in Masat, 948 F.2d at 931 n.15. See also Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 610–11 (“[I]f the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has satisfi the knowledge component of the willfulness requirement. But carrying this burden requires negating a defendant's claim of ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law, he had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any of the provisions of the tax laws. This is so because one cannot be aware that the law imposes a duty upon him and yet be ignorant of it, misunderstand the law, or believe that the duty does not exist.”); United States v. Doyle, 956 F.2d 73, 75–76 (5th Cir. 1992).

For further discussion on instructions regarding “willfulness,” see United States v. MacHauer, 403 F. App'x 967, *4 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Barnett, 945 F.2d 1296, 1298–99 (5th Cir.
1991).

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.102A

2.102A

FALSE STATEMENTS ON INCOME TAX RETURN
26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)

Title 26, United States Code, Section 7206(1), makes it a crime for anyone willfully to make a false material statement on an income tax return.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant signed an income tax return that contained a written declaration that it was made under penalties of perjury;

Second: That in this return the defendant falsely stated that ——————————— (state material matters asserted, e.g., the defendant received gross income of
——————————— during the year —————);
Third: That the defendant knew the statement was false;

Fourth: That the false statement was material; and

Fifth: That the defendant made the statement will- fully, that is, with intent to violate a known legal duty.

A statement is “material” if it has a natural ten- dency to infl	or is capable of infl	the Internal Revenue Service in investigating or auditing a tax return or in verifying or monitoring the reporting of income by a taxpayer.
Note

For a list of the elements, see United States v. Jones, 459 F. App'x 379, 384 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding the elements were sup-

2.102	A	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
ported by the facts: “(1) Jones made and signed a false return; (2) a false entry was material; (3) the return contained a written dec- laration that it was made under the penalties of perjury; (4) Jones did not believe the return was true and correct when he signed it; and (5) he signed it willfully and with specific intent to violate the law). See also United States v. Bishop, 264 F.3d 535, 552 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Loe, 262 F.3d 427, 435 n.5 (5th Cir. 2001),
and United States v. Mann, 161 F.3d 840, 848 (5th Cir. 1998).

If the indictment involves a statement or document other than an income tax return, then tailor the instruction accordingly. See United States v. Clayton, 506 F.3d 405, 413 (5th Cir. 2007) (hold- ing that other forms and certain schedules may give rise to liability).

Where the indictment charges the defendant with a material omission, the second element must be modified to show what the return failed to state.

The defi	of “material” is discussed in Neder v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 1827, 1837 (1999). In Neder, the Supreme Court acknowledged that materiality is an essential element of this crime and that the defendant has a constitutional right to have that is- sue submitted to the jury. Id. But the Supreme Court determined that the failure to submit the issue of materiality to the jury is not a “structural” error that requires reversal of a conviction but, instead, an error that is subject to the harmless error rule articulated in Chapman v. California, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967). Id. Under the unique facts of the case, the Neder Court then held that the district court's failure to submit the element of materiality to the jury with respect to the tax charges was harmless error. Id. at 1833, 1837.

Willfulness, as it relates to tax offenses, is defined as the “vol- untary, intentional violation of a known legal duty.” Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604, 610 (1991); see United States v.
Charroux, 3 F.3d 827, 831 (5th Cir. 1993); see also United States v.
Simkanin, 420 F.3d 397, 404, 410–11 (5th Cir. 2005); United States
v. Montgomery, 747 F.3d 303, 308–10 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that mentioning Cheek's good-faith defense in a jury instruction requires further explanation that the “defendant's good-faith belief need not be objectively reasonable”). See also Instruction No. 1.38, “Willfully”—To Act.

Under certain circumstances, reliance on a qualifi tax preparer is an affirmative defense to a charge of willful filing of a false tax return. See Loe, 248 F.3d at 469; Charroux, 3 F.3d at 831; United States v. Wilson, 887 F.2d 69, 73 (5th Cir. 1989); see also

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.102A

United States v. Masat, 948 F.2d 923, 930 (5th Cir. 1991) (to estab- lish reliance as a defense, defendant must show: (1) he relied in good faith on a professional; and (2) he made complete disclosures of all the relevant facts).

2.102	B	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.102B

AIDING OR ASSISTING IN PREPARATION OF FALSE DOCUMENTS UNDER INTERNAL REVENUE LAWS
26 U.S.C. § 7206(2)

Title 26, United States Code, Section 7206(2), makes it a crime for anyone willfully to aid or assist in the preparation of a document, under the internal reve- nue laws, that is false or fraudulent as to any material matter.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant aided in [assisted in] [procured] [counseled] [advised] the preparation [pre- sentation] of a return [an affi	[a claim] arising under [in connection with any matter arising under] the internal revenue laws;

Second: That this return [affidavit] [claim] falsely [fraudulently] stated that ——————————— (state
material matters asserted, e.g., ——————————— received a gross income of ——————————— during the year —————);
Third: That the defendant knew that the statement in the return [affidavit] [claim] was false [fraudulent];

Fourth: That the false [fraudulent] statement was material; and

Fifth: That the defendant aided in [assisted in] [procured] [counseled] [advised] the preparation [pre- sentation] of this false [fraudulent] statement willfully, that is, with intent to violate a known legal duty.

It is not necessary that the government prove that

SUBSTANTIVE OFFENSE INSTRUCTIONS

2.102B

the falsity or fraud was with the knowledge or consent of the person authorized or required to present such return [claim] [affidavit] [document].

A statement is “material” if it has a natural ten- dency to infl	or is capable of infl	the Internal Revenue Service in investigating or auditing a tax return or in verifying or monitoring the reporting of income by a taxpayer.
Note

See Note to False Statements On Income Tax Return, Instruc- tion No. 2.102A.

The elements of this offense are discussed in United States v. Clark, 139 F.3d 485, 489 (5th Cir. 1998) and United States v.
Coveney, 995 F.2d 578, 588 (5th Cir. 1993). See also United States
v. Mudekunye, 646 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that the defendant does not need to file the return); United States v. Clark, 577 F.3d 273, 285 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding that the defendant need not sign or prepare return to conspire or aid and abet filing of false return; statute reaches all knowing participants in the fraud).
Where the indictment charges the defendant with a material omission, the second element must be modified to show what the return failed to state.

A person need not actually sign or prepare a tax return in or- der to be guilty of willfully aiding and assisting in the preparation of false returns. See Coveney, 995 F.2d at 588; United States v. Bryan, 896 F.2d 68 (5th Cir. 1990). In Bryan, the Fifth Circuit held that the following conduct in promoting fraudulent tax shelters was suffi to support the defendants' convictions: speaking at seminars to generate clients for the scheme, participat- ing in the decision to create an offshore corporation for the assign- ment of losses and gains so as to create taxable losses on paper, discussing how to avoid discovery, and discussing various methods to secretly return offshore gains to clients. 896 F.2d at 72–75.

See Instruction No. 1.38 for a discussion of the word “willfully.”

2.103	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.103

REPORTS ON EXPORTING AND IMPORTING MONETARY INSTRUMENTS
31 U.S.C. § 5316(a)(1)

Title 31, United States Code, Section 5316(a)(1), makes it a crime for anyone intentionally to fail to report the exporting [importing] of monetary instru- ments of more than $10,000 at one time.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly transported [was  about  to  transport]  more  than  $10,000  in
——————————— (describe the alleged monetary instrument, e.g., currency) at one time from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United States [to a place in the United States from or through a place outside the United States];

Second: That the defendant knew that he had a legal duty to file a report of more than $10,000 trans- ported; and

Third: That the defendant knowingly failed to file the report, with intent to violate the law.

[Fourth: That the defendant willfully violated this law while violating another law of the United States, specifically ————— (describe the law mentioned in the indictment) [as part of a pattern of illegal activity involving more than $100,000 in a 12-month period].]
Note

The fourth element, prompted by the Apprendi doctrine, is required when the indictment alleges facts which would result in an enhanced penalty under 31 U.S.C. § 5322. See Apprendi v. New

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2.103

Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362–63 (2000). To convict under this stat- ute, the government must prove that “the defendant had actual knowledge of the currency reporting requirement and voluntarily and intentionally violated that known legal duty.” United States v. O'Banion, 943 F.2d 1422, 1426–27 (5th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). This offense can be committed through structuring. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3) and (b). Instruction No. 2.104, Structuring Transactions to Evade Reporting Requirements, must then be adjusted accordingly. Use definitions in 31 U.S.C. § 5312, if needed in a particular case.

2.104	PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
2.104

STRUCTURING TRANSACTIONS TO EVADE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3)

Title 31, United States Code, Section 5324(a)(3), makes it a crime for anyone to structure [attempt to structure] [assist in structuring] any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions in order to evade the reporting requirements of or any regulation prescribed under section 5313(a) of Title 31 of the United States Code.

Section 5313(a) and its implementing regulations require the fi of a government form called a Cur- rency Transaction Report (CTR). Those regulations require that every domestic financial institution which engages in a currency transaction of more than $10,000 must fi a report with the Internal Revenue Service furnishing, among other things, the identity and ad- dress of the person engaging in the transaction, the person or entity, if any, for whom he is acting, and the amount of the currency transaction. The CTR must be filed within fifteen (15) days of the transaction.

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knew of the domestic financial institution's legal obligation to report transac- tions in excess of $10,000;

Second: That the defendant knowingly structured [attempted to structure] [assisted in structuring] a cur- rency transaction; and

Third: That the purpose of the structured transac- tion was to evade that reporting obligation.

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[Fourth: That the defendant violated this law while violating another law of the United States, specifically
————— (describe the law mentioned in the indictment) [as part of a pattern of illegal activity involving more than $100,000 in a 12-month period].]

A person structures a transaction if that person, acting alone or with others, conducts one or more cur- rency transactions in any amount, at one or more fi	institutions, on one or more days, for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements de- scribed earlier. Structuring includes breaking down a single sum of currency exceeding $10,000 into smaller sums, or conducting a series of currency transactions, including transactions at or below $10,000. Illegal structuring can exist even if no transaction exceeded
$10,000 at any single financial institution on any single day.

The government need not prove that a defendant knew that structuring a transaction to avoid triggering the fi requirements was itself illegal. The govern- ment need only prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant structured [assisted in structuring] [at- tempted to structure] currency transactions with knowl- edge of the reporting requirements.
Note
The fourth element, prompted by the Apprendi doctrine, is required when the indictment alleges facts that would result in an enhanced penalty under 31 U.S.C. § 5324(c). See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362–63 (2000).
This instruction is based on a charge of structuring to avoid the requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a). The structuring statute can also be used with other reporting statutes, e.g., 12 U.S.C.
§§ 1829(b) and 1953, or 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316, 5325, and 5326, and these instructions would have to be adjusted accordingly.
If the case involves monetary instruments other than cur- rency, substitute appropriate term. See the definition of “monetary instruments” and other pertinent definitions in 31 U.S.C. § 5312.

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If the evidence is that the bank fi the CTR as required, then the judge may instruct the jury that the defendant may still be found guilty of this offense even if the bank properly filed the CTR.

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BULK CASH SMUGGLING 31 U.S.C. § 5332(a)

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Title 31, United States Code, Section 5332(a) makes it a crime for anyone, with the intent to evade a cur- rency reporting requirement, to knowingly conceal more than $10,000 in currency [other monetary instruments] and transport [transfer] [attempt to transport] [attempt to transfer] such currency [monetary instrument] from a place within the United States to a place outside the United States [from a place outside the United States to a place within the United States].

For you to find the defendant guilty of this crime, you must be convinced that the government has proved each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

First: That the defendant knowingly concealed more than $10,000 in ————— (specify monetary instrument) on his or her person [in any conveyance, article of luggage, merchandise or other container];

Second: That the defendant transported [attempted to transport] [transferred] [attempted to transfer] the
————— (specify monetary instrument) from a place within the United States to a place outside the United States [from a place outside the United States to a place within the United States];

Third: That the defendant knew that a report was required to be filed with the Secretary of Treasury for the transport [attempted transport] [transfer] [at- tempted transfer] of amounts $10,000 or greater; and

Fourth: That the defendant intended to evade filing such a report.

The intent to evade the reporting requirement can arise at any time prior to (and including) the moment

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of [attempted] transportation [transfer] [attempted transfer]. It is not necessary that the defendant have such intent at the time the concealment occurred.

The currency [other monetary instrument] need not be unlawfully derived. In other words, the Govern- ment does not have to prove that the defendant trans- ported [attempted to transport] [transferred] [at- tempted to transfer] illicit funds.
Note

Section 5332 does not require that the defendant have the intent to evade the reporting requirement at the time the actual concealment of currency occurs. United States v. Tatoyan, 474 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2007). Instead, the defendant can form the intent to evade reporting requirements at any time prior to or dur- ing the moment of the transport. Id. “Concealment is simply one part of a continuous course of conduct, at any stage of which the requisite intent can be formed.” Id.
For a discussion of the knowledge element of § 5332, see United States v. Salazar, 223 F. App'x 424, 427–28 (5th Cir. 2007).

31 U.S.C. § 5322 provides for additional penalties above and beyond the penalties already contained in each section of Chapter 31 if a defendant is found to have acted willfully. The penalties set forth in § 5322—for example, a fine of up to $250,000—do not ap- ply unless the jury makes an additional explicit finding that the defendant acted “willfully.” Tatoyan, 474 F.3d at 1180. That the jury must find a willful violation before a defendant's penalties are enhanced also comports with Southern Union Co. v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012), Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151
(2013), and Apprendi v. New Jersey, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). If penalties are sought under § 5322(a), the fourth element should be revised as follows:
Fourth: That the defendant willfully intended to evade filing such a report.

Absent such a finding, the applicable penalties are found in 31
U.S.C. § 5332(b) and include a forfeiture provision, but not a fine. Id. The fourth element will need to be revised if there is an enhancement under 18 U.S.C. § 5322(b).
Section 5332 encompasses both the transportation of illicit funds and the “mere transportation of lawfully derived proceeds.”

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See Cuellar v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 1994, 2001–02 (2008) (distinguishing the conduct targeted in the money laundering stat- ute with the conduct that § 5332 targets and holding that the lat- ter statute punishes the transportation of lawfully derived funds).